Religious Tolerance to Adherents of Islam and Hinduism in Kongkong Village

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ABSTRACT

Background: Indonesia is well-known for its plurality of people, either in terms of ethnic cultures or religions and beliefs. The diversity of the Indonesian nation can be viewed as one of the means to strengthen the unity of the nation by always developing tolerant and respectful attitude toward each other. Currently, the diversity existing in Indonesia tends to cause many conflicts due to people are less able to view the existing equation and to appreciate the differences in society. In Semarang City, (Indonesia) there is a plurality of cultures and religions, precisely at the Kongkong Village, Ngadirgo District, Mijensub district. That most of the population is Hindu. By the occurred conflict, the urgent need to be noticed by the Indonesian people is to redefine the appropriate attitude of diversity within a plural society. One way that should be developed to foster harmony among plural religious adherents as in Indonesia is to develop tolerance among religious adherents. Religious tolerance is an attitude of accepting the presence of others which differ on faiths and respecting others’ beliefs even if he/she does not agree with them. Methodology: The population in this study is the citizens of Kongkong Village, Mijen Subdistrict, Semarang City, and Central Java, Indonesia who are Moslem and Hindu from 15-50 years of age. The samples of 157 people in this study were taken by using purposive sampling technique. The religious tolerance scale used in this study is partly an adaptation of the religious tolerance scale compiled by Walt et al in 2014 and partly compiled by researchers with a benchmark of religious tolerance dimensions by Walt (2014). Result: There is no significant difference in religious tolerance between Islamic and Hindu subjects in Kongkong Village.

Keywords: Religious Tolerance, Islam, Hinduism
Malay, Madurese, and many more are scattered over the islands. In addition, there is also religious pluralism in Indonesia. There are five recognized religions: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Kong Hu Chu's creed.

The diversity of the Indonesian nation can be viewed as one of the means to strengthen the unity of the nation by always developing tolerant and respectful attitude toward each other. Currently, the diversity existing in Indonesia tends to cause many conflicts due to people are less able to view the existing equation and to appreciate the differences in society. For instance, a religious conflict between villagers of Karang Gayam and Buluran, Sampang, East Java, on August 26th, 2012 that happened again (Liputan 6, 2015). Interreligious conflict also happened in Aceh on October 18th, 2015, namely the combustion of a place of worship in Aceh Singkil, on Tuesday afternoon October 12th, 2015. Hundreds of people involved a riot which broke out in Dangguran Village, Simpang Kanan District, Aceh Singkil Regency, Aceh Province. The masses protested against the construction of place of worship that was considered to be unlicensed (Liputan6, 2012). Religion is frequently the most sensitive tangent point in the plural society. Each side claims that he is the right one, while the other is wrong. The perception that difference is either a bad thing or a frightening thing, is so ingrained in the soul of the religious community (ethnocentrism).

According to Nasih & Agung (2011), the results of their research “Harmonisasi RelasiSosial Umat Muslim dan Hindu di Malang Raya” (Harmonization of Social Relations of Moslems and Hindus in Great Malang) indicates that the fundamental thing which causes a harmonious relationship between them was the mutual understanding and tolerance, and the agreement of social system without sacrificing their respective faiths. In addition, Faridah (2013) also revealed about the influence of religious tolerance to social interaction of the community through the results of her research “Toleransi Antarumat Beragama Masyarakat Perumahan” (Interreligious Tolerance of Housing Society), that the form of tolerance done by religious citizens was religious tolerance and social tolerance. Factors that influence the tolerance among religious citizens consist of both driving factors and inhibiting factors. The driving factors include a firm principle of harmony and respect, and a high solidarity among the people while the inhibiting factors include conflicts such as competition and suspicion of other religious people. By the research of Nisvilyah (2013) entitled "Interreligious Tolerance in Strengthening Unity and Nation (Case Study of Moslems and Christians of Segaran Hamlet, Dlanggu Subdistrict of Mojokerto Regency)" shows that the fundamental values of the bases of religious tolerance, normatively include religious value and cultural values while empirically include (1) humanitarian value; (2) nationalism value; (3) historical value; (4) exemplary value of community leaders; and (5) value of patience.

In Semarang City, Indonesia, there is a plurality of cultures and religions, precisely at the Kongkong Village, Ngadirgo District, Mijensubdistrict. That most of the population is Hindu. In Kongkong Village there are two temples, namely Pura Buana Mandala and Pura Setya Darma, which is divided into two groups. People who have different religious backgrounds
help each other in the construction of places of worship. According to preliminary data (November 9, 2014), the village elder said, "They are different (people who do the work of devotion), anyone who wanted to help ". Since the Hindu community as a minority, and Moslems as the majority, conflict arises. According to preliminary data (November 9th, 2014), the village elder said, "Indeed, there are differences, it depends on each person, for example, when the village chief was a Hindu, he embraced all citizens, but now the village chief does not, even he tends to be fanatic, I don’t mean to speak ill of him, I just tell the fact"

By the occurred conflict, the urgent need to be noticed by the Indonesian people is to redefine the appropriate attitude of diversity within a plural society. One way that should be developed to foster harmony among plural religious adherents as in Indonesia is to develop tolerance among religious adherents.

According to Borba (2008), tolerance is an attitude to appreciate each other without differentiating tribes, genders, appearances, cultures, beliefs, abilities, and sex orientations. Allport (1954) gave limitation to the tolerance that is someone’s friendly and confidence attitude toward other people without considering others’ origin. This tolerance manifestation is a kind of someone’s attitude that can accept someone else, so that, religious tolerance is a kind of someone’s attitude to accept and respect the presence of other person with different religion although he/she do not agree with other’s faith. Another word of tolerance is *tasamuh*. Hasyim (1979) stated that *tasamuh* means a kind of someone’s attitude who can be broad minded and also can respect to the others. To create a harmonious life, it does not mean that it needs to integrate a certain faiths with other ones (Syncretism). While religious life in harmony includes respecting and helping each other in the society.

Tolerance could happen in several forms, such as conformity tolerance, character conditioning tolerance, militant tolerance, passive tolerance, liberalism tolerance, radicalism tolerance (Allport, 1954). Tolerance is a complex topic. Therefore, to understand the tolerance, it needs to notice tolerance dimensions proposed by Walt (2014). This research focuses on the: (1) personal fish-bowl; (2) expectancy filters; (3) the radical centre of values; (4) the expectancy filters of value orientation; (5) relative value of emptiness; (6) tendency toward total tolerance; (7) the technicalities of religious and world view tolerance; (8) same further technical distinction; (9) toleration approach; (10) willingness to enter into social contract; (11) a healthy modus vivendi; (12) grand narratives and the new spirituality. Allport (1954) explained that many factors influence someone’s tolerance are the results from the interaction factor with the same direction. The outline of the tolerance could be classified into three main factors, namely the early life, education, and empathy.

**METHODOLOGY**

**Sample**

The populations in this research were Moslems and Hindus in Kongkong Village at the age of 15-50 years. This village is located in Ngadirgo sub-district of Mijen districts, Semarang,
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Central Java, Indonesia. The populations in this research were 274 men and women of Kongkong villagers. This research sample as much as 157 people were taken using Purposive sampling technique. The sample characteristics used in this research were as follows:

a. Male and/or Female.
b. Age of 15-50 years
c. Kongkong villagers
d. Moslem or Hindu

**Instruments**

The method to obtain the data used in this research was one of the psychology scales, which was the religious tolerance scale.

1. **Religious Tolerance Scale:** Some parts of religion tolerance scale used in this research was the adaptation one arranged by Walt et al in 2014 and also some parts of it were arranged by researchers based on the dimensions of religious tolerance asserted by Walt (2014). There are two item variations in this scale, namely favourable and unfavourable items. Responses options used in this scale were Very Relevant (VR), Relevant (R), Not Relevant (NR), and Very Not Relevant (VNR). Item format used in this research was statements-responses. The Validity Test was done using Product Moment technique from Pearson on software app. Then, there were obtained 43 valid items. To measure the reliability, the researchers used Alpha Crombach formula on the statistics software app. From the reability test, it was obtained the Coefficient Reliability Instrument with as much as 0.899. Therefore, it could be declared as reliable instrument.

**Procedure**

First stage in doing this research was permission process in order to ease the research conduction so that it can meet the goals. After that, the process of collecting data was done using religious tolerance scale on 157 Kongkong villagers. There were 157 booklet were shared by researchers on the every house of Moslem and Hindu who meet the determined requirements. Next, scoring and tabulation were done on the scale that has been filled by the respondents.

**RESULTS**

The data analysis to see if there is the distinction in the religious tolerance, used is Wilcoxon Mann Whitney Test (the difference among groups), due to this research aimed to know whether or not there is the difference religion tolerance.

| Table 1. Summary of the distribution of religious tolerance |
|-------------|---------|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| Category    | Score Interval | Interval | Criteria | F     | Percentage |
| Moslem      | $\mu + 1\sigma \leq X$ | $129 \leq X$ | High   | 81    | 77.1%    |
|             | $\mu - 1\sigma \leq X < \mu + 1\sigma$ | $86 \leq X < 129$ | Medium | 24    | 22.9%    |
|             | $X < \mu - 1\sigma$ | $X < 86$ | Low    | 0     | 0%       |
| Hindu       | $\mu + 1\sigma \leq X$ | $129 \leq X$ | High   | 35    | 67.3%    |
|             | $\mu - 1\sigma \leq X < \mu + 1\sigma$ | $86 \leq X < 129$ | Medium | 17    | 32.7%    |
|             | $X < \mu - 1\sigma$ | $X < 86$ | Low    | 0     | 0%       |
| General     | $\mu + 1\sigma \leq X$ | $129 \leq X$ | High   | 116   | 73.8%    |
|             | $\mu - 1\sigma \leq X < \mu + 1\sigma$ | $86 \leq X < 129$ | Medium | 41    | 26.2%    |
|             | $X < \mu - 1\sigma$ | $X < 86$ | Low    | 0     | 0%       |
Based on table 1, it could be known that the religious tolerance on the Moslem is in the high category as much as 77.1% while the religious tolerance on Hindu is also in the high category, as much as 67.3%. Thus, the religious tolerance of Kongkong villagers in general is in the high category, which is as much as 78.8%.

**Table 2. The result of the differentiation of religious tolerance test between Moslem and Hindu subjects [Test Statistics*]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Statistics*</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mann-Whitney U</td>
<td>2209.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilcoxon W</td>
<td>3587.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>-1.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on table 2, it could be known that both Moslem and Hindu subjects have Sig value with as much as 0.052. Due to the Sig value is 0.054 > 0.05, it could be declared that there is no significant difference between Moslem and Hindu subjects.

**Table 3. Result of religious tolerance differentiation test based on gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Samples Test*</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on table 3, it could be known that both male and female subjects have Sig value as much as 0.957. Due to the Sig value is 0.957 > 0.05, it could be declared that there is no significant difference between male and female subjects.

According to the result of calculation on the Moslem subjects, the highest result of the religious tolerance dimension is tendency toward total tolerance dimension that is as much as 90.4%. Based on Bennett (in Walt, 2014) there are six attitudes related to the religion, namely rejecting, distinction, building defense to the difference, difference minimization, accepting difference, adapting to difference, and integrating to the difference. Based on the Kongkong
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Moslem villagers’ responses, they belong to the subject who can accept differences. They approve and appreciate religious difference on in the case of life value and behaviours. They actively build the inter-religion communication and integrate with different beliefs.

While on the Hindu subjects, the highest result on the religious tolerance dimension is Expectancy Filters dimensions which is as much as 96.1%. The perspective of Kongkong Hindu villager is balance enough. They are not afraid to socialize in the society. They also trust to the others and belong to the open-minded people. According to Olthuis (in Walt, 2014) psychology scientists identify at least there are four Expectancy filters, namely: Secure filter, Pre-occupied filter, dismissing filter, and Fearful filter. In this research, the villagers apply Secure filter. It means they could trust enough to the other person; they are open-minded thinking as well. And also, it may be due to the same thinking way of religion figures in Kongkong village.

DISCUSSION

Generally, religious tolerance in Moslem is in high category similar with Hindu. Tolerance is really needed in Indonesia which is a plural country. Kongkong Village is one of heterogenous villages consists of various religions. Therefore, the religious tolerance is really needed in enduring the social life.

Tolerance is the basic prerequisite between groups constructively. Verkuyten & Slooterin Mashuri et al. 2014). Talib et al. (2013) explained that tolerance is about the balance that needs the action between two sides to decide the result needed based on the agreement. The essential point in religious tolerance as a behaviour of desire to approve the religious difference in plural society without any prejudice or discrimination even though one of them has the power to refuse or deny to reach the prosperity and harmony in society (Talib, 2013). Tolerance is not about equality, justice, or neutrality. It is about how to manage the social relationship to prevent the tension between two sides or more in a disagreement situation.

Based on the result of study and consideration, it is known that the significant standard p= 0.052. Because p > 0.05, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference in religious tolerance between Moslem and Hindu in Kongkong Village. The result study which stated that there is no significant difference in religious tolerance between Moslem and Hindu in Kongkong Village is agree with the result of study conducted by Nasih & Agung (2011) that Hindu in Malang Raya is a minority in which most of them live in rural area. The relationship between Moslem which is majority and Hindu has run well so far. The basic thing for this is that there is an understanding and tolerance between them, and the social system agreed without sacrificing their own beliefs.

Nowadays, Kongkong villagers are able to mix with the believers from other religions. Globalization caused the thinking system of each to be more plural and able to accept the difference. People begin to respect the rights of other believers and respect the opinion of each. Instead of each group thinking which is open minded, there are other factors that caused
the religious tolerance between believers is getting higher based on the interview with an Islamic leader (13 Mei 2017) and Hindu leader (19 April 2017) in Kongkong Village. From the interview with the Islamic leader in Kongkong Village, it is known that there is an agreement made and done together for all religious believers in Kongkong Village (the conformity tolerance), for example, there is a donation for mourning (mourning fee) as much as Rp 5,000,- for each household that then given to the mourning family. All villagers from different religion gather when there is a villager dead without differentiating the religion background.

Moreover, there is a mutual cooperation in Kongkong Village such as community service, help village who have events, build or rebuild houses, and repair the public facilities such as repairing the bridge and irrigation. When there is a mutual cooperation, all villagers participate without looking at the religion background but the equality as villagers. The mutual cooperation in Moslem and Hindu is an ancestor’s inheritance tradition that has to be endured. The mutual cooperation is a form of social interaction involves many sides, for example, the mutual cooperation in building villager houses. Such things done in Kongkong Village without looking at the religion background voluntarily.

For Kongkong villagers, the commemorate of Indonesian Independence Day is a media to communicate between them. Moslem and Hindu held the events together to commemorate the Indonesian Independence Day through some events. Usually the religion figure of Moslem and Hindu did the meeting to discuss about the events, time, and committee composition. The committee arranged with the consideration of representative of each religion. Sometimes the leader of committee is from Hindu, and sometimes is from Moslem. The alternation is believed that it can develop the togetherness in society because each of religion believers feel represented and own the events in the village. Based on the interview with religion leaders of Moslem and Hindu, it is known that conflict about religion between Moslem and Hindu never happened in Kongkong Village. According to Setiawan (2012), in multicultural society, the interaction is a key for all part of social life since it is a basic of social process that show the dynamic social relationship in multicultural condition of Kongkong villagers, the harmonious social interaction caused by the good concept of the attitude of understanding each other and protect the region and the involvement of all sides in every events that lead them to the process of life assimilation.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis, the following are the conclusions of this research:
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• The level of tolerance in Muslim in Kongkong Village is in high category as many as 77.1%. It means the Muslim villagers in Kongkong Village have the high level of tolerance.
• The level of tolerance in Hindu in Kongkong Village is in high category as many as 67.3%. It means the Hindu villagers in Kongkong Village have the high level of tolerance.
• There is no significant difference between the subject of Muslim and Hindu in Kongkong Village.
• There is no significant difference between the subject of male and female in Kongkong Village.
• The form of tolerance in Kongkong Village is *comformity tolerance*.

Keterbatasan Penelitian
There are some limitations in this research:

• There are subjects who filled the tolerance scale in rush so that the answer obtained is not maximum.
• The research was conducted collectively so that it is possible for the member of family copied others’ response which affect the validity test result, realibility, and hypotheses test.
• Some respondents chose the answers that is socially faking good.

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Conflict of Interests: The author declared no conflict of interests.

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Nisvilyah, L, (2013) “Toleransi Antarumat Beragam dalam Memperkokoh Persatuan Kesenjangan Umat Islam dan Kristen Dusun Segara Kecamatan Dlanggu Kabupaten Mojokerto”, Vol. 2 (1); Pages: 382 to 396


The Social Psychology of Intergroup Toleration: A Roadmap for Theory and Research

Maykel Verkuyten\textsuperscript{1} and Kumar Yogeeswaran\textsuperscript{2}

Abstract
The global increase in cultural and religious diversity has led to calls for toleration of group differences to achieve intergroup harmony. Although much social-psychological research has examined the nature of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, and its impact on targets of these biases, little research has examined the nature and impact of toleration for intergroup relations. Toleration does not require that people give up their objections to out-group norms and practices but rather mutual accommodation. Integrating research from various social sciences, we explore the nature of intergroup tolerance including its three components—objection, acceptance, and rejection—while drawing out its implications for future social-psychological research. We then explore some psychological consequences to social groups that are the object of toleration. By doing so, we consider the complex ways in which intergroup toleration impacts both majority and minority groups and the dynamic interplay of both in pluralistic societies.

Keywords
toleration, cultural diversity, intergroup relations, tolerance

It is widely agreed that the core of the concept of toleration is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable.

—Horton (1996, p. 28)

A shift in emphasis in the ethnic attitudes literature from prime concern with intergroup feelings (however measured) to equal concern with intergroup tolerance would broaden the scope of the literature from both a theoretical and a policy perspective, increasing both its sensitivity to and its relevance for the general problem of multigroup coexistence in a democratic society.


How do we manage cultural differences? This is a question hotly debated in many countries, cities, neighborhoods, organizations, and schools around the world. The topic has stimulated various empirical studies on the negative and positive effects of cultural diversity for intergroup relations. On the negative side, diversity would lead to categorizations of others into “us” versus “them” with feelings of out-group threat and group competition that can lead to intergroup conflict. On the positive side, diversity implies opportunities for intergroup contact, cultural learning, and cognitive adaptation that can lead to less stereotyping and higher out-group acceptance (Crisp & Turner, 2011).

Social-psychological research has examined the intergroup consequences of cultural diversity in terms of acculturation strategies (R. Brown & Zagefka, 2011), social categorization processes (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009), and diversity ideologies (Plaut, 2010). For example, various ideological frameworks for dealing with diversity have been proposed and examined. Diversity can be ignored in favor of individual characteristics (color blindness), or rejected with a focus on the dominant majority group (assimilation), or acknowledged and celebrated (multiculturalism). Research shows that these diversity ideologies can promote positive out-group attitudes, but also lead to lower acceptance of out-groups (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013, for reviews), and that the outcome depends on, for example, the national context (Guimond, de la Sablonnière, & Nugies, 2014), the level of intergroup conflict (Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008), in-group identification (Morrison, Plaut, & Ybarra, 2010), and whether the ideology is understood in abstract or concrete terms (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

In contrast to this body of work, there is very little systematic social-psychological theorizing and empirical investigation into toleration in which differences are

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endured. Vogt’s (1997) assessment nearly 20 years ago is still accurate:

Although social psychology has contributed crucially to our understanding of phenomena related to tolerance, such as stereotyping and prejudice, the theoretical work on tolerance itself in social psychology is so underdeveloped that almost any systematic investigation is likely to be productive. (p. 237)

As illustrated by the second quote heading this article, this lack of theorizing and research is unfortunate for several reasons. One is that mutual tolerance is critical because objection and disagreement about what is good and right are inevitable in pluralist societies. Social psychologists tend to focus on improving intergroup attitudes, but often this is very difficult (Paluck & Green, 2009) and not realistic. A diverse, egalitarian, and peaceful society does not require that we all like each other, but it does require that people at least tolerate one another. Tolerance is the necessary step toward living together: a barrier against discrimination, hostility, conflict, and a critical condition for citizenship and democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Walzer, 1997). It is an integrative principle across which basic forms of acceptance and peaceful coexistence between groups can be established despite controversial differences.

Second, a focus on tolerance draws attention to concrete norms and practices, and to the notion of citizenship which is a subject that is hardly addressed directly by psychological theory and research (Condor, 2011). Many social-psychological studies have examined people’s stereotypes and general attitudes toward ethnic and religious out-groups, but few have focused on perceptions of concrete and controversial practices and actions of out-group members. Yet, in culturally diverse societies, the hotly debated questions and issues evolve around foreign dress code, language use, dietary requirements, Mosque building, freedom of speech (e.g., the drawings of Prophet Mohammed), gay marriage, and various other religious and cultural practices. It is around concrete issues that cultural diversity is put to the test, ways of life collide, and the need for toleration is discussed. People might support the general idea of tolerance, but react negatively when facing its practical consequences (Jackman, 1978; Lawrence, 1976).

Third, although in the context of cultural diversity tolerance is an intergroup phenomenon, social psychology has made little contribution to the understanding of toleration (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). The prime theoretical and empirical concern has been with prejudicial attitudes rather than with intergroup tolerance. And the reverse is also true: Knowledge of intergroup processes and social-psychological theories are seldom considered in the extensive political science literature on political tolerance (see J. L. Gibson, 2006; J. L. Gibson & Gouws, 2000). This literature has focused on individual characteristics such as dogmatism and closed-mindedness, as well as political expertise, political participation, and commitment to democratic values, as determinants of tolerance (J. L. Gibson, 2006; Sullivan & Transue, 1999; Vogt, 1997). Yet, tolerance presupposes intergroup differences and typically implies that one group has the power to interfere with the dissenting beliefs and practices of the other.

The aim of this article is to discuss various aspects and paradoxes of intergroup toleration to raise novel questions for social-psychological theory and research. Our argument is that intergroup tolerance is critical for living together in a culturally diverse society: “Toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary” (Walzer, 1997, p. xii). We will try to demonstrate that tolerance is more than the absence of intolerance, and its psychological processes involve moral disapproval (“strong tolerance”) rather than simple dislike (“weak tolerance”) (see Table 1). While “strong tolerance” raises many novel questions for social-psychological research, “weak tolerance” is more related to the phenomenon addressed in existing prejudice research. And finally, tolerance is not inherently good and intolerance is not inherently bad because not everything can and should be tolerated.

In the following sections, we will first discuss the concept of toleration and its three components: objection, acceptance, and rejection. This is followed by a discussion of the permission and respect understanding of toleration that relate to more vertical and horizontal intergroup relations, respectively. Then, we will consider the target’s perspective by discussing the potential social-psychological consequences of being tolerated. Here, we consider the potential consequences of toleration for the target’s sense of belonging, control, identity, (collective) self-esteem, desire for collective action, and the target’s attitudes and behaviors toward those “tolerating” them. The article concludes with future directions for theoretical and empirical development.

In the present context, we are not concerned with the more interpersonal settings of tolerance such as parents tolerating particular behaviors of their children, but with intergroup situations in which the toleration of cultural and religious differences is at stake. This means that we will also not be directly concerned with political tolerance which is extensively studied in political science and focuses, for example, on different groups trying to gain influence on decision-making processes or how religion affects political intolerance (Djupe, 2015). Our focus here is on tolerance of different group practices that sustain and reproduce an identity and way of life among its group members.

Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious conflicts (Walzer, 1997). Immigration and globalization have led to an increased need for people to live besides ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. For example, the presence of an increasing number of Muslims in Western countries has given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing with diversity. Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Cesari, 2013; Zolberg & Long, 1999) and increasingly in North
Table 1. Three Components of Weak and Strong Intergroup Toleration (Objection, Acceptance, and Rejection) and Their Related Psychology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objection</td>
<td>Affective states: Dislike for out-group as a whole</td>
<td>Disapproval of specific practices of out-group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance</td>
<td>Psychological processes: Suppression and compunction over negative sentiments</td>
<td>Balancing considerations of competing values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Behavioral outcomes: Discrimination: Justification of negative behaviors</td>
<td>Intolerance: Moral reasons for objection outweigh those for acceptance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

America (Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Shipler, 2015) and Australia (Fuller & Innis, 2014; Sparrow, 2015). Islam’s presence in the West has also been at the heart of what is perceived as a “crisis of multiculturalism” (Modood, 2007). Islamic norms and values are often considered incompatible with Western values, and Muslims have been labeled as the “indigestible” minority (Huntington, 2004, p. 188). Several of our examples therefore relate to the (perceived) tension between Islamic and Western norms and values as this is part of much public and political discourse in Europe, North America, and Australasia today.

However, in addition to tolerance in the context of Islam in the West, intergroup tolerance can also be investigated in other social contexts where a minority group’s norms and values are perceived to be incompatible with that of the dominant culture. For example, these principles may apply in the context of other ethnic and religious groups that have diverging beliefs, values, and practices from the dominant culture (e.g., the Roma people in Europe or Amish people in the United States). Similarly, these phenomena may also apply to various social and political groups, including hate groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, European National Front, or the Abiding Truth Ministries) and extremist political parties (e.g., Golden Dawn in Greece, Maoist Communist Party of India, or the Australia First Party or New Zealand First political party). With that said, these principles would not apply in the context of all ethnic minority or immigrant groups, especially if their values, norms, and practices are not perceived as incompatible with the mainstream (e.g., Asian Americans in the United States; Germans in the Netherlands). Therefore, we are cautious to generalize these claims beyond cultural and religious groups whose values, practices, and norms are considered incompatible with the dominant culture, thereby leading to a (perceived) clash of worldviews.

The Concept of Tolerance

The concept of tolerance has a long history going back to antiquity. It was used in early Christianity when dealing with religious differences and conflicts, and it became a central concept after the Reformation, when Europe faced many religious–political conflicts. Philosophers such as Spinoza, Bayle, Locke, and Montesquieu developed toleration theories to reconcile religious differences, and in the 19th century, John Stuart Mill discussed toleration in relation to other forms of cultural and political plurality. The importance of tolerance for contemporary diverse societies is discussed by current thinkers such as W. Brown (2008), Forst (2012), Habermas (2004), and Walzer (1997).

All these scholars are concerned with situations in which people put up with or endure norms and practices that they object to. As stated in the first quote heading this article, the core of toleration “is the refusal, where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable” (Horton, 1996, p. 28). This means that tolerance is not indifference, neutrality, or refraining from acting out of fear, and it is also not the opposite of prejudice (e.g., Crawford, 2014; Jackman, 1977; Van der Noll, Poppe, & Verkuyten, 2010; Van Zalk & Kerr, 2014). In social psychology, tolerance is often equated with being nonjudgmental, open, and valuing diversity, or it is considered a generalized positive attitude toward out-groups (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Yet, the concept of tolerance shares with prejudice the aspect of “negativity,” but emphasizes forbearance and not begrudging other people their own ways. Tolerance, therefore, serves as a barrier against discrimination.

According to Forst (2012), this conceptualization has three components: the objection, the acceptance, and the rejection (see also Galeotti, 2002; Habermas, 2004). Tolerance requires (a) reasons to object to norms and practices of others, (b) reasons to nevertheless accept them and show self-restraint, and (c) reasons for the limits of tolerance and not accepting particular norms and practices. In the sections that follow, we unpack these different components of tolerance and explore how each of these can inform social-psychological research on intergroup relations. Table 1 summarizes the main aspects and differences that we will discuss.

The Objection Component

There are many situations in which people put up with something that they disapprove of. Religious believers tolerate homosexuality, gay marriage, and abortion; nonbelievers
tolerate religious teachings in schools, religious holidays, and ritual slaughter of animals. In some Western countries, female officials are allowed to wear a headscarf in public institutions, and in other countries, people with radical views are allowed to congregate and rally (e.g., White supremacists). The tolerated norms or practices are considered wrong or bad and evaluated negatively. The objection component implies a negative judgment for which a general distinction between dislike and disapproval can be made (Horton, 1996). The former implies (implicit) negative feelings of dislike, distaste, or hate toward categories of people or their practices. The latter involves normative and moral reasons for considering specific beliefs, norms, or practices wrong or bad. One can dislike Muslims, but that does not have to mean that one disapproves of all their religious practices, and vice versa. Similarly, people can disapprove of smoking, but that does not have to mean that they dislike smokers. The distinction between dislike and disapproval is, of course, not always clear-cut, but it features in debates about toleration (see Horton, 1996). For some, the notion of toleration is only appropriate when there is disapproval, while others extend the notion to cases in which the objection takes the form of (implicit) feelings of dislike. The latter has many similarities with the thinking about prejudice and has been defined as toleration in a weak sense, whereas the former has been conceptualized as toleration in a stronger sense and implies virtuous conduct (Mendus, 1989; Pasamonik, 2004; Warnock, 1987). This distinction is important in terms of underlying psychological processes (Table 1) and is useful for explaining the nature and importance of strong toleration, which is our aim.

**Out-group dislike.** Tolerance is often examined in terms of disliked groups. For example, many studies in political science, and social psychology (e.g., Crawford, 2014), use the so-called “least liked group approach” to measure political tolerance (Sullivan, Pireson, & Marcus, 1979). With this measure, people are first asked to indicate which group in society they dislike most. In a next step, they are asked whether members of this group should be allowed to hold public office, teach in schools, and hold public rallies. This approach allows one to examine political tolerance of groups that participants themselves dislike (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). Tolerance is considered to occur jointly with feelings of dislike: It is about how far one is willing to grant equal rights to disliked groups.

This approach has its limitations because not only feelings of dislike but also disapproval of practices can be involved in people’s reactions (Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, & Togeby, 2010). With this approach, it is often difficult to make a distinction between the act and the actor (Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002). People can object to a particular practice of a group because they dislike the group or because they disapprove of the practice itself. For example, one can resist the idea of Muslims establishing Islamic schools or an Islamic political party—as happens in some European countries—because one feels negatively toward Muslims, or because one thinks that any religion has no place in education or in party politics (Van der Noll & Saroglou, 2015).

A focus on feelings of dislike or hate involves a limited understanding of toleration and leads to the paradox of the tolerant racist. A racist person showing self-restraint in the face of the racial category that he or she despises would be tolerant, and the more racist the person is, the more tolerant he or she would be (Horton, 1996; King, 1976). Higher tolerance would imply stronger dislike together with more endurance resulting from stronger self-restraint. This counterintuitive implication indicates that a focus on dislike, or (implicit) negative feelings more generally, passes over something important. The psychology of racial hatred is something other than objecting toward dissenting norms and practices that one disapproves of. The nature or grounds for the objection to what one tolerates is important. For example, whereas racial tolerance involves prejudicial beliefs and “unreasonable” feelings of dislike, religious tolerance typically involves the “reasonable” disapproval of conflicting beliefs and convictions. A racist person showing self-restraint can be considered tolerant, but it can be argued that he or she should not want to act on his or her racist beliefs in the first place. Addressing racism is not about increasing tolerance, but about recognizing the “intrinsic moral irrelevance of racial differences” (Horton, 1996, p. 34). Racists should be discouraged from having racist beliefs and feelings rather than be encouraged to be tolerant. In contrast, promoting religious tolerance is more about encouraging people to accept other religious beliefs and practices rather than discouraging them from having any objections toward things that contradict one’s sacred beliefs.

**Out-group disapproval.** A religious believer can be convinced that “Jesus is the only way” and object toward humanism as a belief system, but one should be egalitarian toward humanists as a group of people. Criticizing a system of belief is more socially acceptable than stereotyping or dehumanizing a group of people. And defining a system of belief is more socially acceptable than stereotyping or dehumanizing a group of people. Criticizing a system of belief is more socially acceptable than stereotyping or dehumanizing a group of people. And defining a system of belief as being unequal to “our” norms and values is more acceptable than labeling a (racial) group of people inferior. The implication is that “the reasons for objection must be reasonable in a minimal sense” (Forst, 2012, p. 2). The disapproval interpretation of tolerance implies that the objection must not be rooted in feelings of fear or hatred, but rather must not be unreasonable (e.g., not arbitrary) or without value. It is much more difficult to recognize the value and reasonableness of racist belief and hatred than of secularists’ concerns about the imposition of religious laws, or of antiabortionists’ concern for the unborn life. This raises the question of what subjectively these defensible reasons for disapproval might be, and this is an important topic for future research. Here we want to suggest that at least two types of reasons should be examined: shared norms and conventions, and values.
**Norms and conventions.** Toleration questions in pluralist societies are often about social standards, conventions, and customs. They stem from perceptions that dissenting beliefs and practices are “unduly upsetting the orderly social life based on ingrained and familiar conventions and stable expectations” (Galeotti, 2015, p. 98). In everyday life, individuals rely on the ideas they assume are socially shared to establish common ground (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2008). In communicating with in-group members, people draw on shared knowledge and implicit expectations which enable them to anticipate and comprehend the actions of others. People “think and act on ideas perceived to be consensual with little reservation” (Zou et al., 2009, p. 580), and in doing so reproduce the prevailing, cultural patterns: patterns that are seen as simple “common sense” and equated with normality (Verkuyten, 2001; Zou et al., 2009). As a result, objection to and condemnation of dissenting or “abnormal” norms and practices are considered reasonable and even “logical” (Billig, 1988).

Perceived cultural consensus implies a bias toward traditionality and does not have to implicate the self or require awareness of one’s cultural group identity (Zou et al., 2009). Yet, rules of civility and propriety relating, for example, to dress code, collective celebrations, and religious rituals are often linked to notions of in-group identity and therefore considered legitimate reasons for disapproval. This is summarized in the maxim, “when in Rome, do as the Romans do.” The self-evidence of this expectation is typically substantiated by the claim that one would, of course, adapt to the normative and customary ways of life when emigrating to another country (Verkuyten, 1997). Research has shown that the maintenance and adaptation to the established rules and standards that bind society together and defines the in-group identity is a central and independent reason for why people disapprove of disrupting out-group norms and practices (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007).

**Value pluralism.** Very meaningful or sacred values lead people to act in terms of principles rather than prospects, and to strongly protect their own worldview (Ginges & Atran, 2011). People are extremely resistant to taboo trade-offs in which these values are compared with or transacted in market pricing (Tetlock, 1986). This resistance cannot fully be explained by an incommensurable objection that makes people confused, but rather implies a principle disapproval involving moral indignation and outrage (e.g., Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). These values and principles tend to be in-group defining but can also have a universalistic appeal (e.g., human rights).

For example, the lives of observant believers are organized around their religious beliefs, values, and practices that are considered binding and provide certainty and meaningfulness. Religions involve truth-claims and absolute moral principles that define what it means to be a believer of a particular religion. For a true believer, all religions are not equally right because one’s own faith is the correct one, and the idea of making adjustments is an oxymoron. Religious belief is concerned with the moral good and divine truth, which are difficult to reconcile with moral and epistemic diversity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Trying to convert people to one’s religious belief and punishing apostasy are aims, and even duties, in some religions.

A similar difficulty is involved in cultural value pluralism. The “culturalist” view of each human group having their own culture, and that the differences and boundaries between cultures can be specified, is very intuitive and powerful in its appeal (Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). Culture deeply matters to people, and everyone would need his or her own culture to live a meaningful and free life. The attachment to one’s cultural values implies that things that conflict with those values will be considered wrong or inferior. Because of their propositional content, all cultures cannot be considered as equal. Different cultural worldviews about what is right or wrong, true and false, cannot all be simultaneously confirmed, but they can be tolerated.

Principle reasoning, rejecting value pluralism, and having an ethnocentric worldview are not necessarily contradictory to toleration. Rejecting the idea that all religions or all cultures are equally right and valuable is something other than being intolerant. In social psychology, there is research on fundamentalist, orthodox, and strong beliefs as forms of intolerance and as underlying prejudice and discrimination. Empirical evidence reveals that these types of beliefs relate to out-group stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (for a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Yet, being deeply convinced that one is right and following a strict set of beliefs and rules does not necessarily imply intolerance (Eisenstein, 2006). Rather, disapproval based on core beliefs and principles is an aspect of toleration, which additionally requires the component of acceptance. People may have rigid beliefs about the rightness of their own religion or their cultural group’s norms and values, but yet accept other social groups as having a right to their own way and tolerate the diversity in people’s values and belief systems.

**Integrative thoughts on dislike and disapproval components of objection.** The distinction between dislike and disapproval indicates that individuals can disapprove of out-group norms, values, and practices that are incompatible with their own, without necessarily disliking the category of out-group people (Rokeach, 1960). In a large study of the Netherlands, it was demonstrated that majority Dutch who object to what they consider unequal treatment of women and children among Muslim immigrants do not necessarily dislike Muslim people (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). They disapproved of certain practices based on their commitment to liberal values of gender equality and freedom of thought, and showed no dislike or hatred toward Muslims as a group (see also Imhoff & Recker, 2012). This is in line with research
that has demonstrated that intergroup prejudice and intolerance tend to be weakly or nonsignificantly associated (J. L. Gibson, 2006). Many majority members judge male–female relationships and the parenting style within Muslim immigrant communities as morally reprehensible, and similarly many Muslims reject the “liberal” practices of the majority or the Western world more generally (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).

Similarly, among national samples in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it was found that a substantial portion of people with a positive attitude toward Muslims supported a ban on headscarves (Van der Noll, 2010). Analyzing data from six European countries, Helbling (2014) found that Europeans with liberal values were positive toward Muslims as a group, but felt torn regarding the legislation of religious practices such as the wearing of the headscarf. He concluded that “people in western Europe make a distinction between Muslims as a group and the Muslim headscarf” (p. 10). Similarly, political conservatives might oppose policies like affirmative action not because they are racially prejudiced but because they believe such programs violate core values of meritocracy and individualism (Sniderman & Tetlock, 2003).

Although there is debate about the empirical evidence for this principled conservatism (e.g., Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2005; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996) and also for the belief incongruence proposition (R. Brown, 2010), the point is that objections toward out-group beliefs and practices can be based on perceived inconsistencies between in-group norms and values rather than generalized prejudice (e.g., Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001; Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008). This is further supported by research showing that those on the political left and right are equally intolerant toward ideologically dissimilar groups (e.g., Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014), but that the political left is more tolerant toward immigrants as a category of people (e.g., Van Prooijen, Krouwel, Boiten, & Eenedbak, 2015). Future social-psychological research would benefit from disentangling the influence of thoughts and feelings toward out-group practices and values from the people in particular. Moreover, social-psychological research would broadly benefit from exploring the distinction between dislike and disapproval in relation to (in)tolerance.

**The Acceptance Component**

Toleration involves acceptance of dissenting out-group norms and practices. This acceptance should be voluntary and not compelled. Although feelings of out-group threat and fear are among the most important determinants of intolerance (e.g., J. L. Gibson, 2006; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, & Nolte, 1995), these do not form the basis of tolerance. Toleration begins where discrimination ends—It involves the intentional suppression of the inclination to oppress out-group norms and practices (Schuyt, 1997). Toleration always involves two sets of considerations, for objection and for acceptance, that should be examined in relation to each other. As shown in Table 1, we propose that depending on the type of objection (dislike or disapproval), other psychological processes are involved in showing self-restraint.

**Dislike, and suppression and compunction.** Accepting things that one disapproves of is challenging from an attitude–behavior perspective. It creates an inconsistency between one’s attitude and behavioral intention, thereby eliciting dissonance and uneasiness (Festinger, 1962; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999). Such dissonance may create obstacles for the achievement of toleration in an everyday context and means that tolerance may be much more fragile than intolerance (J. L. Gibson, 2006). The asymmetry of (in)tolerance refers to the finding that it is easier to convince tolerant people to give up their tolerance than to persuade intolerant people to become more tolerant (e.g., Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Peffley, Knigge, & Hurwitz, 2001). With intolerance, the negative judgment about a dissenting norm or practice is in agreement with rejecting those norms or practices: You reject what you object to. Being tolerant, on the contrary, implies putting up with actions and practices that you consider wrong: You accept what you object to.

Toleration in a weak sense implies that feelings of dislike are not translated into negative behavior. The justification–suppression model suggests that people simultaneously hold negative beliefs and unprejudiced values and norms that suppress the expression of these beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Relatedly, the dissociation model of prejudice proposes that conscious normative and moral beliefs can override implicit negative stereotypes and attitudes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), and the self-regulation of prejudice model argues that normative and moral standards make people internally motivated to control their prejudicial feelings (Monteith, Arthur, & McQueary Flynn, 2010; Plant & Devine, 1998). These models are typically based on the need to be viewed by oneself, or others, as unprejudiced. People might accept that they are perhaps less competent or sociable than others, but they want to have a sense of being a good person (Ellemers & Van den Bos, 2012). Such research examines how automatically activated negative stereotypes and prejudicial biases are self-monitored, inhibited, and controlled, and concludes that these processes of self-regulation are more effective than thought suppression (Monteith et al., 2010). In subtle or modern forms of prejudice, people regard their own prejudices as unjust and offensive because it goes against principles of equality and justice. Allport (1954) argued that prejudice with compunction is common because prejudicial attitudes often conflict with personally held values leading to inner conflicts and feelings of guilt.

**Disapproval and psychological balancing.** Toleration implies that it is preferable to accept disapproved out-group norms or
practices rather than to reject or ban them outright. Thus, the norms or practices are considered wrong but not intolerably wrong. In other words, tolerance based on disapproval implies a trade-off between contrasting reasons for objecting and for accepting the dissenting norms or practices: There need to be additional good reasons that trump the reasons for disapproval. The social-psychological processes involved here are different from what is described in the suppression and self-regulation models of prejudice. These are not processes of suppression and compunction but rather the balancing between competing considerations and reasons whereby there are more important reasons for accepting than rejecting the disapproved norms and practices.

One important reason for toleration is the endorsement of civil equality and liberties such as freedom of thought, expression, and equal opportunity. Although subjectively there are acceptable reasons for disapproval, it is simultaneously emphasized that every citizen has an equal right to practice his or her culture or religion. For example, in research on religious toleration among Muslims living in Germany, it was found that the disapproval of others' beliefs and practices was balanced by respect for them as fellow citizens (Simon & Schaefer, 2015). And a research in the Netherlands demonstrated that the endorsement of liberal values was associated with the acceptance of Muslim veils (Gustavsson, Van der Noll, & Sundberg, 2016). With toleration, there is a commitment to “agree to disagree” because the freedom and reasons of the other are acknowledged without giving up one’s own convictions and beliefs. Research has demonstrated that support for civic and democratic values are among the most important predictors of political tolerance (see Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Furthermore, people tend to be more tolerant of dissenting speech than practices (Wainryb, Shaw, & Maianu, 1998). Laws often protect people from engaging in dissenting speech (e.g., public criticism of government or hate speech), but not actions against the same targets (e.g., actions against the government or attacks on specific groups). Tolerance toward the public expression of dissenting beliefs is consistent with the idea of freedom of speech and stimulates debate which is important for the democratic process.

Another reason for toleration is prudential and involves the costs of interference in comparison with the value of social order and civil peace. Dissenting practices, norms, and beliefs can be tolerated because these are part of living in a liberal democracy. Yet, the value of social order and peace can also be used to argue against tolerance. Questions of toleration tend to involve competing principles and values. For example, the debate over toleration for political extreme groups contains a conflict between competing fundamental values (Tetlock, 1986). On one hand are the civil rights to free speech and assembly, and on the other hand are the values of the preservation of public order and safety. These differing values can conflict with each other, for example, when civil liberties put public order at risk. If both the reasons for disapproval and those for acceptance involve moral principles, then it becomes morally right or even required to tolerate what is morally wrong: “the paradox of moral tolerance” (Horton, 1994; Raphael, 1988).4

Paradox of moral tolerance. One psychological solution to this paradox is to distinguish between various kinds of principles, whereby the ones supporting toleration outweigh those that ground the disapproval. For example, majority groups in Western nations might object to some dissenting norms and practices of Muslim immigrants because they consider conformity to operative public values that are embodied in norms and rules that govern civic relations critical for a cohesive and just society (Parekh, 2000). Yet, maintaining established social rules and standards can be considered as less important than freedom of thought and the right to follow one’s own way. In the context of the Netherlands, it was found that majority Dutch who strongly take exception to the perceived way in which Muslim immigrants treat women and children overwhelmingly support the right of Muslim immigrants to follow their own ways of life (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). This support was equal to those who had in every respect a favorable attitude toward Muslims.

Thus, the way people rank competing values (e.g., civil liberties or social order) plays an important role in tolerance judgments (Peffley et al., 2001), which raises the important psychological question of how people come to rank competing values and how this ranking affects tolerance judgments. For example, people can clearly prioritize one value over another, but experiences of value conflict are also possible because competing values are simultaneously considered equally important. Existing research, however, mainly focuses on the association between tolerance and separate values rather than investigating the relative importance of self-endorsed values (see Peffley et al., 2001). Yet, for understanding the balancing process involved in toleration, research should examine the relative importance of the values that are involved in the reasons for disapproval and self-restraint.

However, psychologically, there is another more dynamic solution to the paradox of moral tolerance whereby both the reasons for disapproval and those for acceptance involve valuable principles. This solution focuses on the situational, and thereby alternating, salience of values and is based on the assumption that whether a particular value guides one’s actual judgment is dependent not only on the relative importance attached to it but also on the situational cues that make that value relevant. According to Fazio (1986), attitudes influence a person’s interpretation of an event only when these attitudes are activated from memory. Feather (1990) argued that values are more readily activated when the cognitive or emotional associations in which they are embedded are triggered by an external stimulus. Most events and situations can be interpreted in multiple ways, and depending on the interpretation, competing values become temporarily relevant as standards of evaluation. For example, people may
strongly endorse freedom of speech, but for this value to influence their judgment, an event or situation should be interpreted as one in which freedom of speech is at stake. Focusing on the effects of media framing on tolerance, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) found that when news regarding political actions of the Ku Klux Klan was framed in terms of the importance of freedom of speech, participants had higher levels of political tolerance for this group compared with a situation in which the importance of public order was emphasized. These and other results (e.g., Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Vescio & Biernat, 2003; Zilli Ramirez & Verkuyten, 2011) suggest an additive model which asserts that when a particular value is both strongly endorsed and situationally salient, people tend to evaluate an event in terms of that value (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Hence, the strength of the relationship between civil liberties and tolerance is influenced by the salience of equality and freedom values. When civil liberties are endorsed relatively strongly and made temporarily relevant, they will guide one’s interpretation and judgment. And when the value of social order is endorsed relatively strongly and made relevant, this value will inform (in)tolerance judgments. Collectively, these varied themes suggest that future research on tolerance would benefit from examining both individual differences in value priorities and situational conditions that make particular values salient in contexts where toleration is relevant.

Perspective taking. The acceptance component of tolerance does not mean that the objection is removed but rather implies a dual form of thinking. On one hand, there is what one sincerely believes is true and right, but on the other hand, one must be able and willing to try to understand the perspective of the other. Tolerance is not the same as indifference or accepting anything blindly but involves comparing one’s own worldview with that of others. The ability to entertain the perspective of another is a critical ingredient in the acceptance component of tolerance and distinguishes it from acceptance based on indifference, misunderstandings, or a lack of knowledge (Graumann, 1996). Tolerance is difficult when one does not understand the reasons behind dissenting beliefs and practices. One has to understand the self-defining meanings of out-group beliefs and customs to be able to accept the right to be different.

Perspective taking can reduce stereotyping and increase positive attitudes toward out-groups (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003; Wang, Ku, Tai, & Galinsky, 2014). It broadens people’s horizons by recognizing the value of other cultures and thereby put their own taken-for-granted cultural standards into perspective, making them less in-group centric (Galinsky, 2002). However, perspective taking in the context of toleration is not concerned with improving out-group attitudes, but rather with the acceptance of what one objects to, while also trying to convince the other without force or oppressive means. Being able to think about controversies from more than one perspective encourages (political) tolerance (Habermas, 2003; Mutz, 2006). Taking the perspective of the other allows one to understand the legitimate rationale for dissenting beliefs and practices. This in itself can lead to greater tolerance and, importantly, forms the basis for dialogue. Understanding other’s point of view is a central aspect of interaction and debate that is needed to maintain democratic citizenship (Mutz, 2006).

Future research should examine the importance of perspective taking for toleration and the related commitment to try to convince others to change their “misguided” beliefs and practices (Schuyl, 1997). In doing so, it is important to consider person-based factors. For example, although fundamentalist and orthodox beliefs do not necessarily imply intolerance, they do make it more likely (e.g., Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990). These beliefs make it more difficult to accept other beliefs and lifestyles that are considered contrary to in-group defining cultural values or the holy scripture. In addition, rigid forms of thinking can hinder perspective taking and the willingness to enter in debate. Cognitive inflexibility, closed-mindedness, and a desire for simplicity, certainty, and security (e.g., need for closure) not only make it likely that individuals object toward dissenting beliefs and practices but also that they are unwilling to accept or tolerate them (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). In addition, feelings of fear and uncertainty result in resistance to change and opposition to equality (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). This means that individuals higher on conservatism or authoritarianism, as indicators of traditionalism, and social dominance orientation, as an indicator of (in)equality, can be expected to be less tolerant of dissenting minority norms, beliefs, and practices (e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Whitley, 1999; but also see Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008).

The Rejection Component

Toleration is not without limits and thereby differs from relativism with its abstention of judgment toward the norms and practices of others. If we are to avoid tolerating everything, there must be norms and activities that we regard as intolerably wrong, for subjectively right reasons. For dislike-based or weak tolerance, these reasons justify the translation of one’s prejudicial attitudes into discriminatory practices. The justification–suppression model suggests that people simultaneously can have negative feelings and endorse values and norms that suppress the expression of these beliefs (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). One implication of this model, and of related ones, is that the expression of prejudice in discrimination is facilitated by justifications such as legitimizing myths that support unequal social arrangements (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), threat perceptions (Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010), perceived procedural and distributive justice (Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalone, 2007), and processes of
infra- and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). For example, research shows that infra- and dehumanization alleviate moral concerns and thereby facilitate punishment and violence of out-groups (see Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014), and the availability of nonracist justification facilitates discrimination by aversive racists (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). These justifications resolve the psychological conflict that derives from, on one hand, the display of discriminatory behavior, and, on the other hand, the need to view oneself as a good person (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In these models, intolerance has a negative connotation because it implies a motive for justification that makes people look for beliefs that legitimize their prejudices and discriminatory behavior. With the proper justifications, racists will express their racist feelings in racist acts.

For strong tolerance based on disapproval, the psychological process is different. It is about balancing reasons for finding something objectionable with reasons for showing self-restraint. The limits of tolerance occur when reasons for rejection become stronger than the reasons for acceptance. The considerations for rejecting particular norms and practices outweigh the ones for acceptance either because of a more enduring ranking of competing values or because of the alternating salience of values. In both cases, there are moral reasons to regard out-group norms and activities as intolerably wrong, making intolerance (or zero tolerance) a positive rather than a negative response.

This means that the question of strong (in)tolerance does not apply to out-groups that are deprived of their humanity (Haslam, 2006). There is no need to tolerate those that are considered nonhuman or less than fully human because these groups are removed from moral concern and can simply be ignored, rejected, or excluded (Bandura, 1999). Self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) argues that people understand and interpret group differences and similarities within the context of a common identity. Intergroup comparisons are always made against the background of what is shared. It is the shared humanity that forms the moral basis for evaluating out-group norms, beliefs, or practices as going against basic human rights and therefore as not to be tolerated. And it is the shared identity as citizens that forms the basis for being intolerant toward those who reject society’s core values and principles. So toleration implies shared (human, national) categorization. Strong intolerance does not imply that out-group members are dehumanized or excluded from the common category but rather requires that they are humanized and included. Future research should examine whether there is empirical support for this paradoxical implication.

Tolerance in its strong sense is not a value, but requires other values and principles, and the same is true for intolerance (Forst, 2004). This raises the question of what morally right reasons people can provide for rejection. We suggest that these reasons can be based, at least, on the harm and rights principle, the principle of identity continuity, and the self-defense principle. In the section that follows, we will elaborate on all three of these principles and future research that could systematically examine the role of each in the limits of tolerance.

**Harm and rights principle.** The moral domain is predominantly concerned with fairness, justice, and other’s welfare; it is typically considered to apply anywhere and everywhere (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Turiel, 2002). Research with children demonstrates that they interpret issues of fairness, justice, and avoiding harm to others as unalterable, general, and not subject to authority jurisdiction (Wainryb, 2006). It is, of course, not always clear whether a particular practice is interpreted as belonging to the moral domain, but when it does, tolerance of the practice becomes difficult. Rozin (1999) described the process of moralization through which preferences are converted into moral values. In many Western countries, for example, cigarette smoking is not accepted anymore because it has changed from a preference to a moral violation related to health concerns (Rozin & Singh, 1999). Moralized entities and activities tend to lead to avoidance and rejection rather than toleration.

Similarly, the refusal to shake hands with someone of the opposite sex by Muslim civil servants and teachers has led to some uproar in Europe (Verkuyten, 2014). Critics construe the act of shaking hands as a matter of principle because it symbolizes the moral equality of men and women rather than a preference or social convention. If I say that I stand for gender equality, but that other people may think differently about it, then it becomes a matter of personal preference. But if I consider the equality of men and women a moral principle, I stand for gender equality everywhere and want everyone else to do so. If people from another community disagree, there is a problem, one that goes beyond differences in preferences and social conventions that can be solved with mutual understanding and reasonable accommodations.

One can argue about the interpretation and applicability of a moral principle but not about the principle itself. Research on moral emotions shows that people exhibit strong intuitive objection to the physical and psychological harm of others and to unfair treatment (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987; also see Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Furthermore, sacred values make people act in terms of moral principles and to react with moral outrage when the integrity of these values is challenged (Ginges & Atran, 2011; Tetlock et al., 2000). And people also tend to reject beliefs and practices that go against basic human capabilities (Turiel, 2002). From a human rights perspective, accepting honor killings, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and forced marriage would imply culpable indulgence and not tolerance. In these cases, toleration would infringe on the harm principle and the rights of others. Thus, it is likely that tolerance will be harder to achieve if out-group practices are perceived as causing harm to others (e.g., hate groups) or as mistreating or threatening the freedom and rights of others (e.g., against
women and gay rights). Future work can systematically test whether framing out-group actions as causing harm or violating human rights reduces tolerance toward the out-group and increases restrictions for minority rights.

**Identity continuity.** Another reason for the limits of toleration has to do with the importance of maintaining one’s cultural identity. In-group and out-group values can be experienced as conflicting and being irreconcilable because they contradict each other and therefore cannot be simultaneously pursued, or they may be mutually denunciatory whereby taking one seriously is to repudiate the other (Lukes, 2008). Perceptions of incompatible ways of life have been found to predict the feeling that one is not able to live by one’s in-group identity (Sindic & Reicher, 2009) or not able to develop a sense of shared national belonging (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012).

In addition, perceived violation of cherished in-group values is a predictor of negative out-group attitudes, often independent of group membership (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Marques & Paez, 1994; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that people tend to oppose social developments and out-groups that undermine the continuation or future existence of their group identity (Jetten & Wohl, 2012; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).

In a “culturalist” perspective, the idea of conflicting and incommensurable values is a key proposition (Morris et al., 2015; Wimmer, 2009). This idea is quite powerful and features in analyses and concerns about “colliding ways of life” (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007) and the confrontational clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). It is also prominent in the way in which laypeople think about cultural differences. Self-defining core values tend to be seen as nonnegotiable (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) providing a justifiable reason for rejecting those norms and practices that are grounded in different moral values (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Accommodations and changes that are perceived as undermining or destroying the core of one’s group identity are almost impossible to accept (Kelman, 2001; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Human beings would “have a right to culture—not just any culture, but their own” (Margalit & Halbertal, 1994, p. 491). For example, liberal principles of gender equality and individual freedoms would form the nonnegotiable core of American, British, French, or Dutch identity and thereby a justified basis for being intolerant of illiberal beliefs and practices that subvert this core (Schildkraut, 2007). The result is that Muslims in Western Europe, North America, or Australasia are criticized for their lack of allegiance to a set of “core national values” that their religion would reject (Kundhni, 2007).

The limits of tolerance can also be drawn in relation to in-group members. In fact, the rejection might even be stronger toward dissenting beliefs and practices within one’s own community. Research on the black sheep effect convincingly demonstrates that normative deviant in-group members are evaluated more negatively than deviant out-group members (Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). Furthermore, when in-group members cannot agree about the defining characteristics or essence of their group identity, this will instigate schismatic processes (Sani, 2005, 2009). To tolerate dissenting beliefs and practices of out-group members living in the same society is one thing, but it is quite another thing to tolerate in-group members who put forward a contrasting understanding of the group identity. This directly undermines the continuity of the nature of the group and where it stands for. For example, Muslims in the United States have been found to be more intolerant of diverse interpretations of Islam than of dissenting beliefs of other groups (Djupe & Calfano, 2012). Similarly, members of the Church of England have left their own institution because of the ordination of women to priesthood (Sani & Reicher, 1999, 2000). The ordination of women priests was seen as subverting the group identity because it fundamentally denied core beliefs and values (i.e., apostolic succession). Here, the limits of tolerance are found in the threat to the continuation of the historically grounded principles that are considered to form the heart of the group identity. Taken together, future empirical research would benefit from examining how perceived threats to the in-group’s identity continuity emerging from both in-group and out-group sources influence toleration (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015).

**Self-defense principle.** In addition to the harm and rights principle and to in-group continuity, there is the principle of self-defense of the liberal and democratic order. Tolerance cannot constitute a virtue if it is at the expense of the collective security and persistence of the social and political order. What threatens the stability of liberal society is often a contested matter, and social-psychological research should examine why and when certain practices are considered to undermine the liberal order. In doing so, it is important to recognize that the principle of self-defense can also be used for strategic purposes.

Reciprocity, for example, is central to the idea of toleration. It implies the classical paradox that one cannot tolerate those who are intolerant. Walzer (1997) noted that some immigrant minorities are tolerated, but cannot practice intolerance in the society of settlement even though their fellow believers in other countries may be “brutally intolerant” (p. 81). Being tolerant toward forces that fail to reciprocate undermines the benefits of civil liberties and equality and therefore cannot be tolerated. The principle of reciprocity is essential for toleration because otherwise the practice of toleration is destroyed.

However, the slogan “no toleration for the intolerant” is used by populist politicians in Europe to argue against Muslims (e.g., Verkuyten, 2013) suggesting that this proposition is not unproblematic. There is always the question of who draws the line against whom, for which reasons, and by what means. In liberal democracies, only political authorities have the legitimate power to interfere with people’s liberties.
This means that majority members call on political authorities to reaffirm the boundaries for toleration. The implication is that social-psychological research on toleration should not only focus on the majority–minority relation but should also consider the perceived role of political authorities (Allport, 1954; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Subaśić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). Populist politicians emphasize the self-defining meaning of in-group tolerance to criticize Muslim immigrants for their intolerance and unwillingness to adapt (Kundnani, 2007; Verkuyten, 2013). It is argued by these politicians that we have been tolerant enough and that “our” tolerance has led to segregated and isolated communities that threaten to self-destroy our liberal society (see Blommaert & Verschueren, 1994; Vasta, 2007). This indicates that the notion of tolerance can be used to argue not only for acceptance of the beliefs and practices of immigrants but also for drawing a moral boundary between “us, the tolerant” and “them, the intolerant” (Van der Veer, 2006).

This discourse about the reversal of (in)tolerance tends to draw upon a disapproval rather than dislike conceptualization of toleration. Populist politicians argue that “our” tolerant and democratic values are threatened by particular ideologies (e.g., Islam) rather than by a certain group of people (see Mols & Jetten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2013). A distinction is made between disapproval of out-group ideology and dislike of out-group people, and this distinction mitigates against accusations of racism. A focus on Islam draws attention away from human groups, which makes populist proposals to limit and forbid Islamic schools, Mosques, the headscarf, and other visible signs of this religion understandable. Criticizing a system of belief is acceptable and is part of what is expected of a politician. In addition, defining a system of belief as being unequal to “our” norms and values is more acceptable than labeling a group of people inferior. Notions of tolerance depend on equality and, as populists argue, Islam is unequal to our liberal worldview, and therefore it is not intolerant to treat Islam in a different way (Verkuyten, 2013).

There is a further implication of this “reversal of tolerance.” In their fight against the alleged Islamization of the West, populist politicians give a reified and essentialist representation of Islam as being intrinsically contradictory to “our” tolerant norms and values (Lazar & Lazar, 2004; Wood & Finlay, 2008). A representation of profound and inherent cultural differences is typical of a cultural racist discourse in which minority cultures are defined as subordinate, backward, or inferior, and the majority culture needs protection (Barker, 1981; Wieviorka, 1995). Yet, the notion of tolerance has also been criticized for reifying and essentializing group identities (W. Brown, 2008). A cultural essentialist discourse can be found among minority groups and proponents of diversity and toleration. They emphasize the self-defining importance of genuine cultural differences and therefore the need to tolerate these differences (Verkuyten, 2003). Cultural essentialism is an important political tool for ethnic and racial minority groups (Hodgson, 2002; Morin & Saladin d’Anglure, 1997). Culture is the socially right category on which to rest the claim for group rights and to argue for toleration of one’s authentic identity.

The social-psychological implication is that cultural essentialism is not just oppressive but can have strategic advantages for minority groups. Essentialist beliefs are typically examined as supporting prejudice and discrimination against minorities and as rationalizing social hierarchies and existing social arrangements (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). However, for ethnic and racial minority groups, higher in-group essentialism can be expected to go together with stronger demands for group rights and toleration. Research has shown that minorities use essentialism to counter the denial of their identity (Morton & Postmes, 2009; Verkuyten, 2003), and that majority members reject essentialism when they argue against multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2003) and when it is used to exclude them (Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2009). Future research should examine the strategic aspects of cultural essentialism in relation to toleration.

### The Intergroup Context of Tolerance

The aim of toleration is not to abolish the “us–them” distinction but rather to ensure peaceful coexistence between the two. Toleration refers to a relation between those who tolerate and those who are tolerated, between subjects and objects of toleration. This means that the relevant intergroup context needs to be taken into account to understand how toleration is experienced and practiced. This context can be characterized by a difference in power and status whereby the powerful majority permits dissenting minority groups to live according to their way of life. Alternatively, the intergroup context can be more equal in which there is mutual respect between the tolerating parties. In the former situation, the relation of toleration is vertical or hierarchical, whereas in the latter it is horizontal. This difference in intergroup context corresponds to the permission and respect understanding of toleration, respectively (Forst, 2012).

### Permission Understanding

Toleration according to this conceptualization implies that the dominant majority has the power to interfere with the practices of a minority but nevertheless tolerate (some of) these practices. Thus, the majority allows minorities certain privileges on conditions specified by them, such as allowing Muslims to pray at work, but not during office hours; and to allow political protests to take place outside government buildings, but only if they do not disrupt the daily functioning of the offices. The qualified permission to the minority group members to live according to their beliefs affirms the dominant position of the majority. As a corollary, the minority should accept its minority position and not claim equal...
public and political status. A historical example of this is the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which was characterized by religious and linguistic pluralism. The empire was very accommodating toward the different religious communities (the millets) that had a great deal of autonomy, but this relied on the official toleration position taken by the government for the sake of peace (Walzer, 1997).

The reasons for granting minority groups qualified permission to practice their own beliefs can be pragmatic or principled. Pragmatically, toleration can be considered the least costly way to accommodate diversity without disturbing existing social order and civil peace. A more principled reason is when one finds it morally problematic to force people to give up their identity-defining norms and practices as witnessed in the forced assimilation programs of indigenous populations in America (Heart & DeBruyn, 1998; Hoxie, 1984) and Australia (Haebich, 2008; Van Krieken, 1999).

These norms and practices are often tolerated as long as they are confined to the private realm of the minority community or do not interfere with public life. In line with this reasoning, research in the American context reveals that people show greater national exclusion and dislike for ethnic minorities (e.g., Chinese Americans and Native Americans) after exposure to six individuals from the ethnic group speaking a language other than English in public spaces relative to when these individuals speak the same language in the privacy of their home (Yogeeswaran, Adelman, Parker, & Dasgupta, 2014; Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta, Adelman, Eccleston, & Parker, 2011). However, seeing the same ethnic minority individuals speak a language other than English in the privacy of one’s home had no effect on one’s attitudes or national inclusion of the ethnic group relative to baseline controls suggesting that people specifically frowned upon public expressions of ethnic identity. Such negative reactions toward public expressions of ethnic identity were especially strong among Americans who strongly identified with the nation (Yogeeswaran et al., 2014).

The permission form of toleration implies a strong “us-them” distinction whereby the majority is the subject of toleration and minorities the object of it. Because it confirms the dominant position of the majority, it is likely that it is endorsed more strongly among politically right-wing (compared with left-wing) individuals who tend to have antiegalitarian beliefs such as those high in social dominance orientation (Jost et al., 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, research has shown that political conservatives and those high in right-wing authoritarianism react especially negatively toward immigrants and ethnic minorities after exposure to diversity messages (Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & Wagner, 2013; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). A permission form of toleration is also more likely in settings in which there is a stable and clear group-based hierarchy, whereas it is less likely when the intergroup context is rather insecure (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Giving qualified permission to minorities to live according to their beliefs is less threatening in a context in which the intergroup structure is perceived to be relatively stable and legitimate. Such a context makes it less likely that qualified permission is a stepping stone for minority groups to organize themselves and act collectively to challenge and change the status quo (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Future research should systematically examine the influence of these intergroup factors on toleration and its limits.

**Respect Understanding**

The respect understanding of toleration involves a more equal relationship between groups (Galeotti, 2002; Honneth, 1995). While groups hold very different beliefs about the good life and have different cultural or religious norms and practices, they recognize and respect each other as equal citizens with the same rights and liberties. Here the subjects of toleration are at the same time the objects of it. An example is the pillarization history in the Netherlands, a country often celebrated for its tolerance (Lechner, 2008). Traditionally, Roman Catholics lived in the southern part of the country, while Lutheran, Reformed, and Dutch Reformed lived in the northern part. These religious differences were institutionalized in the separate, “pillarized” state structure (together with a social democratic pillar) with parallel newspapers, broadcasting stations, labor unions, medical organizations, schools, and political parties. The different groups knew that they will not agree about the good life but accepted others as equal citizens. In practice, the respect understanding of toleration can take two different forms with different implications for intergroup relations (Forst, 2012): the formal equality model, and the qualitative equality model of toleration.

The **formal equality model** is based on a strict distinction between the public and private sphere. Beliefs and practices related to group identities are confined to the private domain, and the general citizenship values and principles apply to the public sphere. The French secular republicanism is a clear example. It implies, for example, that religious symbols are not tolerated in public schools in which children are educated to be autonomous citizens. As a result, Muslim students are not allowed to wear headscarves to school just as Christians are not allowed to wear a necklace with a cross. The formal equality model comes down to color blindness whereby a secular citizen identity has primacy.

Social-psychological research in the American context has shown that color-blind ideologies are endorsed more strongly by majority compared with minority group members, and that this ideology can be used to rationalize minority group disadvantages and leads to more negative attitudes toward minorities (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2015; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Yet, this ideology can be defined in different ways, and its understanding depends on the national context. For example, color blindness has quite a different meaning in France compared with the United States. In the former country, it is positively associated with multiculturalism because both reflect a commitment to equality...
(Guimond et al., 2014; see also Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & Judd, 2015). And because the shared citizenship identity is central, it is possible that color blindness does not lead to a more positive attitude toward a dissenting out-group but does have a positive effect on toleration. Similarly, multiculturalism which calls for the recognition of cultural differences may also promote greater toleration as people may recognize differences they may not agree with, but nevertheless accept. For example, multiculturalism in education does not have to discourage children from having any objections to things that conflict with what they strongly believe or value, but can focus on encouraging them to be tolerant. Future research should examine the importance of these different cultural diversity ideologies for toleration across varied national contexts. Although many studies have examined the effects of diversity ideologies on out-group attitudes (see Deaux & Verkuyten, 2014; Rattan & Ambady, 2013), little is known about their role in toleration and its limits.

A problem with the formal equality model is that it considers cultural identities as private affairs that do not require public enactment. Yet, a rigid distinction between the private and public realm can be quite difficult when identity-defining beliefs and practices are involved, such as with religion. Such a distinction would mean that a true believer can only be a Muslim, Christian, or Jew at home or in his or her own religious community. Social identities, however, are not like private beliefs but require social validation. They do not simply exist in people’s head but are bound up with socially defined distinctions that position people in the world and have real social implications (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Verkuyten, 2005). For example, one’s ethnic identity can be very present in one’s thoughts, but that identity must be recognized and accepted by other people. Self-verification theory argues that individuals seek out external verification from others about their internally held identities, regardless of whether the self-view is positive or negative (see North & Swann, 2009, for a review). In addition, research on identity denial has demonstrated that denying one’s social identity leads to negative emotions and attempts at proving one’s belongingness in the group (Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011; see also Huynh, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that not only the freedom of belief should be protected but also the freedom to publicly express one’s belief in appropriate practices.

This problem with the formal equality model is acknowledged in the qualitative equality model of toleration (Forst, 2012). This model considers identity-defining beliefs and practices as sufficient grounds to exempt certain groups from the rules or behavioral codes that apply to everyone else. As a result, group members are respected as equals and also as having a distinct cultural identity that should be tolerated. For example, in some contexts, Sikhs have been exempt from wearing motorcycle helmets and being allowed to carry their kirpans (dagger) in public places. As such, tolerance denotes higher level unity (equal citizenship) rather than lower level uniformity.

In social-psychological terms, this latter understanding of toleration is similar to dual identity models of intergroup relations, but with some interesting twists. Dual identity models (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2009) propose that the combination of subgroup and superordinate identities is most promising for developing harmonious intergroup relations in plural societies. Dual identities would reduce subgroup identity threat, and the shared superordinate identity would stimulate positive attitudes and cooperation with other subgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Out-group members will be evaluated more positively when they are seen as part of a shared superordinate category through processes that involve pro-in-group bias (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is especially likely when the superordinate category is represented as a dual identity that affirms subgroup distinctiveness in the context of common belonging (R. Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dovidio et al., 2009; but see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

However, the qualitative equality understanding of toleration is different in at least three respects. First, this understanding is not concerned with the development of more positive intergroup attitudes but rather with accepting things that one continues to object to. Second, the basis for acceptance is not, for example, pro-in-group bias or increased cooperation because of reduced subgroup threat (Hewstone & Brown, 1986), but respect for others as equal citizens (Simon, Mommert, & Renger, 2015). This respect is a form of social recognition (Honneth, 1995) and balances people’s objection, making it possible to tolerate out-group members’ way of life. Thus, the social-psychological processes behind the dual identity model and the equality toleration understanding seem to be different, and this should be examined empirically.

Third, the nature of the dual identity representation differs. Specifically, the focus in the equality understanding of toleration is on equal citizenship or one’s membership of a particular political unit. So the emphasis is on the combination of specific cultural identities with equal rights and liberties. In contrast, dual identity models in social psychology tend not to specify the identity content. To measure a sense of dual identity, people are asked about their level of ethnic and national sense of belonging (“I identify with my ethnic group,” “I identify with the national category”) or requested to indicate to what extent they identify with hyphenated labels such as African-American, Turkish-German, or British-Muslim (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2015). Yet, it makes a difference whether individuals identify with a national community of people, a particular territory and history, mainstream cultural beliefs and practices, or rather with political institutions (S. Gibson & Condor, 2009). The content of the identity provides direction for how to perceive, evaluate, and behave in situations of identity salience (Turner et al., 1987). Citizenship implies membership of a particular polity and involves the acceptance of other group identities.
as moral and political equals. The result is not the recognition and valuing of cultural differences, as in forms of multiculturalism, but rather the acceptance of other ways of life to which one continues to object to. Furthermore, the respect understanding of toleration implies that the limits of tolerance lie in the citizenship rights, duties, and liberties. One cannot tolerate illiberal practices when citizenship is defined in terms of liberal principles.

**Integrative Thoughts on Permission and Respect Understanding of Toleration**

The permission and respect understanding of toleration can be present in society at the same time and fuel conflicts about whether and to what extent certain practices should be accepted. From a permission understanding perspective, one can accept that a Muslim woman is a teacher at a public school but not with a headscarf. This is problematic from the perspective of a respect understanding because the headscarf might be an intrinsic part of her religious identity. A research example comes from a large-scale study of majority Germans where approximately 70% accepted the right of Muslim women to wear headscarves, and of Muslims to build Mosques and to have Islamic education at German public schools (Van der Noll, 2012). Yet, less than 6% accepted the idea of an important Islamic holiday becoming a national holiday in Germany. Accepting that Muslims can practice their religion similar to other religious groups is one thing, but symbolically incorporating them as equals with public recognition of their identity is something else. This finding illustrates that toleration has important implications for group identities and intergroup relations. And because much is at stake, strong debates exist. In several European countries, opponents of the headscarf argue it should be banned in public places because it is a sign of intolerance and gender inequality. In contrast, others argue that it would be an act of intolerance if Muslim women were not able to wear a headscarf (see Verkuyten, 2014).

Unfortunately, there is hardly any systematic theoretical and empirical research on the differences and relations between the permission and respect understanding of toleration. We do not know how people perceive and assess these different understandings and how these influence (in)tolerance judgments and behaviors. Therefore, empirical research would strongly benefit from examining how contexts that characterize the permission and respect understanding of tolerance impact out-group attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, as well as one’s self-conceptions.

**To Be Tolerated: The Targets’ Perspective**

Toleration is a necessity for living together and “to be the object of tolerance is a welcoming improvement on being the object of intolerance” (Horton, 1996, p. 35). Toleration has several positive consequences for minorities. It allows them to express their cultural identities, provides access to resources and rights, and protects them from violence. Toleration gives minority citizens the freedom and right to define and develop their own ways of life. Most ethnic, religious, sexual, and other minorities do not proselytize but rather try to convince others to expand the scope of acceptable positions or their latitudes of acceptance (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In terms of minority influence research, these minorities try to increase the societal tolerance of diversity rather than seeking to convert society to their position. Experimental research has shown that minority members advocating tolerance compared with seeking conversion valued the group more, were more likely to consider themselves a member of the group, and were more loyal to the group (Prislin & Filson, 2009; Shaffer & Prislin, 2011).

However, toleration is only likely to fully satisfy minority members when they themselves accept that what they do is in some respect objectionable. If not, negative social-psychological implications are likely, especially in the context of the permission understanding of tolerance whereby toleration can be seen as “a word signifying power, domination and exclusion” (Forst, 2012, p. 3). A well-known quote from the German thinker and writer, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1829), states, “Tolerance should be a temporary attitude only: it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult” (cited in Forst, 2012, p.3). It is argued that “mere” tolerance is not enough because toleration would be a poor substitute for the recognition and affirmation that minority members deserve and need (Parekh, 2000).

There is a sizable literature on the “target’s perspective” that is concerned with the social-psychological implications of belonging to a devalued, discriminated, or stigmatized minority group (Major, Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998). Such research examines the influence of negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination on minority members’ psychological well-being (Pascoe & Richman, 2009; D. R. Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999); academic adjustment (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Schmader, Major, & Gramzow, 2001); group identification (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999); and collective action (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). With discrimination, social identities are at stake because people are treated unjustly on the basis of their group membership. Being the victim of discrimination implies a lack of control, lower status, and a lack of belonging. Psychologically, blaming outcomes on discrimination acknowledges that these are under the control of prejudiced others (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). This may protect feelings of self-worth (e.g., “that employer discriminated against me and therefore it is not my fault that I did not get the job”) and also threatens one’s sense of control over personal outcomes (e.g., “not me, but the employer decides my life”; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Major et al., 2002; Ruggiero & Taylor, 1997).
Publicly interpreting events in terms of discrimination also elicits negative social costs. Experimental research has demonstrated that individuals who report discrimination are perceived negatively by others (e.g., being “moaners” or embracing victimhood), even when discrimination was the clear cause of the event (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). In addition, it has been found that in the presence of majority group members, ethnic minorities are relatively unwilling to report that negative events occurring to them are the result of discrimination (Stangor, Van Allen, Swim, & Sechrist, 2002). Furthermore, coethnics can also react negatively toward individual group members, for example, when they fear that they themselves or their entire ethnic group will be labeled as moaners who avoid responsibility for their lives (Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005).

By contrast to the rather large social-psychological literature on the effects of being a target of prejudice and discrimination, very little is known about the social-psychological implications of being the object of toleration. Tolerance is the opposite of discrimination and implies that minority members are permitted or allowed to express and enact their group identity. However, being tolerated may still have negative consequences on the individual and their group. We propose that there are several possible negative consequences of the experience of toleration, especially in its permission understanding form that may help to understand why people often do not like to be tolerated. These consequences should be examined in future research.

**Implications for Belonging, Self-Esteem, and Well-Being Among the Tolerated**

First, toleration implies objection toward one’s values, beliefs, and practices and can be experienced as nonintervention based on a dismissive attitude: The majority grudgingly agrees to turn a blind eye or puts up with minorities. In doing so, the larger society’s dislike and disapproval of minority identities and practices is implicitly affirmed. What is being tolerated transgresses or deviates from what is considered appropriate and normative and this implied deviance and inferiority thereby threatens a valued group membership among the tolerated. Such an identity threat may negatively impact (collective) self-esteem (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994) and well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999) among the tolerated. In such a context, the tolerated may react with stronger in-group closure and out-group derogation, especially among higher identifiers and when the social structure is thought to be stable and legitimate (Branscombe et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Relatively, being tolerated may also undermine one’s sense of belonging thereby impacting (collective) self-esteem and well-being. Tolerance can define minorities as second-class citizens and legitimizes and reinforces the power of those who extend the tolerance. There is no full inclusion on equal footing as the majority. This means that toleration can be perceived as an (implicit) form of unequal treatment whereby society itself is not considered just and worthwhile and the practices and policies of toleration are seen as confirming the lack of social recognition and respect (Honneth, 1995). Such a perspective may imply that the tolerated individual or group feel a decreased sense of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) within society as their practices are merely being tolerated but not valued. Such a threat to belonging may lead the tolerated to experience a host of negative emotions, decreased well-being, and reduced (collective) self-esteem. Future work can thereby benefit from examining the consequences of being “tolerated” for the target’s self-esteem, well-being, and sense of belonging within particular group contexts.

**Implications for Social Distancing, Perceived Control, and Collective Action Among the Tolerated**

One possible implication of being an object of toleration is that it will be more difficult to convince others of the negative implications of toleration, compared with the negative implications of discrimination. While people in many places recognize that it is wrong to discriminate (and it is illegal to do so in many countries), it is much more challenging to demonstrate the harm of being tolerated. The social accusations and possible costs of discussing tolerance are likely to be different. For example, rather than being seen as a moaner, one might be considered unreasonable and demanding. Minority and disadvantaged groups may, therefore, refrain from expressing their viewpoints on the topic to people in the majority or those belonging to privileged groups, which may promote greater social distancing.

A related implication of being “tolerated” is that it may undermine a perceived sense of control and feelings of (collective) efficacy. Tolerance affirms a relationship of inequality where the tolerated group is cast in an inferior position: “To tolerate someone else is an act of power; to be tolerated is an acceptance of weakness” (Walzer, 1997, p. 52). As tolerance implies that one has to rely on the self-restraint or “good grace” of the majority, tolerance can be experienced as an act of generosity whereby the object of tolerance should be thankful for being allowed to express their identity and are placed in a dependent and vulnerable position. One becomes dependent on the goodwill of the majority rather than to take control themselves. By feeling that one’s standing and membership within the larger community is precarious and dependent on the good grace of those around, the tolerated can feel a decreased sense of control over their own lives (Crocker et al., 1991; Major et al., 2002). Such a lack of perceived control may undermine personal and group efficacy. Psychological research has shown that this is a difficult situation that can lead to feelings of depression and helplessness, and a reduced willingness to act collectively against social inequality (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).
The latter implication would be that politics of toleration can lead minority members to attend less to group-based disparities and to engage in collective action that challenge and change these disparities. This possibility is reminiscent of Marcuse’s (1965) analysis of repressive tolerance as a subtle social mechanism contributing to domination: “what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression” (p. 81). This would mean that a focus on toleration can contribute to a further social-psychological understanding of why and when minority members’ willingness to protest on behalf of minority groups is undermined. Research has shown that an emphasis on a shared national identity can have such an undermining effect (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; Ufkes, Dovidio, & Tel, 2015). In addition, it has been demonstrated that positive contact with the dominant group can reduce awareness of group inequality and discrimination, and decreases support for social policies that benefit minorities (e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & Levin, 2012). Future research could examine whether, when, and why a politics of toleration has a weakening effect on minority member’s sense of control and collective action intentions or even feelings of personal efficacy in more everyday contexts.

**Discussion**

Toleration is a core feature of liberal democracy and a necessary condition for pluralistic societies. It makes difference possible by defining the conditions of peaceful coexistence. People inevitably and regularly object to ways of life other than their own, and despite such objection, they have to learn to live with it. Toleration does not require that people give up their objections of out-group norms, beliefs, and practices, which may in fact be very difficult, if not impossible, to do, but stimulates debate and mutual accommodation. However, the societal and everyday importance of toleration is ignored or underrated in social psychology, which has predominantly focused on the reduction of stereotypes and prejudices. Although the goal of reducing stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination is important, there are many situations where people may simply never see eye to eye or accept what are considered blasphemous, disastrous, or obscenely wrong out-group beliefs and practices; in such cases, members of these different groups should agree to peacefully coexist side by side.

We have tried to argue that toleration raises important and novel questions for social psychology and intergroup relations research in particular. We have discussed various implications, and for several of these implications there is empirical evidence. Yet, the different aspects should be examined more fully and systematically in future research. Thus, the suggested questions, paradoxes, and implications are meant as directions for further social-psychological theory and research on toleration. There are some additional issues that might be important for future work that we were not able to discuss thus far. We will briefly draw attention to three of these.

First, it is important to note that we have discussed toleration from a more cognitive, reflexive perspective that requires an active and principled balancing of different reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. The reason is that although the objection component of (weak) toleration might be based on gut feelings of dislike and related implicit, unconscious processes, this is less likely for the acceptance component that requires that people consider additional reasons to do so. Yet, it does mean that we did not consider more prereflexive forms of toleration whereby people habitually provide each other normative leeway. Future research examining automatic and controlled processes might be important to shed further light on these forms of toleration. It may be that toleration in its weak sense promotes lower levels of deliberate stereotyping and prejudice or lower levels of blatant discrimination as individuals self-regulate (Monteith et al., 2010) or control their negative sentiments. However, when it comes to automatic stereotyping and prejudice, it may be that people fail to refrain from discrimination (thereby failing to demonstrate toleration). By studying toleration using both explicit and implicit measures (e.g., Yogeeswaran, Devos, & Nash, 2016) as well as by using blatant and subtle discrimination paradigms (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Rooth, 2010), we may be able to better understand the nuanced ways in which toleration can impact intergroup relations.

Second, our aim was to provide a conceptual analysis that initiates new lines of intergroup and cultural diversity theory and research, rather than to develop a coherent theoretical framework or a particular conceptual model that can be tested empirically. This means that future work should examine possible social-psychological processes underlying tolerance as well as individual differences and social conditions that stimulate or hamper toleration. Future work could systematically examine, for example, why and when exactly people are tolerant and how they decide about the limits of toleration. In doing so, it is important to recognize that tolerance is not an all-or-none construct but depends on whom, what, and when people are asked to tolerate dissenting norms and practices (McClosky, & Brill, 1983; Sigelman & Toebben, 1992). People take into account various aspects of what they are asked to tolerate and the sense in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social implication of the behavior, and the underlying belief type of the dissenting norm or practice, all make a difference (e.g., Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). For example, the level of tolerance might depend on the type of social relationship. One might accept Muslim immigrants as co-nationals or co-residents in one’s neighborhood, but reject them in one’s sporting club or voluntary organization. There also are indications that people are more tolerant toward actions that are based on a different factual view of the world (“they think it is like that”) than on different moral beliefs (“they think that it is right and good”); for example, Wainryb, 1993; Wainryb
et al., 1998). For example, in one study, Dutch majority group adolescents were found to be more tolerant of Muslim practices based on dissenting cultural beliefs than on dissenting moral beliefs (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007). One reason for this was that the type of underlying belief could be used to infer intentions behind the practice that one objects to but is asked to accept. Ignorance and misinformation can be inferred from informational dissent, whereas badness or immorality is a more likely inference from moral dissent. Furthermore, it is important to examine different aspects of tolerance because accepting that people have different beliefs does not have to imply that one accepts that they act on those beliefs or that they try to persuade others to engage in such dissenting practices. Accepting that a religious group has a different religious belief is easier than accepting that they can enact their religious identity in public life (Yogeeswaran et al., 2011), and it becomes even more problematic when the group tries to mobilize others to also start practicing these beliefs in everyday life (e.g., by also wearing a headscarf or not shaking hands with someone of the opposite sex; Gieling, Thijs, & Verkuyten, 2010).

Third, we have discussed tolerance in terms of self-restraint and putting up with out-group norms and practices that one dislikes or disapproves of. This means that without objection, the question of tolerance does not arise. However, the distinction between dislike and disapproval indicates that the basis and strength of the objection can be different and might change. For example, people can gradually become acclimated to ideas and practices they once found very offensive (Chong, 1994). They can get used to living around groups with different cultural beliefs, customs, and practices, and become more inured to things that once bothered them (e.g., abortion, gay marriage). This does not mean that they no longer have objections, but these might be less strongly felt and less infused with fears and anxieties, and thus, there is less psychological balancing and tension and less need for self-restraint. Future research could examine tolerance in relation to the processes of psychological adaptation to changing norms and practices. People’s feelings about the things that they tolerate can gradually change and the limits of their tolerance can alter. In this respect, it also may be fruitful to consider the impact of promoting tolerance on majority group members’ stereotypes, prejudice, and discriminatory tendencies, this work has not examined the importance of toleration in intergroup relations. Toleration emphasizes civic identity and individuals’ freedom to define and develop their own identities, while offering crucial space for religious and cultural diversity. This means that it is important to consider and systematically investigate what the basis of the objection is, whether and when objectionable norms and practices should be tolerated or not, and what the social-psychological implications are of being tolerated.

In the present article, we have tried to offer an early mapping for a landscape that is largely unexplored by social psychologists. There is much to be discovered here, and our effort by no means is an adequate mapping of the whole terrain. We have identified some striking landmarks and put up some signpost that may be useful in further exploration. However, systematic attention for questions on tolerance is much needed as these can enhance the field’s contribution to the development of positive intergroup relations in plural societies. It can contribute to our continuing effort of developing a dynamic, challenging, and societally relevant social psychology.

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Notes
1. Dislike and disapproval may interrelate in a variety of ways, and the distinction is not always easy to make. Here we use these terms to explain the importance of different grounds for objection for understanding forms of toleration. For example, the distinction has implications for understanding the difference between religious and racial tolerance, and to assess in how far it is meaningful to speak about the latter.

2. One criticism is that the least-liked group approach implies that in comparing levels of tolerance, it is unclear whether the target groups are equally disliked. Furthermore, different societies or different generations within the same society might be considered equally (in)tolerant despite clear country differences or societal changes in the direction of more (or less) acceptance of new groups, lifestyles, habits, and customs (Chong, 1994). Asking people about the groups they themselves dislike implies that the objection is taken into account, but this can result in overlooking the fact that historically a society has become more tolerant. Similarly, it may overlook the fact that people living in liberal democratic societies are generally more tolerant than those living in dictatorial societies.

3. Obviously, in many cases it will not be straightforward what the merit of the objection is because it can be opaque or mixed. There will be hard cases and many disputes and disagreements but the important point is that it must be possible to recognize some (intersubjective) value in the objection.

Conclusion
In the past decade, social-psychological research on intergroup relations and cultural diversity has grown tremendously. While the great majority of studies on the topic have focused on negative stereotypes, prejudicial attitudes, and
4. This paradox has also led to the argument that genuine tolerance is almost impossible. For a true believer, it is very hard to be tolerant because the views and practices of the other are considered blasphemous or obscenely wrong: “any conviction potentially precludes tolerance toward dissidence from that conviction” (B. Williams, 1999, p. 69).

5. Although the exercise of tolerance presupposes the power to interfere and therefore applies to the majority group in particular, there can be a disposition to be tolerant or intolerant among minorities. Minority members might have the intention to interfere or not interfere if they had the power to do so, and this can also be examined.

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Measuring religious tolerance in education

Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among educators and their students worldwide

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Preface

This monograph forms part of the output of a research project about the issue of religious tolerance among educators, particularly teachers and their students or pupils. A series of articles on religious tolerance has already been published or is currently in press, each covering only a specific facet of the problem. It was envisaged right from the outset that not only conceptual and theoretical investigations would be launched into the matter of religious tolerance in education but that empirical work should also be done, in the form of a comparative study of how the 203 member states of the United Nations have been dealing with religious differences and with religion (education), and in the form of a questionnaire that could probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by educators (teachers) and student teachers, and the children in their care. This explains the origin of this monograph. It covers a number of conceptual and theoretical aspects regarding religious tolerance that normally would not be discussed in disparate journal articles, despite their importance for establishing the conceptual and theoretical substratum for a questionnaire. In this monograph, each of the items of the proposed questionnaire flows from a specific conceptually and theoretically developed viewpoint, enabling researchers to acquire a detailed picture of the extent to which educators and their students are tolerant of the religious views of others of a different religious persuasion.

The findings after the eventual application of the questionnaire will be of the greatest import for practising teachers and their pupils as well as for student teachers, in mono-religious, multi-religious, purported non-religious, post-religious, secular and / or post-secular\(^1\) settings (Taylor, 2007; Miedema, 2012). The findings will inform the former that there is a wider world outside of their particularist setting for which they have to prepare their students, and it will assist them to devise the necessary strategies for helping their students to cope with the challenges of multi-religionism. It will also enable them and their pupils to pre-empt the possible dangers of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and hence intolerance. Those in multi-religious and the other settings mentioned above, in turn, might learn from the results of the survey that they live in a complex world for which they have to prepare their students; they will in the process also learn (how) to avoid the possible dangers of unprincipled tolerance and laissez faire relativism.

I hereby express my gratitude to Dr Bram de Muynck, Lecturer at the Driestar Educatief, for the publication of this monograph, and especially to the panel of experts that he convened for the purpose of critically reviewing the manuscript. I also thank my colleagues Ferdinand Potgieter and Charl Wolhuter who critically reviewed the text of this monograph. I take responsibility for any mistakes and shortcomings remaining after this painstaking process and would welcome any advice for the improvement not only of this monograph but also of the questionnaire that it has given birth to.

Hannes van der Walt

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\(^1\)“Post-secular” in this context refers to the period in which we now live, a period in which a variety of meaning choices, including choices of a religious or spiritual nature, is possible.
Measuring religious tolerance in education

Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among educators and their students worldwide

The need for an instrument to measure religious tolerance

While his remark may sound cynical, Gray (2003: 12) is probably right in saying that humanity as such does not exist; there are only human beings driven by conflicting needs and illusions, and subject to every kind of infirmity of will and judgement. Because of this, human beings are unable to live together peacefully, and are often engaged in strife, whether on a personal, community or (inter-)national level. For some or other reason, people are either always in competition with one another or in conflict. Conflict can be caused by different interests, aspirations, gender, race, religion and faith. Alford (2009: 57) regards the latter, in the form of religious fundamentalism, as the cause of many of the world’s ills, including religious intolerance.

A study of the role played by religious ideas in the great clashes between civilisations is instructive (Wright, 2010: 5). Even Christianity which generally regards itself as a balanced religion (with exceptions, of course) has not always been good. According to Van der Walt (2007: 159), the many heresies among Christians, injustice and even violence in the name of Christendom all through the past 2000 years clearly illustrate the fact that no faith is perfect and above criticism. Much of Christianity’s history since the 17th century concurred with the rise of modernism, of which the Holocaust is emblematic.

Despite unparalleled advances in almost every field of human endeavour, especially technology, our streets abound with the hungry and homeless, violence and war continue to plague us (Olthuis, 2012: 2/7). Especially religious conflict is rife, as can be observed in the Middle East, North and West Africa, and of which the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 can be regarded as emblematic. No matter how promising the idea of non-oppositional differences with other people, the ever-present economy of violence makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to put into practice, says Olthuis.

To further demonstrate the nature of the minefield in which we find ourselves with regard to religious violence and conflict, De Vos (2011) mentions that many passages in religious texts might appear inexplicable, demonstrably false, deeply hurtful, offensive and harmful to any reasonable person not blinded by his or her own cultural and religious commitments. According to him, many

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2Readers wishing to begin with a technical discussion of the meaning of “tolerance” could first read Sections 7 and 8 of this monograph, particularly the second technical point where the word is semantically examined. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, “tolerance” can mean any of the following: 1. the capacity to endure pain or hardship: endurance, fortitude, stamina; 2. sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one’s own (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tolerance). (In)tolerance is an attitude with regard to, or response to a characteristic of an individuals or of a group; religious (in)tolerance, in particular is seen as an attitude that (a) flows from religious motives and/or (b) is directed at persons or groups from other religions.
passages in the Bible and the Quran may be interpreted as containing hate speech against women, gay men and lesbians, while other passages may be interpreted as inciting violence, either directly or indirectly, against women, gay men and lesbians. Other examples of religious intolerance are the reactions of many people to the Rastafarian claim that partaking in the holy herb of cannabis will bring them closer to God, to the widespread practice among Muslims and Jews to cut off a part of a baby boy’s penis shortly after birth, and to the practice among Hindu school girls who attempt to wear nose studs in state schools in South Africa (De Vos, 2011b).

The need for tolerance\(^3\) has not only increased because of an epidemic of hate crimes, but also because of daily social interactions that require treating one another with respect and dignity. (Religious) intolerance is most frequently reflected in classroom, hallway and playground insults\(^4\), angry outbursts, social cliques, put-downs and dismissals of others’ viewpoints during class discussions (cf. Gateways to Better Education, 2005: 1,2; Schweitzer, 2007: 89).

The current strife in Syria, the recent “Arabic Spring” uprisings and the conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south of Nigeria and Mali count as examples of religious (and ethnic) conflict. Peck (2006: 173) correctly points out that differences can exist between atheists and theistic believers as well as within religious groups. “We see dogmatism, and proceeding from dogmatism, we see wars and inquisitions and persecutions. We see hypocrisy: people professing the brotherhood of man killing their fellows in the name of faith, lining their pockets at the expense of others, and practicing all manner of brutality” (Peck, 2006: 184). In Wright’s (2009: 421) view, “the bulk of westerners and the bulk of Muslims are in a deeply non-zero-sum relationship, [and] by and large aren’t very good at extending moral imagination to one another”. Alford (2009: 57) concurs with him in saying that religious fundamentalism seems to be the cause of many of the world’s ills, the reason for this being that people tend to operate from a narrower frame of reference (world view) than what they are capable of, thereby failing to transcend the influence of their particular religion, culture, particular set of parents and childhood experience upon their understanding (Peck, 2006: 180).

Tensions and attitudes such as those just mentioned are understandable because of the importance of religion to every person. Religious tenets, convictions, attitudes and behaviours of people that contradict one’s own deepest religious convictions are not easily tolerated, and are often seen as a threat. On the one hand, Van der Walt (2007: 160, 162) avers, almost all religions preach love for one’s neighbour; on the other, violence is committed in the name of the very same religions. Large numbers of people on earth suffer from the scourge of intolerance (Wright, 2009: 5). In view of this, Needleman (2008: 99) despairingly concludes: “All we can say is that our religious ideals, our moral

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\(^3\) The contents of this paragraph pertain to violent societies such as those of South and West Africa. It is not as applicable to other societies, such as that of the Netherlands, where conflict does not necessarily rise from religious differences but rather from political and ethnical differences. The growing presence of immigrant groups (Moroccans, Antillians, Turks, Surinams and so on) has been the cause of conflict. In some cases, populistic politicians have ascribed the conflict also to religious differences by pointing fingers at, for instance, Islam. This is not done, however, on the basis of a pertinent Christian or other religious motive but rather to score political points. Academics in the Netherlands are therefore hesitant to ascribe this form of intolerance to religious differences.

\(^4\) This monograph, as its sub-heading indicates, focuses on the situation in schools and broader pedagogical contexts. The problem of (religious and cultural) intolerance surfaces in all spheres of life, however.
resolves, our ideologies, our campaigns, however honourably conceived, have not prevented – and perhaps have even hastened – the arrival of our world and our lives at the rim of despair and destruction”. We find ourselves in the moral dilemma of, on the one hand, attempting to destroy one another, and on the other hand, to save one another (Grayling, 2010: 7).

All of these conflicts, Wright (2010: 127) insists, demand a hermeneutic of understanding that is inseparable from moral obligation (cf. Levinas and Ricoeur). This has been recognised by humankind. From its very beginning, says Gray (2009: 11), moral philosophy has been a struggle to exorcise conflict among individuals and groups from ethical life. In the (ancient Greek) city, as in the soul, harmony has been the ideal. There has always been a search for harmony of values. The same can be said of politics, Comte-Sponville (2005: 13-14) avers. We need politics so that conflicts of interest can be resolved without violence, and so that the powers of humankind can be united rather than opposed. Comte-Sponville (2005: 15) goes so far as to define politics as the management of conflicts, alliances of balances and power without resort to violence or war, not simply among individuals but also in society as a whole. Politics presupposes conflict, albeit governed by moral rules, compromises, albeit provisional, and eventually agreements on how to resolve disagreements. Also somewhat cynically, Hampshire (2003: 134) contends that political thought is no longer guided by the positive vision of what an ideal society should be like but rather on the negative vision, on what is wrong with society, and tries to remedy that. According to Hampshire (2003: 140-142), conflict resolution lies at the heart of political justice, and that demands conflict resolution mechanisms such as arbitration, a search of balance between conflicting interests and convergent reasoning. All these processes, he admits, are risky; they can go wrong.

The above underscores the importance of investigating the problem of religious tolerance respectively religious intolerance, particularly in education. It is not our purpose in this monograph to enter into a discussion about how to actually resolve religious, cultural and political conflict⁵. The above merely provides background and rationale for our efforts in the rest of this paper to embark on the development of an instrument to measure the degree of religious tolerance (or intolerance, as the case may be) among teachers and their students (pupils). Leutwyler, Petrovic and Mantel (2012: 111) correctly point out that teachers are central actors in education; they are expected to provide equal educational opportunities to all children, irrespective of religious or cultural orientation. These authors refer to research on teacher competence that shows that “teachers’ personal dispositions are crucial for performing specific functions and tasks in teaching” and that these dispositions “correspond to deeply held beliefs, values and norms which are strongly anchored in individuals’ subjective theories⁶. These subjective theories may interfere with the normative claims inherent to the officially taught concepts how to teach productively in culturally diverse settings”. Because, as will be argued below, some of these privately held theories of teachers may impact on the degree of tolerance that teachers are prepared to display with respect to other

⁵ It is important to note that there does not seem to be a necessary and linear connection or causal relationship between religiosity and intolerance. The possibility exists, however, as has been shown, that people may be intolerant on religious grounds of other individuals and groups. Empirical research is required to understand the extent of this phenomenon, and to devise a strategy to combat the problem.

⁶ Life and world views, life concepts, see the discussion of the “fishbowl” below. These subjective theories represent the individuals’ cognitions about the world and their connected emotions, volitions and motivations. They express, therefore, the individuals’ understandings and interpretations of how the world functions; they express how individuals have constructed their world views, in other words: their realities (Leutwyler et al, 2012: 111-112).
teachers and to children of a different religious orientation, we have to find ways and means to measure their dispositions in dealing with religious heterogeneity.

Once the degree of religious tolerance respectively intolerance has been measured attention can be paid to the issue of eradicating the scourge of religious intolerance (if indeed it exists, as we suppose it does). This has become necessary because of the much greater diversity in our societies than ever before and because of the religious intolerance under which many individuals and the world in general have been staggering of late. The former “foreign” religions have in recent times become our “neighbour” religions. As the intermingling and contact increases, the potential for conflict also increases (Van der Walt, 2007: 154). The time has indeed come to “dance with diversity and value pluralism” in the form of having empathy with the other, and to enter into dialogue with the other (Schreiner, 2005: 13).

**Steps taken to draft an instrument to measure tolerance**

The end destination of the discussion in this monograph is the construction of a questionnaire regarding religious tolerance / intolerance based on a plausible theoretical foundation. Each item in the questionnaire should be traceable to a particular theoretical insight thereby ensuring construct and content validity for the entire questionnaire (see Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011: 188-189 for a detailed discussion of these forms of validity). As far as could be ascertained, no questionnaire based on theories such as the radical centre of value theory, modus vivendi theory, social imagination theory and several other similar theories exists, which underscores the necessity of not only developing such a questionnaire and also to theoretically justify every item therein.

The construction of the questionnaire on religious tolerance entails a number of distinctive steps. A section of this monograph will be devoted to each of those steps. The discussion of each step will result in the formulation of one or more items that could become part of the final questionnaire. After working through the different steps, and after formulating the envisaged items for the questionnaire, all the items will be brought together in a separate final section (see the following diagram for a visual outline of the steps followed in the rest of this monograph).

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7 The use of Bennett’s model in this study should not be construed that the stadia of cultural diversity, from ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism exactly coincide with the degree of religious tolerance or intolerance, as the case may be. The concept “cultural diversity” (at which Bennett’s instrument is aimed) has a broader meaning than “religion”. In a sense, culture can also embrace religion. Use was made of Bennett’s distinctions for the purpose of measuring the attitudes or perceptions regarding others, in the broadest sense of the word.

8 As mentioned, (in)tolerance need not be necessarily religiously inspired. This monograph is interested, however, in (in)tolerance that is indeed religiously inspired.

9 The instrument to measure (religious) tolerance flowing from this monograph can be used for various purposes, for instance by someone interested in measuring religious tolerance in a culturally and religiously diverse setting, or by someone interested in measuring tolerance of this nature in a relatively religiously homogeneous setting.

10 Tolerance can also be construed in psychological terms. It will become clear from the rest of this discussion that the instrument to measure tolerance is not of a psychological nature but rather of a religious philosophical nature.

11 The drafting and editing of an actual questionnaire on (religious) tolerance among school teachers and their students will of course require further processing.
The steps of constructing an instrument for measuring religious
tolerance among teachers and students (pupils) worldwide

1. Orientation: the personal “fishbowl”

According to Olthuis (2012: 1/7\textsuperscript{12}), the growing realisation that there are no innocent, unbiased ways of looking at the world, that everyone wears “glasses” and looks at the world through a peculiar lens, window or frame, has given common currency to the idea of worldview. His view coincides with that of Hawking and Mlodinow (2010: 23) who came up with the following rather apt description of what has commonly become known as a life view, a worldview or a life and worldview:

A few years ago the city council of Monza, Italy, barred pet owners from keeping goldfish in curved goldfish bowls. The measure’s sponsor explained the measure by saying that it is cruel to keep a fish in a bowl with curved sides because, gazing out, the fish would have a distorted view of reality. But how do we know we have a true, undistorted picture of reality? Might not we ourselves also be inside some big goldfish bowl and have our vision distorted by an enormous lens? The goldfish’s picture of reality is different from ours, but can we be sure it is less real?

It is now generally acknowledged, Olthuis (2012: 1/7, 4/7) claims, that everyone comes outfitted with a wide array of faith-based pre-judgments, that everyone has built-in biases, and that knowledge is perspectival, world-viewish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, and never is universal or absolute. A world view is the pre-conceptual orienting lens or glasses in and through which people reach out to the world even as the world impinges on them. World-viewing or world-visioning, he is convinced, is a complex, developmental (as will be demonstrated below) and two-way looking process (also discussed below) (Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).

Van der Walt’s (1999: 48 ff.) catalogue of the features of a life view casts light on the nature of a life and world view. A life and worldview is a way of looking at reality; it orientates a person and helps him/her to understand the world; it is a unity; it can be both descriptive and prescriptive; it demands full commitment; it is typically human; it is pre-scientific or pre-theoretical; it is a deep-seated source of action; it provides a definite view of reality but nevertheless remains fallible, and it evokes deeply felt emotions in the person. Important in Van der Walt’s (1999: 51-2) description of the structure of the fishbowl / the life and world view is his contention that a life and world view is a connection between a person’s faith and his or her practical everyday life. Each person believes in something; faith plays an important role in the lives of all people in that it gives direction to life. A person’s life view, Van der Walt maintains, gives hands and feet to a person’s faith, renders faith into something relevant for everyday life. In his words: A life view is a vision of faith for life. It also works in the opposite direction: a person forms a vision of life and then changes his or her faith accordingly: a vision of life for faith. Olthuis (2012: 4/7) agrees: as a person grows up, his or her experiences determine how he or she responds and acts to what they see and experience. Put differently, a worldview is not only a vision of the world, but it is at the same time a vision for the world.

\textsuperscript{12} This article is in electronic format. The page reference means “page 1 of 7”.
Hawking and Mlodinow’s metaphor is particularly apt in the case of religious attitude and viewpoint in that it reveals several things to us. Firstly, all people find themselves “swimming” inside their own respective religious and life and worldview “fishbowls”, in some cases for the span of an entire life without ever inquiring about the distortions created by the “glass sides” of the bowl or whether what is seen through the sides is “correct” by generally accepted standards or the standards of other people. Applied to religion, this could mean that a person “swims” within the confines of a fishbowl the size of, and the opaqueness of the sides of which are determined by a particular religion. He or she might have been born within that religion, grown up, been educated in terms of it, and now lives in accordance with its tenets without ever questioning the “correctness” or (the word is used advisedly) the “truth” of what is perceived through the sides of the fishbowl.

Secondly, the metaphor underscores the fact that people might have a skewed picture of the reality outside, and would not know about their distorted view of reality, unless of course the distortions are pointed out to them by people looking in through the sides of their particular fishbowls. This tells us that Socrates was correct in stating that the unexamined life is not worth living (Armstrong, 2001:67). While we will never have any guarantees or warranties that we will gain a “more correct” or “truer” picture of reality by attempting to look at reality through the sides of other people’s fishbowls, we could get a better understanding of reality and of our own place therein by doing so. Put differently, we need to examine our own fishbowl perspective as well as those of others in order to see whether we could come to a better view and understanding of life and of the world. This means that we have to occasionally change our fishbowl perspective. As Peck (2006: 33) observed:

...we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our maps will be. (...) the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The world is constantly changing. (...) the vantage point from which we view the world is (also) constantly and quite rapidly changing. (...) We are daily bombarded with new information as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually revise our maps¹³, and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we must make major revisions [to our map]. The process of making revisions, particularly major revisions, is painful...

Each individual has a life-map that changes frequently without that individual’s knowledge or conscious collaboration, or is deliberately changed by the individual him-/herself, depending on his / her experiences with regard to the world around him / her. To return to the original metaphor: a person is occasionally compelled to change his or her fishbowl perspective because of his or her interaction with reality and because of self-reflection. In extreme cases, the change might be radical, analogous to jumping from a round fishbowl into a square tank.

As mentioned, a world view is also a two-way bridge: a person’s perceptions might have an effect on the surrounding reality, and the person’s experiences in and with reality might impact on how he/she sees reality. Like a two-way bridge that carries traffic to and fro, a life view represents a

¹³ In view of Peck’s over-all argument, this revision should not be construed to mean that individuals have to engage in some or other empirical verification process in order to arrive at a form of truth that could be shared by all other people, universally, Peck merely draws attention to the fact that each person should revise his or her map to a level where it most adequately provides a grasp of reality or provides a depiction of reality.
process through which a person’s daily experiences help him or her to either confirm, question or correct his or her faith. According to Peck (2006: 179), in endeavouring to create a life view map that conforms to the reality of the cosmos and a person’s role in it, as best as a human being can know that reality, a person must constantly revise and extend his or her understanding to include new knowledge of the larger world. A person must constantly change and adapt his or her frame of reference regarding reality and the larger world. There is, according to Peck (2006: 182), no such thing as a good hand-me-down religion and life and worldview; to be vital, to be the best of which a person is capable, a person’s religion and concomitant life and worldview should be a wholly personal one, forged entirely through the fire of his or her questioning and doubting in the crucible of his or her own experience of reality. It is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness of our intuition, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) claims, by our bodily attunement, by our learned physical, emotional and moral reflexes, that we make our way in the world. Recognising the role of all our senses in finding our way in the world suggests that we would do well to talk of world orienting or world visioning rather than only world viewing. In saying this, he links up with views expressed by Heidegger and Gadamer: prejudgments are the frames, the pictures – the world views – from which and through which we see the world and make sense of it (Olthuis, 2012: 5/7). In a certain sense, a world view is not very stable because it is constantly changing, and – in the case of some people, even heterodox and eclectic – all features of a world view that postmodernists tend to exploit (Wright, 2010: 121, 123; Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).

As one grows up and forms a religious perspective and/or a life-view, one tends to fill one’s life-view with typical life-view content, among others convictions and assumptions about God/god, the world, the order in the world – including the place and duties of the human being – and about how all these entities cohere with one another. Everyone has an explicit or implicit set of ideas or beliefs as to the essential nature of the world (Peck, 2006: 174). No-one is able to live in a “fishbowl” defined by universal values only since such values are necessarily general and relatively indeterminate. As a person grows up and forms his or her life-map, he or she re-articulates the general or universal values in the language of norms. Norms, as Parekh (2000: 152) observes, relate values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted in a person’s life, and give them life-view content. Norms in turn can be articulated in either the language of rights or that of duties and obligations. This entire process is at best only “incompletely conscious” (Peck, 2006: 174). As individuals, people decide which values would support their principles and hence to make part of their world view (i.e. internalise as their own).

The values contained in a life and worldview place an imperative on a person to act in a manner consistent with what he or she regards as worth striving and living for, worth protecting, honouring and desiring (Nieuwenhuis, 2007: 9; Lusenga, 2010: 20).

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #1**:

1. With which religion do you associate yourself? If you associate yourself with a **mainstream** religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not associate yourself

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14 Each of the proposed items can be moulded into a more user friendly form in the questionnaire itself, among others by providing for various responses on a five-point Likert-type scale, and spaces in which to write open-ended responses.
with any mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.

Interpretation of the response: This item informs the researcher whether the respondent associates him- or herself with a mainstream religion, with a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or with no formal religion at all – as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without religion, however (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent.

2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and prescriptions of my religion and worldview” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on Bennett’s work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in a religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

2. Expectancy filters (theory)
Olthuis (2012: 4/7) recently developed an interesting theory about how children learn to look at the world around them. According to him, world-viewing or –visioning is a complex, developmental two-way learning process and a worldview is the pre-conceptual orienting glass or glasses (referred to above as the “fishbowl” in which a person lives or learns to live) in and through which a person reaches out to the world even as the world impinges on him or her. Under the guidance of their

15 See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect.
educators and through their educators’ eyes children develop expectancy filters that affect not only how and what they observe and experience but also how they respond and react to what they observe and experience. In other words, Olthuis says, a worldview is not only a vision of the world but also a vision for the world.

According to Olthuis (2012: 4-5/7), much of our relational knowledge is encoded in emotional meaning-patterns which act as expectancy filters or attachment filters that predispose from a certain point on how a person experiences relationships. This occurs automatically, without the person even being aware of it. Olthuis is convinced that a person would be aware of his or her experiences but not of the filter itself through which the person experiences. According to him, psychologists have identified at least four such expectancy or attachment filters. A person using a secure filter is able to trust others and is open to the world; a person with a pre-occupied filter is engrossed in efforts to get his or her own needs met and is inattentive to the needs of others; a person with a dismissing filter expects nothing of others and of the world, and tends to be disconnected from the self or others; a person with a fearful filter may need closeness with others and the world but at the same time is fearful of any closeness. If early formation is good enough, in other words if the attachment filters are ‘secure’, there will tend to be a ‘good enough’, continually recalibrating, mutually interactive fit between the explicit knowledge of a love-oriented, other-affirming world view and the person’s implicit gut knowledge. There will develop a double two-way movement: the implicit and explicit world views will interact dynamically and integrate in a positive growth spiral. The expressed and confessed world views will not only find embodied resonance in the implicit gut knowledge but they will act to encourage, direct and support explicit rituals, routines and rhythms in daily life. In that way world-viewing can play an indispensable role in the coming into being of liturgies of love, both personally and interpersonally in the various relationships that a person might find him- or herself.

If the formed expectancy filters are fearful, dismissive or pre-occupied rather than secure, there will be strong, if implicit, resistance to adopting and living out a love-oriented, other-affirming world view. More than that, Olthuis (2012: 5/7) maintains, there will be deep-seated impulses to thematise world views which justify and thus rationalise a person’s fears and dreads. Unless these resistances are worked through, adherence to the articulated world view will lead to half-hearted lip-service.

These expectancy or attachment filters, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) is convinced, act below a person’s awareness level but nevertheless give shape to how a person feels about him- or herself, and helps a person make sense of his or her life, God / god and others – in other words, it gives shape to a person’s life and world view. These filters, which can also be described as moods or patternings, form in early childhood experience and continue to play an indispensable and inextricable role in a person’s later efforts to explicitly thematise and conceptualise his or her life and world view.

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #2:**

1. (2.1) Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my existence. 2. I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be
bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me.

Interpretation of the responses: 1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their views. 2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated tolerance of others and their views.

3. The radical centre of values (theory)

In the culturally, including religiously, diverse and pluralistic societies and communities that can be found all over the post-Second World War world people have a desire, on the one hand, to pursue the interests of their own well-being, and on the other, to provide room for diverse positions and lifestyles. It is difficult, therefore, to find a single successful recipe or formula for ensuring both individual and group well-being and peaceful coexistence in the rich and complex diversity of social and moral phenomena that modern society consists of (Grayling, 2010: 10). Because of this difficulty, many communities depend on politics, the state and government to resolve conflicts of interests without violence and war, and also to unite all the forces in the community (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15). To reach a consensus of the kind needed to create a peaceful community all those whose interests are at stake tend to engage in a deliberative process of hearing all sides (Hampshire, 2003: 134, 137, 139). Such negotiations and arbitration require not only mechanisms through which all sides can be heard fairly but also institutions that can balance all the competing interests and the moral will among the participants to engage in the deliberations and to work across frontiers and the barriers that create divides among them. The arbitration about values regarding well-being, the common good and peaceful coexistence should be done fairly and justly, in a methodological and rational way, as far as possible under the guidance of recognised institutions and according to generally accepted procedures. Such interactive dialogue could lead to the discovery of common values that could be widely shared and even considered to be valid for the public domain (Van der Walt, 2007: 156).

A basic thesis of the radical centre of values theory that will be outlined in the rest of this Section is that, despite the diversity of interpretations of values that we encounter in the world, there is a core of universal values that all people can associate with and that they will find broadly acceptable (Alford, 2009: 57, 163). Awareness of such universal values requires that each person for a minute step back from themselves and their personal interests (Needleman, 2008: 108) and that they develop an attitude of not excluding others or proving that their way is the only true or acceptable way, but to give witness of how and why they see things as they do. In that way, Olthuis (2012: 3/7)
maintains, a person can invite all others to share their deepest feelings and convictions for mutual learning and benefit. He is convinced that the welfare of humankind (and the rest of reality, creation) depends on such interfaith negotiation.

As far back as 1990, cultural philosopher Frederick Turner (1990: 85, 97) wrote about the need for a “solvent” that could serve as a common medium for all kinds of cultural information. If we transpose his ideas about such a “solvent” to the realm of religious differences, he in effect claims that we can assume that once the bonds that hold the religious ideas and faith commitments of individuals and religious groups locked in a solid configuration are “loosed” by the solvent, in this case a radical centre of values, the elements of religion, being basically human, will have the hooks and valences to permit them to build up new coherent systems not limited to one religion. As the human race recognises itself as a “we” it will paradoxically be more and more surprised by the otherness of what was once considered familiar in the respective own religions. Elsewhere (Turner, 1990b: 745), he expresses the hope that moral values may one day be less arbitrary and thus more negotiable than they are today; that is, that it may be possible to develop some universal moral values from an understanding of human nature.

Needleman’s (2008: 108-109) “ethics of the threshold” is likewise a plea for the adoption of more permanent principles, in the sense of “universally accepted”. We need to find ways and means, he says, to be “outwardly in the street” in our actual lives, while somehow, or to some extent, also remaining inwardly in the theatre of the mind. Put differently, we need to step back from ourselves while wholeheartedly engaging our lives and answering its obligations. In his opinion, a new morality will emerge from this seemingly self-contradictory effort. As in the case of Turner’s “radical centre of values theory”, Needleman’s “ethics of the threshold” attempts to avoid the excesses of both moral absolutism and moral relativism, and is therefore akin to Makrides’s (2012: 264, 266) notion of a bridge between what we are and what we wish to be in the light of the ethical and religious commandments that have formed the basis of every civilisation in the world (Needleman, 2008: 109), namely a trans-confessional theory of religious tolerance or a constructive dialogue about it. Olthuis (2012: 2/7) expresses much the same sentiment by stating that in our pluralistic, multi-faith global village, the honourable and respectful embrace of difference is the greatest challenge facing our postmodern world. We urgently need, he says, to develop a model of non-oppositional difference, an economy in which power-over (with its opposition to the other) is replaced with power-with (mutual recognition, attunement and empowerment). In a sense, Wright (2010: 132) also refers to a radical centre or core of values by saying that a critical spiritual education will take, with equal seriousness, the integrity of our developing experiences, and the authority of the order-of-things that stands accessible, if always ultimately beyond our understanding.

Talen and Ellis (2002: 36, 37) summarise the theory of the radical centre of values as follows. The theory departs from a belief in self-organising principles, i.e. the idea that the universe is not deterministic but is self-renewing and infinitely creative. On the other hand, it questions the postmodern assumption that does not take the discussion of substantive goods, such as morality, seriously. It therefore departs from the assumption that there are durable, time-tested truths and discoveries that have been, and continue to be, made about various forms of moral behaviour (including the moral behaviour that is referred to as “religious tolerance”).

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #3:**
The following items for a questionnaire among teachers and their pupils regarding the degree of religious tolerance they display could flow from the above discussion of the radical value centre (theory):

1. (3.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following options: 1. I totally, fully agree with this statement. 2. I agree with it to a fairly large degree 3. I only agree to a certain degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and world view conviction.*

2. (3.2) Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and world view. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.*

3. (3.3) Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and life and worldview. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.*

4. The expectancy filter of value orientation

In addition to the four expectancy or achievement filters mentioned by Olthuis (2012), and discussed in Section 2 above, we can distinguish a fifth, namely the expectancy filter of value orientation. Under the influence and guidance of our teachers and other educators, we learn how to orientate ourselves with regard to the values available to us in the life-world with which we slowly but surely
get acquainted as we grow up. Since all values are loaded concepts that mean different things to
different people (Van der Walt, 2007: 172) and therefore seldom come to us in the sanitised form as
described in terms of the radical centre of values, in the form of “mere names or words” without any
life and world view content, they have to be reinterpreted. According to Zecha (2007: 57), the
names of values appearing in the radical centre of values “are all wonderful words which may
certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they do not give a useful account of
what the pupil is expected to do when he/she has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, respect,
etc. ... It is [therefore] ... important to explore with the students what these key-words (value words)
entail”. Gray (2009: 38) agrees with this in saying that values have to be given content, otherwise
they will remain empty. Nieuwenhuis (2010: 2) significantly adds that the basically contentless
values embodied in the radical value centre have to be filled with life-conceptual content. To be able
to do so, says Van de Beek (2010: 41), philosophers and ethicists have been agitating for the use of
“thick value language”, meaning language filled with life and worldview content. According to Van
de Beek, empty values can become more meaningful by filling them with content from the heritage
of one’s religious and life and world view tradition. This, he claims, is what people do in real life;
persons do not live according to the abstract values contained in the radical value centre but rather
according to how those same values have been filled-in and coloured by their respective religions
and world views. Filled-in values do greater justice to real life than the abstract values in the radical
centre. Ramcharan (2008: 13) agrees. Individuals generally tend to create space for themselves;
individual choices abound, also within the holistic order of religions; individuals tend to attach their
own interpretations and connections to the greater ideas that they encounter.

Van de Beek (2010: 41-42) then makes a most important point with regard to the theme of the
tolerance measuring instrument that is to flow from this monograph, namely that the more a person
tends to fill in his or her values with confessional, religious and life and world view content, the more
likely he or she would be to differ in life attitude from others, and the more he or she might come
into conflict with others with a different value orientation, with values filled in with content from other
religious and world view traditions. The more a person’s values get filled in with life view and /
or religious content, the more specific they become and hence increasingly exclusive. This
exclusivity, he avers, could lead to living a very private religious life the values of which cannot be
publicly tested because they pertain, per definition, to a value world that transcends the actual
world in which we live. In saying this, Van de Beek echoes a view expressed by Swartz (2006: 565-6),
namely that the life-conceptual filling-in that people do can be plotted on a continuum ranging from the
“thin-public-minimal-narrow” end, i.e. those values which may be described as “legal”, to the
“thick-private-maximal-broad” end of a continuum, i.e. those values that are considered to be
“personal” and private, left to the conscience of the individual, with a range of positions in-between.

According to Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12-16), an education system cannot operate optimally on the
basis of values filled with life and worldview content because, they claim, such values smack of
culturalism and particularism. Such completely life-conceptually filled-in values, they aver, “[are]
often embedded in one particular narrative (i.e. a specific religious or cultural belief system) – a
specific life-view perspective”. The reason why an education system cannot be based on such a
perspective – according to them - is because of “the relativity of truths, not only between different
religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations and truths found in one religious
denomination.” They agree with other scholars that “a value system that is based on only one
particular religious or cultural view means that only one narrative is taken into account. That could
jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South Africa. Such “mono” approaches to values in support of education might even take the form of a revival of the highly contested and divided ideology, Christian Nationalist Education, which dominated the apartheid era...”

In their effort to steer away from particularist, i.e. completely life-conceptually filled values, they argue as follows: “We should not be asking whose values should be promoted in education, since this might lead to particularist hostility. It would also be precarious to accept human rights values as univocal and not subjected to diverse interpretation. For this reason we will discuss the position of Bikhu Parekh in terms of this debate, because he produces an alternative way of thinking about this. His position may assist in pursuing values ... that (are) both contextually recognised and justified on a universal level. His main thesis [which Du Preez and Roux support] is that humans could express their moral life in different ways, but that this does not exclude anyone from being judged according to basic universal values. He refers to the latter notion as “minimum universality” which represents an intermediate position between relativism (particularism) and monism (universalism).”

The discussion so far illustrates how the fifth expectancy filter works. Wolhuter, Steyn, De Klerk and Rens to whose particularistic and confessional approach Du Preez and Roux (2010: 14) object, applied an expectancy filter in terms of which they availed themselves of Christian values, i.e. values filled with content from a Christian and Biblical life view perspective, to promote discipline in schools. Du Preez and Roux (2010: 15), on the other hand, seem to have operated with quite a different expectancy filter, namely that values should be filled with contextual content that would not jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of a democratic country. Whereas Wolhuter et al made use of Christian values in the expectancy of promoting discipline in schools, Du Preez and Roux made use of contextually recognised and universally justified values to promote their expectations in a multicultural school and education setting.

We shall return to this issue of value fullness and emptiness and of thick and thin value language in the discussion of the “Valley of relative value emptiness” (see Section 5 below). We first need to attend to two further issues regarding this, the fifth expectancy filter that educators employ when dealing with children and / or young people. The first is that the expectancy filter of value orientation that a child grows up with can change over time, as we have seen in Section 1. A very small child could be subject to a certain expectancy filter of value orientation, but gradually learn to develop his or her own expectancy filter of value orientation, and could end up with a value system filled with world view content that might be somewhat or even radically different from that of his or her parents and other educators. Such changes are due to influences that impact on the person growing up and because of his or her constant examination of own life and existence.

The expectancy filter of value orientation can also be seen working in one and the same person. Take the following example: a person who is both a parent of a very young child, a church going person, and an educationist charged with the task of planning a national education system might, as parent, employ an expectancy filter in the education of the child which could lead to the instilment of Christian religious and church values in the child while, on the other hand, as an education system planner he or she might apply an expectancy filter inspiring him or her to employ values that are more generally or universally recognised and would promote the ideals of democracy and multiculturalism. Ackerley (2008: 24) thus rightly remarked about a dichotomy between, on the one
hand, church- and temple- and personal, cultural, life-conceptually filled values, and on the other hand the universal aspirations regarding, for instance, human rights. The latter is not substantively meaningful among people of religious communities where, for many, their religious institutions are the context and the structure of their moral value systems.

Naudé (2010: 11) draws our attention to the second issue, namely the importance of distinguishing between relativism which says that we are all different from one another but that we should respect those differences regardless of whether we find the values associated with them acceptable or not. Relativity on the other hand says that we are different but not to such an extent that we cannot live peaceably together and that we should respect and tolerate another’s views and values, come what may. There is sufficient agreement about generally shared values that we can live by them and also weigh our individual, personal convictions and values against them.

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #4:**

1. (4.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable. 4. I disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement.

*Interpretation of the responses:* A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared values. A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and world view convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views.

5. The “valley of relative value emptiness”

The phrase “valley of relative value emptiness” is not meant as a derogatory term but rather as one that describes a stance in which the discussants attempt to transcend their personal life-conceptually meaning-filled values for the sake of a more general ideal, for example the promotion of multiculturalism, human rights, peaceful coexistence or democracy. It is understandable that some people, in some circumstances, might opt for the application of such relatively life-conceptually empty values. Education system planners, for instance, might find themselves in a position where they have to apply such universally recognised and acceptable values as those contained in the radical value centre discussed in Section 2 because of the demands of democracy, fairness, social justice, peaceful coexistence and the ideals of multiculturalism. One example of this can be found in the three-fold position described by Ackerley (2008: 38):

For those moved by human rights violations, (this) book offers three things. First, I offer them a philosophical justification for the political legitimacy of their moral intuitions. Regardless of the spiritual, religious, and personal resources that motivate them to think about the rights of
all humanity, whether their own moral system is grounded in a transcendental divine power, in the power of good argument, or in the power of human relationships, the concern for human rights has universal authority to guide criticism. Second, I offer those working for the human rights of all of humanity a way to think about human rights that is dictated neither by a cultural nor by a political tradition, but has nevertheless a universal authority to guide criticism. Third, the book offers guidance in thinking about universal human rights so that human rights activism continues in ways that support the human rights of all of humanity by transforming the institutions and practices that condition the lives of all of humanity.

It is clear from this brief exposition that Ackerley wishes to move his discussion of human rights values out of the context of life-conceptual meaning-filling into what has been described above as the “valley of relative value emptiness” where the discussion is characterised by “philosophical justification”, “political legitimacy”, people’s general “moral intuitions”, “universal authority”, not dictated by any “cultural or political tradition”, “the rights of all humanity” and so on.

As mentioned above, because of working in the public domain of human rights theory, Parekh (2000) also went a short step further in the direction of filling values with meaning in his attempt to “contextually fill” certain values that are universally recognised and justified. His description of the process entails four steps, of which the first three pertain to values that are relatively contentless: First, universal values can be understood in a variety of ways ranging from the minimalist to the maximalist. Secondly, since these universal values are necessarily general and relatively indeterminate, they should as far as possible be articulated in the language of norms. Norms relate values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted, and give them content. Thirdly, we should not confuse values with particular institutional mechanisms; we should not be dogmatic about values, and we should not so identify the institutions that hold particularist values with the values that the values cannot be discussed and defended separately. In the fourth place, Parekh recognises the need for life-conceptual content-filling of values but clearly sees it as a matter for the personal or private sphere: since every society enjoys the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise the agreed body of universal values, we cannot condemn its practices simply because they are different from or offend against ours (Parekh, 2000: 152-153). There is an inevitable dialectical interplay, he admits (Parekh, 2000: 158), between the relatively thin universal values and the thick moral structures that characterise different societies. The universal values regulate the national structures even as the latter pluralise the values.

As observed earlier, others, such as parents of very young children and educators teaching children in the context of a religious institution such as a church, mosque, synagogue or temple might feel themselves compelled to apply a value system that is completely filled in by the life and worldview of that particular religious denomination. Parekh’s (2000: 158) position of regulative or pluralist universalism will not appeal to them.

There might also be others who, for reasons of their own, prefer not to bind themselves to any religious value orientation and opt for a relativist, pragmatic or even a more or less laissez faire value stance. A moderate form of this, as Grayling (2010: 7-8) noted, is moral relativism, i.e. the view that there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather what counts as such in each different society is determined by that society’s own traditions, beliefs and experience. There is no objective ground for deciding between them. The pragmatist, in turn, holds the attitude of “doing
something” in the morally right or acceptable “direction” as conceptualised by the community, without interfering too much with other legitimate and personally significant commitments and avocations (Grayling, 2010: 18). The laissez faire approach in turn is a “do nothing” approach, says Grayling (2010: 18-190); it holds that unless a person can achieve the utmost in terms of value-driven actions and behaviour, let him or her do nothing, which “is the same thing as letting him be careless and indifferent”.

The current postmodern attitude of value relativism / relativity is also characteristic of the “valley of relative value emptiness”. According to Parkin (2011: 154-155), people have an entire supermarket of values at their disposal, and its impact on the soul, on the inner self of disorganised and vulnerable individuals has become the criterion for choosing a value (De Botton, 2012: 95). According to Bower (2005: 181, 254), it is a tenet of the postmodern perspective that people “invent” and create meaning in regard to their identity, value and purpose. A system of beliefs (i.e. a modernistic grand narrative) that weakens individual responsibility stands in the way of the emergence of an open society and an adult world in which the principle of individual responsibility and the accountability that goes with it, is the basis of all human relationships. McGrath (2005: 218) concurs with Bower’s analysis: reacting to the simplistic overstatements of the Enlightenment, postmodernity has stressed the limits to human knowledge and encouraged a toleration of those who diverge from the “one size fits all” philosophy of modernity. The world in which we live is now seen as a place where nothing is certain, nothing is guaranteed, and nothing is unquestionably given. It has become fashionable, Needleman (2008: 61) contends, to deny the existence of absolutes in the ethical sphere: who is to say what is good or bad, right or wrong? What is good in one place or for one person may be bad in another place or for another person. All morality is seen as relative to time, place, ethnicity, religion, social class, nationality and so on. For many people of this day and age, experiences are immediately translated into simply what “feels good” or what “feels bad”. The postmodern zeitgeist, says Needleman (2008: 108), dispirits people with ethical cynicism and relativism. It reduces every viewpoint, every norm and conviction, however firmly believed by some, to a temporary phenomenon, an event of transient nature. Everything is seen as historically determined and historically relative, in other words, everything is relativised (Van der Walt, 2007: 178).

According to Olthuis (2012: 1/7), worldviews are nowadays frowned upon because they are considered euphemisms for ideologies with their dogmatism. We need, it is said, to move beyond such exclusivism into an era after worldviews (i.e. grand narratives). According to the postmodern stance, life is more than logic; there is a limit to knowledge and knowledge is never disinterested, neutral, a-temporal or a-spatial. There is no such thing as Universal Reason, and reason is never impartial; it is always in the service of wider and broader interests. All grand narratives that claim to explain everything have lost credibility (Olthuis, 2012: 3/7). According to Wright (2010: 122), some postmodernists even claim that ultimately we fail to obtain knowledge of reality because, at the end of the day, there is no such thing as reality, no actual order of things. The notion of reality only exists within our psychological conventions and linguistic contractions\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{16}Wright (2010: 123) correctly says that these thinkers fall in the epistemic fallacy of confusing reality with knowledge of reality. We have no grounds to deny the existence of reality simply because it is beyond our intellectual powers to fully comprehend it.
No person is completely a-religious or can live without a trace of life-conceptual content filling of his or her values. All people have faith in something. Gray (2009: 13) rightly comes to the conclusion that “secular thinkers imagined that they had left religion behind, when in truth they had only exchanged religion for humanist faith in progress”. For this reason, he regards contemporary humanism as a religion in its own right (Gray, 2009: 15). In view of this, Peck’s (2006: 174) advice to psychologists is to find out their patients’ religions even if they say they do not have any. The same applies for a life and worldview; every person has an explicit or implicit set of ideas and beliefs as to the essential nature of the world. It is nowadays widely acknowledged that all knowledge is perspectival, world view-ish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, rather than universal or absolute (Olthuis, 2012: 1/7).

What all of the above means for a person who wishes to exist in the “valley of relative value emptiness” is that it takes a special effort to leave one’s religious convictions, assumptions and prejudgements behind and to contrive living according to those supposedly empty values that transcend all life-conceptual differences among people.\(^\text{17}\)

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #5:**

1. (5.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree

Interpretation of the responses: Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment.

6. A tendency towards total tolerance of others, their religious persuasion and their values

A person preferring to relate with people of different religious and life and worldview persuasion on the basis of the relatively “contentless” values embodied in the radical value centre, with the bare minimum of religious or worldview filling, with values couched in thin value language, with a (postmodern) relativistic value attitude, and with a pragmatic or even a laissez faire attitude with respect to religious and worldview differences, could be assumed to be tolerant of other people and their religious convictions and assumptions. It should be noted, however, that since no person is ever without religion or without religious convictions and a life and worldview, no person is ever

\(^{17}\)As mentioned, a person such as a scholar or a curriculum designer may periodically and temporarily, for purposes of scientific objectivity in a diverse setting, contrive to transcend his or her personal life view convictions et cetera, but such a stance is not viable as a consistent life-view, certainly not for a person of integrity (Nolan, 2009: 13).
likely to be without a value system on the basis of which he or she would, if the occasion arose, be intolerant of the views of people of different persuasion. Nevertheless, theoretical provision has to be made for the possibility of total tolerance, for an attitude of “anything goes”, for complete relativism, for total naivety. Bennett (1993) arguably made similar provision by distinguishing in his developmental model stages V “Adaptation to difference” and VI “Integration of difference”.

It is necessary to stress at this point that absolute tolerance of others and their views is not necessarily “wrong” or “incorrect”. Whether it is to be adjudged as wrong or incorrect will largely depend on the observer’s religious stance, as will now be explained with the help of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model in which he makes certain distinctions in terms of cultural sensitivities (for the purposes of this monograph and of the questionnaire that has to result from it, Bennett’s distinctions in the cultural domain will be transposed to religious sensitivities. The formal distinctions that Bennett made and categorised can be just as valid as categories regarding religious attitude):

I. **Denial of difference**: a person in this category is unable to construe religious difference. His or her attitude could be characterised by benign stereotyping (well-meant but ignorant or naïve observations) and superficial statements of tolerance. This attitude can sometimes be accompanied by attribution of deficiency in intelligence or personality to religiously deviant behaviour. There is a tendency to dehumanise outsiders and to isolate them in homogeneous groups, which deprives the person from either the opportunity or the motivation to construct relevant categories for noticing and interpreting religious difference. The person’s intentional separation from religious difference protects his or her worldview (“fishbowl”) from change by creating conditions of isolation.

II. **Defence against difference**: a person in this category recognises religious difference coupled with a negative evaluation of most religious variations; the greater the difference, the more negative the evaluation. His or her thinking is characterised by dichotomous us-them thinking and is frequently accompanied by overt negative stereotyping. He or she has a tendency towards religious proselytising of “other” religions\(^\text{18}\). The person in this category possesses cognitive categories for construing religious difference as isolated by evaluating them negatively, thus protecting his or her own world view from change. His or her existing world view is protected by exaggerating its positive aspects compared to all other religions. Any neutral or positive statement about another religion may be interpreted as an attack on his or her own religion.

III. **Minimisation of difference**: a person in this category recognises and accepts superficial religious differences such as rituals and eating customs, while holding that all human beings are essentially the same. The emphasis is on the similarity of people and the commonality of basic values. There is a tendency to define the basis of commonality in egocentric terms (since everyone else is essentially like us, just be yourself). There is also an emphasis in terms of similarity (after all, we are all human). The emphasis may be on commonality of human beings as subordinate to a particular supernatural being, religion or social philosophy (we are all children of God whether we know it or not). The own worldview is protected by attempting to subsume difference into what is already familiar (deep down we are all the same).

\(^{18}\)See discussion of inclusivism below.
IV. **Acceptance of difference**: a person in this category recognises and appreciates religious differences in behaviour and values. Acceptance of religious differences is regarded as a viable alternative solution to the organisation of human existence.\(^{19}\) This person operates on the basis of religious relativity, and begins to interpret phenomena within their different cultural or religious contexts. Categories of difference are consciously elaborated. He or she is able to analyse complex interaction in religion-contrast terms. He or she has the ability to see beliefs, values and other general patterns of assigning “goodness” or “badness” to ways of being in the world in their different cultural and religious contexts.

V. **Adaptation to difference**: this person is able to develop communication skills that enable inter-religious communication\(^{20}\), and to make effective use of empathy\(^{21}\), or frame of reference shifting, to understand and be understood across religious boundaries. This person is able to consciously shift perspective into alternative religious world view elements and to act religiously in appropriate ways in those areas. He or she is also able to shift their behaviour completely into different religious frames without much effort. For this person, internalisation of more than one complete worldview is viable. Knowledge and behaviour are linked to conscious intention, and category boundaries (i.e. between religions) become more flexible and permeable.

VI. **Integration of difference**: a person in this category is able to internalise a bi-religious or multi-religious frame of reference. He or she is able to maintain a definition of identity that is “marginal” to any particular religion, and sees the self as “in process”. He or she is able to use multiple religious frames of reference in evaluating phenomena, and is able to accept an identity that is not primarily based in any one religion. He or she is able to facilitate constructive contact between religions for the self and for others, and is willing to participate to some extent in a “marginal reference group”, where other marginals rather than religious compatriots are perceived to be similar\(^{22}\). World view and religious categories are seen as “constructs” maintained by self-reflexive consciousness (religions and individuals are “making themselves up”).

Leutwyler et al (2012: 113) gives a brief summary of the meaning of Bennett’s developmental model, again “translated” by the author of this monograph into religious sensitivities\(^{23}\). Inter-religious sensitivity can be approached in terms of this six-tier model in terms of religious attitude, from a religio-centric on the one hand, to a religio-relative attitude or view on the other.\(^{24}\) The first three levels refer to a religio-centric world view, and the last three to a religio-relative world view. People with the former world view experience their own religion as the only reference to construct their reality while the deeply held beliefs and behaviours from their primary socialisation remain unquestioned. They are seen as “just the way they are”. In contrast, individuals with a religio-relative

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\(^{19}\)See the discussion of the social contract below.

\(^{20}\)See discussion of dialogical pluralism below.

\(^{21}\)See discussion of moral imagination, empathy and sympathy below.

\(^{22}\)The “new reformation group” in South Africa could be seen as falling in this category.

\(^{23}\)The formal categories distinguished for cultural attitude by Bennett and now explained by Leutwyler et al are valid – in a formal sense, not in terms of content – for religious attitude categories.

\(^{24}\)We are not so much concerned about the developmental aspects in this monograph. These aspects are by no means unimportant, however; they will have to be reckoned with in efforts to redress any shortcomings among teachers and pupils with respect to religious tolerance.
world view experience their beliefs and behaviours as only one organisation of reality among many other possibilities. This distinction has clear implications for religious tolerance among teachers and students. Teachers and students will have different images of religious differences and similarities and therefore about inter-religious education and dialogue if they are in a religio-centric stage of development or if they have developed a religio-relative perspective. It can be expected that teachers and students in the former stage of development will have a less tolerant view of others of different religious persuasion than those in the latter stage.

The question that confronts us here is whether education systems world-wide are meeting the target for education to encourage “tolerance and respect for the religion of others” also included in official political statements. Religions have not disappeared, as some social scientists predicted; religion now exists in more differentiated and individualised forms. As will be discussed in more detail below, institutionalised religion has lost influence and relevance in society, and religiously plural settings in school and in the classroom have become more and more common (Schreiner, 2005: no page number). The question is whether Schreiner is correct in surmising that “teachers are getting sensible to the individualised form of religion of their pupils as the context and the content of teaching”. Are they indeed coming to grips with the religious diversity with which they are confronted in school and in class? Are they indeed as religiously tolerant as expected? What about the children whom they are teaching – are they as tolerant as could be expected of religious differences in others (i.e. their teachers, their school mates)? Or do we have the situation described by Leutwyler et al (2012: 116): “It may be assumed that the more or less appropriate policies in this regard are not implemented in daily teaching – precisely because they do not fit the teachers’ individual belief systems”. As far as South Africa is concerned, Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12) indeed found the following: “Early in our research project, it became evident that some teachers believe that discipline can only be maintained through the elevation of cultural values (particularism). One reason for this phenomenon could be that people in many instances see traditional, cultural values as preferable to emancipatory, human rights values. … An illustration of a particularist stance is illustrated (sic) by Wolhuter and Steyn and De Klerk and Rens who argue that acceptance of certain Christian values could promote discipline in schools.” Could it be that teachers teaching children from a particularist, religio-centric perspective might be more or less intolerant towards others adhering to other particularist or confessional orientations? The purpose of the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this monograph is to establish whether or not this is indeed the case.

As will be discussed in the following Section, religious tolerance as such is characterised by a number of technical considerations.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #6:

1. (6.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement.
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might belong in Bennett’s categories IV to VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III.

7. The technicalities of religious and world view tolerance

The first technical point about tolerance that has to be kept in mind is that the well-being of individuals and of their societies depends to a significant extent on the degree of tolerance that is displayed by all concerned (Gray, 2009:21; Strauss, 2009: 509). As stated at the beginning of this monograph, societies are today more diverse and pluralistic than ever, and religious and cultural conflict has become a fact of life. Tolerance therefore can be seen as the key to living together in a society that harbours many different ways of life. Societies and their members have to search for the best ways of living together, and tolerance seems to be one of the attitudes most sorely needed to ensure the well-being of all concerned. Olthuis (2012: 5/7) correctly observes that people have to make sense of the diversity of cultures, religions and world views around them; from their different viewpoints (through the sides of their different “fishbowls”, as it were), they are called to negotiate, to work together for justice with compassion, for mercy with truth.

The second technical point is that tolerance does not mean accepting a belief or a practice that one does not agree with. As two authoritative dictionaries show, tolerance refers to endurance and not necessarily to acceptance of what has to be endured. Tolerance refers to the act of being tolerant, in other words the capacity to endure something such as pain or hardship, to treat with indulgence and forbearance, and to accept that people tend to hold religious and world view opinions that differ from the established religion of a country (Sinclair, 1999) or from one’s own. It could also refer to allowing the existence or occurrence of something that one dislikes or disagrees with without interference (Soames & Stevenson, 2008). What underlies tolerance, Grayling (2002: 9) correctly concludes, is the recognition that there is plenty of room in the world for alternatives to exist, and if one is offended by what other do “it is because one has let it get under one’s skin”. In contrast to the dictionaries mentioned above, Van der Walt (2007: 202-203) mentions acceptance of what has to be tolerated but he immediately qualifies such acceptance. Tolerance, he says, is the degree to which we accept things of which we disapprove; the degree with which we understand differences and learn how to differ from others, and does not preclude appreciation for what is good in other religions (for instance). As far as acceptance is concerned he qualifies his definition with the rider that we are not to tolerate everything with which we do not agree (which explains the use of “the degree to which” in his definition of tolerance above). According to Boersma (2012), tolerance is a

25Other factors, such as economics and population pressure, might also lead to forms of intolerance and violence.

26Boersma (2012) shares a similar sentiment. In his case, the matter is complicated by a linguistic problem. He writes in Dutch: “Kern van tolerantie is dat ik verdraag wat ik niet accepteer maar wel aanvaard”. The Dutch “accepteer” is derived from English “accept”. The Dutch word “aanvaar” also means “to accept”. Taken at face value, Boersma seems to say: “The core idea of tolerance is that I tolerate or forbear that which I do not accept but which I do accept”. However, in view of the rest of his exposition one has to conclude that “accepteer” has a different meaning from “aanvaar”: “accepteer” seems to mean something like “do not agree with”, so what Boersma in fact states is: “The core of tolerance is that I tolerate something that I cannot agree with but which I nevertheless accept”. If this translation is correct, he seems to agree with Van der Walt (2007: 202-203).
concept with inherent tension\textsuperscript{27}, in the sense that it causes pain and requires from the person having to tolerate a degree of violation of his or her value system\textsuperscript{28}.

The third technical point pertains to the extent to which one (or a society) should tolerate beliefs and actions that they prefer not to adopt. Put differently, to what extent can open societies tolerate the existence and the efforts of fundamentalist\textsuperscript{29} enemies of freedom, in other words, those people who tend to live with a value system that is filled with value content from their own personal and private religious and world view approach and commitment to the extent that they openly and contemptuously reject the values contained in the radical value centre referred to above or in the value systems of others whose value systems differ from theirs? To what extent must open societies, i.e. societies that tend to operate on the values contained in the radical value centre; values that are universally recognised but contextually understood, abandon their own habits of tolerance in order to deny the right of its fundamentalist enemies to exist? (Bower, 2005: 43). The answers to both these questions, according to Grayling (2002: 8), should be a resounding “No!” Tolerance, he says, should protect itself, and can do so by saying that anyone is free to moot a point of view but no one can force another to accept it. The only acceptable coercion in an open and democratic society is that of reason and argument. Members of an open society have only one obligation: the power of honest reasoning, of argument. Grayling is convinced that “the reasonings of an open mind will come out in favour of what is good and true” (ibid.).

The fourth technical point about religious and other forms of tolerance is that it depends on trust (Arielly, 2010; 127-128; Ilbury & Sunter, 2011: 73) and moral imagination. Tolerance depends on trusting the \textit{bona fides} of all other members of society. If trust is broken for whatever reason, there can be no tolerance of the other’s beliefs or actions. A lack of trust also cramps our moral imagination, in other words our capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person. As will be indicated below, the notion of peaceful coexistence (a healthy \textit{modus vivendi}) depends to a large extent on the degree of trust and moral imagination that prevail in a society.

The fifth technical point pertains to the reasons why people are either tolerant or intolerant. Morton (1998: 167 et seq.) explains this in some detail. Most people, he says, are torn between tolerance of the values of other people, which may be based on ideas and preferences that they do not understand, and dislike of values that seem wrong, especially those that seem to involve cruelty or hatred. Different people resolve the conflict differently. Some people are extremely tolerant (as demonstrated above with reference to people with a totally relativist or laissez faire attitude) of other people’s values, allowing others to hold and follow those values that seem to them repulsive. Others are extremely intolerant (as also demonstrated above with reference to people with a militant fundamentalist and radically exclusivist attitude), thinking that others should not hold and

\textsuperscript{27} According to Boersma (2012), the Christian view of tolerance differs from the liberal view in that the latter holds that one has to tolerate the other out of respect for his or her freedom (as a human right). Christians do not believe that human beings possess such absolute freedom, and rather base their conception of freedom on love, as mentioned by Olthuis (see previous paragraph in this section).

\textsuperscript{28} Boersma (2012) also distinguishes a “milder” form of tolerance, namely “gedogen”, to disapprove of something but to just look the other way. The English equivalent of “gedogen” might indeed be “to look the other way” or to endure.

\textsuperscript{29} Living strictly according to certain dogmas and doctrines or a set of thick (content filled) values does not necessarily amount to being a fundamentalist. Adherence to such dogmas and doctrines also do not necessarily lead to violence and intolerance – as the rest of the discussion in this monograph will illustrate.
follow values that are from their point of view wrong. These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence in his or her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

The final technical point that has to be kept in mind is that the concept of tolerance has recently undergone a shift, what Van der Walt (2007: 203) refers to as a secular down-scaling, a shift from tolerating the ideas and beliefs of others to tolerating others. This is due, in his opinion, to an ethics of politeness, courtesy and decency. In his opinion, this down-scaling is a result of modern-day (postmodern) relativism which seems to promote an ethic of gentility and studied moderation; a code of social discourse whereby “religious beliefs and political convictions are to be expressed discreetly and tactfully and in most cases, privately. Convictions are to be tempered by good taste and sensibility. It is an ethics that pleads “no offence”. The greatest breach of these norms is belligerence and divisiveness; the greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerant.

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #7:**

1. (7.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not agree at all.  

   **Interpretation of the responses:** A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas.

2. (7.2) Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 6. I have no opinion about this

   **Interpretation of responses:** A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person.

3. (7.3) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and worldview that are completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all.

   **Interpretation of responses:** A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and their religious views.
4. (7.4) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree 3. Agree to a considerable extent 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree.

Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant.

5. (7.5) Which TWO of the following views of others is most applicable to you as a person? (1) My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own moral beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

Interpretation of the responses: These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own moral beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

8. Some further technical distinctions
According to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39), three formal views are usually distinguished as far as the relationships among religions are concerned, namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism (also see Van der Walt, 2007: 195). The weakness of this typology lies in its rather vague understanding of pluralism. Whereas today there seems to be consensus about the models or views of exclusivism, the pluralist view is described in many ways, ranging from a relativistic approach stressing the quality of all religions, to a dialogical approach stressing the need for dialogue in order to find religious truth. Vermeer and Van der Ven therefore decided to differentiate this three-way typology more closely by breaking down the pluralism model into two components, with the result that they began working with a four-way distinction within religious plurality: exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism and dialogical pluralism.

In its most extreme form, the exclusivist claim would be that only one’s own religion is absolutely and uniquely true and that all other religions are therefore false. A more open version of this view is one where the followers of one religious tradition admit that their religion is not the sole possessor of truth in all respects and that they may perhaps learn from other religious traditions. Such a more open version is, according to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39-40), also exclusivist as long as the adherents to a religion are not prepared to question their own basic beliefs in light of encounters with followers of other religions. People entertaining such a more open view of exclusivism might be prepared to work together with adherents to other religions for the sake of promoting some or other shared interest, but they do not feel the need to enter into a dialogue about matters of
religious truth or salvation because they feel that they are already in possession of the truth. Exclusivism is characterised by an unwillingness to enter into religious dialogue with followers of other religious traditions. Exclusivism is characterised by absolutism, uniqueness, emphasis on difference, particularism and exclusive view of truth (Van der Walt, 2007: 197).

Like exclusivists, inclusivists maintain the truth and superiority of their own religious tradition, but differ from the former in that the other religious traditions are considered as products of divine revelation or as legitimate paths to salvation. This is mainly done by interpreting other faiths in terms of one’s own faith and by claiming that other faiths either originated from one’s own faith or will one day reach fulfilment in one’s own faith. The difference between exclusivism and inclusivism is only one of degree (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 40). Generally speaking, inclusivism is characterised by relativism, emphasis on similarities, egalitarianism, the equality of all faiths as far as truth claims are concerned, and the view that truth is relative (Van der Walt, 2007: 197).

As far as the third view, pluralism, is concerned, the basic claim is not that all religions are equally valid because they all worship and believe in the same God, but rather from a phenomenological point of view it is argued that the essence of all religions lies in the human experience of the transcendent, and from an epistemological view it is claimed that the articulation of this basic experience in belief systems is always related to a particular cultural environment and therefore cannot claim absolute validity. Religious pluralism can take one of several forms. Parallel pluralism holds that all faiths promote certain parallel dogmas, for instance about evil; puzzle pluralism holds that every religion only possesses a fragment of the full and final truth (about, for instance, salvation); gradual pluralism holds that in some religions the final truth comes to the fore in a stronger way than in others (Van der Walt, 2007: 196).

Pluralism not only claims on a phenomenological basis that all religions are based on one and the same religious experience but also on epistemological grounds that they are always related to specific cultural environments. On the basis of these two arguments, the conclusion is drawn that basically all religions offer an adequate picture of the Divine. Although this does not mean that there are no metaphysical and theological differences between religions, the emphasis in pluralism is on what is shared by the different religious traditions rather than on what separates them from one another (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 41-42).

The fourth view, brought to the fore by Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 42-43), is dialogical pluralism which stresses the need for an inter-religious dialogue for the mutual enrichment of different religious traditions. This view attempts to address two shortcomings of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, namely the lack of perspective exchange between religions, the ability and willingness to try to understand the other in terms of own religious preconceptions; also the second shortcoming that is of an epistemological nature: exclusivists claim that their religion is the only valid or true one among many, and the inclusivists attempt to reconcile different sets of incompatible beliefs. The possibility exists, Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 43-44) claim, that aspects of religious truth also can be found in other religions. Therefore, in order to avoid these difficulties, dialogical pluralists avoid all preconceptions about the truth or falsity of different religions and instead claim that religious truth can only be discovered in a dialogue between religions. At the core of dialogical pluralism is a particular understanding of inter-religious dialogue, namely as a communicative process in which people of several traditions enter into discussions about what is ultimately true and
of value in life. This dialogue consists of three distinctive phases, namely information exchange, perspective exchange and perspective coordination. Van der Walt (2007: 187) supports the notion of conducting a dialogue between the adherents of the different religions. In his opinion, such dialogue is of import for the sake of a just and peaceful society. The only condition for dialogue, he says, is that one should believe that all religions are not all the same, because if they were, dialogue would be without purpose. He also warns that one should not enter such a dialogue with an attitude of superiority and pride as if one held the monopoly on truth. In such a dialogue, the discussion is not about who is right, but what could be seen as the truth. The aim of the dialogue is to lessen the tension between the different religions and to promote a peaceful and just society. This cannot take place without mutual understanding and trust. The alternative, he correctly concludes, is misunderstanding, conflict and violent clashes.

In Van der Walt’s (2007: 207-208) view, pluralism can easily deteriorate into intolerance. His argument runs as follows. Absolute (in the sense of consistent) relativism is impossible. If every religion were relative, then the (mild and radical) relativists would have to acknowledge that their own viewpoint itself is also relative. Since no-one can think consistently relativistically – for then such a person would simply have to keep quiet – the so-called relativists today defend their standpoint in an intolerant way. Their so-called tolerance thus means intolerance towards all who do not share their point of view. The religious tolerance for which their “tolerance” fought is destroyed – ironically – by the same “tolerance”. On close analysis, a “tolerance” which thinks relativistically about truth is by no means an example of “democracy” in the religious field. It creates the impression of being “enlightened” and very modest but in essence relativism is just as arrogant as the other religions which are blamed for being arrogant.

Although Van der Walt (2007: 195) begins his outline of the different views of the relationship between religions with the usual distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, he discusses a whole variety of positions with regard to these views. He begins, for instance, by saying that the phenomenological method promotes a view that can be typified as “historicist relativism” since it undermines the rather absolute nature of all religions with its basic assumption that everything is relative. It propagates the modern secularist relativism which teaches that all religions are equally true or false, and that it makes no difference which one chooses to adhere to. In Van der Walt’s (2007: 189) opinion, relativist religious pluralism is, in spite of the fact that it opposes all kinds of religious dogma and absolutism, itself guilty of a hidden dogma, namely that all religions are in principle equal.

Van der Walt (2007: 196) also distinguishes at least three forms of confessional particularism. Magnetic particularism holds that a dogma might work like a magnet that draws all other religions to it; healing particularism teaches that a dogma may work like a vaccine that can cure believers and hence can draw non-believers; imperial particularism teaches that a particular dogma is of the utmost importance and that no salvation is possible without adhering to it (an example of this is the Christian belief that Christ is the only source of salvation and that an intentional confession of belief in Christ is the only hope for salvation).

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #8:

1. (8.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all
religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude.

9. Three approaches to tolerance

As indicated in Section 8 above, there seems to be many ways of attempting to be tolerant towards the religious views and dogmas of others, some of which might lead to more success than others in the resolution of conflict, the procurement of mutual trust, human well-being and peaceful human coexistence. Three broad life and world view (“fishbowl”, “life map”) approaches can be distinguished among the plethora of approaches to the plurality currently prevailing in Europe and Southern Africa, the two regions in which the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this monograph will be administered, namely liberalism, Christianity (indeed post-Christianity in some areas and among some people) and what has become known as secularism, liberal secularism or secular humanism.

From a modern liberal viewpoint, Grayling (2010: 220) advises that society should learn how to manage less acceptable beliefs and behaviour by understanding their ill consequences and to encourage more acceptable behaviour by sweeping up the pieces and “otherwise being stoical”. In brief, says Schreiner (2005: 13), people have to show empathy to the other, enter into dialogue with them and acquire the competence of “dancing with difference” in the increasingly pluralist environments in which they find themselves. Gray (2003: 112) agrees with all of the above, and reiterates that “fugitive empathy” with other living things is the ultimate source of ethics. Moral imagination is required, in other words the ability to put oneself in the shoes not only of relatives and good friends but also in those of rivals and enemies. Moral imagination implies efforts at understanding others from the inside\(^\text{30}\) (Wright, 2009: 418).

Olthuis (2012: 2/7, 6/7) gives similar advice from a Christian perspective: Firstly, in ethical Postmodernism, difference is not the enemy, a threat, defect or deficit which needs to be controlled, but rather a challenge that has to be connected with, attended to and honoured. The proper relation to the other (different) person is deference rather than domination, condescension, dismissal or persecution. Genuine community is being together in difference and diversity, rather than marginalisation or fusion into sameness. In Biblical terms, freedom does not mean “free from” but rather “free to” love and minister to the other. As God is with us (Emmanuel), so a person should be with others; people are called to suffer with others, not to fusion with others, not to abandonment of others, nor even the rescue or persecution of the other, but being with the other, suffering-with

\(^{30}\)See the discussion of *modus vivendi* below.
and celebrating-with. Reason, transformed by and in the service of love, will have an eye for difference not in order to close it down or to marginalise it, but in order to approach and connect with it, and let it be. Love, in Olthuis’s understanding, is not an auxiliary to the order of reason; there is only one order, he says, and that is the order of Love, with reason as one of its dimensions. In very practical terms he advises that the members of a society should develop an economy of love not to exclude others or to prove that their own way of life is the only true way, but to give witness of how and why - rooted in their own religious and life view (“fishbowl”) perspective – they see things the way they do, and how they conceive of justice and practise mercy. Along these lines and in this way, they invite others to share their deepest beliefs and convictions for mutual learning, benefit and well-being. Van der Walt (2007: 202) makes the same point by stating that religious and other forms of diversity will not disappear in this dispensation, therefore tolerance towards all other people is the only and right attitude. People need to find ways of living alongside one another without destroying one another and without ignoring or trivialising the differences among them. The task of tolerance, he avers, is not to ignore or to trivialise differences but to “establish the right to differ”. Olthuis (2012) agrees with the position outlined a few years earlier by Van der Walt (2007: 213). Tolerance based on a Biblical view is aimed at establishing the truth, and should always be modest and based on love. Tolerance from a Biblical perspective implies full involvement with the other and a sincere interest in the other; it is eager to know as much about the other as possible. True tolerance is never hesitant or sentimental; to endure things that one does not approve of takes strength and courage.

Secularism, in turn, as Mohler (2008: 29-30) correctly observed, is a lifeview according to which humankind sees itself not only as liberated from the bonds of the church and other religious institutions but from all forms of theistic religion. In view of the fact, as already mentioned, that no human being is ever without religion and religious commitment, secularists mistakenly believe that religion and religious forms will disappear in due course, that history was driving toward the utter removal of belief in God, and that education, technology and affluence would lead to a massive civilisation-wide loss of belief; secularisation would be a global phenomenon, marked by the rejection of both the social functions and the symbolic nature of theistic belief. Although it is unlikely that secularism will dominate life and the world on this massive scale, there are clear signs of it making progress, also in the form of atheism (Mohler, 2008: 15). According to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 15), secularism is a “godless culture”, a majority culture that interprets life “through unregenerate eyes and promotes its conclusions through various means, from advertising to education”. Instead of depending on guidelines flowing from theistic religious books and dogmas, secularists depend on other mediators of values such as entertainment celebrities, the social media and advertisements.

The central message of secularism, according to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 17) is “me!”, and as a result of that it leaves humankind without transcendent values. The only values that remain are those of survival by whatever means that serves the lusts and the needs of the moment. Van der Walt (2007: 213) regards the secular, including the liberal, approach to tolerance as “negative, since it can say nothing more but that one should not be uncivil, discourteous, impolite, tactless, unpleasant or opposing”. Boersma (2012) also finds the secular-liberal-humanist view of tolerance unacceptable. He does not accept the “enlightened” dogma that one should allow the other to enjoy his or her freedom because of freedom being regarded as an absolute value that entails respect for the value of living and let live, all of which is based on the dogma of human autonomy. Liberal tolerance does
not include tolerance of those who deem themselves to be subject to some or other heteronymous force; the purpose of liberal tolerance is indeed the liberation of such persons. To this could be added that it is indeed a question to what extent a me-centred person would be willing to tolerate others in his or her struggle for survival in the new secular age that Mohler refers to.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #9:

1. (9.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude.

10. Willingness to enter into a social contract

Peaceful coexistence in a community or a society depends on a social contract among the members of such a community. The contract should provide room for diverse positions in society, and emerge from a joint decision of rational individuals. Antecedent to a social contract there are no principles of justice or agreement about expectations in force. Put differently, the emergence of a social contract among individuals who widely differ from one another in terms of background, religion, culture, customs and habits leads not only to a well-ordered society, to the well-being of all the contracting parties and to social justice for all concerned (Strauss, 2009: 510-511). Following Rousseau, Rawls (2007: 566-571) states that government is based on a social contract among free, equal and rational persons entering into a contract based on the principle of justice as fairness and for the well-being of all concerned. The contract leads to the adoption of certain rights and duties and to the measuring out of benefits for everyone. The basic structure of society should provide for the governing of the assignment of rights and duties and the distribution of social and economic advantages.

Bower’s (2005: 226, 228) assessment of the Constitution of the United States of America gives a good idea of what a proper social contract could provide for all. In his opinion, that Constitution “is nothing if not a repository of human values [which] had a profoundly beneficial effect on the development of civil society, on the emergence of a trustworthy judiciary and on the achievement of freedom...”. Part of the social contract is also common law which, in his opinion, governs the affairs and relationships of people. Common law is the law of common practice, the law emanating from the wisdom of peoples who strive to regulate their relationships with one another on the basis of justice and decency. Common law was responsible, among others, for establishing the notion that the relationship between people was governed by agreed standards of probity, rather than the unfettered exercise of power. Nussbaum (2000: 5) adds to this that the governments of all nations should adhere to those principles that a bare minimum of respect for human dignity requires. She
refers to the social contract as “an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very different conceptions of the good”. The contract should therefore provide for treating each person as an end and none as a tool of others. According to Robeyns (2005: no page number), the capabilities approach worked out by Nussbaum and Sen forms a broad normative framework for what has been referred to above as a social contract among individuals, in other words for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society. Sen (2010: 245, 247) concurs with her in saying that it would be hard to understand why and how a person undertakes some of his or her activities without comprehension of his or her societal relations. Individual human beings with their various plural identities, multiple applications and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of societal interactions.

Now, after briefly having looked at the nature and purpose of the social contract among individuals, we can return to the core argument of this monograph, namely the issue of religious tolerance. The question is, which of the two groups referred to above, those with a rather “thick” or maximalist value orientation or those with a rather “thin” or minimalist value orientation would be most willing and ready to enter into a social contract with others and hence be more tolerant of others involved in the contract and their views? Of course, to ask this question is more of an academic exercise than of practical significance since all of us, whether we wish to do so or not, are party to a social contract as embodied in the Constitution of our countries and in the Government of the day. By far the majority of us conforms to the rules and stipulations of that contract, on the one hand because of understanding the benefits that might flow from the contract in terms of personal and communal well-being, justice and fairness, rights and duties, and on the other hand, out of fear of punishment in the form of imprisonment, fines and social sanction. There have been incidents, however, caused by pathological dissidents, such as Timothy McVeigh responsible for the Oklahoma Bombing and Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the Norway massacre, who do not accept the authority vested in the government of the day on the basis of a social contract, who not only wish to opt out from the contract but also to show their dissatisfaction with the status quo.

An academic exercise has the value, however, of revealing something of the dynamics of religious tolerance in our present-day diverse societies. It can be reasonably and arguably expected that those individuals who operate with relatively “thin” or minimalist values, such as those contained in the radical value centre or in the “valley of relative value emptiness”, those with a laissez faire attitude, who are willing to accept that “anything goes”, those with a totally relativistic value system, will more readily enter into a social contract. They readily enter because they do not feel very strongly about their value system; they are prepared to enter into an “overlapping consensus” with others with quite different value orientations because they expect that doing so will not affect their own value orientation in any way. For this group, values are “just wonderful names with very little life and world view content” as Zecha remarked. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, the members of this group arguably belong in either category IV - those who accept difference, or in category V - those who adapt to difference, or in category VI - those who integrate difference. In terms of the distinctions in the previous section, a person in this group might be prepared to practise religious pluralism and / or dialogical pluralism, and may also be tolerant of others and their religious views.
The obverse can also be expected. Those who operate with “thick” or maximalist values might be less willing to enter into a social contract because of their awareness of the deep value rifts that exist between them and others of different religious or cultural persuasion. The “thicker” or more maximalist their value system, the less likely they will be prepared to enter into such a contract. There is also the distinct possibility that those operating with a maximalist value system that borders on fundamentalism and fanaticism, those with a “toxic” religious orientation might refuse to enter into a social contract and prefer to resort to terrorist tactics to destabilise the extant social contract because of its being founded on values unacceptable to the dissidents. Such destabilising tactics can be observed both internationally where terrorist groups, inspired by religious fervour, attempt to undermine the extant world order (September 11, 2001 is a case in point), and also nationally, where religious groups attempt to destabilise the national order of their country (Mali and the DRC are currently suffering from such attempts). The members of these groups might also be totally intolerant of the religious views of other groups which they regard as enemies and as heathens. Their efforts will be more directed towards proselytising and missionary work rather than to tolerating others and their religious differences. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, such a radical group might belong in category I – total denial of differences among people (in terms of the distinction in the previous section, totally exclusivist (only my religion is true) or totally inclusivist (since only my religion is true, I have to convert all others to it), or category II – I have to defend myself against difference.

The person with a less “thick” or maximalist value orientation might fall in category III – I feel the need to minimize the differences between myself and others. Ideally speaking, such a balanced and worthy member of society should fall in the category of some value “thickness” or maximalisation, not in the extreme categories of fundamentalist intolerance or of radical relativistic tolerance. Put differently, he or she should ideally fall in Bennett’s categories III – minimisation of differences among people (the differences between myself and others are not all that important; we can talk about them and exchange ideas – dialogical pluralism), IV – acceptance of differences among people (people are different, and that is a fact of life, we have to live with it), and V – adaptation to difference (although I have to live with the differences among people, I can be myself and apply my own value system in the context of the social contract to which I am party).

Bennett’s category I – denial of difference (I recognise only my own value system; all others either do not exist or are not valid) is the reserve of the totally intolerant. Category VI – integration of difference (my value system is not so important to me that I cannot associate myself with all other values; all values are equally valid) is also the reserve of the totally tolerant.

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #10:**

1. (10.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such
participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude, totally willing to enter into a social contract, and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

11. Tolerance (and respect) a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence (a healthy modus vivendi)

In his book *The Open Society and its Enemies*, first published in 1945, Karl Popper engaged with the task of defining the best available conditions under which humanity could live as a community, and with a diagnosis of the factors that would undermine the achievement of such conditions (Bower, 2005: 25). Popper’s search, launched nearly seven decades ago, is still an ongoing one in the present day. Even today, different societies and individuals interpret, prioritise and realise values that could be considered to be universal (radical centre values) differently, and this is both inescapable and desirable (Parekh, 2000: 158).

The answer to Popper’s quest is not simple and straightforward. Its formulation will depend in the final analysis on one’s societal relationship theory. For example, a person with a socialist, communal view of society might feel that some people in society should not be allowed to express or even to possess their own values, ideas and beliefs in the interest of creating or ensuring a society with shared values. In this case, it is clear that the possession of private values (et cetera) that may deviate from the norm in a hoped-for unified society will not be tolerated by the majority. More cynical socialists such as Marxists would be wary of social structures that seem to serve the powerful or a particular interest group in society, that manipulate and exploit the sense of fear of ordinary people, structures that (for instance) use religion as a tool of social control or as an “opiate for the masses”.

If, on the other hand, one had a more liberal view of society one would accept and honour people’s right to personal, private and often dissident views, and hence would be more tolerant of such views in the interest of a positive *modus vivendi*. In this context, it would be important to reason with others who think and behave differently (cf. dialogical pluralism, as discussed above), and to be sceptical of others’ ideas and beliefs (Morton, 1998: 171). If one believed in total individualism, however, one could be one of the causes of society falling atomistically apart, with very few shared values on which to base a social contract. If one believed in Mills’ no harm principle, the only reason for preventing someone doing or believing something is the potential harm that it could cause another or society as a whole. No one has the right to tell another how to be or how to act provided that such being and acting does no harm to others (Grayling, 2002: 8). The challenge here is to only allow what should be truly allowed and forbid what should be forbidden. The harm principle should therefore never be used arbitrarily (Morton, 1998: 170-171).
It, in turn, one approached society from a functionalist view one would be interested in what promoted the interests of society as a whole, what would make society “socially good”, or “collectively stronger”, “socially more vital”, “more alive and active”, what would promote social cohesion and productivity, generosity and social harmony (Wright, 2009: 43-44).

What underlies tolerance in a diverse or pluralistic society is the recognition that there should be room for all kinds of alternatives to exist. Learning to tolerate is indeed one of the aims of civilised life (Grayling, 2002: 9). Human community benefits by permitting a variety of lifestyles to flourish because they represent experiments from which much might be learned about how to deal with the human condition (Grayling, 2002: 8).

While we will never discover cast-iron rules of good conduct and the good life in our societies which will answer every question that might arise about how human beings can live peacefully and well together, the lack of absolute agreement on what peaceful coexistence means and requires should not discourage us from investigating and promoting the theoretical notion of a healthy modus vivendi (De Botton, 2012: 83). As mentioned, peaceful coexistence depends, in the first place, considerably on the amount of moral imagination that the members of a community are able to display, i.e. the capability of placing themselves in the shoes of another, be it friend or enemy. The process entails scouring one’s mind and memory for shared points of reference, the mutual validation of feelings and ideas, working towards a common goal or perspective, the virtual sharing of experiences, knowing the other from the inside, putting prejudice in abeyance and showing empathy and sympathy. The expansion of moral imagination forces one to see the interior of more and more people for what their interiors are, namely remarkably like one’s own. Like one’s own interior, says Wright (2009: 428), it is deeply coloured by emotions and passions; like one’s own it also colours the world (cf. the “fishbowl” metaphor) with self-serving moral judgment.

Whatever transpires in a society, it should create and promote the conditions of the good life. Something that happens defeats this purpose when it violates human dignity, (self-)respect and tolerance of others, and when it renders its members incapable of leading the good life (Parekh, 2000: 157). Certain agreed-upon values should be respected by all in society, and each society should be free to find the most effective way to popularise and realise the values on which its social contract is founded (Parekh, 2000: 156). This is where tolerance comes in. Since every society and every individual member thereof enjoy the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise their values, their practices cannot and should not be condemned merely because they are different from or offend against one’s own (Parekh, 2000: 153). A healthy modus vivendi indeed rests on the assumption that people have so many things in common that they should be able to realise their ideals and goals through mutual support and cooperation, and this requires tolerance of the religious and other characteristics that members of a society might have. Through a healthy modus vivendi every member has an equal opportunity to develop his or her potential, or to protect the environment (Ramcharan, 2008: 53).

Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, it should neither be expected nor desired that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever one’s obligations to others (also reciprocally), each has the right to his or her own way (Schneller, 2011: 190). What one might expect from others is the moral qualities of honesty, truthfulness, decency, courage and justice coupled with the intellectual qualities of thoughtfulness, strength of mind,
curiosity and the communal qualities of neighbourliness, charity, self-support as well as the political qualities of commitment to the common good, respect for law, responsible participation, helpfulness, cooperativeness and respect for others (Schneller, 2011: 175). Tolerance and respect seem to go hand in hand in the establishment of a healthy *modus vivendi*. Diversity needs respect (Christian Science Monitor, 2005: 8). Any attempt at coercion unglues the respect that holds a diverse society together.

True tolerance, as observed in the previous section of this monograph, does not originate in opportunism which tolerates other religions merely for its own profit or for the sake of a superficial form of coexistence. It rather takes a sincere interest in the other’s religion and is eager to know as much of it as possible (Van der Walt, 2007: 213). Honest and sincere interest and respect for others and their capabilities can indeed lead to happiness, the provision of space for one another and also to social justice as fairness. According to Valenkamp (2011), the philosopher Kant claimed that the actual practising of a healthy *modus vivendi* among diverse people requires a certain “push from behind”. The love commandment, as expressed in the various forms of the Golden Rule (see Comte-Sponville, 2005: 8-10 for a discussion of the various versions of the Rule), is not the true ground for morality, Kant claims, but it provides the necessary flow, the inspiration to provide space for one another; it provides the stimulus to recognise-in-the-other-the-same-needs, to such an extent that the members of a society ought to do what the Golden Rule demands, i.e. to love one’s neighbour as oneself. People need to create societies in which differences can be recognised and conflicts resolved, where their forces can be united, not because all human beings are good and just, but because they are not; not because they are united, but so that they have a realistic chance to become united (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15).

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #11:**

1. (11.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people in a community are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together in a community. People are just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions in the same community is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

**Interpretation of the responses:** 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.
12. **Grand narratives and the new spirituality**

As mentioned in Section 10 above, those with a rather “thick” or maximally life-conceptually filled value system might be reluctant to be tolerant of the religious and cultural views of those of different persuasion than themselves. The thesis there was that the “thicker” or maximalist a value system becomes, the more aware its adherents would be of the depth of the rifts between their own value system and those of others of different religious or cultural persuasion, to the extent that they might reach a point where they feel they have to dissociate them from the social contract with others. It could be argued, however, that this is highly unlikely among rational and sane individuals. Most people understand and welcome the profits that could be made by entering into the social contract and living according to values and principles about which consensus had been reached.

However, there is a possibility\(^\text{31}\) that rational and sane individuals socially bonded together in what has been termed “a grand narrative” or “totalising system” (McGrath, 2005: 219) of whatever nature, could be less tolerant of others, their ideas and beliefs than those outside of such a “grand narrative”. Members of a mainstream church, for instance, could feel conscience bound by the dogmas and the confessions of their organisation, and hence not free to be tolerant of deviant views. This is because, apart from the fact that each individual member of such an institution comes with a set of in-built pre-judgments and biases, he or she is a member of an institution with a certain agreed-upon set of dogmas or ideologies which make it difficult for members to be tolerant of other views not consonant with those of the institution. In many cases, the personal “fishbowl” perspective of the members have been affected or coloured by the ideologies or dogmas of the institution as a grand narrative. As Olthuis (2012: 3/7) remarked, grand narratives tend to claim to be able to explain everything. This claim, as we have seen in the discussion of postmodernism above, has today lost much of its credibility.

Although, as Makrides (2012: 250-251) correctly observed, the grand narratives of modernism have not been totally replaced by postmodernism, there is a strong tendency away from the grand narratives and their relative dominance over the thoughts and behaviour of their adherents. People understand nowadays that despite the claims of the grand narratives, people only know partially, not totally. The image of the all-knowing mind is slowly but surely being replaced by the image of the searching mind in and through a complex world, where answers are more likely to be wrong than correct.

In contrast to the search for spirituality within the context of a grand narrative, such as a particular religion, church or other religious institution, there is a resurgence of interest in non-mainstream religion and spirituality, in the realm of the transcendent. There has been a concomitant breakdown in the social and religious cohesion formerly experienced in the context of grand narrative monoliths such as churches and mainstream religions (McGrath, 2005: 219, 263). Spirituality is now widely seen, also in educational context, as something fundamental to the human condition, something that transcends ordinary everyday experience and is concerned with the search for identity and meaning in response to death, suffering, beauty and evil. Spirituality may be encountered in our beliefs, sense of awe, wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and purpose, self-knowledge, relationships, creativity, feelings and emotions, and could be rooted in

\(^{31}\)Attention is drawn to the word “possibility”; not all of those attached to some or other grand narrative may feel themselves so conscience bound to the extent that they might be intolerant of others’ views.
curiosity, imagination, insight and intuition (Wright, 2010: 130). According to Julian (2002: 10), the base of spirituality is the notion of serving a higher purpose, but in Welch’s (1997: 84) opinion, spirituality has in practice been reduced to a feeling of the infinite, an inarticulate ecstasy before the wonders of the self or of nature, on an experience of the ineffable. Modern spirituality therefore has no hell, no doctrine, no substance; it is all about feeling.

Kourie’s (2006: 22-23) definition of spirituality is quite different: spirituality refers to the deepest dimension of the human person; it refers to ultimate values that give meaning to one’s life, whether one is religious or not. Spirituality refers to one’s ultimate values and commitments, regardless of content. De Muynck’s (2008: 7) definition is similar to that of Kourie: spirituality is the manner in which one – by orientating oneself to a source – relates his or her beliefs and experience of inspiration and / or transcendence, more or less methodically, to the actual practice of life.

The purpose of this section is neither to give a full depiction of modern-day spirituality (which is very difficult to do because of the nebulousness of the concept) nor to evaluate it in any detail. Suffice it to say that, as Mohler (2008: 89) observed, spirituality has risen as a replacement for identification with organised religion. It is a new non-theistic form of belief that can range from the New Age movement to the various quests for spirituality that mark popular culture and fit personal taste. Instead of, as expected, religiousness disappearing, it has been resurrected in another form, that of spirituality (Van der Walt, 2007: 150).

The implications of the above for religious tolerance are clear. The more one is immersed in the doctrines, dogmas, structures of a mainstream religion that act as a grand narrative that binds the conscience of its members, the less likely one would be to be tolerant of the religious views and beliefs of others of different religious persuasion. The opposite might also be true: the more one is immersed in the nebulous ambience of some or other form of “new” spirituality, the more one is likely to be tolerant of others’ views.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #12:

1. (12.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them.
Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

13. Preliminary conclusion: (Religious) tolerance a “moving phenomenon”

The discussion so far seems to suggest that (religious and other forms of) tolerance can be regarded as a “moving phenomenon” and hence very difficult to delineate, circumscribe in general terms or define. The discussion also proves that it has many facets and ramifications, and that one and the same aspect might be based in quite different theoretical perspectives. The term “tolerance” has, therefore, to be seen as a phenomenon with various nuances.

(Religious and other forms of) tolerance pertain(s) to a certain moment in time; it seems to be a matter of a specific moment in question. Groups of quite different religious or life and world view persuasion might live peacefully together for many years, even centuries, and may be said to be quite tolerant of the other and its beliefs and convictions. A relatively minor incident, such as the accidental death of a child at the hands of a member of the another (religious) community, may then spark a bout of severe (religious) intolerance - even conflict - that might last for years thereafter. Another incident, for example, a child saved from drowning by a member of the opposing group might terminate the violence, and lead to another prolonged period of (religious) tolerance. This can be practically illustrated with reference to the situation in Kiev, the capital city of the Ukraine in February 2014. The refusal of the president to sign an agreement with the European Union sparked a bout of severe intolerance and violence among the populace. The violence only ended when the president was deposed. Tolerance – in the political realm, in this instance - became the order of day once again.

The degree of (religious and other forms of) tolerance experienced in a community depends on the degree of equilibrium in the system. The various groups of which a society is composed seem to be tolerant of one another if all the checks and balances are in place, when certain tendencies are effectively counterbalanced by others.

Intolerance seems to need a spark or trigger to come to life. The relative peace and quiet and tolerance in a community characterised by potential for conflict can be broken by a single incident which acts as a spark or a trigger (see the examples mentioned above). Even a relatively insignificant incident can act as a trigger that could cause disequilibrium in the system.

The principles or a priori convictions of the various groups that might come into conflict and hence be intolerant of others seem to play an important role. People and groups entertain different sets of principles that flow from their religious persuasion and convictions (their respective “fishbowls”), and they live peacefully according to them on condition that they are not somehow confronted by an incongruous situation, on condition that some or other incident does not cause them alarm about the validity and viability of their personal convictions and principles. Confrontation seems to be the
key to the rise of (religious and other forms of) intolerance. As long as a person or a group is allowed to live peacefully according to their principles and convictions we might expect them to be calm and their system to be in equilibrium. A confrontational incident might disturb this equilibrium and hence result in intolerant behaviour and attitudes. Put differently, the principles might lie latently in the background of an individual or a group, but a certain confrontational incident (a certain casuistic) might bring it to the fore. How a person responds to such a confrontational incident will depend on the “contents” of his or her “fishbowl” (see section 1 above) and expectancy filters (see section 4 above). As mentioned in those two sections, how a person will engage with the world, with confrontation and systemic imbalance, will depend to a large extent to how s/he views the world and other people.

14. © The questionnaire

A few notes about the questionnaire that follows below:

1. The preceding conceptual and theoretical framework lends conceptual and theoretical support and substance to the items which together now form a provisional questionnaire with which to probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by a respondent, and on the basis of which a religious tolerance profile of a person or a group can be constructed.

2. The items, as they have been phrased in the course of the argument outlined above, are much too difficult and complicated in their current form for application in a questionnaire to be completed by teachers, student teachers and the students or pupils in their care. This became evident when the original questionnaire was given to a number of well educated adults to respond to. Although they were able to respond adequately to each item, they found the formulation thereof too theoretical-academic and hence too complicated. This explains why a further edition of the questionnaire had to be drafted (see Section 14 below). This section contains in essence the thrust of the items of the original questionnaire but pains were taken to make the items more understandable and easier to respond to by the target audience.

3. Readers of this monograph are encouraged to attempt responding to the original questionnaire. This exercise will help them decide whether the questionnaire indeed measures what it is intended to measure, in other words whether it possesses the necessary content and construct validity.

4. The items following each theoretical section above overlap in some cases, even to a considerable extent. This is because different theoretical perspectives lead to similar questionnaire items. This problem has to be addressed in the final formulation of the questionnaire.

4. Please read the remark at the end of the questionnaire, i.e. after the interpretation, and after first having completed the questionnaire.

Here is the more simplified version of the questionnaire:

1. To which religion do you belong? If you belong to a mainstream religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not belong to a mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.
2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

4. Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my existence. 2. I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me.

5. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following options: 1. I completely, fully agree 2. To a fairly large degree 3. Only to a limited degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all

6. Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

7. Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the following:1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

8. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable. 4. I disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement.
9. Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree

10. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement.

11. Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I do not agree at all.

12. Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree

13. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and world view that is completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all.

14. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree to a considerable extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree.

15. Which TWO of the following views of others are most applicable to you as a person? (1) My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my
own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to
a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

**Interpretation key**

1. This item informs the researcher whether the respondent belongs to a mainstream religion, to a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or to no religion at all – as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without religion (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent.

2. Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on Bennett’s work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

3. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

4. 1 indicates a balanced and secure worldview. This person is not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their views. 2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing

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32See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect.
from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated tolerance of others and their views.

5. A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and world view conviction.

6. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and worldview. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.

7. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and life and world view. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.

8. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared values. A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and world view convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views.

9. Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment.
10. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might belong in Bennett’s categories IV and VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III.

11. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas.

12. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person.

13. A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and their religious views.

14. A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant.

15. These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence in his or her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

16. 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude.

17. 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude.

18. 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person
with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

19. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

20. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

**Remark:** Initial application of the above questionnaire in a small-scale pilot study revealed two of its characteristics:

1. It is too difficult and complicated in its current format for persons without the necessary conceptual and theoretical background to decide on the appropriate responses. To address this problem a simplified version of the questionnaire was developed for teachers, student teachers and learners, students, pupils in the last two years of school (typically grades 11 and 12 / standards 9 and 10)(Section 14).

2. The initial results show that at least four profiles with respect to religious tolerance could be drafted on the basis of the questionnaire:
   2.1 A respondent with a totally intolerant stance is able to mark the items in such a way that his or her total religious intolerance will be clearly demonstrated.
   2.2 The same goes for a person with the opposite stance as far as religious tolerance is concerned; items can be marked in such a way that his or her total religious tolerance can be demonstrated.
   2.3 According to the pilot study, by far the most respondents seem to mark the items that show his or her adherence to a strong personal value system while at the same time being tolerant of others and their religious views.
   2.4 Some respondents mark the items in such a way they show their adherence to a strong personal value system accompanied by a spirit of relative intolerance of other views.

3. These impressions will have to be tested with larger groups of respondents.

4. The following is an example of the responses of one of the persons in the very initial pilot study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Response number</th>
<th>Response in words</th>
<th>Religious tolerance profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person belongs to the Christian faith or religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agree to some extent</td>
<td>Religio-centric person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Totally agree</td>
<td>Religio-centric and values maximally filled with content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>Balanced and secure world view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Only to a limited degree</td>
<td>Not an exclusivist stance with respect to religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>Prepared to live by universal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Totally agree</td>
<td>Fully committed to own religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Aware of differences among people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>Prepared to work with contextually filled universal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Completely agree</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Completely agree</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Do not agree</td>
<td>This person does not have much moral imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>This is a trusting person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3 and 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person’s confidence in own beliefs is high, and he believes in a unified society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person is a proponent of dialogical pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person’s views are rooted in a Holy book</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person is willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person has a balanced view; is willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person has a balanced view; is tolerant of others and prepared to live with them on certain conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth column, if read from top to bottom, embodies the tolerance profile of this particular person: he is a Christian who is fairly religio-centred in his value stance, whose views are rooted in the Holy Book of Christianity (the Bible), who prefers to apply values that are maximally filled with life and worldview content, who feels balanced and secure in his dealings with other people and their values, who does not entertain an exclusivist view of his religion, is prepared to live by universally recognised values despite being firmly anchored in and committed to his own Christian religion (hence supports the tenet of universally recognised though contextually filled values), is a trusting and tolerant person though without strong moral imagination (he finds it difficult to place himself in the shoes of others), is confident in his own beliefs but also believes in a unified society, is an exponent of dialogical pluralism (prepared to interact and dialogue with adherents to other religions), and is prepared to conditionally enter into a social contract with others and to live peacefully with them.

This is the profile of a single respondent. The tolerance profile of a group of respondents, say a class of Grade 11 students at a certain school, can be determined in the same way.
© Questionnaire for teachers, student teachers and Grade 11 and 12 learners

1. To which religion do you belong? (If you do not belong to any mainstream religion, please describe your religious stance in a few words.)

2. “My religion is very strong, and I am expected to live very strictly according to it.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

3. “I am always strongly conscious of my religion in everything that I do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

4. Here are four statements. Mark the one that is most applicable to you. 1. I feel safe and secure; other people and what they think are not a threat to me. 2. I am mostly concerned with myself; I cannot be bothered about other people and what they think and do. 3. I expect nothing from other people and also nothing from life; one has to make your own fortune. 4. I would like to be friendly with other people but at the same time I am afraid of them and what they could do to me.

5. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share and that is not peculiar to one religion only.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

6. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share, but I shall always interpret them according to my own religion.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

7. “A value that does not flow from my own religion and view of life is useless as a guideline for my life.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

8. “I prefer to values that do not have anything to do with any religion. Values should not lead to divisions and conflict among people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

9. “I prefer not to apply values that will make me different from all other people. That is why I do not like religious values.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

10. “Other people are free to live according to their own religious values; the values of other people do not bother me at all.[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

11. “The well-being of society depends on how tolerant we are with one another and with the other person’s religious values and views.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]
12. “I just tolerate things that others say and do but I shall never be able to accept the things they think and do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

13. “I can place myself in the shoes of person whose religion, worldview, values and ideas are completely different from mine.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

14. “I am naturally inclined to trust other people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

15. Mark any TWO of the following that you think are most applicable to you: (1) My confidence in my own religious beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in my own beliefs is high. (4) I believe the society in which I live should have only a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one; all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way I do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.]

17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) All that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom; everyone should believe what he or she wants. (2) The idea of individual freedom is wrong; people should live according to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. (3) A person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful and pleasant. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions that I do not feel at home in my own surroundings. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such participation does not bring me in conflict with religion. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great for that. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are just people. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions; we cannot tolerate others’ way of thinking. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I am non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I try to connect with a higher
force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are searching for such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, but despite this, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Concluding remarks
Each of the items in the questionnaire above can be traced back to one or more of the theoretical viewpoints that preceded it. This enables the administrator of the questionnaire to interpret the responses to each item. By plotting a respondent’s responses to each of the 20 items the investigator will be in a position to see whether a respondent is basically religiously tolerant in his or her dealings and relationships with others of a different religious persuasion. Not only will such graphs show where each individual respondent lies in terms of being religiously tolerant or intolerant but it will also show where an entire group of respondents lies on the basis of their aggregate response in terms of each item and of the questionnaire in its entirety.

Two further steps will have to be taken before the questionnaire can be administered with confidence to samples of respondents: (a) a pilot study with a few selected respondents has to be done to rectify any shortcomings and mistakes; and (b) the questionnaire should be edited to ensure that it actually measures religious tolerance and that each item and the various options therein are understandable to both teachers, prospective teachers and pupils (students, learners).

References


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Measuring religious tolerance in education

Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among educators and their students worldwide

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References
Preface

This monograph forms part of the output of a research project about the issue of religious tolerance among educators, particularly teachers and their students or pupils. A series of articles on religious tolerance has already been published or is currently in press, each covering only a specific facet of the problem. It was envisaged right from the outset that not only conceptual and theoretical investigations would be launched into the matter of religious tolerance in education but that empirical work should also be done, in the form of a comparative study of how the 203 member states of the United Nations have been dealing with religious differences and with religion (education), and in the form of a questionnaire that could probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by educators (teachers) and student teachers, and the children in their care. This explains the origin of this monograph. It covers a number of conceptual and theoretical aspects regarding religious tolerance that normally would not be discussed in disparate journal articles, despite their importance for establishing the conceptual and theoretical substratum for a questionnaire. In this monograph, each of the items of the proposed questionnaire flows from a specific conceptually and theoretically developed viewpoint, enabling researchers to acquire a detailed picture of the extent to which educators and their students are tolerant of the religious views of others of a different religious persuasion.

The findings after the eventual application of the questionnaire will be of the greatest import for practising teachers and their pupils as well as for student teachers, in mono-religious, multi-religious, purported non-religious, post-religious, secular and / or post-secular\(^1\) settings (Taylor, 2007; Miedema, 2012). The findings will inform the former that there is a wider world outside of their particularist setting for which they have to prepare their students, and it will assist them to devise the necessary strategies for helping their students to cope with the challenges of multi-religionism. It will also enable them and their pupils to pre-empt the possible dangers of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and hence intolerance. Those in multi-religious and the other settings mentioned above, in turn, might learn from the results of the survey that they live in a complex world for which they have to prepare their students; they will in the process also learn (how) to avoid the possible dangers of unprincipled tolerance and laissez faire relativism.

I hereby express my gratitude to Dr Bram de Muynck, Lecturer at the Driestar Educatief, for the publication of this monograph, and especially to the panel of experts that he convened for the purpose of critically reviewing the manuscript. I also thank my colleagues Ferdinand Potgieter and Charl Wolhuter who critically reviewed the text of this monograph. I take responsibility for any mistakes and shortcomings remaining after this painstaking process and would welcome any advice for the improvement not only of this monograph but also of the questionnaire that it has given birth to.

Hannes van der Walt

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\(^1\) “Post-secular” in this context refers to the period in which we now live, a period in which a variety of meaning choices, including choices of a religious or spiritual nature, is possible.
Measuring religious tolerance in education

Towards an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among educators and their students worldwide

The need for an instrument to measure religious tolerance

While his remark may sound cynical, Gray (2003: 12) is probably right in saying that humanity as such does not exist; there are only human beings driven by conflicting needs and illusions, and subject to every kind of infirmity of will and judgement. Because of this, human beings are unable to live together peacefully, and are often engaged in strife, whether on a personal, community or (inter-)national level. For some or other reason, people are either always in competition with one another or in conflict. Conflict can be caused by different interests, aspirations, gender, race, religion and faith. Alford (2009: 57) regards the latter, in the form of religious fundamentalism, as the cause of many of the world's ills, including religious intolerance.

A study of the role played by religious ideas in the great clashes between civilisations is instructive (Wright, 2010: 5). Even Christianity which generally regards itself as a balanced religion (with exceptions, of course) has not always been good. According to Van der Walt (2007: 159), the many heresies among Christians, injustice and even violence in the name of Christendom all through the past 2000 years clearly illustrate the fact that no faith is perfect and above criticism. Much of Christianity's history since the 17th century concurred with the rise of modernism, of which the Holocaust is emblematic.

Despite unparalleled advances in almost every field of human endeavour, especially technology, our streets abound with the hungry and homeless, violence and war continue to plague us (Olthuis, 2012: 27). Especially religious conflict is rife, as can be observed in the Middle East, North and West Africa, and of which the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 can be regarded as emblematic. No matter how promising the idea of non-oppositional differences with other people, the ever-present economy of violence makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to put into practice, says Olthuis.

To further demonstrate the nature of the minefield in which we find ourselves with regard to religious violence and conflict, De Vos (2011) mentions that many passages in religious texts might appear inexplicable, demonstrably false, deeply hurtful, offensive and harmful to any reasonable person not blinded by his or her own cultural and religious commitments. According to him, many

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2Readers wishing to begin with a technical discussion of the meaning of "tolerance" could first read Sections 7 and 8 of this monograph, particularly the second technical point where the word is semantically examined. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, "tolerance" can mean any of the following: 1. the capacity to endure pain or hardship: endurance, fortitude, stamina; 2. sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tolerance). (In)tolerance is an attitude with regard to, or response to a characteristic of an individuals or of a group; religious (in)tolerance, in particular is seen as an attitude that (a) flows from religious motives and/or (b) is directed at persons or groups from other religions.
passages in the Bible and the Quran may be interpreted as containing hate speech against women, gay men and lesbians, while other passages may be interpreted as inciting violence, either directly or indirectly, against women, gay men and lesbians. Other examples of religious intolerance are the reactions of many people to the Rastafarian claim that partaking in the holy herb of cannabis will bring them closer to God, to the widespread practice among Muslims and Jews to cut off a part of a baby boy’s penis shortly after birth, and to the practice among Hindu school girls who attempt to wear nose studs in state schools in South Africa (De Vos, 2011b).

The need for tolerance\(^3\) has not only increased because of an epidemic of hate crimes, but also because of daily social interactions that require treating one another with respect and dignity. (Religious) intolerance is most frequently reflected in classroom, hallway and playground insults\(^4\), angry outbursts, social cliques, put-downs and dismissals of others’ viewpoints during class discussions (cf. Gateways to Better Education, 2005: 1,2; Schweitzer, 2007: 89).

The current strife in Syria, the recent “Arabic Spring” uprisings and the conflict between the Muslim north and the Christian south of Nigeria and Mali count as examples of religious (and ethnic) conflict. Peck (2006: 173) correctly points out that differences can exist between atheists and theistic believers as well as within religious groups. “We see dogmatism, and proceeding from dogmatism, we see wars and inquisitions and persecutions. We see hypocrisy: people professing the brotherhood of man killing their fellows in the name of faith, lining their pockets at the expense of others, and practicing all manner of brutality” (Peck, 2006: 184). In Wright’s (2009: 421) view, “the bulk of westerners and the bulk of Muslims are in a deeply non-zero-sum relationship, [and] by and large aren’t very good at extending moral imagination to one another”. Alford (2009: 57) concurs with him in saying that religious fundamentalism seems to be the cause of many of the world’s ills, the reason for this being that people tend to operate from a narrower frame of reference (world view) than what they are capable of, thereby failing to transcend the influence of their particular religion, culture, particular set of parents and childhood experience upon their understanding (Peck, 2006: 180).

Tensions and attitudes such as those just mentioned are understandable because of the importance of religion to every person. Religious tenets, convictions, attitudes and behaviours of people that contradict one’s own deepest religious convictions are not easily tolerated, and are often seen as a threat. On the one hand, Van der Walt (2007: 160, 162) avers, almost all religions preach love for one’s neighbour; on the other, violence is committed in the name of the very same religions. Large numbers of people on earth suffer from the scourge of intolerance (Wright, 2009: 5). In view of this, Needleman (2008: 99) despairingly concludes: “All we can say is that our religious ideals, our moral

\(^3\) The contents of this paragraph pertain to violent societies such as those of South and West Africa. It is not as applicable to other societies, such as that of the Netherlands, where conflict does not necessarily rise from religious differences but rather from political and ethnical differences. The growing presence of immigrant groups (Moroccans, Antillians, Turks, Surinams and so on) has been the cause of conflict. In some cases, populistic politicians have ascribed the conflict also to religious differences by pointing fingers at, for instance, Islam. This is not done, however, on the basis of a pertinent Christian or other religious motive but rather to score political points. Academics in the Netherlands are therefore hesitant to ascribe this form of intolerance to religious differences.

\(^4\) This monograph, as its sub-heading indicates, focuses on the situation in schools and broader pedagogical contexts. The problem of (religious and cultural) intolerance surfaces in all spheres of life, however.
resolves, our ideologies, our campaigns, however honourably conceived, have not prevented – and perhaps have even hastened – the arrival of our world and our lives at the rim of despair and destruction”. We find ourselves in the moral dilemma of, on the one hand, attempting to destroy one another, and on the other hand, to save one another (Grayling, 2010: 7).

All of these conflicts, Wright (2010: 127) insists, demand a hermeneutic of understanding that is inseparable from moral obligation (cf. Levinas and Ricoeur). This has been recognised by humankind. From its very beginning, says Gray (2009: 11), moral philosophy has been a struggle to exorcise conflict among individuals and groups from ethical life. In the (ancient Greek) city, as in the soul, harmony has been the ideal. There has always been a search for harmony of values. The same can be said of politics, Comte-Sponville (2005: 13-14) avers. We need politics so that conflicts of interest can be resolved without violence, and so that the powers of humankind can be united rather than opposed. Comte-Sponville (2005: 15) goes so far as to define politics as the management of conflicts, alliances of balances and power without resort to violence or war, not simply among individuals but also in society as a whole. Politics presupposes conflict, albeit governed by moral rules, compromises, albeit provisional, and eventually agreements on how to resolve disagreements. Also somewhat cynically, Hampshire (2003: 134) contends that political thought is no longer guided by the positive vision of what an ideal society should be like but rather on the negative vision, on what is wrong with society, and tries to remedy that. According to Hampshire (2003: 140-142), conflict resolution lies at the heart of political justice, and that demands conflict resolution mechanisms such as arbitration, a search of balance between conflicting interests and convergent reasoning. All these processes, he admits, are risky; they can go wrong.

The above underscores the importance of investigating the problem of religious tolerance respectively religious intolerance, particularly in education. It is not our purpose in this monograph to enter into a discussion about how to actually resolve religious, cultural and political conflict. The above merely provides background and rationale for our efforts in the rest of this paper to embark on the development of an instrument to measure the degree of religious tolerance (or intolerance, as the case may be) among teachers and their students (pupils). Leutwyler, Petrovic and Mantel (2012: 111) correctly point out that teachers are central actors in education; they are expected to provide equal educational opportunities to all children, irrespective of religious or cultural orientation. These authors refer to research on teacher competence that shows that “teachers’ personal dispositions are crucial for performing specific functions and tasks in teaching” and that these dispositions “correspond to deeply held beliefs, values and norms which are strongly anchored in individuals’ subjective theories”. These subjective theories may interfere with the normative claims inherent to the officially taught concepts how to teach productively in culturally diverse settings”. Because, as will be argued below, some of these privately held theories of teachers may impact on the degree of tolerance that teachers are prepared to display with respect to other

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5 It is important to note that there does not seem to be a necessary and linear connection or causal relationship between religiosity and intolerance. The possibility exists, however, as has been shown, that people may be intolerant on religious grounds of other individuals and groups. Empirical research is required to understand the extent of this phenomenon, and to devise a strategy to combat the problem.

6 Life and world views, life concepts, see the discussion of the “fishbowl” below. These subjective theories represent the individuals’ cognitions about the world and their connected emotions, volitions and motivations. They express, therefore, the individuals’ understandings and interpretations of how the world functions; they express how individuals have constructed their world views, in other words: their realities (Leutwyler et al, 2012: 111-112).
teachers and to children of a different religious orientation, we have to find ways and means to measure their dispositions in dealing with religious heterogeneity.

Once the degree of religious tolerance respectively intolerance has been measured attention can be paid to the issue of eradicating the scourge of religious intolerance (if indeed it exists, as we suppose it does). This has become necessary because of the much greater diversity in our societies than ever before and because of the religious intolerance under which many individuals and the world in general have been staggering of late. The former “foreign” religions have in recent times become our “neighbour” religions. As the intermingling and contact increases, the potential for conflict also increases (Van der Walt, 2007: 154). The time has indeed come to “dance with diversity and value pluralism” in the form of having empathy with the other, and to enter into dialogue with the other (Schreiner, 2005: 13).

Steps taken to draft an instrument to measure tolerance

The end destination of the discussion in this monograph is the construction of a questionnaire regarding religious tolerance / intolerance based on a plausible theoretical foundation. Each item in the questionnaire should be traceable to a particular theoretical insight thereby ensuring construct and content validity for the entire questionnaire (see Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011: 188-189 for a detailed discussion of these forms of validity). As far as could be ascertained, no questionnaire based on theories such as the radical centre of value theory, modus vivendi theory, social imagination theory and several other similar theories exists, which underscores the necessity of not only developing such a questionnaire and also to theoretically justify every item therein.

The construction of the questionnaire on religious tolerance entails a number of distinctive steps. A section of this monograph will be devoted to each of those steps. The discussion of each step will result in the formulation of one or more items that could become part of the final questionnaire. After working through the different steps, and after formulating the envisaged items for the questionnaire, all the items will be brought together in a separate final section (see the following diagram for a visual outline of the steps followed in the rest of this monograph).

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7 The use of Bennett’s model in this study should not be construed that the stadia of cultural diversity, from ethnocentrism to ethnorelativism exactly coincide with the degree of religious tolerance or intolerance, as the case may be. The concept “cultural diversity” (at which Bennett’s instrument is aimed) has a broader meaning than “religion”. In a sense, culture can also embrace religion. Use was made of Bennett’s distinctions for the purpose of measuring the attitudes or perceptions regarding others, in the broadest sense of the word.

8 As mentioned, (in)tolerance need not be necessarily religiously inspired. This monograph is interested, however, in (in)tolerance that is indeed religiously inspired.

9 The instrument to measure (religious) tolerance flowing from this monograph can be used for various purposes, for instance by someone interested in measuring religious tolerance in a culturally and religiously diverse setting, or by someone interested in measuring tolerance of this nature in a relatively religiously homogeneous setting.

10 Tolerance can also be construed in psychological terms. It will become clear from the rest of this discussion that the instrument to measure tolerance is not of a psychological nature but rather of a religious philosophical nature.

11 The drafting and editing of an actual questionnaire on (religious) tolerance among school teachers and their students will of course require further processing.
Life and world view / Personal fishbowl

Expectancy filters

Radical centre of values (value relativism)

Expectancy filter of value orientation

Value consciousness ("thick values") (personal, private)

Willingness to enter into a social contract?

Degree of tolerance of (religious) differences in others?

Valley of relative value emptiness ("thin values") (legal, public)

Degree of tolerance of (religious) differences in others?

Willingness to enter into a social contract?

Bennett I: Denial of difference

Bennett II: Defence against difference

Bennett III: Minimisation of difference

Bennett IV: Acceptance of difference

Bennett V: Adaptation to difference

Bennett VI: Integration of difference

FLOW CHART TO EXPLAIN THE GIST OF THE ARGUMENT UNFOLDING IN THIS MONOGRAPH
The steps of constructing an instrument for measuring religious tolerance among teachers and students (pupils) worldwide

1. Orientation: the personal “fishbowl”

According to Olthuis (2012: 1/712), the growing realisation that there are no innocent, unbiased ways of looking at the world, that everyone wears “glasses” and looks at the world through a peculiar lens, window or frame, has given common currency to the idea of worldview. His view coincides with that of Hawking and Mlodinow (2010: 23) who came up with the following rather apt description of what has commonly become known as a life view, a worldview or a life and worldview:

A few years ago the city council of Monza, Italy, barred pet owners from keeping goldfish in curved goldfish bowls. The measure’s sponsor explained the measure by saying that it is cruel to keep a fish in a bowl with curved sides because, gazing out, the fish would have a distorted view of reality. But how do we know we have a true, undistorted picture of reality? Might not we ourselves also be inside some big goldfish bowl and have our vision distorted by an enormous lens? The goldfish’s picture of reality is different from ours, but can we be sure it is less real?

It is now generally acknowledged, Olthuis (2012: 1/7, 4/7) claims, that everyone comes outfitted with a wide array of faith-based pre-judgments, that everyone has built-in biases, and that knowledge is perspectival, world-viewish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, and never is universal or absolute. A world view is the pre-conceptual orienting lens or glasses in and through which people reach out to the world even as the world impinges on them. World-viewing or world-visioning, he is convinced, is a complex, developmental (as will be demonstrated below) and two-way looking process (also discussed below) (Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).

Van der Walt’s (1999: 48 ff.) catalogue of the features of a life view casts light on the nature of a life and world view. A life and worldview is a way of looking at reality; it orientates a person and helps him/her to understand the world; it is a unity; it can be both descriptive and prescriptive; it demands full commitment; it is typically human; it is pre-scientific or pre-theoretical; it is a deep-seated source of action; it provides a definite view of reality but nevertheless remains fallible, and it evokes deeply felt emotions in the person. Important in Van der Walt’s (1999: 51-2) description of the structure of the fishbowl / the life and world view is his contention that a life and world view is a connection between a person’s faith and his or her practical everyday life. Each person believes in something; faith plays an important role in the lives of all people in that it gives direction to life. A person’s life view, Van der Walt maintains, gives hands and feet to a person’s faith, renders faith into something relevant for everyday life. Each person believes in something; faith plays an important role in the lives of all people in that it gives direction to life. A person’s life view, Van der Walt maintains, gives hands and feet to a person’s faith, renders faith into something relevant for everyday life. In his words: A life view is a vision of faith for life. It also works in the opposite direction: a person forms a vision of life and then changes his or her faith accordingly: a vision of life for faith. Olthuis (2012: 4/7) agrees: as a person grows up, his or her experiences determine how he or she responds and acts to what they see and experience. Put differently, a worldview is not only a vision of the world, but it is at the same time a vision for the world.

12 This article is in electronic format. The page reference means “page 1 of 7”.
Hawking and Mlodinow’s metaphor is particularly apt in the case of religious attitude and viewpoint in that it reveals several things to us. Firstly, all people find themselves “swimming” inside their own respective religious and life and worldview “fishbowls”, in some cases for the span of an entire life without ever inquiring about the distortions created by the “glass sides” of the bowl or whether what is seen through the sides is “correct” by generally accepted standards or the standards of other people. Applied to religion, this could mean that a person “swims” within the confines of a fishbowl the size of, and the opaqueness of the sides of which are determined by a particular religion. He or she might have been born within that religion, grown up, been educated in terms of it, and now lives in accordance with its tenets without ever questioning the “correctness” or (the word is used advisedly) the “truth” of what is perceived through the sides of the fishbowl.

Secondly, the metaphor underscores the fact that people might have a skewed picture of the reality outside, and would not know about their distorted view of reality, unless of course the distortions are pointed out to them by people looking in through the sides of their particular fishbowls. This tells us that Socrates was correct in stating that the unexamined life is not worth living (Armstrong, 2001:67). While we will never have any guarantees or warranties that we will gain a “more correct” or “truer” picture of reality by attempting to look at reality through the sides of other people’s fishbowls, we could get a better understanding of reality and of our own place therein by doing so. Put differently, we need to examine our own fishbowl perspective as well as those of others in order to see whether we could come to a better view and understanding of life and of the world. This means that we have to occasionally change our fishbowl perspective. As Peck (2006: 33) observed:

...we are not born with maps; we have to make them, and the making requires effort. The more effort we make to appreciate and perceive reality, the larger and more accurate our maps will be. (...) the biggest problem of map-making is not that we have to start from scratch, but that if our maps are to be accurate we have to continually revise them. The world is constantly changing. (...) the vantage point from which we view the world is (also) constantly and quite rapidly changing. (...) We are daily bombarded with new information as to the nature of reality. If we are to incorporate this information, we must continually revise our maps\(^\text{13}\), and sometimes when enough new information has accumulated, we must make major revisions [to our map]. The process of making revisions, particularly major revisions, is painful...

Each individual has a life-map that changes frequently without that individual’s knowledge or conscious collaboration, or is deliberately changed by the individual him-/herself, depending on his / her experiences with regard to the world around him / her. To return to the original metaphor: a person is occasionally compelled to change his or her fishbowl perspective because of his or her interaction with reality and because of self-reflection. In extreme cases, the change might be radical, analogous to jumping from a round fishbowl into a square tank.

As mentioned, a world view is also a two-way bridge: a person’s perceptions might have an effect on the surrounding reality, and the person’s experiences in and with reality might impact on how he/she sees reality. Like a two-way bridge that carries traffic to and fro, a life view represents a

\(^{13}\) In view of Peck’s over-all argument, this revision should not be construed to mean that individuals have to engage in some or other empirical verification process in order to arrive at a form of truth that could be shared by all other people, universally, Peck merely draws attention to the fact that each person should revise his or her map to a level where it most adequately provides a grasp of reality or provides a depiction of reality.
process through which a person’s daily experiences help him or her to either confirm, question or correct his or her faith. According to Peck (2006: 179), in endeavouring to create a life view map that conforms to the reality of the cosmos and a person’s role in it, as best as a human being can know that reality, a person must constantly revise and extend his or her understanding to include new knowledge of the larger world. A person must constantly change and adapt his or her frame of reference regarding reality and the larger world. There is, according to Peck (2006: 182), no such thing as a good hand-me-down religion and life and worldview; to be vital, to be the best of which a person is capable, a person’s religion and concomitant life and worldview should be a wholly personal one, forged entirely through the fire of his or her questioning and doubting in the crucible of his or her own experience of reality. It is by our implicit, often inarticulate awareness of our intuition, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) claims, by our bodily attunement, by our learned physical, emotional and moral reflexes, that we make our way in the world. Recognising the role of all our senses in finding our way in the world suggests that we would do well to talk of world orienting or world visioning rather than only world viewing. In saying this, he links up with views expressed by Heidegger and Gadamer: prejudgments are the frames, the pictures – the world views – from which and through which we see the world and make sense of it (Olthuis, 2012: 5/7). In a certain sense, a world view is not very stable because it is constantly changing, and – in the case of some people, even heterodox and eclectic – all features of a world view that postmodernists tend to exploit (Wright, 2010: 121, 123; Olthuis, 2012: 4/7).

As one grows up and forms a religious perspective and / or a life-view, one tends to fill one’s life-view with typical life-view content, among others convictions and assumptions about God / god, the world, the order in the world – including the place and duties of the human being – and about how all these entities cohere with one another. Everyone has an explicit or implicit set of ideas or beliefs as to the essential nature of the world (Peck, 2006: 174). No-one is able to live in a “fishbowl” defined by universal values only since such values are necessarily general and relatively indeterminate. As a person grows up and forms his or her life-map, he or she re-articulates the general or universal values in the language of norms. Norms, as Parekh (2000: 152) observes, relate values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted in a person’s life, and give them life-view content. Norms in turn can be articulated in either the language of rights or that of duties and obligations. This entire process is at best only “incompletely conscious” (Peck, 2006: 174). As individuals, people decide which values would support their principles and hence to make part of their world view (i.e. internalise as their own).

The values contained in a life and worldview place an imperative on a person to act in a manner consistent with what he or she regards as worth striving and living for, worth protecting, honouring and desiring (Nieuwenhuis, 2007: 9; Lusenga, 2010: 20).

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #1**

1. With which religion do you associate yourself? If you associate yourself with a mainstream religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not associate yourself

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14Each of the proposed items can be moulded into a more user friendly form in the questionnaire itself, among others by providing for various responses on a five-point Likert-type scale, and spaces in which to write open-ended responses.
with any mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.

Interpretation of the response: This item informs the researcher whether the respondent associates him- or herself with a mainstream religion, with a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or with no formal religion at all — as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without religion, however (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent.

2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and prescriptions of my religion and worldview” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on Bennett’s work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalist and a possibility of being situated in religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

2. Expectancy filters (theory)
Olthuis (2012: 4/7) recently developed an interesting theory about how children learn to look at the world around them. According to him, world-viewing or –visioning is a complex, developmental two-way learning process and a worldview is the pre-conceptual orienting glass or glasses (referred to above as the “fishbowl” in which a person lives or learns to live) in and through which a person reaches out to the world even as the world impinges on him or her. Under the guidance of their

15See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect.
educators and through their educators’ eyes children develop expectancy filters that affect not only how and what they observe and experience but also how they respond and react to what they observe and experience. In other words, Olthuis says, a worldview is not only a vision of the world but also a vision for the world.

According to Olthuis (2012: 4-5/7), much of our relational knowledge is encoded in emotional meaning-patterns which act as expectancy filters or attachment filters that predispose from a certain point on how a person experiences relationships. This occurs automatically, without the person even being aware of it. Olthuis is convinced that a person would be aware of his or her experiences but not of the filter itself through which the person experiences. According to him, psychologists have identified at least four such expectancy or attachment filters. A person using a secure filter is able to trust others and is open to the world; a person with a pre-occupied filter is engrossed in efforts to get his or her own needs met and is inattentive to the needs of others; a person with a dismissing filter expects nothing of others and of the world, and tends to be disconnected from the self or others; a person with a fearful filter may need closeness with others and the world but at the same time is fearful of any closeness. If early formation is good enough, in other words if the attachment filters are ‘secure’, there will tend to be a ‘good enough’, continually recalibrating, mutually interactive fit between the explicit knowledge of a love-oriented, other-affirming world view and the person’s implicit gut knowledge. There will develop a double two-way movement: the implicit and explicit world views will interact dynamically and integrate in a positive growth spiral. The expressed and confessed world views will not only find embodied resonance in the implicit gut knowledge but they will act to encourage, direct and support explicit rituals, routines and rhythms in daily life. In that way world-viewing can play an indispensable role in the coming into being of liturgies of love, both personally and interpersonally in the various relationships that a person might find him- or herself.

If the formed expectancy filters are fearful, dismissive or pre-occupied rather than secure, there will be strong, if implicit, resistance to adopting and living out a love-oriented, other-affirming world view. More than that, Olthuis (2012: 5/7) maintains, there will be deep-seated impulses to thematise world views which justify and thus rationalise a person’s fears and dreads. Unless these resistances are worked through, adherence to the articulated world view will lead to half-hearted lip-service.

These expectancy or attachment filters, Olthuis (2012: 4/7) is convinced, act below a person’s awareness level but nevertheless give shape to how a person feels about him- or herself, and helps a person make sense of his or her life, God / god and others – in other words, it gives shape to a person’s life and world view. These filters, which can also be described as moods or patternings, form in early childhood experience and continue to play an indispensable and inextricable role in a person’s later efforts to explicitly thematise and conceptualise his or her life and world view.

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #2:**

1. (2.1) Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my existence. 2. I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be
bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me.

Interpretation of the responses: 1 indicates a balanced and secure world view. This person is not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their views. 2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated tolerance of others and their views.

3. The radical centre of values (theory)

In the culturally, including religiously, diverse and pluralistic societies and communities that can be found all over the post-Second World War world people have a desire, on the one hand, to pursue the interests of their own well-being, and on the other, to provide room for diverse positions and lifestyles. It is difficult, therefore, to find a single successful recipe or formula for ensuring both individual and group well-being and peaceful coexistence in the rich and complex diversity of social and moral phenomena that modern society consists of (Grayling, 2010: 10). Because of this difficulty, many communities depend on politics, the state and government to resolve conflicts of interests without violence and war, and also to unite all the forces in the community (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15). To reach a consensus of the kind needed to create a peaceful community all those whose interests are at stake tend to engage in a deliberative process of hearing all sides (Hampshire, 2003: 134, 137, 139). Such negotiations and arbitration require not only mechanisms through which all sides can be heard fairly but also institutions that can balance all the competing interests and the moral will among the participants to engage in the deliberations and to work across frontiers and the barriers that create divides among them. The arbitration about values regarding well-being, the common good and peaceful coexistence should be done fairly and justly, in a methodological and rational way, as far as possible under the guidance of recognised institutions and according to generally accepted procedures. Such interactive dialogue could lead to the discovery of common values that could be widely shared and even considered to be valid for the public domain (Van der Walt, 2007: 156).

A basic thesis of the radical centre of values theory that will be outlined in the rest of this Section is that, despite the diversity of interpretations of values that we encounter in the world, there is a core of universal values that all people can associate with and that they will find broadly acceptable (Alford, 2009: 57, 163). Awareness of such universal values requires that each person for a minute step back from themselves and their personal interests (Needleman, 2008: 108) and that they develop an attitude of not excluding others or proving that their way is the only true or acceptable way, but to give witness of how and why they see things as they do. In that way, Olthuis (2012: 3/7)
maintains, a person can invite all others to share their deepest feelings and convictions for mutual learning and benefit. He is convinced that the welfare of humankind (and the rest of reality, creation) depends on such interfaith negotiation.

As far back as 1990, cultural philosopher Frederick Turner (1990: 85, 97) wrote about the need for a “solvent” that could serve as a common medium for all kinds of cultural information. If we transpose his ideas about such a “solvent” to the realm of religious differences, he in effect claims that we can assume that once the bonds that hold the religious ideas and faith commitments of individuals and religious groups locked in a solid configuration are “loosed” by the solvent, in this case a radical centre of values, the elements of religion, being basically human, will have the hooks and valences to permit them to build up new coherent systems not limited to one religion. As the human race recognises itself as a “we” it will paradoxically be more and more surprised by the otherness of what was once considered familiar in the respective own religions. Elsewhere (Turner, 1990b: 745), he expresses the hope that moral values may one day be less arbitrary and thus more negotiable than they are today; that is, that it may be possible to develop some universal moral values from an understanding of human nature.

Needleman’s (2008: 108-109) “ethics of the threshold” is likewise a plea for the adoption of more permanent principles, in the sense of “universally accepted”. We need to find ways and means, he says, to be “outwardly in the street” in our actual lives, while somehow, or to some extent, also remaining inwardly in the theatre of the mind. Put differently, we need to step back from ourselves while wholeheartedly engaging our lives and answering its obligations. In his opinion, a new morality will emerge from this seemingly self-contradictory effort. As in the case of Turner’s “radical centre of values theory”, Needleman’s “ethics of the threshold” attempts to avoid the excesses of both moral absolutism and moral relativism, and is therefore akin to Makrides’s (2012: 264, 266) notion of a bridge between what we are and what we wish to be in the light of the ethical and religious commandments that have formed the basis of every civilisation in the world (Needleman, 2008: 109), namely a trans-confessional theory of religious tolerance or a constructive dialogue about it. Olthuis (2012: 2/7) expresses much the same sentiment by stating that in our pluralistic, multi-faith global village, the honourable and respectful embrace of difference is the greatest challenge facing our postmodern world. We urgently need, he says, to develop a model of non-oppositional difference, an economy in which power-over (with its opposition to the other) is replaced with power-with (mutual recognition, attunement and empowerment). In a sense, Wright (2010: 132) also refers to a radical centre or core of values by saying that a critical spiritual education will take, with equal seriousness, the integrity of our developing experiences, and the authority of the-order-of-things that stands accessible, if always ultimately beyond our understanding.

Talen and Ellis (2002: 36, 37) summarise the theory of the radical centre of values as follows. The theory departs from a belief in self-organising principles, i.e. the idea that the universe is not deterministic but is self-renewing and infinitely creative. On the other hand, it questions the postmodern assumption that does not take the discussion of substantive goods, such as morality, seriously. It therefore departs from the assumption that there are durable, time-tested truths and discoveries that have been, and continue to be, made about various forms of moral behaviour (including the moral behaviour that is referred to as “religious tolerance”).

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #3:**
The following items for a questionnaire among teachers and their pupils regarding the degree of religious tolerance they display could flow from the above discussion of the radical value centre (theory):

1. (3.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following options: 1. I totally, fully agree with this statement. 2. I agree with it to a fairly large degree 3. I only agree to a certain degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and world view conviction.*

2. (3.2) Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and world view. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.*

3. (3.3) Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

*Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and life and worldview. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.*

4. The expectancy filter of value orientation
In addition to the four expectancy or achievement filters mentioned by Olthuis (2012), and discussed in Section 2 above, we can distinguish a fifth, namely the expectancy filter of value orientation. Under the influence and guidance of our teachers and other educators, we learn how to orientate ourselves with regard to the values available to us in the life-world with which we slowly but surely
get acquainted as we grow up. Since all values are loaded concepts that mean different things to
different people (Van der Walt, 2007: 172) and therefore seldom come to us in the sanitised form as
described in terms of the radical centre of values, in the form of “mere names or words” without any
life and world view content, they have to be reinterpreted. According to Zecha (2007: 57), the
names of values appearing in the radical centre of values “are all wonderful words which may
certainly designate important attitudes or activities; however, they do not give a useful account of
what the pupil is expected to do when he/she has acquired clarity, communication, loyalty, respect,
etc. ... It is [therefore] ... important to explore with the students what these key-words (value words)
entail”. Gray (2009: 38) agrees with this in saying that values have to be given content, otherwise
they will remain empty. Nieuwenhuis (2010: 2) significantly adds that the basically contentless
values embodied in the radical value centre have to be filled with life-conceptual content. To be able
to do so, says Van de Beek (2010: 41), philosophers and ethicists have been agitating for the use of
“thick value language”, meaning language filled with life and worldview content. According to Van
de Beek, empty values can become more meaningful by filling them with content from the heritage
of one’s religious and life and world view tradition. This, he claims, is what people do in real life;
people do not live according to the abstract values contained in the radical value centre but rather
according to how those same values have been filled-in and coloured by their respective religions
and world views. Filled-in values do greater justice to real life than the abstract values in the radical
centre. Ramcharan (2008: 13) agrees. Individuals generally tend to create space for themselves;
individual choices abound, also within the holistic order of religions; individuals tend to attach their
own interpretations and connections to the greater ideas that they encounter.

Van de Beek (2010: 41-42) then makes a most important point with regard to the theme of the
tolerance measuring instrument that is to flow from this monograph, namely that the more a person
tends to fill in his or her values with confessional, religious and life and world view content, the more
likely he or she would be to differ in life attitude from others, and the more he or she might come
into conflict with others with a different value orientation, with values filled in with content from
other religious and world view traditions. The more a person’s values get filled in with life view and /
or religious content, the more specific they become and hence increasingly exclusive. This
exclusivity, he avers, could lead to living a very private religious life the values of which cannot be
publicly tested because they pertain, per definition, to a value world that transcends the actual
world in which we live. In saying this, Van de Beek echoes a view expressed by Swartz (2006: 565-6),
namely that the life-conceptual filling-in that people do can be plotted on a continuum ranging from
the “thin-public-minimal-narrow” end, i.e. those values which may be described as “legal”, to the
“thick-private-maximal-broad” end of a continuum, i.e. those values that are considered to be
“personal” and private, left to the conscience of the individual, with a range of positions in-between.

According to Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12-16), an education system cannot operate optimally on the
basis of values filled with life and worldview content because, they claim, such values smack of
-culturalism and particularism. Such completely life-conceptually filled-in values, they aver, “[are]
often embedded in one particular narrative (i.e. a specific religious or cultural belief system) – a
specific life-view perspective”. The reason why an education system cannot be based on such a
perspective – according to them - is because of “the relativity of truths, not only between different
religious beliefs, but also the varying interpretations and truths found in one religious
denomination.” They agree with other scholars that “a value system that is based on only one
particular religious or cultural view means that only one narrative is taken into account. That could
jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of the democratic education system in South Africa. Such “mono” approaches to values in support of education might even take the form of a revival of the highly contested and divided ideology, Christian Nationalist Education, which dominated the apartheid era...”

In their effort to steer away from particularist, i.e. completely life-conceptually filled values, they argue as follows: “We should not be asking whose values should be promoted in education, since this might lead to particularist hostility. It would also be precarious to accept human rights values as univocal and not subjected to diverse interpretation. For this reason we will discuss the position of Bikhu Parekh in terms of this debate, because he produces an alternative way of thinking about this. His position may assist in pursuing values ... that (are) both contextually recognised and justified on a universal level. His main thesis [which Du Preez and Roux support] is that humans could express their moral life in different ways, but that this does not exclude anyone from being judged according to basic universal values. He refers to the latter notion as “minimum universality” which represents an intermediate position between relativism (particularism) and monism (universalism).”

The discussion so far illustrates how the fifth expectancy filter works. Wolhuter, Steyn, De Klerk and Rens to whose particularistic and confessional approach Du Preez and Roux (2010: 14) object, applied an expectancy filter in terms of which they availed themselves of Christian values, i.e. values filled with content from a Christian and Biblical life view perspective, to promote discipline in schools. Du Preez and Roux (2010: 15), on the other hand, seem to have operated with quite a different expectancy filter, namely that values should be filled with contextual content that would not jeopardise the realisation of the multicultural ideals of a democratic country. Whereas Wolhuter et al made use of Christian values in the expectancy of promoting discipline in schools, Du Preez and Roux made use of contextually recognised and universally justified values to promote their expectations in a multicultural school and education setting.

We shall return to this issue of value fullness and emptiness and of thick and thin value language in the discussion of the “Valley of relative value emptiness” (see Section 5 below). We first need to attend to two further issues regarding this, the fifth expectancy filter that educators employ when dealing with children and / or young people. The first is that the expectancy filter of value orientation that a child grows up with can change over time, as we have seen in Section 1. A very small child could be subject to a certain expectancy filter of value orientation, but gradually learn to develop his or her own expectancy filter of value orientation, and could end up with a value system filled with world view content that might be somewhat or even radically different from that of his or her parents and other educators. Such changes are due to influences that impact on the person growing up and because of his or her constant examination of own life and existence.

The expectancy filter of value orientation can also be seen working in one and the same person. Take the following example: a person who is both a parent of a very young child, a church going person, and an educationist charged with the task of planning a national education system might, as parent, employ an expectancy filter in the education of the child which could lead to the instilment of Christian religious and church values in the child while, on the other hand, as an education system planner he or she might apply an expectancy filter inspiring him or her to employ values that are more generally or universally recognised and would promote the ideals of democracy and multiculturalism. Ackerley (2008: 24) thus rightly remarked about a dichotomy between, on the one
hand, church- and temple- and personal, cultural, life-conceptually filled values, and on the other hand the universal aspirations regarding, for instance, human rights. The latter is not substantively meaningful among people of religious communities where, for many, their religious institutions are the context and the structure of their moral value systems.

Naudé (2010: 11) draws our attention to the second issue, namely the importance of distinguishing between relativism which says that we are all different from one another but that we should respect those differences regardless of whether we find the values associated with them acceptable or not. Relativity on the other hand says that we are different but not to such an extent that we cannot live peaceably together and that we should respect and tolerate another’s views and values, come what may. There is sufficient agreement about generally shared values that we can live by them and also weigh our individual, personal convictions and values against them.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #4:

1. (4.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable. 4. I disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement.

Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared values. A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and world view convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views.

5. The “valley of relative value emptiness”

The phrase “valley of relative value emptiness” is not meant as a derogatory term but rather as one that describes a stance in which the discussants attempt to transcend their personal life-conceptually meaning-filled values for the sake of a more general ideal, for example the promotion of multiculturalism, human rights, peaceful coexistence or democracy. It is understandable that some people, in some circumstances, might opt for the application of such relatively life-conceptually empty values. Education system planners, for instance, might find themselves in a position where they have to apply such universally recognised and acceptable values as those contained in the radical value centre discussed in Section 2 because of the demands of democracy, fairness, social justice, peaceful coexistence and the ideals of multiculturalism. One example of this can be found in the three-fold position described by Ackerley (2008: 38):

For those moved by human rights violations, (this) book offers three things. First, I offer them a philosophical justification for the political legitimacy of their moral intuitions. Regardless of the spiritual, religious, and personal resources that motivate them to think about the rights of
all humanity, whether their own moral system is grounded in a transcendental divine power, in the power of good argument, or in the power of human relationships, the concern for human rights has universal authority to guide criticism. Second, I offer those working for the human rights of all of humanity a way to think about human rights that is dictated neither by a cultural nor by a political tradition, but has nevertheless a universal authority to guide criticism. Third, the book offers guidance in thinking about universal human rights so that human rights activism continues in ways that support the human rights of all of humanity by transforming the institutions and practices that condition the lives of all of humanity.

It is clear from this brief exposition that Ackerley wishes to move his discussion of human rights values out of the context of life-conceptual meaning-filling into what has been described above as the “valley of relative value emptiness” where the discussion is characterised by “philosophical justification”, “political legitimacy”, people’s general “moral intuitions”, “universal authority”, not dictated by any “cultural or political tradition”, “the rights of all humanity” and so on.

As mentioned above, because of working in the public domain of human rights theory, Parekh (2000) also went a short step further in the direction of filling values with meaning in his attempt to “contextually fill” certain values that are universally recognised and justified. His description of the process entails four steps, of which the first three pertain to values that are relatively contentless: First, universal values can be understood in a variety of ways ranging from the minimalist to the maximalist. Secondly, since these universal values are necessarily general and relatively indeterminate, they should as far as possible be articulated in the language of norms. Norms relate values to conduct, indicate how the values are to be interpreted, and give them content. Thirdly, we should not confuse values with particular institutional mechanisms; we should not be dogmatic about values, and we should not so identify the institutions that hold particularist values with the values that the values cannot be discussed and defended separately. In the fourth place, Parekh recognises the need for life-conceptual content-filling of values but clearly sees it as a matter for the personal or private sphere: since every society enjoys the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise the agreed body of universal values, we cannot condemn its practices simply because they are different from or offend against ours (Parekh, 2000: 152-153). There is an inevitable dialectical interplay, he admits (Parekh, 2000: 158), between the relatively thin universal values and the thick moral structures that characterise different societies. The universal values regulate the national structures even as the latter pluralise the values.

As observed earlier, others, such as parents of very young children and educators teaching children in the context of a religious institution such as a church, mosque, synagogue or temple might feel themselves compelled to apply a value system that is completely filled in by the life and worldview of that particular religious denomination. Parekh’s (2000: 158) position of regulative or pluralist universalism will not appeal to them.

There might also be others who, for reasons of their own, prefer not to bind themselves to any religious value orientation and opt for a relativist, pragmatic or even a more or less laissez faire value stance. A moderate form of this, as Grayling (2010: 7-8) noted, is moral relativism, i.e. the view that there are no universal truths about what is right and wrong, but rather what counts as such in each different society is determined by that society’s own traditions, beliefs and experience. There is no objective ground for deciding between them. The pragmatist, in turn, holds the attitude of “doing
something” in the morally right or acceptable “direction” as conceptualised by the community, without interfering too much with other legitimate and personally significant commitments and avocations (Grayling, 2010: 18). The laissez faire approach in turn is a “do nothing” approach, says Grayling (2010: 18-190); it holds that unless a person can achieve the utmost in terms of value-driven actions and behaviour, let him or her do nothing, which “is the same thing as letting him be careless and indifferent”.

The current postmodern attitude of value relativism / relativity is also characteristic of the “valley of relative value emptiness”. According to Parkin (2011: 154-155), people have an entire supermarket of values at their disposal, and its impact on the soul, on the inner self of disorganised and vulnerable individuals has become the criterion for choosing a value (De Botton, 2012: 95). According to Bower (2005: 181, 254), it is a tenet of the postmodern perspective that people “invent” and create meaning in regard to their identity, value and purpose. A system of beliefs (i.e. a modernistic grand narrative) that weakens individual responsibility stands in the way of the emergence of an open society and an adult world in which the principle of individual responsibility and the accountability that goes with it, is the basis of all human relationships. McGrath (2005: 218) concurs with Bower’s analysis: reacting to the simplistic overstatements of the Enlightenment, postmodernity has stressed the limits to human knowledge and encouraged a toleration of those who diverge from the “one size fits all” philosophy of modernity. The world in which we live is now seen as a place where nothing is certain, nothing is guaranteed, and nothing is unquestionably given. It has become fashionable, Needleman (2008: 61) contends, to deny the existence of absolutes in the ethical sphere: who is to say what is good or bad, right or wrong? What is good in one place or for one person may be bad in another place or for another person. All morality is seen as relative to time, place, ethnicity, religion, social class, nationality and so on. For many people of this day and age, experiences are immediately translated into simply what “feels good” or what “feels bad”. The postmodern zeitgeist, says Needleman (2008: 108), dispirits people with ethical cynicism and relativism. It reduces every viewpoint, every norm and conviction, however firmly believed by some, to a temporary phenomenon, an event of transient nature. Everything is seen as historically determined and historically relative, in other words, everything is relativised (Van der Walt, 2007: 178).

According to Olthuis (2012: 1/7), worldviews are nowadays frowned upon because they are considered euphemisms for ideologies with their dogmatism. We need, it is said, to move beyond such exclusivism into an era after worldviews (i.e. grand narratives). According to the postmodern stance, life is more than logic; there is a limit to knowledge and knowledge is never disinterested, neutral, a-temporal or a-spatial. There is no such thing as Universal Reason, and reason is never impartial; it is always in the service of wider and broader interests. All grand narratives that claim to explain everything have lost credibility (Olthuis, 2012: 3/7). According to Wright (2010: 122), some postmodernists even claim that ultimately we fail to obtain knowledge of reality because, at the end of the day, there is no such thing as reality, no actual order of things. The notion of reality only exists within our psychological conventions and linguistic contractions.

16Wright (2010: 123) correctly says that these thinkers fall in the epistemic fallacy of confusing reality with knowledge of reality. We have no grounds to deny the existence of reality simply because it is beyond our intellectual powers to fully comprehend it.
No person is completely a-religious or can live without a trace of life-conceptual content filling of his or her values. All people have faith in something. Gray (2009: 13) rightly comes to the conclusion that “secular thinkers imagined that they had left religion behind, when in truth they had only exchanged religion for humanist faith in progress”. For this reason, he regards contemporary humanism as a religion in its own right (Gray, 2009: 15). In view of this, Peck’s (2006: 174) advice to psychologists is to find out their patients’ religions even if they say they do not have any. The same applies for a life and worldview; every person has an explicit or implicit set of ideas and beliefs as to the essential nature of the world. It is nowadays widely acknowledged that all knowledge is perspectival, world view-ish, rooted in a particular historical and cultural setting, rather than universal or absolute (Olthuis, 2012: 1/7).

What all of the above means for a person who wishes to exist in the “valley of relative value emptiness” is that it takes a special effort to leave one’s religious convictions, assumptions and prejudices behind and to contrive living according to those supposedly empty values that transcend all life-conceptual differences among people.\(^{17}\)

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #5:**

1. (5.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree

*Interpretation of the responses: Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees him- or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment.*

6. **A tendency towards total tolerance of others, their religious persuasion and their values**

A person preferring to relate with people of different religious and life and worldview persuasion on the basis of the relatively “contentless” values embodied in the radical value centre, with the bare minimum of religious or worldview filling, with values couched in thin value language, with a (postmodern) relativistic value attitude, and with a pragmatic or even a laissez faire attitude with respect to religious and worldview differences, could be assumed to be tolerant of other people and their religious convictions and assumptions. It should be noted, however, that since no person is ever without religion or without religious convictions and a life and worldview, no person is ever

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\(^{17}\)As mentioned, a person such as a scholar or a curriculum designer may periodically and temporarily, for purposes of scientific objectivity in a diverse setting, contrive to transcend his or her personal life view convictions et cetera, but such a stance is not viable as a consistent life-view, certainly not for a person of integrity (Nolan, 2009: 13).
likely to be without a value system on the basis of which he or she would, if the occasion arose, be intolerant of the views of people of different persuasion. Nevertheless, theoretical provision has to be made for the possibility of total tolerance, for an attitude of “anything goes”, for complete relativism, for total naivety. Bennett (1993) arguably made similar provision by distinguishing in his developmental model stages V “Adaptation to difference” and VI “Integration of difference”.

It is necessary to stress at this point that absolute tolerance of others and their views is not necessarily “wrong” or “incorrect”. Whether it is to be adjudged as wrong or incorrect will largely depend on the observer’s religious stance, as will now be explained with the help of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model in which he makes certain distinctions in terms of *cultural* sensitivities (for the purposes of this monograph and of the questionnaire that has to result from it, Bennett’s distinctions in the cultural domain will be transposed to *religious* sensitivities. The formal distinctions that Bennett made and categorised can be just as valid as categories regarding religious attitude):

I. **Denial of difference**: a person in this category is unable to construe religious difference. His or her attitude could be characterised by benign stereotyping (well-meant but ignorant or naïve observations) and superficial statements of tolerance. This attitude can sometimes be accompanied by attribution of deficiency in intelligence or personality to religiously deviant behaviour. There is a tendency to dehumanise outsiders and to isolate them in homogeneous groups, which deprives the person from either the opportunity or the motivation to construct relevant categories for noticing and interpreting religious difference. The person’s intentional separation from religious difference protects his or her worldview (“fishbowl”) from change by creating conditions of isolation.

II. **Defence against difference**: a person in this category recognises religious difference coupled with a negative evaluation of most religious variations; the greater the difference, the more negative the evaluation. His or her thinking is characterised by dichotomous us-them thinking and is frequently accompanied by overt negative stereotyping. He or she has a tendency towards religious proselytising of “other” religions. The person in this category possesses cognitive categories for construing religious difference as isolated by evaluating them negatively, thus protecting his or her own world view from change. His or her existing world view is protected by exaggerating its positive aspects compared to all other religions. Any neutral or positive statement about another religion may be interpreted as an attack on his or her own religion.

III. **Minimisation of difference**: a person in this category recognises and accepts superficial religious differences such as rituals and eating customs, while holding that all human beings are essentially the same. The emphasis is on the similarity of people and the commonality of basic values. There is a tendency to define the basis of commonality in egocentric terms (since everyone else is essentially like us, just be yourself). There is also an emphasis in terms of similarity (after all, we are all human). The emphasis may be on commonality of human beings as subordinate to a particular supernatural being, religion or social philosophy (we are all children of God whether we know it or not). The own worldview is protected by attempting to subsume difference into what is already familiar (deep down we are all the same).

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18. See discussion of inclusivism below.
IV. **Acceptance of difference**: a person in this category recognises and appreciates religious differences in behaviour and values. Acceptance of religious differences is regarded as a viable alternative solution to the organisation of human existence. This person operates on the basis of religious relativity, and begins to interpret phenomena within their different cultural or religious contexts. Categories of difference are consciously elaborated. He or she is able to analyse complex interaction in religion-contrast terms. He or she has the ability to see beliefs, values and other general patterns of assigning “goodness” or “badness” to ways of being in the world in their different cultural and religious contexts.

V. **Adaptation to difference**: this person is able to develop communication skills that enable inter-religious communication, and to make effective use of empathy, or frame of reference shifting, to understand and be understood across religious boundaries. This person is able to consciously shift perspective into alternative religious world view elements and to act religiously in appropriate ways in those areas. He or she is also able to shift their behaviour completely into different religious frames without much effort. For this person, internalisation of more than one complete worldview is viable. Knowledge and behaviour are linked to conscious intention, and category boundaries (i.e. between religions) become more flexible and permeable.

VI. **Integration of difference**: a person in this category is able to internalise a bi-religious or multi-religious frame of reference. He or she is able to maintain a definition of identity that is “marginal” to any particular religion, and sees the self as “in process”. He or she is able to use multiple religious frames of reference in evaluating phenomena, and is able to accept an identity that is not primarily based in any one religion. He or she is able to facilitate constructive contact between religions for the self and for others, and is willing to participate to some extent in a “marginal reference group”, where other marginals rather than religious compatriots are perceived to be similar. World view and religious categories are seen as “constructs” maintained by self-reflexive consciousness (religions and individuals are “making themselves up”).

Leutwyler et al (2012: 113) gives a brief summary of the meaning of Bennett’s developmental model, again “translated” by the author of this monograph into religious sensitivities. Inter-religious sensitivity can be approached in terms of this six-tier model in terms of religious attitude, from a religio-centric on the one hand, to a religio-relative attitude or view on the other. The first three levels refer to a religio-centric world view, and the last three to a religio-relative world view. People with the former world view experience their own religion as the only reference to construct their reality while the deeply held beliefs and behaviours from their primary socialisation remain unquestioned. They are seen as “just the way they are”. In contrast, individuals with a religio-relative

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19 See the discussion of the social contract below.
20 See discussion of dialogical pluralism below.
21 See discussion of moral imagination, empathy and sympathy below.
22 The “new reformation group” in South Africa could be seen as falling in this category.
23 The formal categories distinguished for cultural attitude by Bennett and now explained by Leutwyler et al are valid – in a formal sense, not in terms of content – for religious attitude categories.
24 We are not so much concerned about the developmental aspects in this monograph. These aspects are by no means unimportant, however; they will have to be reckoned with in efforts to redress any shortcomings among teachers and pupils with respect to religious tolerance.
world view experience their beliefs and behaviours as only one organisation of reality among many other possibilities. This distinction has clear implications for religious tolerance among teachers and students. Teachers and students will have different images of religious differences and similarities and therefore about inter-religious education and dialogue if they are in a religio-centric stage of development or if they have developed a religio-relative perspective. It can be expected that teachers and students in the former stage of development will have a less tolerant view of others of different religious persuasion than those in the latter stage.

The question that confronts us here is whether education systems world-wide are meeting the target for education to encourage “tolerance and respect for the religion of others” also included in official political statements. Religions have not disappeared, as some social scientists predicted; religion now exists in more differentiated and individualised forms. As will be discussed in more detail below, institutionalised religion has lost influence and relevance in society, and religiously plural settings in school and in the classroom have become more and more common (Schreiner, 2005: no page number). The question is whether Schreiner is correct in surmising that “teachers are getting sensible to the individualised form of religion of their pupils as the context and the content of teaching”. Are they indeed coming to grips with the religious diversity with which they are confronted in school and in class? Are they indeed as religiously tolerant as expected? What about the children whom they are teaching – are they as tolerant as could be expected of religious differences in others (i.e. their teachers, their school mates)? Or do we have the situation described by Leutwyler et al (2012: 116): “It may be assumed that the more or less appropriate policies in this regard are not implemented in daily teaching – precisely because they do not fit the teachers’ individual belief systems”. As far as South Africa is concerned, Du Preez and Roux (2010: 12) indeed found the following: “Early in our research project, it became evident that some teachers believe that discipline can only be maintained through the elevation of cultural values (particularism). One reason for this phenomenon could be that people in many instances see traditional, cultural values as preferable to emancipatory, human rights values. ... An illustration of a particularist stance is illustrated (sic) by Wolhuter and Steyn and De Klerk and Rens who argue that acceptance of certain Christian values could promote discipline in schools.” Could it be that teachers teaching children from a particularist, religio-centric perspective might be more or less intolerant towards others adhering to other particularist or confessional orientations? The purpose of the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this monograph is to establish whether or not this is indeed the case.

As will be discussed in the following Section, religious tolerance as such is characterised by a number of technical considerations.

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #6:**

1. (6.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement.
Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an “anything goes” attitude, and hence might belong in Bennett’s categories IV to VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III.

7. The technicalities of religious and world view tolerance

The first technical point about tolerance that has to be kept in mind is that the well-being of individuals and of their societies depends to a significant extent on the degree of tolerance that is displayed by all concerned (Gray, 2009:21; Strauss, 2009: 509). As stated at the beginning of this monograph, societies are today more diverse and pluralistic than ever, and religious and cultural conflict has become a fact of life. Tolerance therefore can be seen as the key to living together in a society that harbours many different ways of life. Societies and their members have to search for the best ways of living together, and tolerance seems to be one of the attitudes most sorely needed to ensure the well-being of all concerned. Olthuis (2012: 5/7) correctly observes that people have to make sense of the diversity of cultures, religions and world views around them; from their different viewpoints (through the sides of their different “fishbowls”, as it were), they are called to negotiate, to work together for justice with compassion, for mercy with truth.

The second technical point is that tolerance does not mean accepting a belief or a practice that one does not agree with. As two authoritative dictionaries show, tolerance refers to endurance and not necessarily to acceptance of what has to be endured. Tolerance refers to the act of being tolerant, in other words the capacity to endure something such as pain or hardship, to treat with indulgence and forbearance, and to accept that people tend to hold religious and world view opinions that differ from the established religion of a country (Sinclair, 1999) or from one’s own. It could also refer to allowing the existence or occurrence of something that one dislikes or disagrees with without interference (Soames & Stevenson, 2008). What underlies tolerance, Grayling (2002: 9) correctly concludes, is the recognition that there is plenty of room in the world for alternatives to exist, and if one is offended by what other do “it is because one has let it get under one’s skin”. In contrast to the dictionaries mentioned above, Van der Walt (2007: 202-203) mentions acceptance of what has to be tolerated but he immediately qualifies such acceptance. Tolerance, he says, is the degree to which we accept things of which we disapprove; the degree with which we understand differences and learn how to differ from others, and does not preclude appreciation for what is good in other religions (for instance). As far as acceptance is concerned he qualifies his definition with the rider that we are not to tolerate everything with which we do not agree25 (which explains the use of “the degree to which” in his definition of tolerance above). According to Boersma (2012), tolerance is a

25 Other factors, such as economics and population pressure, might also lead to forms of intolerance and violence.

26 Boersma (2012) shares a similar sentiment. In his case, the matter is complicated by a linguistic problem. He writes in Dutch: “Kern van tolerantie is dat ik verdraag wat ik niet accepteer maar wel aanvaard”. The Dutch “accepteer” is derived from English “accept”. The Dutch word “aanvaar” also means “to accept”. Taken at face value, Boersma seems to say: “The core idea of tolerance is that I tolerate or forbear that which I do not accept but which I do accept”. However, in view of the rest of his exposition one has to conclude that “accepteer” has a different meaning from “aanvaar”: “accepteer” seems to mean something like “do not agree with”, so what Boersma in fact states is: “The core of tolerance is that I tolerate something that I cannot agree with but which I nevertheless accept”. If this translation is correct, he seems to agree with Van der Walt (2007: 202-203).
concept with inherent tension\textsuperscript{27}, in the sense that it causes pain and requires from the person having to tolerate a degree of violation of his or her value system\textsuperscript{28}.

The third technical point pertains to the extent to which one (or a society) should tolerate beliefs and actions that they prefer not to adopt. Put differently, to what extent can open societies tolerate the existence and the efforts of fundamentalist\textsuperscript{29} enemies of freedom, in other words, those people who tend to live with a value system that is filled with value content from their own personal and private religious and world view approach and commitment to the extent that they openly and contemptuously reject the values contained in the radical value centre referred to above or in the value systems of others whose value systems differ from theirs? To what extent must open societies, i.e. societies that tend to operate on the values contained in the radical value centre; values that are universally recognised but contextually understood, abandon their own habits of tolerance in order to deny the right of its fundamentalist enemies to exist? (Bower, 2005: 43). The answers to both these questions, according to Grayling (2002: 8), should be a resounding “No!”. Tolerance, he says, should protect itself, and can do so by saying that anyone is free to moot a point of view but no one can force another to accept it. The only acceptable coercion in an open and democratic society is that of reason and argument. Members of an open society have only one obligation: the power of honest reasoning, of argument. Grayling is convinced that “the reasonings of an open mind will come out in favour of what is good and true” (ibid.).

The fourth technical point about religious and other forms of tolerance is that it depends on trust (Arielly, 2010; 127-128; Ilbury & Sunter, 2011: 73) and moral imagination. Tolerance depends on trusting the \textit{bona fides} of all other members of society. If trust is broken for whatever reason, there can be no tolerance of the other’s beliefs or actions. A lack of trust also cramps our moral imagination, in other words our capacity to put ourselves in the shoes of the other person. As will be indicated below, the notion of peaceful coexistence (a healthy \textit{modus vivendi}) depends to a large extent on the degree of trust and moral imagination that prevail in a society.

The fifth technical point pertains to the reasons why people are either tolerant or intolerant. Morton (1998: 167 et seq.) explains this in some detail. Most people, he says, are torn between tolerance of the values of other people, which may be based on ideas and preferences that they do not understand, and dislike of values that seem wrong, especially those that seem to involve cruelty or hatred. Different people resolve the conflict differently. Some people are extremely tolerant (as demonstrated above with reference to people with a totally relativist or laissez faire attitude) of other people’s values, allowing others to hold and follow those values that seem to them repulsive. Others are extremely intolerant (as also demonstrated above with reference to people with a militant fundamentalist and radically exclusivist attitude), thinking that others should not hold and

\textsuperscript{27}According to Boersma (2012), the Christian view of tolerance differs from the liberal view in that the latter holds that one has to tolerate the other out of respect for his or her freedom (as a human right). Christians do not believe that human beings possess such absolute freedom, and rather base their conception of freedom on love, as mentioned by Olthuis (see previous paragraph in this section).

\textsuperscript{28}Boersma (2012) also distinguishes a “milder” form of tolerance, namely “gedogen”, to disapprove of something but to just look the other way. The English equivalent of “gedogen” might indeed be “to look the other way” or to endure.

\textsuperscript{29}Living strictly according to certain dogmas and doctrines or a set of thick (content filled) values does not necessarily amount to being a fundamentalist. Adherence to such dogmas and doctrines also do not necessarily lead to violence and intolerance – as the rest of the discussion in this monograph will illustrate.
follow values that are from their point of view wrong. These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence in his or her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

The final technical point that has to be kept in mind is that the concept of tolerance has recently undergone a shift, what Van der Walt (2007: 203) refers to as a secular down-scaling, a shift from tolerating the ideas and beliefs of others to tolerating others. This is due, in his opinion, to an ethics of politeness, courtesy and decency. In his opinion, this down-scaling is a result of modern-day (postmodern) relativism which seems to promote an ethic of gentility and studied moderation; a code of social discourse whereby “religious beliefs and political convictions are to be expressed discreetly and tactfully and in most cases, privately. Convictions are to be tempered by good taste and sensibility. It is an ethics that pleads “no offence”. The greatest breach of these norms is belligerence and divisiveness; the greatest atrocity is to be offensive and thus intolerant.

**Items for the questionnaire flowing from step #7:**

1. (7.1) Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5 I do not agree at all.

   *Interpretation of the responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas.*

2. (7.2) Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree 6. I have no opinion about this

   *Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person.*

3. (7.3) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and worldview that are completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all.

   *Interpretation of responses: A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and their religious views.*
4. (7.4) Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree 3. Agree to a considerable extent 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree.

*Interpretation of responses:* A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant.

5. (7.5) Which TWO of the following views of others is most applicable to you as a person? (1) My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own moral beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

*Interpretation of the responses:* These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

8. Some further technical distinctions

According to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39), three formal views are usually distinguished as far as the relationships among religions are concerned, namely exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism (also see Van der Walt, 2007: 195). The weakness of this typology lies in its rather vague understanding of pluralism. Whereas today there seems to be consensus about the models or views of exclusivism, the pluralist view is described in many ways, ranging from a relativistic approach stressing the quality of all religions, to a dialogical approach stressing the need for dialogue in order to find religious truth. Vermeer and Van der Ven therefore decided to differentiate this three-way typology more closely by breaking down the pluralism model into two components, with the result that they began working with a four-way distinction within religious plurality: exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism and dialogical pluralism.

In its most extreme form, the exclusivist claim would be that only one’s own religion is absolutely and uniquely true and that all other religions are therefore false. A more open version of this view is one where the followers of one religious tradition admit that their religion is not the sole possessor of truth in all respects and that they may perhaps learn from other religious traditions. Such a more open version is, according to Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 39-40), also exclusivist as long as the adherents to a religion are not prepared to question their own basic beliefs in light of encounters with followers of other religions. People entertaining such a more open view of exclusivism might be prepared to work together with adherents to other religions for the sake of promoting some or other shared interest, but they do not feel the need to enter into a dialogue about matters of
religious truth or salvation because they feel that they are already in possession of the truth.
Exclusivism is characterised by an unwillingness to enter into religious dialogue with followers of
other religious traditions. Exclusivism is characterised by absolutism, uniqueness, emphasis on
difference, particularism and exclusive view of truth (Van der Walt, 2007: 197).

Like exclusivists, inclusivists maintain the truth and superiority of their own religious tradition, but
differ from the former in that the other religious traditions are considered as products of divine
revelation or as legitimate paths to salvation. This is mainly done by interpreting other faiths in
terms of one’s own faith and by claiming that other faiths either originated from one’s own faith or
will one day reach fulfilment in one’s own faith. The difference between exclusivism and inclusivism
is only one of degree (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 40). Generally speaking, inclusivism is
characterised by relativism, emphasis on similarities, egalitarianism, the equality of all faiths as far as
truth claims are concerned, and the view that truth is relative (Van der Walt, 2007: 197).

As far as the third view, pluralism, is concerned, the basic claim is not that all religions are equally
valid because they all worship and believe in the same God, but rather from a phenomenological
point of view it is argued that the essence of all religions lies in the human experience of the
transcendent, and from an epistemological view it is claimed that the articulation of this basic
experience in belief systems is always related to a particular cultural environment and therefore
cannot claim absolute validity. Religious pluralism can take one of several forms. Parallel pluralism
holds that all faiths promote certain parallel dogmas, for instance about evil; puzzle pluralism holds
that every religion only possesses a fragment of the full and final truth (about, for instance,
salvation); gradual pluralism holds that in some religions the final truth comes to the fore in a
stronger way than in others (Van der Walt, 2007: 196).

Pluralism not only claims on a phenomenological basis that all religions are based on one and the
same religious experience but also on epistemological grounds that they are always related to
specific cultural environments. On the basis of these two arguments, the conclusion is drawn that
basically all religions offer an adequate picture of the Divine. Although this does not mean that there
are no metaphysical and theological differences between religions, the emphasis in pluralism is on
what is shared by the different religious traditions rather than on what separates them from one
another (Vermeer & Van der Ven, 2004: 41-42).

The fourth view, brought to the fore by Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 42-43), is dialogical
pluralism which stresses the need for an inter-religious dialogue for the mutual enrichment of
different religious traditions. This view attempts to address two shortcomings of exclusivism,
inclusivism and pluralism, namely the lack of perspective exchange between religions, the ability and
willingness to try to understand the other in terms of own religious preconceptions; also the second
shortcoming that is of an epistemological nature: exclusivists claim that their religion is the only valid
or true one among many, and the inclusivists attempt to reconcile different sets of incompatible
beliefs. The possibility exists, Vermeer and Van der Ven (2004: 43-44) claim, that aspects of religious
truth also can be found in other religions. Therefore, in order to avoid these difficulties, dialogical
pluralists avoid all preconceptions about the truth or falsity of different religions and instead claim
that religious truth can only be discovered in a dialogue between religions. At the core of dialogical
pluralism is a particular understanding of inter-religious dialogue, namely as a communicative
process in which people of several traditions enter into discussions about what is ultimately true and
of value in life. This dialogue consists of three distinctive phases, namely information exchange, perspective exchange and perspective coordination. Van der Walt (2007: 187) supports the notion of conducting a dialogue between the adherents of the different religions. In his opinion, such dialogue is of import for the sake of a just and peaceful society. The only condition for dialogue, he says, is that one should believe that all religions are not all the same, because if they were, dialogue would be without purpose. He also warns that one should not enter such a dialogue with an attitude of superiority and pride as if one held the monopoly on truth. In such a dialogue, the discussion is not about who is right, but what could be seen as the truth. The aim of the dialogue is to lessen the tension between the different religions and to promote a peaceful and just society. This cannot take place without mutual understanding and trust. The alternative, he correctly concludes, is misunderstanding, conflict and violent clashes.

In Van der Walt's (2007: 207-208) view, pluralism can easily deteriorate into intolerance. His argument runs as follows. Absolute (in the sense of consistent) relativism is impossible. If every religion were relative, then the (mild and radical) relativists would have to acknowledge that their own viewpoint itself is also relative. Since no-one can think consistently relativistically – for then such a person would simply have to keep quiet – the so-called relativists today defend their standpoint in an intolerant way. Their so-called tolerance thus means intolerance towards all who do not share their point of view. The religious tolerance for which their “tolerance” fought is destroyed – ironically – by the same “tolerance”. On close analysis, a “tolerance” which thinks relativistically about truth is by no means an example of “democracy” in the religious field. It creates the impression of being “enlightened” and very modest but in essence relativism is just as arrogant as the other religions which are blamed for being arrogant.

Although Van der Walt (2007: 195) begins his outline of the different views of the relationship between religions with the usual distinction between exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism, he discusses a whole variety of positions with regard to these views. He begins, for instance, by saying that the phenomenological method promotes a view that can be typified as “historian relativism” since it undermines the rather absolute nature of all religions with its basic assumption that everything is relative. It propagates the modern secularist relativism which teaches that all religions are equally true or false, and that it makes no difference which one chooses to adhere to. In Van der Walt’s (2007: 189) opinion, relativist religious pluralism is, in spite of the fact that it opposes all kinds of religious dogma and absolutism, itself guilty of a hidden dogma, namely that all religions are in principle equal.

Van der Walt (2007: 196) also distinguishes at least three forms of confessional particularism. Magnetic particularism holds that a dogma might work like a magnet that draws all other religions to it; healing particularism teaches that a dogma may work like a vaccine that can cure believers and hence can draw non-believers; imperial particularism teaches that a particular dogma is of the utmost importance and that no salvation is possible without adhering to it (an example of this is the Christian belief that Christ is the only source of salvation and that an intentional confession of belief in Christ is the only hope for salvation).

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #8:

1. (8.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all
religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude.

9. Three approaches to tolerance
As indicated in Section 8 above, there seems to be many ways of attempting to be tolerant towards the religious views and dogmas of others, some of which might lead to more success than others in the resolution of conflict, the procurement of mutual trust, human well-being and peaceful human coexistence. Three broad life and world view (“fishbowl”, “life map”) approaches can be distinguished among the plethora of approaches to the plurality currently prevailing in Europe and Southern Africa, the two regions in which the questionnaire to be developed on the basis of this monograph will be administered, namely liberalism, Christianity (indeed post-Christianity in some areas and among some people) and what has become known as secularism, liberal secularism or secular humanism.

From a modern liberal viewpoint, Grayling (2010: 220) advises that society should learn how to manage less acceptable beliefs and behaviour by understanding their ill consequences and to encourage more acceptable behaviour by sweeping up the pieces and “otherwise being stoical”. In brief, says Schreiner (2005: 13), people have to show empathy to the other, enter into dialogue with them and acquire the competence of “dancing with difference” in the increasingly pluralist environments in which they find themselves. Gray (2003: 112) agrees with all of the above, and reiterates that “fugitive empathy” with other living things is the ultimate source of ethics. Moral imagination is required, in other words the ability to put oneself in the shoes not only of relatives and good friends but also in those of rivals and enemies. Moral imagination implies efforts at understanding others from the inside30 (Wright, 2009: 418).

Olthuis (2012: 2/7, 6/7) gives similar advice from a Christian perspective: Firstly, in ethical Postmodernism, difference is not the enemy, a threat, defect or deficit which needs to be controlled, but rather a challenge that has to be connected with, attended to and honoured. The proper relation to the other (different) person is deference rather than domination, condescension, dismissal or persecution. Genuine community is being together in difference and diversity, rather than marginalisation or fusion into sameness. In Biblical terms, freedom does not mean “free from” but rather “free to” love and minister to the other. As God is with us (Emmanuel), so a person should be with others; people are called to suffer with others, not to fusion with others, not to abandonment of others, nor even the rescue or persecution of the other, but being with the other, suffering-with

30 See the discussion of modus vivendi below.
and celebrating-with. Reason, transformed by and in the service of love, will have an eye for difference not in order to close it down or to marginalise it, but in order to approach and connect with it, and let it be. Love, in Olthuis’s understanding, is not an auxiliary to the order of reason; there is only one order, he says, and that is the order of Love, with reason as one of its dimensions. In very practical terms he advises that the members of a society should develop an economy of love not to exclude others or to prove that their own way of life is the only true way, but to give witness of how and why - rooted in their own religious and life view (“fishbowl”) perspective – they see things the way they do, and how they conceive of justice and practise mercy. Along these lines and in this way, they invite others to share their deepest beliefs and convictions for mutual learning, benefit and well-being. Van der Walt (2007: 202) makes the same point by stating that religious and other forms of diversity will not disappear in this dispensation, therefore tolerance towards all other people is the only and right attitude. People need to find ways of living alongside one another without destroying one another and without ignoring or trivialising the differences among them. The task of tolerance, he avers, is not to ignore or to trivialise differences but to “establish the right to differ”. Olthuis (2012) agrees with the position outlined a few years earlier by Van der Walt (2007: 213).Tolerance based on a Biblical view is aimed at establishing the truth, and should always be modest and based on love. Tolerance from a Biblical perspective implies full involvement with the other and a sincere interest in the other; it is eager to know as much about the other as possible. True tolerance is never hesitant or sentimental; to endure things that one does not approve of takes strength and courage.

Secularism, in turn, as Mohler (2008: 29-30) correctly observed, is a lifeview according to which humankind sees itself not only as liberated from the bonds of the church and other religious institutions but from all forms of theistic religion. In view of the fact, as already mentioned, that no human being is ever without religion and religious commitment, secularists mistakenly believe that religion and religious forms will disappear in due course, that history was driving toward the utter removal of belief in God, and that education, technology and affluence would lead to a massive civilisation-wide loss of belief; secularisation would be a global phenomenon, marked by the rejection of both the social functions and the symbolic nature of theistic belief. Although it is unlikely that secularism will dominate life and the world on this massive scale, there are clear signs of it making progress, also in the form of atheism (Mohler, 2008: 15). According to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 15), secularism is a “godless culture”, a majority culture that interprets life “through unregenerate eyes and promotes its conclusions through various means, from advertising to education”. Instead of depending on guidelines flowing from theistic religious books and dogmas, secularists depend on other mediators of values such as entertainment celebrities, the social media and advertisements.

The central message of secularism, according to Tripp and Tripp (2008: 17) is “me!”, and as a result of that it leaves humankind without transcendent values. The only values that remain are those of survival by whatever means that serves the lusts and the needs of the moment. Van der Walt (2007: 213) regards the secular, including the liberal, approach to tolerance as “negative, since it can say nothing more but that one should not be uncivil, discourteous, impolite, tactless, unpleasant or opposing”. Boersma (2012) also finds the secular-liberal-humanist view of tolerance unacceptable. He does not accept the “enlightened” dogma that one should allow the other to enjoy his or her freedom because of freedom being regarded as an absolute value that entails respect for the value of living and let live, all of which is based on the dogma of human autonomy. Liberal tolerance does
not include tolerance of those who deem themselves to be subject to some or other heteronymous force; the purpose of liberal tolerance is indeed the liberation of such persons. To this could be added that it is indeed a question to what extent a me-centred person would be willing to tolerate others in his or her struggle for survival in the new secular age that Mohler refers to.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #9:

1. (9.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

Interpretation of the responses: 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude.

10. **Willingness to enter into a social contract**

Peaceful coexistence in a community or a society depends on a social contract among the members of such a community. The contract should provide room for diverse positions in society, and emerge from a joint decision of rational individuals. Antecedent to a social contract there are no principles of justice or agreement about expectations in force. Put differently, the emergence of a social contract among individuals who widely differ from one another in terms of background, religion, culture, customs and habits leads not only to a well-ordered society, to the well-being of all the contracting parties and to social justice for all concerned (Strauss, 2009: 510-511). Following Rousseau, Rawls (2007: 566-571) states that government is based on a social contract among free, equal and rational persons entering into a contract based on the principle of justice as fairness and for the well-being of all concerned. The contract leads to the adoption of certain rights and duties and to the measuring out of benefits for everyone. The basic structure of society should provide for the governing of the assignment of rights and duties and the distribution of social and economic advantages.

Bower’s (2005: 226, 228) assessment of the Constitution of the United States of America gives a good idea of what a proper social contract could provide for all. In his opinion, that Constitution “is nothing if not a repository of human values [which] had a profoundly beneficial effect on the development of civil society, on the emergence of a trustworthy judiciary and on the achievement of freedom...”. Part of the social contract is also common law which, in his opinion, governs the affairs and relationships of people. Common law is the law of common practice, the law emanating from the wisdom of peoples who strive to regulate their relationships with one another on the basis of justice and decency. Common law was responsible, among others, for establishing the notion that the relationship between people was governed by agreed standards of probity, rather than the unfettered exercise of power. Nussbaum (2000: 5) adds to this that the governments of all nations should adhere to those principles that a bare minimum of respect for human dignity requires. She
refers to the social contract as “an overlapping consensus among people who otherwise have very
different conceptions of the good”. The contract should therefore provide for treating each person
as an end and none as a tool of others. According to Robeyns (2005: no page number), the
capabilities approach worked out by Nussbaum and Sen forms a broad normative framework for
what has been referred to above as a social contract among individuals, in other words for the
evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies,
and proposals about social change in society. Sen (2010: 245, 247) concurs with her in saying that it
would be hard to understand why and how a person undertakes some of his or her activities without
comprehension of his or her societal relations. Individual human beings with their various plural
identities, multiple applications and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with
different types of societal interactions.

Now, after briefly having looked at the nature and purpose of the social contract among individuals,
we can return to the core argument of this monograph, namely the issue of religious tolerance. The
question is, which of the two groups referred to above, those with a rather “thick” or maximalist
value orientation or those with a rather “thin” or minimalist value orientation would be most willing
and ready to enter into a social contract with others and hence be more tolerant of others involved
in the contract and their views? Of course, to ask this question is more of an academic exercise than
of practical significance since all of us, whether we wish to do so or not, are party to a social contract
as embodied in the Constitution of our countries and in the Government of the day. By far the
majority of us conforms to the rules and stipulations of that contract, on the one hand because of
understanding the benefits that might flow from the contract in terms of personal and communal
well-being, justice and fairness, rights and duties, and on the other hand, out of fear of punishment
in the form of imprisonment, fines and social sanction. There have been incidents, however, caused
by pathological dissidents, such as Timothy McVeigh responsible for the Oklahoma Bombing and
Anders Behring Breivik, responsible for the Norway massacre, who do not accept the authority
vested in the government of the day on the basis of a social contract, who not only wish to opt out
from the contract but also to show their dissatisfaction with the status quo.

An academic exercise has the value, however, of revealing something of the dynamics of religious
tolerance in our present-day diverse societies. It can be reasonably and arguably expected that those
individuals who operate with relatively “thin” or minimalist values, such as those contained in the
radical value centre or in the “valley of relative value emptiness”, those with a laissez faire attitude,
who are willing to accept that “anything goes”, those with a totally relativistic value system, will
more readily enter into a social contract. They readily enter because they do not feel very strongly
about their value system; they are prepared to enter into an “overlapping consensus” with others
with quite different value orientations because they expect that doing so will not affect their own
value orientation in any way. For this group, values are “just wonderful names with very little life
and world view content” as Zecha remarked. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, the
members of this group arguably belong in either category IV - those who accept difference, or in
category V - those who adapt to difference, or in category VI - those who integrate difference. In
terms of the distinctions in the previous section, a person in this group might be prepared to practise
religious pluralism and / or dialogical pluralism, and may also be tolerant of others and their religious
views.
The obverse can also be expected. Those who operate with “thick” or maximalist values might be less willing to enter into a social contract because of their awareness of the deep value rifts that exist between them and others of different religious or cultural persuasion. The “thicker” or more maximalist their value system, the less likely they will be prepared to enter into such a contract. There is also the distinct possibility that those operating with a maximalist value system that borders on fundamentalism and fanaticism, those with a “toxic” religious orientation might refuse to enter into a social contract and prefer to resort to terrorist tactics to destabilise the extant social contract because of its being founded on values unacceptable to the dissidents. Such destabilising tactics can be observed both internationally where terrorist groups, inspired by religious fervour, attempt to undermine the extant world order (September 11, 2001 is a case in point), and also nationally, where religious groups attempt to destabilise the national order of their country (Mali and the DRC are currently suffering from such attempts). The members of these groups might also be totally intolerant of the religious views of other groups which they regard as enemies and as heathens. Their efforts will be more directed towards proselytising and missionary work rather than to tolerating others and their religious differences. In terms of Bennett’s (1993) developmental model, such a radical group might belong in category I – total denial of differences among people (in terms of the distinction in the previous section, totally exclusivist (only my religion is true) or totally inclusivist (since only my religion is true, I have to convert all others to it), or category II – I have to defend myself against difference.

The person with a less “thick” or maximalist value orientation might fall in category III – I feel the need to minimize the differences between myself and others. Ideally speaking, such a balanced and worthy member of society should fall in the category of some value “thickness” or maximalisation, not in the extreme categories of fundamentalist intolerance or of radical relativistic tolerance. Put differently, he or she should ideally fall in Bennett’s categories III – minimisation of differences among people (the differences between myself and others are not all that important; we can talk about them and exchange ideas – dialogical pluralism), IV – acceptance of differences among people (people are different, and that is a fact of life, we have to live with it), and V – adaptation to difference (although I have to live with the differences among people, I can be myself and apply my own value system in the context of the social contract to which I am party).

Bennett’s category I – denial of difference (I recognise only my own value system; all others either do not exist or are not valid) is the reserve of the totally intolerant. Category VI – integration of difference (my value system is not so important to me that I cannot associate myself with all other values; all values are equally valid) is also the reserve of the totally tolerant.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #10:

1. (10.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such
participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

*Interpretation of the responses:* 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude, totally willing to enter into a social contract, and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

11. **Tolerance (and respect) a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence (a healthy *modus vivendi*)**

In his book *The Open Society and its Enemies*, first published in 1945, Karl Popper engaged with the task of defining the best available conditions under which humanity could live as a community, and with a diagnosis of the factors that would undermine the achievement of such conditions (Bower, 2005: 25). Popper’s search, launched nearly seven decades ago, is still an ongoing one in the present day. Even today, different societies and individuals interpret, prioritise and realise values that could be considered to be universal (radical centre values) differently, and this is both inescapable and desirable (Parekh, 2000: 158).

The answer to Popper’s quest is not simple and straightforward. Its formulation will depend in the final analysis on one’s societal relationship theory. For example, a person with a socialist, communal view of society might feel that some people in society should not be allowed to express or even to possess their own values, ideas and beliefs in the interest of creating or ensuring a society with shared values. In this case, it is clear that the possession of private values (et cetera) that may deviate from the norm in a hoped-for unified society will not be tolerated by the majority. More cynical socialists such as Marxists would be wary of social structures that seem to serve the powerful or a particular interest group in society, that manipulate and exploit the sense of fear of ordinary people, structures that (for instance) use religion as a tool of social control or as an “opiate for the masses”.

If, on the other hand, one had a more liberal view of society one would accept and honour people’s right to personal, private and often dissident views, and hence would be more tolerant of such views in the interest of a positive *modus vivendi*. In this context, it would be important to reason with others who think and behave differently (cf. dialogical pluralism, as discussed above), and to be sceptical of others’ ideas and beliefs (Morton, 1998: 171). If one believed in total individualism, however, one could be one of the causes of society falling atomistically apart, with very few shared values on which to base a social contract. If one believed in Mills’ no harm principle, the only reason for preventing someone doing or believing something is the potential harm that it could cause another or society as a whole. No one has the right to tell another how to be or how to act provided that such being and acting does no harm to others (Grayling, 2002: 8). The challenge here is to only allow what should be truly allowed and forbid what should be forbidden. The harm principle should therefore never be used arbitrarily (Morton, 1998: 170-171).
If, in turn, one approached society from a functionalist view one would be interested in what
promoted the interests of society as a whole, what would make society “socially good”, or
“collectively stronger”, “socially more vital”, “more alive and active”, what would promote social
cohesion and productivity, generosity and social harmony (Wright, 2009: 43-44).

What underlies tolerance in a diverse or pluralistic society is the recognition that there should be
room for all kinds of alternatives to exist. Learning to tolerate is indeed one of the aims of civilised
life (Grayling, 2002: 9). Human community benefits by permitting a variety of lifestyles to flourish
because they represent experiments from which much might be learned about how to deal with the
human condition (Grayling, 2002: 8).

While we will never discover cast-iron rules of good conduct and the good life in our societies which
will answer every question that might arise about how human beings can live peacefully and well
together, the lack of absolute agreement on what peaceful coexistence means and requires should
not discourage us from investigating and promoting the theoretical notion of a healthy modus
vivendi (De Botton, 2012: 83). As mentioned, peaceful coexistence depends, in the first place,
considerably on the amount of moral imagination that the members of a community are able to
display, i.e. the capability of placing themselves in the shoes of another, be it friend or enemy. The
process entails scouring one’s mind and memory for shared points of reference, the mutual
validation of feelings and ideas, working towards a common goal or perspective, the virtual sharing
of experiences, knowing the other from the inside, putting prejudice in abeyance and showing
empathy and sympathy. The expansion of moral imagination forces one to see the interior of more
and more people for what their interiors are, namely remarkably like one’s own. Like one’s own
interior, says Wright (2009: 428), it is deeply coloured by emotions and passions; like one’s own it
also colours the world (cf. the “fishbowl” metaphor) with self-serving moral judgment.

Whatever transpires in a society, it should create and promote the conditions of the good life. Something that happens defeats this purpose when it violates human dignity, (self-)respect and
tolerance of others, and when it renders its members incapable of leading the good life (Parekh,
2000: 157). Certain agreed-upon values should be respected by all in society, and each society
should be free to find the most effective way to popularise and realise the values on which its social
contract is founded (Parekh, 2000: 156). This is where tolerance comes in. Since every society and
every individual member thereof enjoy the moral freedom to interpret and prioritise their values,
their practices cannot and should not be condemned merely because they are different from or
offend against one’s own (Parekh, 2000: 153). A healthy modus vivendi indeed rests on the
assumption that people have so many things in common that they should be able to realise their
ideals and goals through mutual support and cooperation, and this requires tolerance of the
religious and other characteristics that members of a society might have. Through a healthy modus
vivendi every member has an equal opportunity to develop his or her potential, or to protect the
environment (Ramcharan, 2008: 53).

Because there are so many human possibilities worth exploring, it should neither be expected nor
desired that every person or every society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever one’s
obligations to others (also reciprocally), each has the right to his or her own way (Schneller, 2011:
190). What one might expect from others is the moral qualities of honesty, truthfulness, decency,
courage and justice coupled with the intellectual qualities of thoughtfulness, strength of mind,
curiosity and the communal qualities of neighbourliness, charity, self-support as well as the political qualities of commitment to the common good, respect for law, responsible participation, helpfulness, cooperativeness and respect for others (Schneller, 2011: 175). Tolerance and respect seem to go hand in hand in the establishment of a healthy *modus vivendi*. Diversity needs respect (Christian Science Monitor, 2005: 8). Any attempt at coercion unglues the respect that holds a diverse society together.

True tolerance, as observed in the previous section of this monograph, does not originate in opportunism which tolerates other religions merely for its own profit or for the sake of a superficial form of coexistence. It rather takes a sincere interest in the other’s religion and is eager to know as much of it as possible (Van der Walt, 2007: 213). Honest and sincere interest and respect for others and their capabilities can indeed lead to happiness, the provision of space for one another and also to social justice as fairness. According to Valenkamp (2011), the philosopher Kant claimed that the actual practising of a healthy *modus vivendi* among diverse people requires a certain “push from behind”. The love commandment, as expressed in the various forms of the Golden Rule (see Comte-Sponville, 2005: 8-10 for a discussion of the various versions of the Rule), is not the true ground for morality, Kant claims, but it provides the necessary flow, the inspiration to provide space for one another; it provides the stimulus to recognise-in-the-other-the-same-needs, to such an extent that the members of a society ought to do what the Golden Rule demands, i.e. to love one’s neighbour as oneself. People need to create societies in which differences can be recognised and conflicts resolved, where their forces can be united, not because all human beings are good and just, but because they are not; not because they are united, but so that they have a realistic chance to become united (Comte-Sponville, 2005: 15).

**Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #11:**

1. (11.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people in a community are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together in a community. People are just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions in the same community is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

*Interpretation of the responses:* 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.
12. Grand narratives and the new spirituality

As mentioned in Section 10 above, those with a rather “thick” or maximally life-conceptually filled value system might be reluctant to be tolerant of the religious and cultural views of those of different persuasion than themselves. The thesis there was that the “thicker” or maximalist a value system becomes, the more aware its adherents would be of the depth of the rifts between their own value system and those of others of different religious or cultural persuasion, to the extent that they might reach a point where they feel they have to dissociate them from the social contract with others. It could be argued, however, that this is highly unlikely among rational and sane individuals. Most people understand and welcome the profits that could be made by entering into the social contract and living according to values and principles about which consensus had been reached.

However, there is a possibility\textsuperscript{31} that rational and sane individuals socially bonded together in what has been termed “a grand narrative” or “totalising system” (McGrath, 2005: 219) of whatever nature, could be less tolerant of others, their ideas and beliefs than those outside of such a “grand narrative”. Members of a mainstream church, for instance, could feel conscience bound by the dogmas and the confessions of their organisation, and hence not free to be tolerant of deviant views. This is because, apart from the fact that each individual member of such an institution comes with a set of in-built pre-judgments and biases, he or she is a member of an institution with a certain agreed-upon set of dogmas or ideologies which make it difficult for members to be tolerant of other views not consonant with those of the institution. In many cases, the personal “fishbowl” perspective of the members have been affected or coloured by the ideologies or dogmas of the institution as a grand narrative. As Olthuis (2012: 3/7) remarked, grand narratives tend to claim to be able to explain everything. This claim, as we have seen in the discussion of postmodernism above, has today lost much of its credibility.

Although, as Makrides (2012: 250-251) correctly observed, the grand narratives of modernism have not been totally replaced by postmodernism, there is a strong tendency away from the grand narratives and their relative dominance over the thoughts and behaviour of their adherents. People understand nowadays that despite the claims of the grand narratives, people only know partially, not totally. The image of the all-knowing mind is slowly but surely being replaced by the image of the searching mind in and through a complex world, where answers are more likely to be wrong than correct.

In contrast to the search for spirituality within the context of a grand narrative, such as a particular religion, church or other religious institution, there is a resurgence of interest in non-mainstream religion and spirituality, in the realm of the transcendent. There has been a concomitant breakdown in the social and religious cohesion formerly experienced in the context of grand narrative monoliths such as churches and mainstream religions (McGrath, 2005: 219, 263). Spirituality is now widely seen, also in educational context, as something fundamental to the human condition, something that transcends ordinary everyday experience and is concerned with the search for identity and meaning in response to death, suffering, beauty and evil. Spirituality may be encountered in our beliefs, sense of awe, wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and purpose, self-knowledge, relationships, creativity, feelings and emotions, and could be rooted in

\textsuperscript{31}Attention is drawn to the word “possibility”; not all of those attached to some or other grand narrative may feel themselves so conscience bound to the extent that they might be intolerant of others’ views.
curiosity, imagination, insight and intuition (Wright, 2010: 130). According to Julian (2002: 10), the base of spirituality is the notion of serving a higher purpose, but in Welch’s (1997: 84) opinion, spirituality has in practice been reduced to a feeling of the infinite, an inarticulate ecstasy before the wonders of the self or of nature, on an experience of the ineffable. Modern spirituality therefore has no hell, no doctrine, no substance; it is all about feeling.

Kourie’s (2006: 22-23) definition of spirituality is quite different: spirituality refers to the deepest dimension of the human person; it refers to ultimate values that give meaning to one’s life, whether one is religious or not. Spirituality refers to one’s ultimate values and commitments, regardless of content. De Muynck’s (2008: 7) definition is similar to that of Kourie: spirituality is the manner in which one – by orientating oneself to a source – relates his or her beliefs and experience of inspiration and / or transcendence, more or less methodically, to the actual practice of life.

The purpose of this section is neither to give a full depiction of modern-day spirituality (which is very difficult to do because of the nebulousness of the concept) nor to evaluate it in any detail. Suffice it to say that, as Mohler (2008: 89) observed, spirituality has risen as a replacement for identification with organised religion. It is a new non-theistic form of belief that can range from the New Age movement to the various quests for spirituality that mark popular culture and fit personal taste. Instead of, as expected, religiousness disappearing, it has been resurrected in another form, that of spirituality (Van der Walt, 2007: 150).

The implications of the above for religious tolerance are clear. The more one is immersed in the doctrines, dogmas, structures of a mainstream religion that act as a grand narrative that binds the conscience of its members, the less likely one would be to be tolerant of the religious views and beliefs of others of different religious persuasion. The opposite might also be true: the more one is immersed in the nebulous ambience of some or other form of “new” spirituality, the more one is likely to be tolerant of others’ views.

Item for the questionnaire flowing from step #12:

1. (12.1) Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them.
Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

**Interpretation of the responses:**
1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person.
2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views.
4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

13. **Preliminary conclusion: (Religious) tolerance a “moving phenomenon”**

The discussion so far seems to suggest that (religious and other forms of) tolerance can be regarded as a “moving phenomenon” and hence very difficult to delineate, circumscribe in general terms or define. The discussion also proves that it has many facets and ramifications, and that one and the same aspect might be based in quite different theoretical perspectives. The term “tolerance” has, therefore, to be seen as a phenomenon with various nuances.

(Religious and other forms of) tolerance pertain(s) to a certain moment in time; it seems to be a matter of a specific moment in question. Groups of quite different religious or life and world view persuasion might live peacefully together for many years, even centuries, and may be said to be quite tolerant of the other and its beliefs and convictions. A relatively minor incident, such as the accidental death of a child at the hands of a member of the another (religious) community, may then spark a bout of severe (religious) intolerance - even conflict - that might last for years thereafter. Another incident, for example, a child saved from drowning by a member of the opposing group might terminate the violence, and lead to another prolonged period of (religious) tolerance. This can be practically illustrated with reference to the situation in Kiev, the capital city of the Ukraine in February 2014. The refusal of the president to sign an agreement with the European Union sparked a bout of severe intolerance and violence among the populace. The violence only ended when the president was deposed. Tolerance – in the political realm, in this instance - became the order of day once again.

The degree of (religious and other forms of) tolerance experienced in a community depends on the degree of equilibrium in the system. The various groups of which a society is composed seem to be tolerant of one another if all the checks and balances are in place, when certain tendencies are effectively counterbalanced by others.

Intolerance seems to need a spark or trigger to come to life. The relative peace and quiet and tolerance in a community characterised by potential for conflict can be broken by a single incident which acts as a spark or a trigger (see the examples mentioned above). Even a relatively insignificant incident can act as a trigger that could cause disequilibrium in the system.

The principles or a priori convictions of the various groups that might come into conflict and hence be intolerant of others seem to play an important role. People and groups entertain different sets of principles that flow from their religious persuasion and convictions (their respective “fishbowls”), and they live peacefully according to them on condition that they are not somehow confronted by an incongruous situation, on condition that some or other incident does not cause them alarm about the validity and viability of their personal convictions and principles. Confrontation seems to be the
key to the rise of (religious and other forms of) intolerance. As long as a person or a group is allowed to live peacefully according to their principles and convictions we might expect them to be calm and their system to be in equilibrium. A confrontational incident might disturb this equilibrium and hence result in intolerant behaviour and attitudes. Put differently, the principles might lie latently in the background of an individual or a group, but a certain confrontational incident (a certain casuistic) might bring it to the fore. How a person responds to such a confrontational incident will depend on the “contents” of his or her “fishbowl” (see section 1 above) and expectancy filters (see section 4 above). As mentioned in those two sections, how a person will engage with the world, with confrontation and systemic imbalance, will depend to a large extent to how s/he views the world and other people.

14. © The questionnaire

A few notes about the questionnaire that follows below:

1. The preceding conceptual and theoretical framework lends conceptual and theoretical support and substance to the items which together now form a provisional questionnaire with which to probe the degree of religious tolerance displayed by a respondent, and on the basis of which a religious tolerance profile of a person or a group can be constructed.

2. The items, as they have been phrased in the course of the argument outlined above, are much too difficult and complicated in their current form for application in a questionnaire to be completed by teachers, student teachers and the students or pupils in their care. This became evident when the original questionnaire was given to a number of well educated adults to respond to. Although they were able to respond adequately to each item, they found the formulation thereof too theoretical-academic and hence too complicated. This explains why a further edition of the questionnaire had to be drafted (see Section 14 below). This section contains in essence the thrust of the items of the original questionnaire but pains were taken to make the items more understandable and easier to respond to by the target audience.

3. Readers of this monograph are encouraged to attempt responding to the original questionnaire. This exercise will help them decide whether the questionnaire indeed measures what it is intended to measure, in other words whether it possesses the necessary content and construct validity.

4. The items following each theoretical section above overlap in some cases, even to a considerable extent. This is because different theoretical perspectives lead to similar questionnaire items. This problem has to be addressed in the final formulation of the questionnaire.

4. Please read the remark at the end of the questionnaire, i.e. after the interpretation, and after first having completed the questionnaire.

Here is the more simplified version of the questionnaire:

1. To which religion do you belong? If you belong to a mainstream religion such as Christianity, the Muslim faith, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism then please write the name of the religion in the space provided. If you do not belong to a mainstream religion, please write a short phrase in which you describe your religious stance, e.g. “I believe in a form of spirituality that is not associated with any mainstream religion”.
2. Please respond to the statement: “I live very strictly according to the tenets and prescriptions of my religion and world view” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

3. Please respond to the statement “I am always and acutely conscious of my religious convictions and beliefs whenever I do something or have to make a choice in my life” by marking one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

4. Which of the following views of the world is typical of how you personally view and approach the world and other people? Mark the response that describes your basic view of the world, and your attitude towards the world and other people most appropriately: 1. I feel safe and secure; I do not see the world and other people as a threat to me or my existence. 2. I concentrate on my own affairs, and have very little to do with other people and their needs; I am concerned about my own welfare in this world. 3. I cannot be bothered about the world and other people; I expect nothing from life or other people; one has to make your own fortune in life. 4. I would like to be close and friendly to other people, but at the same time I am fearful of them and what they could do to me.

5. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I am willing and prepared to associate myself with a set of values that has universal currency, a set of values, principles and norms that people say is true and valid for all people in the world, for all religions and world views in the world”. Please choose one of the following options: 1. I completely, fully agree 2. To a fairly large degree 3. Only to a limited degree 4. Not so much 5. Not at all

6. Please respond to the statement: “I am prepared to live by values that are supposedly valid for all people in the world, irrespective of their personal religion and life and world view but I think I will need to reinterpret them according to my personal religion and world view”. Mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

7. Please respond to the statement: “A value that does not flow from my own, personal religion and world view is worthless as a guideline for my life”. Please mark one of the following: 1. Totally agree 2. Agree to some extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a certain extent 5. Totally disagree

8. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I prefer values that are simple, have nothing to do with any religion or world view, that all people can agree with because they are formulated in very general terms, and will not lead to divisions and conflict among people”. 1 I strongly agree with this statement 2. I agree with the statement to a certain degree 3. I find this statement fairly acceptable. 4. I disagree with the statement to some extent. 5. I completely disagree with the statement.
9. Please respond to the following statement by marking with a cross one of the options that follow: “I prefer to deal with other people on the basis of values that are generally acceptable to all people, and not on the basis of my own religious and life view values which tend to make me different.” 1. Totally agree with the statement 2. Agree to a large extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree

10. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I could not care less what other people think and do; I feel comfortable around them when they act according to the dictates of their religion and world view; it does not matter to me what people think and do in terms of their religion; other people, their ideas and actions do not bother me at all”. 1. I totally agree with this statement 2. I agree with this statement to a certain extent 3. I find this statement acceptable 4. I disagree with this statement to a considerable degree 5. I totally disagree with this statement.

11. Please respond to the following statement by marking the option that represents your view the most accurately: “The well-being of society and of the individuals that make up society depends on my being tolerant towards them, their ideas, their religion and their beliefs”. 1. I completely agree 2. I largely agree 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I do not agree at all.

12. Please respond to the following statement by marking the most appropriate response that follows: “I just tolerate things in others that I do not like and will never accept”. 1. I fully agree 2. I agree to a large extent 3. I agree 4. I do not quite agree 5. I completely disagree

13. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “I can place myself in the shoes of a person who holds a religion and world view that is completely different from mine and which I shall never accept as my own religion or life view.” 1. I fully agree with this statement 2. I agree to a certain extent 3. I agree 4. I do not agree to a considerable extent 5. I do not agree at all.

14. Please respond to the following statement by marking one of the options that follow: “My natural inclination is to trust other people”. 1. Fully agree 2. Agree to a considerable extent 3. Agree 4. Disagree to a considerable extent 5. Totally disagree.

15. Which TWO of the following views of others are most applicable to you as a person? (1) My confidence in my own moral beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe in a unified society with a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one, and that all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way we do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in sincere dialogue with all other religions because I think my
own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that all that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom, and that he or she should be allowed to believe in whatever makes sense to them. (2) I believe that people cannot follow the whims associated with the idea of individual freedom but that they should adhere to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. The religious views of others should nevertheless be respected. (3) I believe that a person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not strictly religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful, pleasant and not opposing. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not feel at home in my community and even in my country; I feel dissatisfied with the government of this country and with all people in charge; I dislike all people who do not see things my way; I wish I could move elsewhere where people approached daily life the way I see it. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I cannot be bothered whether Christians, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists or New Agers governed this country. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such participation does not bring me in conflict with some of my basic religious convictions. I am prepared to vote for a government that does not deviate too much from my religious convictions. Although I do not always feel comfortable in my community and in this country, I do not wish to move elsewhere. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions, principles and values that I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great for that. I think people also do not trust one another sufficiently to live peacefully together. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are just people, and there is very little that keeps them apart. People should be more trustful of others. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.

20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions. Everything that we do in my church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution is so defined in terms of dogmas and doctrines that it is difficult for me to deal with people who do not belong to the same religious group or institution. I have to be inward thinking because I cannot understand the religions of other people, and I do not think they can understand my religion. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I regard myself as non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutional religion, but I see myself as religious since I adhere to
a form of spirituality in which I try to connect with a higher force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are involved in such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives; some only do it within some or other religion, others find such institutionalised religion an obstacle in their search. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, synagogue, mosque, temple or religious institution, and although we worship according to certain dogmas and confessional documents, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Although I feel myself religiously different from other people, I treat them with respect and dignity. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

**Interpretation key**

1. This item informs the researcher whether the respondent belongs to a mainstream religion, to a form of spirituality not associated with any mainstream religion or to no religion at all – as far as the respondent is concerned (according to the literature, no person is ever actually without religion (Gray, 2009: 2; Peck, 2006: 108)). This item reveals the nature of the personal “fishbowl” (life and worldview orientation) of the respondent.

2. Interpretation of the response: A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (based on Bennett’s work). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalistic and a possibility of being situated in a religio-relative orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

3. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of a maximalist attitude and a possibility of being situated in a religio-centric orientation (cf. Bennett, 1993). A 4 or 5 response could be construed as minimalistic and a possibility of being situated in a religio-relative orientation (Bennett, 1993). Put differently, a 1, 2 or 3 response could refer to the respondent’s attitude of being happy and satisfied to live in his or her own “fishbowl” and seemingly does not feel the need to examine his or her own worldview or to exchange it for another worldview or a broader look on life, including the views of other people.

4. 1 indicates a balanced and secure worldview. This person is not fearful of engaging with the world or with other people; he or she trusts others and the predictability of the world, and is generally open to the world. This person might be tolerant of others and their views. 2 is indicative of a pre-occupied life and world view; this is an inward looking person, who is not concerned about the welfare of others or of the world in general. This person is so concerned about him- or herself that tolerance of others and their views does not come into play. 3 This person is disconnected from the world, expects nothing

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32 See Section 6 for a detailed discussion of this aspect.
from others or the world. This disconnection could be indicative of a mentality in which tolerance plays no significant role. 4. This person leads an ambivalent life; he or she is both fearful of the world and of others but also aspires to be close to others. Fear could lead to intolerant behaviour; on the other hand, the wish for closeness could lead to exaggerated tolerance of others and their views.

5. A 1, 2 or 3 response would indicate that the respondent is not at all or at least not fully committed to some or other exclusive confessional stance far as his or her religious orientation is concerned. He or she is prepared to share a set of values that is supposedly universally applicable to all people. A 4 or 5 response will be indicative of the opposite, namely that the respondent is so committed to some or other confessional religious or life and world view stance and perspective that he or she does not find it possible or viable to share values, principles and norms with others of a different religious and / or life and world view conviction.

6. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of the fact that the respondent seems to be prepared to live by generally accepted and supposedly universally valid values, norms and principles but also feels the need to reinterpret those values and norms in terms of his or her private religious stance and life and worldview. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.

7. A 1, 2 or 3 response could be indicative of (full) commitment to a personal religion and life and world view. A 4 or 5 response could be seen as confirmation of a 1, 2 or 3 response in item 3.1.

8. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a respondent preferring to operate with minimalist, general values, values that have been thinly formulated. This person seems to pave the way for getting along with others on the basis of rather generally shared values. A 4 or 5 response would indicate that the respondent prefers values that are maximally, thickly formulated in terms of his or her religious and life and worldview convictions. Respondents who opt for a 4 or a 5 seem to be more likely to be more conscious of their own religion and life and worldview rooted value system, and hence also more aware of differences between his or her value system and those of others whose value systems might be rooted in different religions and world views.

9. Responses 1, 2 and 3 indicate that the respondent sees himself- or herself as preferring values that are relatively devoid of content or that are universal though contextually filled and meaningful. The respondent seems to prefer to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” in order to get along with most other people, irrespective of their value stances. Responses 4 and 5 might be indicative of a respondent who prefers not to operate in the “valley of relative value emptiness” but rather with values that are more or less conceptually filled with meaning and content. The value stance of such respondents is likely to be rooted in a pertinent religious, faith or life and worldview commitment.
10. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is more or less completely tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different religious persuasion. He or she may even be suspected of an "anything goes" attitude, and hence might belong in Bennett’s categories IV and VI. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is not prepared to be quite as tolerant of the religious views and actions of people of different persuasion, and hence could belong in Bennett’s categories I, II or III.

11. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a person who is religiously and otherwise tolerant of others and their ideas. A 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a person who is (fairly) intolerant of others and their ideas.

12. A 1, 2 or 3 response would be indicative of a fairly tolerant person whereas a 4 or 5 response would be indicative of a fairly intolerant person.

13. A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of a person with moral imagination and who might be tolerant of the religious views of others. A 4 or 5 response is indicative of a respondent with very little or no moral imagination and who could be quite intolerant of others and their religious views.

14. A 1, 2 or 3 response is indicative of the fact that the respondent is a trusting person and therefore probably tolerant of others. A 4 and 5 response is indicative of the fact that the person is not naturally inclined to trust others and therefore might be fairly intolerant.

15. These different attitudes can be explained as follows. If a person is very or fairly tolerant, it may be (a) because his or her own confidence is his or her own moral beliefs is low, or (b) because he or she thinks that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. If a person is very or fairly intolerant, it may be (a) because his or her confidence in own beliefs is high, or because (b) he or she believes in a unified society with a single set of shared values.

16. 1. This response will be indicative of an exclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of an inclusivist and hence probably intolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a religious pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude. 4. This response will be indicative of a dialogical pluralist and hence probably tolerant attitude.

17. 1. This response will be indicative of a liberal and hence probably tolerant attitude. 2. This response will be indicative of a stance rooted in some holy book but that the religious views of others should be respected. This is indicative of a tolerant attitude. 3. This response will be indicative of a secular and hence probably tolerant attitude.

18. 1. This response will be indicative of a person not wishing to enter or be part of a social contract and hence will probably be tolerant of others. 2. This response will be indicative of a person with a totally laissez faire attitude and who could be regarded as totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person
with a balanced view, willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

19. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2. This response will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 3. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

20. 1. This response will be indicative of a religiously intolerant person. 2 and 3. These responses will be indicative of a person who is totally tolerant of others and their religious views. 4. This response will be indicative of a person with a balanced view, willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions, and hence will probably be conditionally tolerant towards others and their religious views.

Remark: Initial application of the above questionnaire in a small-scale pilot study revealed two of its characteristics:

1. It is too difficult and complicated in its current format for persons without the necessary conceptual and theoretical background to decide on the appropriate responses. To address this problem a simplified version of the questionnaire was developed for teachers, student teachers and learners, students, pupils in the last two years of school (typically grades 11 and 12 / standards 9 and 10)(Section 14).

2. The initial results show that at least four profiles with respect to religious tolerance could be drafted on the basis of the questionnaire:

2.1 A respondent with a totally intolerant stance is able to mark the items in such a way that his or her total religious intolerance will be clearly demonstrated.

2.2 The same goes for a person with the opposite stance as far as religious tolerance is concerned; items can be marked in such a way that his or her total religious tolerance can be demonstrated.

2.3 According to the pilot study, by far the most respondents seem to mark the items that show his or her adherence to a strong personal value system while at the same time being tolerant of others and their religious views.

2.4 Some respondents mark the items in such a way they show their adherence to a strong personal value system accompanied by a spirit of relative intolerance of other views.

3. These impressions will have to be tested with larger groups of respondents.

4. The following is an example of the responses of one of the persons in the very initial pilot study:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Response number</th>
<th>Response in words</th>
<th>Religious tolerance profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td></td>
<td>This person belongs to the Christian faith or religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agree to some extent</td>
<td>Religio-centric person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Totally agree</td>
<td>Religio-centric and values maximally filled with content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>Balanced and secure world view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>Balanced and secure world view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Only to a limited degree</td>
<td>Not an exclusivist stance with respect to religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>Prepared to live by universal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Totally agree</td>
<td>Fully committed to own religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Aware of differences among people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>Prepared to work with contextually filled universal values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Completely agree</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Completely agree</td>
<td>A tolerant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Do not agree</td>
<td>This person does not have much moral imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>This is a trusting person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3 and 4</td>
<td>This person’s confidence in own beliefs is high, and he believes in a unified society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>This person is a proponent of dialogical pluralism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>This person’s views are rooted in a Holy book</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>This person is willing to enter into a social contract on certain conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>This person has a balanced view; is willing to live peacefully with others on certain conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>This person has a balanced view; is tolerant of others and prepared to live with them on certain conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth column, if read from top to bottom, embodies the tolerance profile of this particular person: he is a Christian who is fairly religio-centred in his value stance, whose views are rooted in the Holy Book of Christianity (the Bible), who prefers to apply values that are maximally filled with life and worldview content, who feels balanced and secure in his dealings with other people and their values, who does not entertain an exclusivist view of his religion, is prepared to live by universally recognised values despite being firmly anchored in and committed to his own Christian religion (hence supports the tenet of universally recognised though contextually filled values), is a trusting and tolerant person though without strong moral imagination (he finds it difficult to place himself in the shoes of others), is confident in his own beliefs but also believes in a unified society, is an exponent of dialogical pluralism (prepared to interact and dialogue with adherents to other religions), and is prepared to conditionally enter into a social contract with others and to live peacefully with them.

This is the profile of a single respondent. The tolerance profile of a group of respondents, say a class of Grade 11 students at a certain school, can be determined in the same way.
15. © Questionnaire for teachers, student teachers and Grade 11 and 12 learners

1. To which religion do you belong? (If you do not belong to any mainstream religion, please describe your religious stance in a few words.)

2. “My religion is very strong, and I am expected to live very strictly according to it.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

3. “I am always strongly conscious of my religion in everything that I do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

4. Here are four statements. Mark the one that is most applicable to you. 1. I feel safe and secure; other people and what they think are not a threat to me. 2. I am mostly concerned with myself; I cannot be bothered about other people and what they think and do. 3. I expect nothing from other people and also nothing from life; one has to make your own fortune. 4. I would like to be friendly with other people but at the same time I am afraid of them and what they could do to me.

5. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share and that is not peculiar to one religion only.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

6. “I am willing and prepared to live according to a set of values that all people can share, but I shall always interpret them according to my own religion.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

7. “A value that does not flow from my own religion and view of life is useless as a guideline for my life.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

8. “I prefer to values that do not have anything to do with any religion. Values should not lead to divisions and conflict among people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

9. “I prefer not to apply values that will make me different from all other people. That is why I do not like religious values.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

10. “Other people are free to live according to their own religious values; the values of other people do not bother me at all.[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]

11. “The well-being of society depends on how tolerant we are with one another and with the other person’s religious values and views.”[Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent 5. I totally disagree]
12. “I just tolerate things that others say and do but I shall never be able to accept the things they think and do.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

13. “I can place myself in the shoes of person whose religion, world view, values and ideas are completely different from mine.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

14. “I am naturally inclined to trust other people.” [Mark one of the following: 1. I strongly agree with this statement. 2. I agree to a certain extent. 3. I agree. 4. I disagree to a certain extent. 5. I totally disagree]

15. Mark any TWO of the following that you think are most applicable to you: (1) My confidence in my own religious beliefs is low. (2) I think that others have a right to follow their beliefs however wrong they are. (3) My confidence in own beliefs is high. (4) I believe the society in which I live should have only a single set of shared values. Mark ANY TWO in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I believe that my religion is the only true one; all others are false. (2) I believe that all religions contain some truths but that all others should be changed so that they see the truth the way I do in my religion. (3) I believe that all religions lead to one and the same God / god / gods and that they only differ from one another because of local conditions and circumstances. (4) I believe in dialogue with all other religions because I think my own religion and all others will be enriched by the experience. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.]

17. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) All that counts in life is a person’s individual freedom; everyone should believe what he or she wants. (2) The idea of individual freedom is wrong; people should live according to the principles outlined in a holy book such as the Bible. (3) A person should live and behave in accordance with values that are not religious, such as to be civil, polite and courteous, tactful and pleasant. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

18. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I feel so strongly about my personal religious convictions that I do not feel at home in my own surroundings. (2) I feel totally comfortable with whatever other people feel and think. I just go with the flow. (3) I feel that one should participate in community life on condition that such participation does not bring me in conflict with religion. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

19. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I do not think that people can ever live peacefully together. The divisions among people are just too great for that. (2) I think people should just find ways and means to live peacefully together. People are just people. (3) I think that peaceful coexistence among people with different religious convictions is possible on condition that every member of society respects the differences around him or her, and treats others with the necessary respect and dignity. [Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3.]

20. Which ONE of the following statements is most applicable to you as a person? (1) I belong to a religious group with very strong convictions; we cannot tolerate others’ way of thinking. (2) I do not belong to any form of organised or institutionalised religion. I am non-religious. I just respect what others think without ever judging them. (3) I try to connect with a higher
force that could give direction to my life. I think all people are searching for such a spiritual search for a higher force in their lives. (4) I belong to a religious group such as a church, but despite this, we feel ourselves free to interact with other people, to discuss religious issues and differences with them. Mark ONE in the spaces provided: 1 2 3 4.

16. Concluding remarks
Each of the items in the questionnaire above can be traced back to one or more of the theoretical viewpoints that preceded it. This enables the administrator of the questionnaire to interpret the responses to each item. By plotting a respondent’s responses to each of the 20 items the investigator will be in a position to see whether a respondent is basically religiously tolerant in his or her dealings and relationships with others of a different religious persuasion. Not only will such graphs show where each individual respondent lies in terms of being religiously tolerant or intolerant but it will also show where an entire group of respondents lies on the basis of their aggregate response in terms of each item and of the questionnaire in its entirety.

Two further steps will have to be taken before the questionnaire can be administered with confidence to samples of respondents: (a) a pilot study with a few selected respondents has to be done to rectify any shortcomings and mistakes; and (b) the questionnaire should be edited to ensure that it actually measures religious tolerance and that each item and the various options therein are understandable to both teachers, prospective teachers and pupils (students, learners).

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Beyond Living Together in Fragments: Muslims, Religious Diversity and Religious Identity in the Netherlands

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Beyond Living Together in Fragments: Muslims, Religious Diversity and Religious Identity in the Netherlands†

HERMAN L. BECK

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the question of whether the Netherlands, in the past and at present, can be characterized as a mono-religious or as a religiously diverse society. After defining the concept of “religious diversity” in this paper, a brief overview of the religious situation in the Netherlands during the Middle Ages, the Dutch Golden Age (1600–1700) and the years following World War II will provide an answer to this question. Attention will also be paid in passing to the concept of (religious) “tolerance”. The question of what is the situation in the Netherlands will be dealt with on the basis of three questions from the introduction: (1) How much religious diversity can a society take? (2) What is the impact of religious diversity? (3) How do the Dutch people react to an increase in religious diversity? Are they right to consider religious diversity as the consequence of immigration, which they primarily associate with Muslims? As afterthought I will argue for accepting religious pluralism in circumstances of religious diversity.

Dutch Media Headlines

Random headlines of recent news items in the Dutch written media:

- Prison sentences for trafficking through Sikh temple in Amsterdam
- Police raid Santo Daime church in Amsterdam during service
- Amsterdam Urchins become Radical Salafi-Jihadist Muslims
- Order of the Transformants Alleged to be a Sex Sect
- Stop Subsidizing Controversial Gülen Movement
- Scientology: Anatomy of a Frightening Cult

Numerous other examples can be added from the Dutch media publications.

Introduction

Most Dutchmen have probably never even heard of these religious groups mentioned in the headlines. Given the incredible variety of these groups, a complete knowledge of the religious map of the Netherlands is almost impossible. For example, in the year 2000,
there were approximately 350 different religious communities in Amsterdam alone.¹ In Europe, however, Amsterdam’s position is hardly unique. At the beginning of the third millennium, for example, Berlin accommodated more than 360 religious communities.² The Swiss cities of Basel and Zürich are known to house more than 370 different religious groups.³ The dynamics in the religious field are enormous: changes and new developments take place constantly. Religious ideologies and religious movements are formed, find their niche in Dutch society, and sometimes disappear again. If any attention is paid to them at all, it is usually biased reporting.

The indeterminate number of religious groups and lack of familiarity with their teachings and the way of life they preach, combined with the fact that they are shown in a negative light, has generated concern and questions among part of the Dutch population. “How much religious diversity can a society take?”⁴ “What is the impact of religious diversity?”⁵ “How do people react to the increase in religious diversity?”⁶ Such questions are regularly asked, in many different formulations, both in the Netherlands and in other Western societies.

Definition of the Problem, Research Question and Design

Many Dutch people think that religious diversity in the Netherlands is a recent phenomenon. They consider it to be a deviation from and an infringement of the Dutch norm, and experience it as a problem.⁷ Consciously or otherwise, a large part of the Dutch population nurtures the ideology that Dutch society has always been a monoculture with one religion.⁸ True, its identity may be based on a Judeo-Christian-humanist heritage, but from a religious point of view, it has been forged into a solid, uniform unity. Religious diversity, however, is at odds with and erodes that norm. As a result, religious diversity is a threat to the national identity of the Netherlands and to its moral order with norms and values that have been fostered for centuries.⁹ According to many Dutch people, religious diversity is the consequence of immigration, which they primarily associate with Muslims.¹⁰ This immigration and its accompanying problems seem to have caused a change in mentality in the Netherlands. Not only have measures been taken to restrict immigration from “Muslim countries”, proposals have also been made that purport to limit the religious freedom of Muslims, which implies intolerance against them.

During my stay as a visiting professor at Venice International University in the autumn of 2010, and coming from the Netherlands my colleagues from Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, and the USA pointedly asked me: “Whatever is the matter with the Dutch?”¹¹ They referred to reports in the media on statements by Dutch politicians and opinion makers who wanted to ban “Islamic clothing” and the building of new mosques in the Netherlands. My colleagues could not reconcile such plans with the liberal reputation which, in their view, the Netherlands had enjoyed since the seventeenth century. For centuries, the Netherlands has been considered one of the most tolerant and pluralist societies in Europe.¹² The ability to accept (religious) diversity has long been considered one of the main virtues of the Dutch people.¹³

The subject of this paper is to explore the question whether the Netherlands, in the past and at present, can be characterized as a mono-religious or as a religiously diverse society. After defining the concept of “religious diversity”, a brief overview of the religious situation in the Netherlands in the Middle Ages, the Golden Age and the years following World War II will offer an answer to this question. In passing, attention will be paid to the concept of (religious) “tolerance”. The question of “what is the matter with the Neth-
Religious Diversity

According to contemporary religious scholars, religious diversity is part of the human condition and constitutes the norm rather than the exception. They hold the view that religious diversity has traditionally been characteristic of and inherent to Europe and America, because both continents have always known immigration throughout their history. Religious diversity has always played an important role as co-shaping the form and content of Western culture and Western identity. Most religious scholars use religious diversity, or the synonyms religious plurality, religious pluralism and religious multiformity, as a descriptive concept indicating that, in a certain demarcated area or within a particular society, different religions or forms of religions occur side by side. More nuances can be introduced by referring to interreligious diversity when two or more different religious systems with differing religious images and ritual practices and experiences are concerned, and of intrareligious diversity when there are different groups or movements from the same religious tradition with differing religious images and ritual practices and experiences. However, one rarely comes across these nuances in the literature. They are often referred to in combination with the concept of religious pluralism, which should not be used as a synonym of religious diversity but must, on the contrary be sharply differentiated from this term.

Religious Diversity in the Netherlands

The Middle Ages and the Golden Age

As regards the Dutch context, the view of religious scholars is corroborated by historical data. Through the centuries, the Netherlands has had religious diversity, also in periods in which the Roman-Catholic church was the state church or when the Dutch Reformed Church (gereformeerde kerk) was the public (i.e. the official) and privileged church. In their classic work, De lage landen bij de zee: Een geschiedenis van het Nederlandse volk [The Low Countries by the Sea. A History of the Dutch People], dating from 1934, Jan and Annie Romein show—particularly in the chapters “Geest en gedachte in de middeleeuwen” [Spirit and Thought in the Middle Ages] and “Calvinisme en libertinisme” [Calvinism and Libertinism]—how large the religious diversity was in the Netherlands in the Middle Ages (500–1500 A.D.) and the Golden Age (1600–1700 A.D.). Thus, they refute the current opinion that “Church and Christianity in the Middle Ages reigned supreme.” They describe the fight to the bitter end of the “Church” against remnants of the “heathen” Germanic (and possibly even older) religion and convincingly show that the witch hunts and the persecution of heretics may have been part of that struggle. Jan and Annie Romein also discuss Protestantism as the new dominant religious factor in the Golden Age in the Netherlands, after and next to Catholicism. They emphasize that members of the Dutch Reformed Church, the Calvinists, were only one main stream among many other main streams and numerous side streams.
The Calvinist Protestants played a prominent role in their Iconoclastic Fury of 1566 in stirring up the rebellion against the Spanish rule of the Netherlands, the resulting struggle for independence, and the ultimate establishment of the Republic of the United Netherlands in 1588. The Union of Utrecht of 1579 is regarded as the Republic’s “foundation charter” and is a kind of “treaty for joint defence between the contracting states.” In the context of religious diversity, Article 13 of the “foundation charter” is of special relevance. This article stipulates that no one in the seven provinces (regions or states) that have united under the Union of Utrecht may be prosecuted on account of his religion. The article breathes the same spirit as the treaty of religious freedom proposed by William of Orange (1533–1584 A.D.), who dedicated himself to enabling Protestants and Catholics in the Republic to live together peacefully. However, considerable differences existed among the seven provinces on how to interpret and apply Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht. In fact, every province was free to act as it saw fit in matters of religion. In practice, this Article was generally interpreted in the sense of freedom of conscience rather than of religion. In the privacy of the home, everyone was more or less free to practice their faith as they saw fit. In the public domain, however, people had to give due consideration to the view and the rules of the state church of the Calvinist Protestants. This meant, for example, that all worship of denominations other than that of the state church had to be hidden from direct view and was forced to go “underground”, a development that gave rise to the clandestine church (schuilkerk), a church that is literally concealed. Around 1620 the city of Haarlem had 11 clandestine churches: 7 for the Catholics, 3 for the Mennonites and 1 for the Lutherans. Around the same time, Amsterdam had even more than twice that number of clandestine houses of worship. It must be mentioned, however, that the Netherlands already had an advocate of full freedom of religious worship in this period, in the person of Dirk Volckertszoon Coornhert (1522–1590 A.D.). His contemporaries therefore considered his Synodus van der Conscientiën Vrijheydt [Weighing the Freedom of Conscience] from 1582 as “the most complete formulation of the idea of tolerance in Holland and perhaps even in the whole of Europe”.

**Religious Diversity and Tolerance**

**Tolerance or Toleration**

In the Middle Ages and in the Dutch Golden Age (1600–1700 A.D.), the Netherlands was a country with great religious diversity, even though—with the exception of the Jews—mainly intrareligious diversity was concerned. In this respect, my colleagues at Venice International University from Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, and the USA were correct. But was the Netherlands—as my colleagues assumed—also one of the most tolerant countries in Europe, an opinion that was already held in the eighteenth century, incidentally? The answer turns on the definition of tolerance. How must that tolerance be understood if religious freedom in the daily, public life of the Golden Age Netherlands in fact did not exist? The dominant and authoritative position of the Calvinist Protestant religion had been institutionalized in their church, which had become the privileged state church of the Netherlands, even though the Calvinist Protestants were a minority among the population. This religious minority had it in its power to make it pretty difficult for others, such as the Catholic majority in the province of Holland, to practice their religion. It is true that other denominations did enjoy freedom of conscience, but were obliged to worship in secrecy. As long as they did so, the Calvinist Protestants adopted
a more or less tolerant attitude towards dissenters such as Lutherans, Remonstrants, and Mennonites, who, as a result, were able to achieve a rather comfortable standard of living. From about 1615, even Jews in Amsterdam enjoyed almost a full right to public worship.

The Dutch word tolerantie means both tolerance and toleration. In the context of religion, the difference between these two words can perhaps best be conveyed by adding an adjective: “active” tolerance and “passive” toleration, respectively. “Passive” toleration is the political concept that stands for a government policy of reluctantly permitting or turning a blind eye to public worship. “Passive” toleration is inclined to neutrality and distance and thus to a certain form of indifference towards the person or practice that is being tolerated. “Active” tolerance is rather a “moral” concept that implies a particular attitude or disposition of an individual or of a group of individuals who accept other individuals or groups of individuals with different religious convictions and/or practices and in their religious difference as equals. In common parlance, “tolerance” has more positive connotation for many people than “toleration”, among other things because “tolerance” embodies a certain ideal of engagement and “toleration” emphasizes the power imbalance between the “tolerator” and the person who is being tolerated. Thus defined, there was passive toleration in the Golden Age rather than active tolerance, perhaps with the exception of individuals like Coornhert. The government, in the person of the stadholder (stadhouder is a function roughly comparable to England’s sixteenth century Lord Lieutenant) or in the institution of the States General (the supreme authority and the central government of the northern Netherlands after they successfully revolted against the Spanish king and his domination), imposed toleration on the Dutch Reformed Church. There were two reasons for this policy. First, there was concern that intolerance might harm the unity and welfare of the Republic. To force all citizens of the Republic to religious uniformity by ordering them to accept the orthodoxy of the Dutch Reformed Church as the state church would without a doubt have led to more dissention, more fierce resistance, and further fragmentation. Second, the economic growth and economic prosperity of the Republic would profit from a policy of tolerance. After all, the Republic depended on trade in which non-Calvinist merchants, both from the Netherlands and abroad, played an important part. There was also fear that intolerance would lead to emigration of religious dissenters, who were crucial to the economy of the Republic.

It seems therefore that political and economic reasons inspired the pragmatism of passive religious toleration in the Golden Age Netherlands. The adherents of the various religions and denominations obviously attached such importance to their own religious identity that it appeared more sensible and more profitable to the magistrate to accept the existing religious diversity through freedom of conscience and thus a “living together in fragments” than to try and establish a uniform, mono-religious state. This living together in fragments is also known as omgangsoecumene or “informal religious co-existence” and is characteristic of the Netherlands. However, there was no full freedom of religion until the privileged position of the Dutch Reformed Church was ended in 1796 and after the constitutional reform of 1848, in which freedom of religion was adopted.

Religious Diversity in Post World War II Netherlands

This brief historical overview of the religious diversity in the Middle Ages and the Golden Age shows that the view of many Dutch people is untenable that religious diversity in their
country is a new phenomenon and that Dutch society has always been mono-cultural and mono-religious. It also shows that the Republic’s religious policy during the Golden Age was founded on passive toleration on the basis of freedom of conscience, whereas my non-Dutch colleagues at Venice International University thought that active tolerance on the basis of freedom of religion was so characteristic of the Netherlands. Their view of the Netherlands as one of the most tolerant and pluralist societies in Europe therefore needs to be put into perspective.

Like other Western countries after World War II, the Netherlands was faced with increasing modernization. This phenomenon can be described as a process of differentiation, rationalization, individualization and domestication. This process led, among other things, to the development of science and technology and to the “institutionalization of principles such as constitutional government, moral autonomy, secularism, democracy, human rights and the equality of citizens”. As a result of this modernization, Dutch society, which was organized on the basis of religious or political ideologies, evolved into a secularized society. The division of religious and political groups in so-called “pillars” is known as “pillarization”.

The Netherlands were characterized by pillarization (verzuiling in Dutch) from the last quarter of the nineteenth century until the 1970s. It is considered to be the typical Dutch answer to religious diversity. During this period, the Netherlands was modelled on a pattern of four vertical, parallel pillars, next to a number of other small religious and political or ideological groups. Each pillar was founded on a particular religious or secular ideology or philosophy of life and had its own schools, newspapers and other media, trade unions, political parties, etc. Pillarization has been called “a form of social segmentation aimed at stabilising Dutch society”. Its function was to end or prevent conflict between indigenous religious and political groups. Pillarization also indicates that religious diversity is not a recent phenomenon in the Netherlands. During the years of Pillarization, (non-)religious identity seemed so fundamental and distinctive for the Dutch that also, at that time, a “living together in fragments” was accepted as a solution to the informal co-existence of believers, dissenters, and non-believers in one country. Just like in the Golden Age, the Pillarization period seems to have been one of passive toleration rather than active tolerance.

One of the effects of modernization, secularization, was late to come to the Netherlands and slow to develop, but ultimately seems to have taken root more thoroughly than in other Western countries. The Christian religion lost much of its importance as a key factor of social cohesion in the public domain as a result. Modernization and secularization thus contributed, on the one hand, to the de-Pillarization of Dutch society but, on the other hand, resulted in a further increase of the already existing religious diversity.

Other developments closely associated with modernization and secularization also played an important role in the growth of religious diversity in the Netherlands. Individualization brought the freedom to experiment with religious alternatives. This led to growing awareness that adhering to a faith, practicing a religion, following religious-ethical precepts, and participating in religious and ritual practices was a matter of individual choice. Practicing the religion of one’s parents or ancestors was no longer a matter of course. It was possible to shop on the religious market and to choose from a large and diversified supply of religions and degrees of religiosity. Membership of and identification with a particular religion or religious group was founded on an autonomous, personal preference. Religiosity and belief did not necessarily require membership of a particular religious community. Individual religious bricolage was a real possibility. Given a
person’s lifestyle and self-tailored identity, a matching religion was chosen or created.\textsuperscript{51} Atheism also became a viable alternative.

Immigration also contributed to the growth of religious diversity in the Netherlands after World War II. Until 1975, the Dutch government held the official view that the Netherlands was an emigration rather than an immigration country. From the end of the 1950s, Dutch prosperity and a shortage of cheap labour led to a stream of economic migrants to the Netherlands. In addition to immigrants who settled in the Netherlands for economic reasons, there were also those who had political or educational motives. As a result of this immigration, the religious diversity in the Netherlands grew further.

Given the principle of the separation of church and state, the religious factor played a marginal role at best in the Dutch government policy concerning immigrants until the 1990s, even though many of them came from “Muslim” countries such as Turkey and Morocco. The government was not interested in their religious identity, and their religious disparity was treated with certain indifference. During the first decades of their presence in the Netherlands, these immigrants were successively called “guest workers”, “economic migrants”, “non-Western foreigners”, and “members of a cultural and/or ethnic minority”. In this period, it was the ethnicity rather than the religion as an identity marker that played a dominant role in the public discourse of government and immigrants.\textsuperscript{52} A minority policy was developed that was aimed at fighting discrimination, racism, and deprivation and at stimulating the ideal of a multicultural society.\textsuperscript{53} The ideology behind this ideal was inspired by the Canadian minority policy that propagated multiculturalism as the attitude of mutual appreciation, recognition, and active support of cultural differences, and equal opportunities for all cultural and ethnic groups in the country.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{How much Religious Diversity can a Society Like the Netherlands Take?}

In the course of the first decade of the third millennium, the government seems to have abandoned the ideology of multiculturalism in its minority policy which, according to some opinion makers and politicians, had become a disaster.\textsuperscript{55} There is more attention for religious diversity now, but usually mistakenly associated with the Muslim presence in the Netherlands. The figures for 2010 in the \textit{Jaarrapport Integratie} [Annual Report on Integration] of Statistics Netherlands show that the Dutch population is estimated at 16,575,000 people, 13,215,000 of whom are regarded as native. The 3,359,000 foreigners are distinguished into 1,501,000 Western foreigners and 1,858,000 non-Western foreigners. Of the latter group, 883,000 people, given their background, will in all probability have an Islam-related identity. The other 975,000 non-Western foreigners originate from countries where Christianity or a religion other than Islam is dominant.\textsuperscript{56}

In publications from 1996 and 2006, more attention was drawn to the position and problems of non-Western Christians in the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{57} On the basis of these publications and estimates made by migrant platform “Samen kerk in Nederland” (Together Church in the Netherlands), set up in 1997, and Cura Migratorum (Care for the Migrants), that was discontinued in 2005, it was argued that between 600,000 and 700,000 non-Western Christians were staying in the Netherlands in 2006.\textsuperscript{58} Again, Amsterdam can be referred to as an example. As mentioned above, in the year 2000 it accommodated approximately 350 different religious communities, among them 70 Christian migrant denominations which gathered for worship in 160 different places in the capital.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to non-Western Christian migrants, divided over a myriad of
Roman-Catholic and Protestant groups, Western Christian migrants are living in the Netherlands who, depending on their country or region of origin, are Roman-Catholic, Old Catholic, Anglican, Orthodox (Bulgarian, Greek, Russian and the like), one of the many Protestant denominations or Mormon.

Also as a result of immigration from Israel, the number of Jews in the Netherlands increased to approximately 52,000 persons in 2009. However, Judaism in the Netherlands is no more a uniform community than are Christianity or Islam. The same holds for Hinduism and Buddhism, religions originating in the Indian subcontinent; its adherents in the Netherlands belong to many different movements. A third religion that hails from India is Sikhism, which, according to its website, has approximately 12,000 adherents in the Netherlands. One of the monotheist religions with a fewer number of followers in the Netherlands is, for example, the Bahá’í faith, originating from Iran.

It is impracticable and unnecessary to enumerate all religions, all religious groups, and all forms of religiosity extant in the Netherlands. It has become sufficiently clear that the Netherlands has enormous religious diversity—both inter-religious and intra-religious. The 350 different religious communities in Amsterdam in the year 2000 prove this. It has also been shown that the view of the prominent sociologist of religion José Casanova that, as regards continental Europe, “immigration and Islam are almost synonymous” does not apply, at least not to the Netherlands. How much religious diversity a society like the Netherlands can take is a question that cannot yet be answered. It is known, though, that “an ‘excess’ of diversity … gives rise to problems in the field of social cohesion and trust”. According to some scholars, cultural diversity and social cohesion are incompatible concepts.

The Impact of Religious Diversity

The Netherlands has always had religious diversity, and this diversity has greatly increased after World War II. What is the impact of religious diversity on and in a country like the Netherlands? Of course it cannot be denied that negative reports on non-Islamic religions and religious groups, as suggested by four of the six media headlines mentioned in the opening section, have also led to some concern in Dutch society. However, such concern usually does not last very long. The main reason that many people experience religious diversity as a serious problem and a continuing source of concern is the presence of adherents of Islam in the Netherlands.

The primary association—an unjustified one, incidentally, as has been shown—of religious diversity with Muslim presence, however, conceals that the problems that are attributed to them may be the consequence of religious diversity in general rather than being the consequence of the Muslim presence. Research has shown that religious diversity can indeed lead to various problems in a society, for example, problems concerning (feelings of) safety, security, and social cohesion, issues around (national and other forms of) identity, the moral order, norms and values, and claims relating to the veracity of this or that religion. Because of the association with Islam and Muslims, a number of problems that may be related to religious diversity in general is explained on the basis of “Islamic” examples. On the one hand, these examples show that actual, real, objective problems are concerned because large groups of people experience them as deviating from and/or contrary to the social norm; on the other hand, they show that the problems are also related to subjective feelings, prejudices, and stereotypes. It must be emphasized that
what is said about Islam in this context applies *mutatis mutandis* to religious diversity in general.

*Islamization: The Danger and the Perceived Threat*

Contemporary events such as 9/11 (2001), the murder of Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004, and other bloody terrorist attacks involving Muslims have confirmed and reinforced the image of Islam as an “aggressive, violent, and expansionist religion” in the eyes of many Dutch people. As a result, large sections of the Dutch population are afraid of “the danger of Islam”. They fear the Islamization of the Netherlands. A few people therefore think that, with the Muslims residing here, the “Trojan Horse” has been let in.\(^{68}\)

However, there is no attention for the fact that this negative image of Islam and Muslims is partly based on centuries-old prejudices and stereotypes. The role which a number of Western opinion makers and politicians from the last quarter of the twentieth century have played in the revival and/or continuation of these prejudices and stereotypes is easily overlooked. It has been forgotten that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, various prominent Western politicians declared, orally and in writing that no longer communism but Islam and Islamic fundamentalism were the new enemy of the West.\(^{69}\) The Western world apparently has a political interest in an enemy image of Islam.

*The “Incompatibility” of the Islamic Identity with the Dutch Identity*

It is remarkable that the Turks and Moroccans in this country who, as mentioned above, had successively been called “guest workers”, “economic migrants”, “non-Western foreigners”, and “members of a cultural and/or ethnic minority” were primarily identified as Muslims after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The debate on minorities and multiculturalism became “Islamized”, which may have been the reason that the Dutch policy of multiculturalism is considered to have failed. To achieve better integration into Dutch society, Turks and Moroccans were expected to give up their “Islamic identity”. In a speech made in Lucerne on 6 September 1991, Frits Bolkestein (b. 1933), the then leader of the Dutch Liberal Party, was one of the first who addressed this topic. An “Islamic identity” was obviously thought to be incompatible with the “Dutch identity”.

Apparently, the seeds of Bolkestein’s view needed time to germinate in Dutch soil, where individualization was still rampant. Following World War II the idea had taken root after all that a clear-cut and well-delineated group identity implied the exclusion of others and of the “Other”. Too great an emphasis on the individual character of the group carried the risk of racism, the greatest evil of all, as the recent war had shown. Individualism became the norm and being different was celebrated in the ideal of multiculturalism.\(^{70}\)

Around the turn of the millennium, a change seemed to have taken place. Society became selfish and uncaring, norms and values became blurred, extreme individualization and intolerance increased;\(^{71}\) these and other negative social developments are a source of great concern to the Dutch government and population. They fear the erosion of social solidarity and disintegration of social cohesion. With campaigns like “Society, that means you” by SIRE,\(^{72}\) the government has tried since 1998 to make the population aware again of its own responsibility in this context and thus to re-establish the community feeling. Here and there, a causal link is made between the loss of both
social solidarity and social cohesion and the so-called “Islamization of Dutch culture”. The call for a return to and restoration of the “Dutch identity” sounded louder at the end of the 1990s than at the beginning of that decade.73

What constitutes that “Dutch identity” is unclear. After all, since World War II, the Netherlands has changed dramatically from a:

- pillarized society on a religious and ideological basis into a secularized, fragmented society;
- people with norms and values that were shared by the whole community into a society of individuals who think they can determine their own norms and values and who expect to be accepted as they are;
- country with a government that focused on solidarity and looking out for each other into a country with a government that emphasizes self-help and the ability of individuals to manage for themselves;
- nation focused on its own country into an EU member state, as a result of which national interests are often at odds with the common interests of the European community at large.

These developments—and many more can be mentioned—have led to the feeling that people are living in a fragmented country without social cohesion and without an identity of its own. The sense of community on the basis of a shared identity must be rekindled. The search for and the rediscovery of the “Dutch identity” confirm theories propagating that identity is a process of identification and disassociation, a process of inclusion and exclusion, a process in which the role of the other is equally important as the own role, since it is defined in relationship to the other.74 One thing is very clear: the “Dutch identity” is completely different from and incompatible with the “Islamic identity”. The ideal projected onto the past proves useful here: the “Dutch identity” is founded in the monoculture of olden days, with shared norms and values originating from a joint Judeo-Christian-humanist heritage. Opposite this “rediscovered” Dutch identity, that is the guarantee for social cohesion, “the” Islamic identity is projected as a massive, uniform, monolithic unity that is a threat to social cohesion. There is no attention for the great variety of currents, sub-currents, and counter-currents existing among Muslims in the Netherlands.

*The Alleged “Incompatibility” of Islam with Dutch Norms and Values*

People living in the Netherlands who hold on to Islam and their “Islamic identity” are denied by populist leaders and opinion makers the ability to agree with and abide by the norms and values accepted in the Netherlands. According to these populist leaders and opinion makers this inability is caused by the absolute loyalty to the *umma*, the Islamic religious community, and the blind obedience to the *shari’ah*, the religious law of Islam, which every Muslim is expected to follow to the letter. As a result, Muslims are regarded with distrust. They are suspected of failing to recognize the authority of the Dutch state and of being after power in the public domain.75 It is interesting that, in the past, Jews and Roman-Catholics were mistrusted for more or less the same reason: the primary loyalty of a Jew was alleged to be with the “People of Israel” or the “Jewish Nation”, and that of a Roman-Catholic with “Rome” (remember ultramontanism!).

In some circles, it is feared that the Muslims in the Netherlands are not only out to islamize the country but want to introduce the *shari’ah* as well. Democracy, the state under
the rule of law, human rights, fundamental principles like equality, etc., are feared to be at
risk. Women are again threatened with subordination. Dutch people who are not and do
not wish to become Muslims must fear that they will become second-class citizens in
their own country. Conflicts over norms and values may erode the unity of the traditional
(Judeo-Christian) system of norms and values, causing social cohesion to disintegrate
further.76

How do People React to the Increase in Religious Diversity?

The examples given on the basis of Islam show that a situation of religious diversity
can indeed lead to feelings of uncertainty, fear, and distrust, to a disintegration of
social cohesion and to the emergence of what Job Cohen, the former mayor of Amsterdam,
called “a society of ‘strangers’”. However, the question is whether only religious
diversity is to be blamed for this. Paraphrasing Cohen, it can be argued that this
society of strangers has not only come about as a result of religious diversity, but
mainly as a consequence of the disintegrating aspects of five important developments
in the past 40 years: individualization, democratization, privatization, globalization,
and secularization.77

Religious Diversity—as a Stimulus for Social Cohesion

Some Dutch people perceive religious diversity as a threat because it can be accompanied
by problems. In the past, the government and the state church as well as the rest of the
population have reacted to these problems with passive toleration. Economic motives
were at the basis of this attitude. The consequence of this policy proved to be a
“society in fragments”, but everyone living in the Netherlands was able to retain their
own religious identity. However, even merely passive toleration seems to be non-existent
in present-day Holland! It is true that the Netherlands is now a secular state and the
government needs to adopt an impartial attitude in matters of religion and philosophy
of life, but still some politicians want Muslims to give up their “Islamic identity”. The
restrictions concerning immigration, clothing, life style, etc., imposed on people from
“Muslim countries” are pervaded with the same spirit of intolerance.

The following three things seem to be deliberately ignored here:

(1) Muslims form part of the religious diversity of the Netherlands. As argued
in the previous section, this religious diversity is not the source of the prob-
lems in the Netherlands, at least not the only one. Expecting Muslims to
give up their “Islamic identity” and applying the above-mentioned restric-
tions make Muslims into scapegoats and injures their human dignity.

(2) Especially for migrants, a religious identity can be a source of consolation
and stability. Religious identity offers security, something to go by in the
strange, new environment, and might thus be helpful in adapting to
changed and changing circumstances.78 For Muslim migrants—and this
also applies to other immigrants—their religious (Islamic) identity
becomes more important and their religious commitment is greater in
their country of residence than it was in their country of origin.79

(3) Every person has more than one identity.80 It is not for outsiders to decide
what “Islamic identity” is and what a Muslim is capable of on the basis of
that “Islamic identity” or not. On the one hand, it is true that identity is
attributed and on the other hand, it is also acquired. It is possible for Muslims to adopt an “Islamic identity” that is completely compatible with the norms and values accepted in the Netherlands. Moreover, neither identity nor norms and values are a static and neat unity; they are dynamic and in constant flux.

It is a well-known fact that religious identity as an identity marker can strongly contribute to the social cohesion of a group. History has shown that, in a situation of religious diversity, appreciation of that religious diversity and tolerance of the religious disparity is a better stimulus for social cohesion between groups than coercion toward religious uniformity by making people give up their religious identity. Another historical fact is that the social cohesion in a community is most at risk if one group is convinced that it does not need the other groups.

Conclusion

The common identity of and therefore the social cohesion between the various religious communities and groups will benefit from the general acceptance of the principle of religious pluralism. Religious pluralism is an ideological, normative, and dynamic concept, which presupposes, accepts, and appreciates religious diversity. It is an ideological concept, because it presumes that the adherents of the different religions (interreligious pluralism) or denominations within the same religion (intra-religious pluralism) communicate with each other. This communication must lead to interaction with and mutual recognition as fellow citizens whose religion is legitimate. Religious pluralism implies engagement of believers. They must be aware of each other’s religious commitment and dedicate themselves to a mutual relationship that goes beyond relativism and purely passive toleration. In this way, religious pluralism can contribute to a peaceful society. It is normative, because is recognizes the adherents of all religions as equal citizens. It is true that it rejects the absolute truth claim of one particular religion, but it does not slip back into religious relativism. More than that, combating all forms of discrimination forms an integral part of religious pluralism which, in this way, stimulates everybody to become full members of society. After all, religious pluralism is dynamic because, being aimed at religious tolerance and freedom of religion, it stimulates peaceful co-existence in a situation of religious diversity. Thus, religious pluralism contributes to an environment with optimal conditions for democracy to flourish. Embracing religious pluralism as a fundamental principle, not merely paying lip service to it, but realising it in daily practice, religious diversity can contribute to enriching a society that transcends a living together in fragments.

NOTES

5. “What are the Impacts of Religious Diversity? Regions in Three European Countries Compared” is the title of a 2007 proposal that was submitted in the framework of the NORFACE programme “Re-emergence of Religion as a Social Force in Europe”?


8. For me, religion is an element of culture. A monoculture, in which there is only one religion, can be called a monoreligious culture or monoreligious society.


11. This question is also posed by Bas Heijne, Onredelijkheid [Unreasonableness], Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2007, p. 31.


18. According to J. van Eijnnatten and F. van Lieburg, Nederlandse religiegeschiedenis [A History of Religions in the Netherlands], op. cit., p. 16, there was a diversity of local, regional forms of religiosity before the eleventh century.


23. D.M. Swetschinski, “Tussen middeleeuwen en Gouden Eeuw, 1516–1621” [Between the Middle Ages and the Golden Age], in Geschiedenis van de Joden in Nederland [A History of the Jews in the Neth-
erlands], eds. J.C.H. Blom and R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld, Amsterdam: I. Schöffer, 1995, pp. 52–94, pp. 72–73. Swetschinski states that William of Orange “laboured for the so-called ‘religious peace’ (10 July 1578), … Article 2 of this agreement contained a general, modern sounding declaration of freedom of conscience”. It is interesting that this Article 2 is about “de diversiteit der Religien” (“the diversity of religions”).


29. See, for example, J.N. Bakhuizen van den Brink and W.F. Dankbaar, Handboek der kerkgeschiedenis [Handbook of the History of the Church]. Derde deel: Reformatie en Contra-Reformatie [Part three: Reformation and Contra-Reformation], The Hague: Bakker, 1967, p. 275. Bakhuizen van den Brink and Dankbaar mention a minority of 10%. The Catholics, by contrast, constituted more than 30% of the Dutch population: Herman Beliën and Monique van Hoogstraaten, De Nederlandse geschiedenis in een notendop [The Dutch History in a Nutshell], Amsterdam: Prometheus, 1998, p. 59. However, cf. J. van Eijnatten and F. van Lieburg, Nederlandse religiegeschiedenis [A History of Religions in the Netherlands], op. cit., p. 172, who argue that, in the provinces of Zeeland, Drenthe, Friesland, and Groningen around 1650, more than 80% of the population was Protestant; in Holland, Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel not more than between 45% and 55%. P. Nissen, “Proeftuin” [Experimental Garden], op. cit., p. 141 gives different percentages.


35. S. Schama, Embarrassment, op. cit., p. 72.

36. S.B. Schwartz, All Can Be Saved, op. cit., p. 5; D. Swetschinksi, “Tussen middeleeuwen en Gouden Eeuw” [Between the Middle Ages and the Golden Age], op. cit., p. 71.


42. “Pillarization” refers to the politico-denominational segregation of Dutch and Belgian societies. These societies were (and in some areas, still are) “vertically” divided into several segments or “pillars” (zuilen, singular: zuil) according to different religions or ideologies.


56. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Jaarrapport Integratie [Annual Report on Integration], Den Haag and Heerlen: OBT, 2010, p. 33. In the figures of the Statistics Netherlands report, there is a difference of 1000 people between the total estimate and the sum of its parts.


64. WRR=Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [Scientific Council for Government Policy], *Identificatie met Nederland* [Identification with the Netherlands], Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007, p. 29.


68. Islam and Muslims as a contemporary “Trojan Horse” seems to be a favourite theme with Geert Wilders. For example, he wrote a recommendation in the book *Modern Day Trojan Horse. Al-Hijra: The Islamic Doctrine of Immigration. Accepting Freedom or Imposing Islam?* by Sam Solomon and E. Al Maqdisi, Charlottesville: ANM Publishers, 2009 (I am indebted for this reference to my colleague Prof. Gerard Wiegers from the University of Amsterdam) and in various speeches, he identified Islam and Muslims with a Trojan horse; see, for example: <http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1610>, last accessed on 23 February, 2010.


71. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–34: “The foreigners who praise the Netherlands as a country of ultimate freedom and astonishing tolerance forget that the emphasis in the past decades has been almost exclusively been on personal freedom, the right of the individual to arrange his own life as he sees fit... Slowly but surely people are becoming aware of the fact that full personal freedom is not easy to reconcile with the idea of community.”


73. For example, Pim Fortuyn, *Tegen de islamisering van onze cultuur. Nederlandse identiteit als fundamente* [Against the Islamization of our Culture: Dutch Identity as Foundation], Utrecht: Bruna, 1997.


Peter van der Veer quotes Raymond Bardey Williams, *Religions of Immigrants from India and Pakistan. New Threads in the American Tapestry*, Cambridge 1988, p. 11: “Immigrants are religious—by all counts more religious than they were before they left home—because religion is one of the important identity markers that helps them preserve individual self-awareness and cohesion in a group... Apart from its
spiritual dimension, religion is a major force in social participation; it develops and at the same time sacralizes one’s self-identity, and thus the religious bond is one of the strongest social ties”.

80. See especially WRR, Identificatie [Identification], op. cit.


Religious Tolerance in Islam: Theories, Practices and Malaysia’s Experiences as a Multi Racial Society

Ammar Fadzil∗

Abstract
Religious tolerance in Islam can be looked at from two perspectives: firstly, the theory of religious tolerance particularly propounded in the Qur’an; secondly, the practices of religious tolerance exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and his Successors. Islam as a religion consists of certain principles that deal with its adherents and non-adherents. Some of these principles are very fundamental for Muslims, who raise a question as to what extent Islam allows its adherents to tolerate others in matters that affect these fundamental principles. This question is very much relevant to multi-racial and multi-religious Malaysia which has its experiences of harmony among its various religious communities, reducing tension within the society. This article discusses all these dimensions of religious tolerance with special reference to Malaysia, concluding that tolerance can be achieved only when there is a mutual understanding amongst the members of a society and an eagerness to respect each other’s rights.

Keywords: Religious Tolerance, The Qur’an, Multi-Religious, Malaysia, Harmony.

Abstrak

Kata Kunci: Toleransi Agama, Al-Quran, Berbilang Agama, Malaysia, Keharmonian.

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Introduction: Meaning of Tolerance

Tolerance has been widely accepted as a virtue related to human conduct. It deals with all aspects of human life: religious affairs, sexual practices, free expression and ethnic matters. According to the Oxford Dictionary, tolerance is the capacity to tolerate something in which the verb ‘to tolerate’ means to allow the existence or occurrence of something without authoritative interference. It also means to sustain and endure. It might involve dislike or disapproval of the thing tolerated. The word in Arabic which is widely used to denote tolerance is “tasâmuḥ”. The root form of this word has two connotations: generosity (jûd wa karam) and ease (tasâmuḥ). Thus the term is quite different from the English use of the word tolerance, “Where tolerance indicates a powerful, grudgingly bearing or putting up with others who are different, the Arabic term denotes generosity and ease from both sides on a reciprocal basis.”

According to Muzammil Siddiqi there are also other words that have similar meanings, such as “ḥilm” (forbearance) or “afw” (pardon, forgiveness) or “ṣafḥ” (overlooking, forbearance). Tolerance is an attitude of someone towards others which involves two parties. It could be tolerance of someone towards his own self or towards others, which is more common than the first. Tolerance happens in the situation in which conflicting disagreement occurs between two individuals or groups and when there is no way for each of them to abandon their own concept in order to accept the concept of the other group. As a concept, tolerance means “respect, acceptance and appreciation of the rich diversity of world’s cultures, forms of expression and ways of being human”. It is, as put by Barbara Herman, “offered as a reasonable strategy of response to a wide range of moral disagreements in circumstances of pluralism”. The core of the concept of toleration is “the refusal where one has the power do so,

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to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds objectionable.”

According to Charles Teague, “the most pervasive problem involves the relationship not in context of family or humanity but religious communities and the broader society in which they exist.”

Chaumont claims that “the primary fact of religious life in our time is its plurality. Race, ethos, history, and geography are some of the factors that pluralize human societies and set the stage for conflicts that may be violently acted out or sublimated in myriad ways. Among all possible factors, the diversity of religion is the one that creates the most subtle responses to the many differences that fragment the human communities of this world.”

With regard to this article, it will focus only on religious tolerance from Islamic perspective.

Islam and Tolerance

Tolerance is a basic principle of Islam. It does not mean a lack of principles, or lack of seriousness about one’s own principles. It does not mean that a Muslim should neglect his own obligations. Tolerance, according to Islam, does not mean that its members believe that all religions are the same. However, what are the areas of tolerance? The Islamic conception of tolerance is similar to what UNESCO conceives of it: tolerance is:

Consistent with respect for human rights, the practice of tolerance does not mean toleration of social injustice or the abandonment or weakening of one’s convictions. It means that one is free to adhere to one’s own convictions and accepts that others adhere to theirs. It means accepting the fact that human beings, naturally diverse in their appearance, situation, speech, behaviour and values, have

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8 Siddiqui, Muzammil, retrieved from www.crescentlife.com/spritually/tolerance islamic_perspective.htm
the right to live in peace and to be as they are. It also means that one’s views are not to be imposed on others.\(^9\)

Based on these principles, tolerance deals with four issues: the dignity of human beings, the basic equality of all human beings, universal rights and fundamental freedom of thought, conscience and belief. The basis for these elements is recognised in the Qur’an, exemplified in the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition and acknowledged in Islamic Law.\(^10\)

Currently, Islam has been misunderstood by some people as a religion which promotes violence and terrorism. This misunderstanding is essentially based not on the established principles in Islam, but on some examples presented by those who claim to be among Muslims. In regards to the legitimacy of the concepts and guidance, Islam as a faith must be understood from its main sources which are the Qur’an, the word of God, and the sunnah or the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. Right understanding of Islam is very significant to understand the issue of religious tolerance in Islam. Muslims are urged to adhere to their beliefs and actions according to these two sources and not to follow other than these otherwise they are considered misguided by the appeal of their own desires.

Among many things that everyone should know about Islam is its dimensions. Its goals are to secure and develop the human beings in five basic areas: the life, the family and children, the mind, the freedom of faith, and the rights of ownership in case of private or public property. In other words, these elements of Islam are belief (‘aqīdah) worship (‘ibādah), ethics (akhlāq) and laws (shari‘ah). As for the first two, they are not imposed on non-Muslims. This is consistent with the teachings of the Qur’an revealed in both its Meccan and Medinan chapters. The verses “And had your Lord willed those on earth would have believed, all of them together. So, will you then compel mankind until they become believers” (10:99) and “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256) do not tolerate non-Muslims grudgingly, but welcome them to live in a Muslim society.\(^11\) In parallel to this, Islam does not impose alms-giving (zakāt) and participation in jihād on non-
Muslims, though these two considerably contribute to the resources and the security of the state. The reason is that these two are considered as solely religious duties, hence confined only to Muslims. However, as for ethics, its principles are not different from those of other religions. All religions emphasise on virtues such as justice (‘adl), mercy (raḥmah), performance of good deeds (iḥṣān), love (maḥabbah), modesty (‘īffah), bravery (shajā‘ah), generosity (sakhā‘) cooperation (al-ta‘āwun) and disapprove of vices such as adultery (zinā‘), injustice (zulm), deceit (ghishsh), consumption of orphan’s property (akl māl al-yatīm) and harshness to the weak (al-qaswah ʿalā al-ḍu‘afā‘). As for the legal system of Islam, only certain aspects are applicable to non-Muslims in order to organise and harmonise the fabric and structure of a society. However, regarding family laws, non-Muslims are free to choose either to follow Islamic law or to adhere to the teachings of their own religion. Thus non-Muslims have a right to have their own civil court pertaining to their religious matters.\(^\text{12}\)

After having considered these ideas, I would like to elaborate on Islamic tolerance of other religions. In discussing this, the article would be confined to the issue of Islamic tolerance of non-Muslims in an Islamic state.

To begin with, I would like to refer to the question, why non-Muslim minorities living in the Islamic states have to follow the constitution which is based on the Islam? Does this not contradict human freedom, or deny the freedom of religion to others which is upheld in Islam? The answer to this is that living in the Islamic state but ignoring its right to implement its teachings and fundamental principles for the sake of minorities is in fact to oppose the principle of freedom for Muslims who must adhere to their religious teachings when they are the majority in the state. This concept of respecting the rights of the majority by the minorities is accepted even by democracy. However, this right should be followed with the condition that the Islamic state should not be unjust towards the rights of non-Muslim minorities.\(^\text{13}\)

Islam divides non-Muslims into: firstly, those who show antagonism against Muslims, and secondly, those who show


\(^{13}\) Ibid.
peacefulness towards Muslims. With regards the first, Islam has laid down certain criteria on how to deal with them and this is discussed extensively in the chapter of jihād and siyar of Islamic jurisprudential works. Pertaining to the second group of those who live in the Islamic state, Islam regards them as its citizens and satisfies their rights. The classical term for this group was ahl-dhimmah, those who are under protection. Therefore, non-Muslims are not second class citizens, thus in our contemporary situation, even though this term does not intend to imply derogation (dhamma or tanqīs), the use of this term could be altered to non-Muslims in the Islamic state.\(^\textit{14}\)

Human freedom and equality are fundamental in any democracy. Islam regards that human beings are of equal in status. The Qur’an reiterates that all men, though they are divided into nations and races, share certain characteristics. These identities are origin, responsibility, utilization of the resources and destiny.\(^\textit{15}\) Human beings are equal as they descend from the same father, i.e. Adam. What differentiates one man from the other is his fear of God and good deeds. Islam considers “human dignity” fundamental for its ideology, or in other words, its principles for its way of life. Verse 17:71 of the Qur’an has shown that all the children of Adam have been granted “dignity” by their Creator without any difference, and this human dignity has to be secured and maintained by His guidance and laws by the Muslim teachers and authorities, and should never be subject to compulsion. According to Fatḥī Uthmān\(^\textit{16}\), “the human dignity is comprehensive; it encompasses all the human dimensions: spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical.”

Apart from realizing that all human beings are the same in origin which constitutes their dignity, what helps Muslims to be tolerant of non-Muslims is that they are taught to realise that differences in religions happen because of the will of God who confers on man freedom to choose his own belief. In verses 18:29 and 10: 99 of the Qur’an Muslims are asked to be just and to have

\[\textit{14}\] Ibid.


good ethics and fight against injustice even if it is against non-Muslims.17

God has created people to be different and they will always remain different not only in their appearance, but also in their beliefs and it is up to each person whether to become a believer or not.18 Thus, Islamic tolerance of non-Muslims in matters of religion is that non-Muslims are allowed to perform their beliefs and religious duties, and live according to their customs, even if they are forbidden in Islam. If Jews believe that they should not work on Saturday, they should be allowed to do so because it is related to their religion. Similarly for Christians, if they believe that they should go to church on Sunday they cannot be prevented from doing so. Hence, the Islamic state should be tolerant of non-Muslims in matters regarding their religion even though they contravene with Islamic beliefs. Even though the Islamic state within its power is able to prevent non-Muslims from doing certain things in order to be in line with the ideology of the state, it still allows them to enjoy some of the things which are allowable in their religions as long as this does not harm the state and the society. Thus, even though the Christians are not ordered to drink wine and eat pork, they are not prevented from doing so because this is allowed in their religion.19

This toleration of non-Muslims is also seen in their right to bring up their children on their own faith. The right connected with the actual exercise of ritual worship implies the right to educate, to assemble and to organize activities. The right to educate their children concerns religion only, not the civil or public life of the Islamic state as a whole, of which they are members. Hence the Islamic state should grant non-Muslim children the right to have lessons on their religion at school, but not the right to run their own schools, unless such schools conform in terms of the curriculum and general spirit to the public schools. This is because the demands of national integration do not allow any system to

18 See: Abdel Haleem, op. cit., p. 75
19 See: Al-Qaraḍāwī, op. cit., p. 33; See: Abdel Haleem, op. cit., p. 75.
contribute to the fragmentation or dissolution of the unity of the state.  

Islam has shown its tolerance towards non-Muslims within the scope which does not require interference from the state. It is up to the Muslim societies to show their tolerance of the adherents of different religions. The Qur’an insists that a son should respect his parents who are not Muslims. The verse 31:15 of the Qur’an praises those who feed the prisoners including the non-Muslim prisoners (76:8) and allows Muslims to spend their money even on non-Muslims (2:272).

The constitution of Medina during the time of the Prophet Muhammad encouraged cooperation and solidarity in a plural society consisting of Muslims, Christians, Jews and others. Though the constitution was violated at a certain point by the Jewish treachery, it was nonetheless a remarkable effort to put into actual practice the universal ideas of the Qur’an. The Prophet forged a treaty with the Christian monks of Najrân. The people of Najrân were given pledge that their religious rights will be protected and the sanctity of their monastery will be preserved provided they too showed respect for Islam and the emerging Muslim community. Ḥāfez bint Abī Bakr was ordered by the Prophet to maintain good relations with her mother who was a disbeliever. The Prophet used to visit the people of the Book, welcomed their visits, visited the sick among them, received presents from them and gave assistance to them. The people of the Book on some occasions were allowed to perform their prayer in the Muslim mosque in Medina. During the time of the Caliph ʿUmar, he maintained the same attitude. On one occasion, it is reported that he gave the order that one Jewish family would receive a permanent charity benefit from the public treasury (bayt al-māl). Even though he was hit to death by a non-Muslim, he gave a will to his successor to do good to non-Muslims in the Islamic state.  

ʿUmar also showed how tolerant he was through his treatment of the Jews and Christians of Byzantium after the

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conquest of its territories. The text of the treaty of the surrender of Jerusalem was written by Mu’āwiyah and was signed by Sophronious, the Patriarch of the city, on behalf of the Christians. Among many things the treaty guaranteed, the safety of person and property, the right to practise their non-Islamic religions, and to preserve whatever public institutions they had such as churches and schools which were usually attached to the churches.  

In Spain where Muslims ruled from 711 until the fall of Granada in 1492, the three Abrahamic communities – Christians, Jews and Muslims – lived in great harmony for long periods of time. Andalusia, as an Islamic Spain, was known “an exemplar of religious tolerance. It also produced a flowering of science, arts and letters.” Contrary to this was what happened when the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella seized Granada from the Muslims in 1492. Thousands of Jews and Muslims were either killed or expelled in waves because of religious persecution. “Like Spain, Muslim rule in India was also tolerant and compassionate. Aurangzeb was very accommodative towards non-Muslims in his Empire. He employed the largest number of Hindus in the highest echelons of administrative and military service.”

Adam Smith states that the Islamic states did not try to enforce Islamic religious identity onto other religions; rather they opted to be tolerant to the extent that some Muslim Caliphs went to the festivals of the non-Muslims and non-Muslims were allowed to construct their places of worship. It is reported that al-Layth ibn Sa’d and ‘Abd Allah ibn Luhay’ah, the second century Hijri Muslim scholars, viewed the construction of churches as part of the state’s development, arguing that some of the churches in Egypt were constructed during the time of the Companions of the Prophet and their Successor.

This attitude of Muslim leaders towards non-Muslims who lived in their society was so outstanding that Muslim societies

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22 See: Fārūqī, op. cit., pp. 56-60.
24 Chandra Muzaffar, op. cit., pp. 140-1.
came to be regarded as outstanding models of inter-ethnic, inter-religious harmony and good relations within the historical surroundings in which they operated; in the words of Seyyid Hosein Nasr,

In the case of Islam it is particularly interesting that it is the only religion before the modern era which had confronted every major religious tradition of mankind with the exception of Shintoism and the American Indian religions. It had encountered Christianity and Judaism in its birthplace, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Mithraism in Persia, Shamanism, which in its Asian form is a sister religion of Shintoism and the North American religions, in central Asia and Mongolia, the native African religions south of the Sahara and, of course, Hinduism and Buddhism in India and eastern Persia.  

Before taking up the next discussion, it is important to stress here that there is a limit to the concept of tolerance. Muslims’ tolerance of non-Muslims is bound with their Islamic teachings. They are under the obligation not to dilute their religious teachings in keeping with whatever practices or campaigns appear in the society around them. They are under a religious obligation to cooperate with other people who work to maintain what is good but not to do what is wrong as stated in the Qur’an, “Aid one another in what is good and pious, do not aid one another in what is sinful and aggression.” (5:2)

Malaysia and its Experiences in Dealing with Multi Religious Society

It is vital to have a clear perception of Malaysian history to understand the issue of tolerance in Malaysia. Located on the south-eastern edge of the Asian continent, Malaysia, formerly known as Malaya, comprises a peninsula and two states (Sarawak and Sabah) on the island of Borneo in the South China Sea. Malaysia is ethnically diverse, with a population of about twenty

27 See: Abdel Haleem, op. cit., P. 80.
28 The study on the practice of religious tolerance in Malaysia focuses on certain issues since its independence day until 1990.
million on the peninsula comprising approximately 55 percent Malays, 34 percent Chinese, 10 percent Indian, and less than one percent of other ethnic groups including aborigines (orang asli), Europeans, and Eurasians. The religious demography of the peninsula is also complex: based on 1980 data about 56 percent are Muslims, 32 percent Buddhist-Taoists, 8 percent Hindus, 2 percent Christians, and 2 percent Sikhs’ Baha’is, animists, atheists, or religiously anonymous.29

The Malays were recognized as the earliest community who settled in Malaysia. Before the coming of Islam, the majority of them believed in Hinduism and Buddhism. According to some, Islam arrived in Southeast Asia in the 13th century through traders from the Arab and India who came to Malaysia in the next century. Islam was established in Melaka in the 15th century. These traders successfully managed to convert the local people and the rulers to Islam. The Malay rulers who adhered to Hinduism turned to accept Islam and gradually devised an initiative to amend some of the local laws to be in line with Islamic law.

As for the Chinese, their mass settlement in Malaya took place after 1800 under the support of British administration. British commercial development, particularly in tin mining, speeded up the migration of Chinese entrepreneurs and labourers.30 As regard to the introduction of Buddhism to the Malay Peninsula during the first five centuries C.E., it is closely linked to Indianization and early state formation. From the late twelfth century through fifteenth century, Islam spread steadily through the Indonesian archipelago, and by the end of the fifteenth century the Malay rulers of the Indianized maritime trading states had all converted to Islam. Buddhism reappeared on the peninsula with the advent of immigrant Chinese labourers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.31

As for the Indians, “their contacts with the Malaysian peninsula can be traced to pre-Christian times, but trading and cultural activities increased during the early centuries of the

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31 Ibid, p. 58.
Christian era. It was during this period that Hindu ideas were immersed into the cultural structure of the Malay kingdoms. Hinduism in contemporary Malaysia is practised mainly within the Indian community. From the latter half of the nineteenth century until the eve of World War II, the modern Indian migrant to Malaya was chiefly an unlettered labourer, the majority originated from South India, coming into the country to work for a pittance on some plantation or government project. Between 1840 and 1940 about four million Indians arrived in colonial Malaya; they were mostly low-caste Tamils and untouchables."

According to Muzaffar, the vast demographic transformation which colonialism created did not in any way revolutionise the nature of these polities. For the Chinese and Indian immigrants of the early decades of the last century remained on the outside of these societies: they were part of the economic enclaves created by colonial rule. Neither the colonial administration nor the Malay rulers regarded them as citizens. It was only after the Second World War that the situation began to change dramatically. A lot of Chinese and Indians were conferred citizenship rights on a very liberal basis. Their children were even bestowed automatic citizenship in the 1957 Constitution of independent Malaya which at least reduced the tension among them about their status.

Their incorporation into the Malayan and later Malaysian state transformed the very character of the society. It was no longer an exclusive Malay community. Malaysia had become a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. This pluralism could be a reason for Malaysia to gain its secular Constitution although Islam is the official religion of the Federation. In the process, the Malays who once set up the nation had become a community among communities. Nevertheless, the Malays are still the most important ethnic group in Malaysia and Islam, and the Malay’s ethnicity is vital for the Malays’ identity. In term of language used in educational system at school level, the

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32 Ibid. p. 58.
33 See: Muzaffar, op. cit., P. 122.
34 For reasons why Malaysia was made a secular state, see: Hashimah,op. cit. pp. 33-4.
35 See: Muzaffar, op. cit., P. 123.
36 For reasons why Malaysia was made a secular state, see: Hashimah,op. cit., pp. 33-4.
Malay language has been accepted as the national and official language of the land. However, vernacular primary school education in Chinese and Tamil has been allowed as an optional medium. Although this school system is for these two races, it accepts the enrolment of the Malay students. All religious ethnic activities were assisted financially and morally by the government. Hock describes the way of independence as:

a constitution that would satisfy the British that the rights and privileges of all the communities were safeguarded. The essence of bargains was the acceptance by the non-Malay leaders that the Malays, as the indigenous race, were entitled to political dominance, while in return the Malay leaders recognized that the socio-economic pursuits of non-Malays should not be infringed upon.  

It is interesting to note that religion was adopted as a basis for the Malay ethnic boundary which, according to the constitution, the Malay is one “who professes the Muslim religion, habitually conforms to Malay customs”. This, according to Hashimah, “was merely to give a legal recognition to the position that existed before, that is, to equate Malay with Muslim”.  

The government took various steps to accommodate the needs of the new multi-racial religious society. Apart from building mosques for Muslims, the government established the Islamic Centre under the patronage of the national mosque which was officially opened in 1965 to strengthen the government’s role pertaining to the administration of Islam in Malaysia. The Malaysian Pilgrims Management and Funds Board (MPMF) was formally established in 1962 as a body for centralizing Muslims’ savings for the pilgrimage. Another institution, the Malaysian Islamic Economic Development Foundation was established by the prime minister in 1976 as a trust to collect donations, which are invested largely in properties, shares, and securities. Among these multi-million-dollar institutions was the Islamic Bank launched in

37 Oo Yu Hock, 1990, p. 28.
38 Hashimah, op. cit., p. 119.
39 Lee, op. cit. p. 43.
1983 and later has emerged as a dynamic banking alternative in the commercial world. The NEP (New Economic Policy) which was established in 1970 generally created a wide range of opportunities for different sections of the Malay community. It improved socio-economic ethnic imbalances in the economy, thereby enhancing Malay consciousness of greater economic control through a system of special privileges, and later became “an economic and political context that accelerated the rationalization of Islam.”

Non-Muslims in Malaysia are given rights to exercise their religious obligations. As for Buddhism, besides the construction of the temples, a great number of Buddhist associations were established such as the Penang Buddhist Association (PBA) in 1925, Buddhist Missionary Society (BMS) in 1961, Malaysian Buddhist Meditation Center (MBMC) in 1968, Malaysian Buddhist Institute and Young Buddhist Association of Malaysia (YBAM) in 1970.

Hindus in Malaysia are free to celebrate their religious festivals. More than one hundred Hindu temples were established in Malaysia. The celebration of Thaipusam is done in Kuala Lumpur in which its followers will march to Batu Caves. They also established several movements and centres for their religious activities. The Malayan Tamil Pannai (MTP) was set up in 1948 in Kuala Lumpur and Tiruvarul Tava Nerik Manram (TTNM) in 1962.

As for other religions, for example Christianity, “unlike Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism, which have clear-cut links with specific ethnic identities, the Christian identity in Malaysia lacks any explicit connection with particular ethnic groups. Christianity in Malaysia cuts across the boundaries separating the Chinese, Indian, Eurasians, aborigines” and lately a few Malays. Nevertheless, thousands of churches have been constructed throughout Malaysia.

As for the administration of religious activities in Malaysia, it is as Lee states:


40 Lee, op. cit. p. 54.
41 Lee, op. cit. p. 63..
43 Lee, op. cit. p. 114.
44 Lee, op. cit. p. 38.
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non-Islamic religions. Constitutionally, federal and state control of Islamic legislation and administration is separate. Each of the eleven states of the peninsula has its own legal enactment pertaining to the administration of Islamic law (shari'ah). The provisions of these enactments authorize the traditional ruler of each state to assign members of the religious council (majlis agama), the Islamic judiciary, functionaries of mosques, and registrars of Muslim marriages and divorce and to direct the Islamic judiciary on matters concerning legal procedures without contravening the substantive law of shari'ah. The federal parliament has no legal jurisdiction over Islamic legislation and administration in the individual states except in the Federal Territory. Islamic bureaucracy at the federal level is controlled by a religious council through the offices of the Federal Territory Islamic Affairs Department. A national council for Islamic affairs is also located within the Federal Territory. This council, headed by the prime minister, was formed in 1968 to coordinate the administration of Islam through the participation of representatives from each state, although some states, such as Johor, Kedah, and Pahang, are not involved. The national council cannot interfere directly with Islamic matters at the state level, but it can in its advisory capacity exercise limited influence on their course of development.45

In addition to this, each region in Malaysia has a religious department which controls the administration of the affairs and has its own ruling council.46

In dealing with the non-Muslims, the government faces a different set of problems. Islamic religious department also implemented a number of specific laws to control the Muslim moral such as khalwat (close proximity). Although it is limited to Muslims but has raised concerns among non-Muslims whether they

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45 Lee, op. cit. p. 39.
46 Lee, op. cit. p. 137.
Ammar Fadzil

will be affected by the law since an attempt was done in 1989 by the state of Selangor to amend its Islamic laws to include prosecution of non-Muslim khalwat lawbreakers.47

Conclusion

Islam advocates tolerance. It provides not only theories, but comes with exemplified models. Certain intolerant acts performed by some individual Muslims cannot be the basis to deny the policy of tolerance that exists in Islam. Acts of intolerance could be based on a misunderstanding of Islamic teachings. However, in promoting tolerance, Islam has its limits within the boundaries set by the sharī‘ah. Even though Islam cannot accept things that contradict its fundamental beliefs and teachings, it has its own solution in dealing with situations and all types of encounters. Regarding the situation in Malaysia, even though the government has tried its best to accommodate the needs of the multi-religious society, there is still a room for improvement.

47 Lee, op. cit. p. 137.
Changing Values in Turkey: Religiosity and Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

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Changing Values in Turkey: Religiosity and Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

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ABSTRACT Using data from the World Values Surveys, this study examines changing values in Turkey and shows that rising religiosity and intolerance can be traced back to 1995 and have become more visible during the AKP’s rule. Moreover, Turks are found to be the most religious of all the societies compared in the study. Findings suggest that Turkish voters are likely to continue being attracted to political parties like the AKP in the future, which would have important implications for Turkey’s relations with its traditional friends in the West.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 1990s, significant socioeconomic and political developments have taken place in Turkey. One of these developments is the emergence of Islamist-oriented political parties as a credible choice for voters despite repeated attempts by the military and its laicist partners to keep the Islamists out of power. The rise of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and its closure by the Constitutional Court, followed by the similar fate of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) exemplify this conflict. With the split of the FP into two alternative political parties, the conservative Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) and the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkish electoral politics entered a new chapter. The AKP managed to attract many supporters from the traditional center-right as well as the conservative elements of the traditional right of the political spectrum and swept into power in the 2002 national elections. The party has managed to fend off challenges from the Turkish military and continued to repeat its electoral victories, albeit with sizeable decline in its voter support base, in 2007 and in 2009. How is it possible that Turkish voters gave such overwhelming support to an Islamist-based political party? What changes in the social values of the public made it possible for the AKP to maintain its grip on political power? Could it be that the policies of AKP since 2002 have served as a catalyst to move the Turkish public toward conservative social values that might have even greater implications for
Turkey’s domestic development and foreign relations in the future? These questions are not easy to answer. This study attempts to provide some insight into these developments by examining rising conservatism, measured in the form of religiosity, and its impact on tolerance and democratic values based on data obtained from the World Values Survey (WVS). The analysis attempts to present this in the context of comparison with other countries that are members of the European Union, as Turkey represents the most challenging case of candidacy in EU history.

**Conservatism, Religiosity, and Tolerance as Changing Social Values**

Several significant surveys have shown that religiosity is a sound measure of conservatism in Turkey. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu in their 2009 study and Toprak et al. in 2008, provide an in-depth overview of the causes and consequences of conservatism. The latter study found that growing societal cleavages in Turkey are reflected by women wearing the headscarf in order to pressure secularists to conform to religious Islamic practice, for example. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu carried out complex statistical analysis and found that conservatism in Turkey is a product of a different set of complex and multidimensional factors that can be explained by psychology and social psychology. They found that while men are more authoritarian, intolerant, and old-fashioned (dimension-1 of conservatism), women tend to be more state interventionist, religiously liberal, and supportive of the status quo (dimension-2). They also found that partisan preferences had a limited significance on conservatism, but the left-right ideological scale appeared to be significant, showing that as people moved to the ideological right they became more authoritarian, old-fashioned, and religious—though not any more state interventionist—than others. Moreover, their findings demonstrate that happier people seem to be more conservative and religious. Probably the most significant finding of this part of their study is captured in the following statement:

> Among the different measures of conservatism, the first dimension […] captures authoritarianism, old fashioned and intolerant tendencies. These tendencies seem to increase as anomie, political inefficacy, lack of self-esteem, intolerance, and interpersonal trust and happiness increase. As Turkish society plunges into a mind-set defined by these indicators, it is likely that the resulting political regime will be faced with demands and pressures to maintain an oppressive authoritarian regime that looks to the past rather than the future.

Given Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU), it is important to compare these findings with trends observed in other EU countries. For the EU, increase in tolerance is indeed a declared goal—one that has taken a front-row seat on the EU’s agenda following troubling riots and clashes across several member states in the 2000s. The specific relationship between religion and intolerance has been widely proposed in studies of right-wing authoritarianism, in popular discourse, and because religion is one of the main markers of ethnic identity for many cultures. A
number of studies have explored potential relationships in religiosity and values of tolerance in Europe, observing and testing a variety of explanatory hypotheses.

One relevant study on tolerance in Europe tested the effect of religiosity on anti-Semitism to see if anti-Semitism in the Netherlands was a product of the exclusionary doctrine of Christianity. The authors found that there was a positive, albeit somewhat weak relationship, between Christian religiosity and religious anti-Semitism. However, the authors found that Catholic religiosity had a link to secular anti-Semitism, while members of Protestant sects did not differ from average Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful secular predictor of effect on anti-Semitism; they found that a variable on perspective, “narrow perspective,” accounted for 52 percent of the relationship between Christian beliefs and religious anti-Semitism, while religious beliefs accounted for less than 15 percent. They also found that secular anti-Semitism was also largely a product of a narrow perspective, with 70 percent of the variance in secular anti-Semitism accounted for by the perspective variable versus 13 percent associated with Christian religion. The implication of their analysis is that the relationship between Christian religiosity and anti-Semitism was driven by narrow perspective. While the authors documented a positive and significant relationship between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism, they established that the relationship was more of narrow perspective mediated slightly by values of a Christian religiosity. Their analysis notes the relationship among fundamentalist religiosity, authoritarian personalities, and a narrow worldview that contributes to antipathy for groups outside the mainstream.

Another study conducted on the Netherlands hypothesized that religiosity should have a nonlinear negative effect on intolerance. The authors theorized that those who “live” their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only those who claim an affiliation without being a core believer or adhering to a particularistic faith will show positive correlations with intolerance. The authors conducted a multilevel regression analysis of types of religious beliefs and behaviors as well as of Protestant and Catholic sects of Christianity. Their conclusions were that Christians tended to show more support for prejudice than non-religious people or persons of other faiths. However, they found a strong indication that the kind of religiosity practiced mattered. They found negative relationships between intolerance, both doctrinal beliefs, and importance of religion in respondents’ lives, but also found a positive relationship between intolerance and religious particularism. The results seem to support a common-sense notion that those who practice a religion that values tolerance will be more tolerant but those who adhere to an exclusionary interpretation of their faith will tend to be less tolerant. The study shows the importance of using a multidimensional factor for religiosity, as the type of religiosity and the manner in which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with intolerance. The authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of European countries are members of outlying groups and therefore unlikely to express
intolerance towards the minority group to which they belong, a problem that persists in this study too. Minority religious respondents seemed to not answer the religious denomination questions on the survey. Finally, and significantly to this study, the authors found that the religious heterogeneity of the countries in the study had a strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic conditions. Questions about ethnic bias may be more salient to those with out-groups toward whom misanthropic feelings can be directed.

These findings of the multilevel study by Scheepers et al. partially refute and partially support earlier studies on religiosity and bias in Europe. A 1990 study of racism and religiosity in Holland found that there was some association with prejudice among casual church members and those who attended frequently, but that the trend reversed among individuals who participated in church functions and associations. They also found that the positive association between nationalism and religious participation almost completely suppressed the relationship between faith and bias. A 1999 follow-up study that extended the investigation to cross-state comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful effect on bias, and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious to that of nationalism and prejudice. Finally, Maurice Gesthuizen, Tom van der Meer, and Peer Scheepers completed a test of Putnam’s thesis that ethnic diversity and social capital appear to have an inverse relationship, with tentative findings that the presence of a social safety net in wealthy European countries ameliorates much of the “economic threat” argument for the existence of links between income and intolerance.

Patterns of Intolerance

Studies for the European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism by Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepers were able to make a detailed examination of ethnic exclusionism. They found a variety of concepts that were embedded in notions of intolerance and ethnic exclusionism. The study focused on attitudes towards migration, but the hypothesis suggested in their analysis is interesting to a broader discussion of tolerance. The summary report discussed the impact of national GDP and competition over resources may have on the level of ethnic exclusionism. Subsequent analysis of the European Social Survey 2002-2003 found the country-level characteristics GDP and unemployment rates had a significant relationship to resistance to ethnic diversity. However, their hypothesis regarding competition for resources was reversed at the national level. Higher national unemployment was associated with lower resistance to diversity rather than higher. Perhaps the salience of the issue was lower as workers did not tend to flock to other low-unemployment countries.

In order to investigate the change in values as a function of religiosity, this study uses survey data over the several waves of the WVS and constructs a series of indicators using responses from the surveys as observed indicators. The changes in post-materialist values, tolerance, and religiosity are examined individually then as part of regression models to try and isolate the partial correlations between religion
and intolerance while controlling for individual demographics and changes between waves 1 and 5 of the WVS.

**WVS Data and Cross-National Comparison of Religiosity in Turkey**

The World Values Surveys (1990-2005) and its predecessor, the European Values Survey (1981), provide a comprehensive measurement of all major areas of human life, from religion to politics to economic and social life. This survey originated from the work of Ronald Inglehart at the University of Michigan and is conducted every five years by leading social scientists around the world and is the most comprehensive study of its kind. The project director for Turkey is Yılmaz Esmer of Bahçeşehir University in Istanbul. The basic premise of the WVS is that socio-economic development results in profound changes in the basic human values that shape politics. With respect to this study’s focus on religiosity and social values change, Inglehart-Welzel’s values map is important. This map reflects the fact that a large number of basic values are closely correlated; they can be depicted in just two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. These include the traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression values. Together, these two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of cross-national variance.

The traditional/secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast among societies over religion. More traditional societies place greater emphasis on religion while more secular-rational ones do not. Inglehart and Welzel also found that a wide range of values are associated with this dimension. For example, societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They tend to have high levels of national pride coupled with a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences in all of these areas.

The second key dimension of cross-cultural variation is linked with the transition from industrial society to post-industrial societies, which bring a polarization between survival and self-expression values. Their basic argument maintains that unprecedented accumulation of wealth in advanced societies over the course of the past generation resulted in a greater portion of the population taking survival for granted. These people shifted their priorities from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression, and quality of life. Inglehart and Baker found that people’s values shifted from traditional toward secular-rational in almost all industrial societies. Furthermore, reflecting that modernization is not a linear phenomenon, they found that there is a shift from survival values to self-expression values when these societies move from industrial to post-industrial economies.

Inglehart’s research shows that a key component of this transformation is the polarization between materialist and post-materialist values. That is, a cultural shift is occurring among generations who have grown up in an environment where survival is taken for granted. In these cases, self-expression values place higher
priority on such issues as environmental protection, diversity, and tolerance (including towards gays and foreigners), teaching such values to children, increased interpersonal trust, and increased demand by people for participation in economic and political decision-making.

Given the significance of these findings, the analysis of Turkish society begins by expanding the Inglehart-Welzel map from the last two waves to all waves of WVS. The resulting map (Figure 1) displays a vivid picture of trends along the survival/self-expression and traditional/secular-rational values for Turkey and some EU member states.

The values map shows a general trend in the selected EU countries moving from survival to self-expression and traditional to secular-rational values since 1981. Spain, which joined the EU in 1986, clearly shows movement in these directions over a 25–year period. The Dutch and French are even further down the self-expression
Changing Values in Turkey

15

and secular-rational values line. The British and Italian data show progress along self-expression values while holding fairly steady in the mid-range of traditional/secular-rational values. The Czechs, who represent one of the newest members of the EU, display strong secular-rational values with a mix of survival/self-expression values. The two countries that display strong traditional values and strong survival values are Poland and Turkey. In both countries secular values are not found even though Poland was ruled under a communist system for four decades and Turkey has had a laicist political system since 1923. Furthermore, in both cases values associated with economic and physical survival dominate. Results from Turkey confirm Kalacioğlu’s findings on voter realignment in Turkey since 1994 that indicate that the entire electorate shifted to the right of the ideological spectrum. This observation is further confirmed by data obtained from the WVS across five waves, shown in Figure 2.

Religious Practices and Attitudes in Turkey

Religiosity is measured through different questions in the WVS. Figure 3 shows results for Turkey over five WVS waves. An analysis of variance indicates that there are significant ($p<.05$) changes in means over the waves for each of the values;
except for “confidence in mosque,” there is no clear pattern in institutional (confidence or attendance) or personal religious indicators. The 1990 wave indicates lower aggregate religiosity in Turkey; the 1995 wave indicates a return to more religiousness, with an anomalous increase in mosque attendance by women. Finally, there is a mixture of changes in the latest two waves indicating a decreased intensity of religious adherence.

In light of the mixed nature of the religiosity indicators and the unique interactions of religion, gender, and politics in Turkey, religiosity factors were derived from the indicators illustrated above. Figure 4 illustrates the shifts in mean values of religiosity over the various waves of the WVS. Results illustrate a profound shift
towards more intense religiosity in 1995 (measured by importance of God) and a drift back towards less religiosity by 2007 showing similar association with the attendance and gender measure.

Religiosity Factors for Turkey

Often, studies have used attendance at religious services as an instrumental variable for religiosity. As recognized in more recent studies, this practice is generally flawed.\textsuperscript{20} It is particularly flawed for societies such as Turkey’s, which have a complicated mix of religious beliefs and practices as well as traditional Islam’s restriction against women’s participation in public religious life. In light of the complex nature of religiosity in Turkey, a factor analysis was conducted to reduce a variety of features of religiosity into a manageable number of variables. Using principal axis factoring (which is more robust to challenges of normality than maximum-likelihood) and a promax rotation (which allows for correlated factors), an exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the questions provided in the WVS that touch on religious practices and importance. Figure 5 provides results of the factor analysis.

As these results demonstrate, the derivation of two factors for religiosity is particularly important for Turkey, as the difference in beliefs and practice is apparent. Turkish religiosity, as that of many Muslim cultures, is bifurcated around issues of gender and practice. The unique variances labeled on the lines connecting the latent variables with observed responses show factor loadings. This shows the direction and size of unique correlations to the underlying concept. The double-headed arrow linking both factors illustrates the 0.24 correlation between the factors.

Figure 5. Pattern Loadings of Religiosity Factors.
In order to allow ease of interpretation and to adjust for skewed results reflecting the high average level of religious belief in Turkey, the variables for questions asking respondents about the importance of God and the importance of religion in their lives were transformed by taking the natural log of the scores and aligning the scales to reflect low scores with intense religiousness. To account for the dramatic effect of gender on attendance, two separate observed variables for attendance were used: one for male attendance and another for female; in all waves except 1995 female attendance is inversely related to other indicators of religious activity and belief.

The factor analysis function in SPSS (Statistics Package for Social Sciences) derives new compound variables from the pattern loadings shown in Figure 5 above. Table 1 provides regression coefficients for religiosity. The latent factors are labeled as Import of God (importance of God) and Attend-Gender (attendance and gender) religiosity.

As one can see from both the pattern loadings in Figure 5 and the factor regression coefficients in Table 1, both factors are centered at 0 with a scale from -2 being perfectly religious to +2 being an indicator of a non-religious person. The second factor, attendance and gender, allows for the inclusion of traditional women who are both religious and do not attend mosque more frequently than on religious holidays. The male scores for the attendance and gender factor are very closely correlated with the importance of God indicator; the female scores are less closely aligned with those scores as female attendance is less closely aligned with religiosity than it is with men.

To provide further insight into the changing relationship between the factors and other indicators of religiosity the correlations of the two factors with the other religion questions over the past four waves of the WVS are given in Figures 6 and 7. Results in Figure 6 show the diminishing relationship between the gender and attendance-based religiosity and other indicators of religious belief. By the 2005 wave, the confidence in churches factor (religious leadership, Diyanet İşleri Başkanları) had all but faded in any relationship with the factor derived from institutional attendance controlled for gender. In contrast, the table below shows the persistent relationship between the importance of God factor and the various indicators from which it is composed. All the correlations are significant ($p<.05$) across all the waves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor Regression Coefficients (Bartlett Regression)</th>
<th>Import of God</th>
<th>Attend-Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Important child qualities: religious faith</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>−0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence: Churches</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>−0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln (relig imp)</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln (god_imp_)</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attend_by male</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attend_by female</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>−0.434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures 6 and 7 show the changes in the relationship between religion indicators and the attendance-driven factor, while the relationship between the importance of God factor and its constituents are consistent in its correlations but varied in its magnitude.

Next, the relationship between religiosity and traditional-secular and survival/self-expression values was examined, given how Turkey stood apart from other EU countries on these scales, shown in Figure 1 above. Figures 8 and 9 provide the results of these correlations.

**Values**

Religious beliefs and practices are part of the observed variables used by Welzel and Inglehart to estimate their factors for traditional-secular values. What is interesting in Figure 8 is the diminished relationship between attendance-based religiosity and
the traditional-secular measure. The correlations are positive because both the Inglehart-Welzel measure of traditional-secular and this study’s measure of religiosity scale the measures in the following way: Religious/Traditional $\leftrightarrow$ Nonreligious/Secular. The positive correlation means that people who are more religious are more likely to also be traditional.

Results in Figure 9 indicate a very weak relationship between this study’s measures of religiosity and the Welzel-Inglehart measure of survival/self-expression values. The correlations are only significant in the 2000 wave. Interestingly, the relationship between religiosity and survival/self-expression flips in the 2000 wave, for which there is data confirming earlier observations in Figure 1. Speculatively, the flip may be because of the survival/self-expression scores for secular men in particular

Figure 8. Religiosity by Traditional-Secular.

Figure 9. Religiosity by Survival-/Self-Expression.
who were affected by the financial crisis of 2000–2001 and also represent most of the nonreligious individuals in the attendance-based measure.

Social Tolerance and Religiosity in Turkey over Four Waves of the WVS

As with other relationships with religiosity discussed in this study, the relationship between religiosity and intolerance seems to have peaked in 1994. Using a scale derived from responses to a series of questions regarding the desirability of a neighbor from one of several categories, some gauge of social tolerance is obtained and tested against a respondent’s religiosity. The question asked of respondents is whether they would not want to have a member of certain groups as neighbors. The five groups indicated in Figure 10 were included. The survey dataset codes affirmative responses as 1 and negative responses as 2. The responses to the groups below were summed to get the intolerance (Intol) variable. Hence, lower values are associated with more intense intolerance and higher values with tolerance.

Results provide a look at both the means of the constituent groups for the intolerance variables and also the overall mean of intolerance for each wave. There has not been a clear pattern of greater tolerance in Turkey. Instead, there was a period of greater tolerance in 1990, followed by a retrenchment and a slow return to slightly higher levels of tolerance.

Interestingly, the movement in the tolerance means parallels that of the importance of God religiosity factor but not so much the practice-driven attendance-based religiosity measure. The results of a simple Pearson correlation test for each of the waves reinforces observations of Scheepers et al. on the importance of measuring different dimensions of religiosity. The correlations in Table 2 show a steady relationship between the importance of God religiosity factor and tolerance. The pattern of positive correlations means the more religious an individual, the less tolerant

Figure 10. Intolerance in Turkey.
(s)he seems to become. Attendance-gender driven religiosity, on the other hand, shows no correlation only in the 1990 wave, and associations hover around the threshold of statistical significance in the remaining waves.

Next, the relationships between intolerance and the two measures of religiosity were explored using a series of regression models, which control for several covariates of social tolerance and religiosity as well as the difference in main effects for each wave. The final model tests the null hypothesis that there has been no change in the relationship between religiosity and intolerance during the four waves included in this analysis. Grand-mean centered interaction terms were used to discover changes in the slope of religiosity terms over the waves. This is in keeping with standard practice to avoid problems of multicolinearity. The data are presented in Table 3 using standardized coefficients to enable easier comparisons of the relative magnitude of each independent variable’s coefficient.

In all three models, self-positioning on the political scale, educational attainment, and income all have statistically significant coefficients. They all move in the direction expected by the literature on social tolerance and post-materialist values. By model 3, one standard deviation shift rightward in political self-alignment is associated with a 0.107 standard deviation decline in social tolerance. Inversely, increased education and increased income are both associated with improvements in social tolerance. In model 3, controlling for differential slopes among the religiosity indicators in addition to the demographics, the standardized coefficient for education is 0.23. The standardized coefficients for the effects of income are much lower, 0.09, but significant at \( p < 0.05 \).

What is interesting from the demographics variables is that in model 1, with the attendance gender-based indicator omitted, men (the reference case) tend to be less tolerant than women. A 0.043 shift in the intercept for women is observed in model 1, with smaller, non-significant shifts in the other two models when the gender-attendance religiosity is included and mediates the gender effect.

The importance of God indicator does have a strong and changing relationship with social tolerance. However, it is not a linear relationship, as the association intensifies significantly between waves 1 (1990) and 2 (1995), then by wave 4 (2005) seems to be returning to the same levels as wave 1. In model 1, the importance of God has a significant positive standardized coefficient of 0.19, indicating that in aggregate over the waves an increase in religiousness is associated with social intolerance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Importance of God Religiosity (−2=very religious, 2=nonreligious)</td>
<td>.3**</td>
<td>.315**</td>
<td>.325**</td>
<td>.317**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Attendance-Based Religiosity</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>0.1**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>.130**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**=p&lt;.05</td>
<td>N=961</td>
<td>N=808</td>
<td>N=959</td>
<td>N=957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The addition of slope differences (the interaction terms) for each of the waves allows for the examination of change in the relationship of the importance of God religiosity and tolerance over time. What the model 3 standardized coefficients indicate, similar to the correlations in the table above, is that the effect of this form of religiosity does indeed change between waves. The reference slope from wave 1 is 0.125. The wave 2 interaction term has a significant standardized coefficient of 0.079, indicating the slope is 0.079 greater in wave 2 than in wave 1. Likewise, the slope in the wave 3 interaction term is 0.053, indicating a 0.178 increase in tolerance for each standard deviation shift toward intensified religiosity in that wave. Finally, by the 2005-2007 wave, the difference term, 0.024, is no longer significantly different from that of wave 1.

The gender-attendance religiosity variable is more difficult to interpret in its relationship to social tolerance. For men, the gender-attendance variable is closely correlated to the importance of God indicator, while for women, the relationship between faith and attendance is more ambiguous. The data shows that women who are both very devout and traditional, and those who are casually observant, tend to only go to mosque on holidays. The survey conducted in December-January 1995-1996 provided a strong break from that pattern, with many more religious women reporting frequent mosque attendance. Further complicating analysis is the suppression effect that high correlation of the attendance-gender indicator has with the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Tolerance by Religion- Standardized Model Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 1, $R^2$ 0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-positioning in political scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest educational level attained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of incomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of God and religion religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender-attendance-based religiosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wave 3 dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wave 4 dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wave 5 dummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wave3_impgod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wave4_impgod</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Y=INTOL, N=3129
importance of God indicator for men (0.9), while for women it has a much lower correlation.

While interpretation of these coefficients is difficult, insight can still be gleaned from the changes in standardized coefficients between the models. The attendance-gender variable, when used with the importance of God variable, measures the relationship between religious women and social tolerance. In model 2, the slope of gender-attendance religiosity is confounded by the changes in slope over the waves that are revealed in model 3. In model 3, the reference wave’s (1990) standardized slope of gender-attendance is a surprising $-0.071$, which indicates that social tolerance increased among women who were more religious but less frequently attended mosque services than their peers with average education and political and economic characteristics. That unique effect weakened over the next two waves, and the 2005-2007 wave indicates a significant ($p=0.021$) direct association between intolerance and attendance-gender, with a slope of 0.06. Whatever the unique circumstances that existed in the reference 1990 wave concerning privately religious women seems to have faded by 2005.

Conclusions

Analysis in this study clearly shows that the Turkish public has become more conservative (traditional on the Inglehart-Welzel factor of the traditional-secular/rational scale) during the period of 1995 to 2005. The findings indicate that this is not a phenomenon that started with election of the AKP in 2002. It is a trend that can be traced to 1995 and has intensified toward more conservatism since then. That is, while the Turkish public has not become more religious during the last six years, religiosity has become more apparent and visible during the AKP’s rule. This confirms findings of others, such as Esmer’s and Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu’s studies in 2009, respectively. At the same time, a slight but significant shift in survival-self expression values was observed: a regressive shift from 1990 to 2000 followed by a slight return toward more self-expression in 2005. However, Turkish performance on these scales is far below levels observed in EU countries with the exception of Poland. These findings support Kalaycıoğlu’s voter realignment hypothesis, which maintains that since 1994 the Turkish electorate as a bloc has moved to the right of the political spectrum. Such a trend makes it easier for parties like the AKP to capture these conservative-leaning voters.

With respect to the Inglehart-Welzel values map, it was found that self-positioning on the political scale, educational attainment, and income all have significant coefficients across the four waves. They all move in the direction expected by the literature on social tolerance and post-materialist values. It was also observed that religiosity is a complex matter for Turks and shows significant variation based on gender.

The findings show a strong but tapering association between the importance of God religiosity and tolerance. The pattern of positive correlations means the more
religious an individual is the less tolerant (s)he seems to become. The attendance-gender driven religiosity, on the other hand, shows a strong reversed correlation in the 1990 wave, and then associations taper to hovering around the threshold of statistical significance until the last wave, where religiosity is correlated with intolerance. Results from model 1 demonstrate that there is a significant difference in this relationship based on gender. Men tend to be less tolerant than women. Yet there is more to this than meets the eye. The gender-attendance religiosity is more difficult to interpret in its relationship to social tolerance. For men, the gender-attendance variable is closely correlated to the importance of God indicator, while for women the relationship between faith and attendance is more ambiguous. Women who are both very devout and traditional, and those who are casually observant, may only go to mosque during holidays. Further complicating analysis is the suppression effect high correlation of the attendance-gender indicator has with the importance of God indicator for men (0.9), while for women it has almost no correlation.

While there is a persistent correlation between the importance of God measure of religiosity and intolerance, the effects of religiosity on intolerance appears to be returning to the lower level of correlation observed in 1990. There was a weaker correlation between religiosity and intolerance in 2005 wave than in the previous two waves. The latest wave also showed the highest level of social tolerance, along with lower levels of importance of religiosity than in the previous two waves. Two reinforcing phenomena seem to be occurring here: (1) Turkish society is getting slightly more tolerant while becoming more religious, and (2) the relationship between belief in God religiosity and social tolerance is weakening.

The findings here suggest that Turkish society is far from values observed in many EU member states with respect to religiosity and Inglehart and Welzel’s values map. Such findings certainly raise questions concerning implications of increased conservatism and religiosity for Turkey’s future socioeconomic and political development as well as its foreign relations. Moreover, causal factors behind these results need further analysis (e.g., urbanization, political and economic crisis, external shocks like the war on terror). Much of these questions are beyond the scope of this paper. However, it can be concluded that given the trends observed in this study Turkish voters are likely to continue being attracted to political parties like the AKP for the foreseeable future. This trend fits the policy priorities of the current AKP government quite well. Success of the AKP, or any other similar party, in capturing and keeping this support would depend on the party’s ability to provide sufficient response to their aspirations.

Notes

1. For examples of these studies see Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycioğlu, Türkiye’de Siyasetin Yeni Yüzü [The New Face of Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: Open Society Institute, June 2006); Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycioğlu, The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakârlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler [To Be Different in Turkey: Those Who have become “Others” on the Axis of
Religion and Conservatism] (Istanbul: Open Society Institute, 2008); Binnaz Toprak and Ali Çağkoğlu, Değişen Türkiye’de Din Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey] (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006); Yılmaz Esmer, World Values Survey: Turkey Wave No. 5 (Ann Arbor, MI: World Values Survey, 2007); Yılmaz Esmer, “Radikalizm ve Asırcılık,” [Radicalism and Extremism], Milliyet (Turkish daily), May 31, 2009; Binnaz Toprak et al., Türkiye’de Farklı Olmak [To be Different in Turkey] (Istanbul: The Open society Institute and Bosphorus University, 2008).


3. Ibid., p. 95.

4. Ibid., p. 96.


6. By “narrow perspective on social reality” the authors refer to close-visioned values, a difference between differentiated (open-minded) and undifferentiated (closed-minded) styles of thinking, and construct a compound measure to capture the difference. See Konig et al. (2000), “Explaining the Relationship between Christian Religion and Anti-Semitism in the Netherlands,” pp. 375, 379.

7. Ibid., p. 383.


14. Data for World Values Survey are generally referred to in four waves (1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005). However, the initial study that took place during 1981 was called the European Values Survey. This study uses data from all five data bases and therefore refers to them as waves 1 through 5.


16. Ibid.


Measuring Sexism, Racism, Sexual Prejudice, Ageism, Classism, and Religious Intolerance: The Intolerant Schema Measure

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Oklahoma State University

Despite similarities between sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance, investigators do not routinely investigate these intolerant beliefs simultaneously. The purpose of this project was to create a brief, psychometrically sound measure of intolerance reflecting these 6 constructs. Data from existing measures (Attitudes Toward Women Scale, Neosexism Scale, Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale, Modern Homophobia Scale, Fraboni Scale of Ageism, Economic Beliefs Scale, and M-GRISM) and from items created by the authors were obtained from several college samples to create the Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM). Results support the internal consistency, test–retest reliability, and factor structure of the questionnaire. Expected relationships between measured concepts, social dominance, social desirability, and across key demographic groups support the validity of the instrument.

Intolerance toward others is an important problem in today’s society. Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are three facets of intolerance that serve to oppress members of multiple minority groups (Lott & Maluso, 1995). More specifically, the intolerance of “other”—or those who are somehow different from a majority group—is a belief that allows for injustice and inequality between groups of people. When we are intolerant of others at the individual level, it maintains systematic oppression and ultimately silences the oppressed group (Lott & Maluso, 1995).

There are many forms of intolerance, including sexism, racism, sexual prejudice (a preferred concept and term, in comparison to homophobia; Herek, 2000), ageism, classism, and religious intolerance. While intolerance is

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often named as a single entity, there are multiple minority groups in the United States that may experience injustices based on their personal characteristics. Women may lose privileges on the basis of sexism; individuals with various ethnicities and races may lose opportunities as a result of racism; and individuals who define themselves as gay, lesbian, bisexual, queer, or transsexual may experience discrimination as a result of sexual prejudice. Similarly, inequality may be experienced by older adults and the poor as a result of ageism and classism, and religious intolerance may lead to bias against members of certain practicing faiths. Given that, in each instance, individuals experience prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination on the basis of personal characteristics, we may ask if individuals who endorse intolerance toward one group are more likely to endorse intolerance toward multiple groups.

There are several theoretical positions suggesting that multiple forms of intolerance are related. Over 50 years ago, Allport (1954) suggested that individuals who demonstrate prejudice against a group likely have a rigid, intolerant cognitive style that results in prejudice toward multiple groups or topics. Similarly, Adorno and colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) developed a psychoanalytic theory regarding the relationship between personality and prejudice with their authoritarian personality theory. Social dominance theory also suggests that it is normative to believe certain groups should be dominant over other groups (Sidanius et al., Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). Social dominance theory further posits that all forms of group-based oppression (e.g., sexism, racism, sexual prejudice) are special cases of the human tendency to form hierarchies based on group membership (Sidanius et al., 2004). One component of social dominance theory is the idea that individuals vary with regard to their social dominance orientation, or the degree to which they desire group-based dominance (Sidanius et al., 2004).

While the aforementioned theories suggest that there may be an underlying construct, such as general intolerance toward “other” or social dominance orientation, there is also evidence to suggest that there are unique, but related facets or forms of intolerance. For example, a study previously conducted with one of the data sets employed for this project found that the constructs of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance were strongly interrelated (Aosved & Long, 2006). A number of additional studies are available showing strong associations between both sexism and racism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Sidanius, 1993; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) and between sexual prejudice and sexism (e.g., Agnew, Thompson, Smith, Gramzow, & Currey, 1993; Campbell, Schellenberg, & Senn, 1997; Polimeni, Hardie, & Buzwell, 2000; Raja & Stokes, 1998; Stevenson & Medler, 1995). Given the theoretical similarities between these constructs, it is striking that researchers do not typically examine multiple
intolerant beliefs simultaneously. One possible explanation for this may be the lack of a short questionnaire that assesses sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance.

With regard to the question of how best to measure multiple forms of intolerance in an empirical investigation, many investigators rely on several independent survey measures with Likert-type response scales (Campbell et al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Finnerty-Fried, 1982; Greene & Herek, 1994; McHugh & Frieze, 1997). In fact, there are a number of self-report surveys designed to measure the individual constructs of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, and ageism (Campbell et al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Finnerty-Fried, 1982; Greene & Herek, 1994; McHugh & Frieze, 1997). There are fewer instruments designed to measure classism and religious intolerance. Specifically, there is one measure of classism and one measure with a subscale for religious intolerance documented in the literature (Godfrey, Richman, & Withers, 2000; Stevenson & Medler, 1995). While most measures of intolerant beliefs assess only one intolerant belief (e.g., sexism alone), Godfrey et al. developed the one notable exception to this with the Modified Godfrey–Richman ISM Scale (M-GRISMS). The M-GRISMS is a 50-item self-report survey that assesses racism, religious intolerance, sexism, and heterosexism with the same instrument (Godfrey et al., 2000). While the M-GRISMS is an important tool for assessing multiple forms of intolerance, researchers would benefit from a broader measure of intolerance that assesses additional domains of intolerance (e.g., ageism, classism), as well as a measure that provides a global index of general intolerance toward others.

With regard to measures of global intolerance, Adorno et al. (1950) conceptualized prejudice and ethnocentrism as stable personality traits and developed the Fascism Scale (or F Scale) to measure this trait. Adorno et al.’s work led to more recent measures of the construct of authoritarianism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Billings, Guastello, & Rieke, 1993; Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007). While measures such as the F Scale or the Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) Scale (Altemeyer, 1998) assess the global construct of authoritarianism, this construct is similar to intolerance, yet different (e.g., authoritarianism focuses on adherence to social norms, disdain for norm violators, and uncritical adherence to authority, as opposed to intolerance toward people who are different or minority group members). Finally, existing measures of authoritarianism do not measure multiple forms of intolerance toward specific minority groups.

Given the absence of strong tools measuring both an overall index of intolerance and a number of the unique aspects of this construct, it is the purpose of the present study to create a measure of intolerance that reflects the broad construct of intolerance, as well multiple specific dimensions of intolerance, including sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and
religious intolerance. Several existing longer measures of each of these singular constructs were identified in the research literature, including the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973), Neosexism Scale (Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995), Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986), Modern Homophobia Scale (Raja & Stokes, 1998), Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni, Saltstone, & Hughes, 1990), Economic Beliefs Scale (Stevenson & Medler, 1995), and the religious intolerance items from the M-GRISMS (Godfrey et al., 2000). Data from each of these, as well as additional items created by the authors to assess classism and religious intolerance, were obtained from large samples of college students. The Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM) was developed from participants’ responses to these instruments. Preliminary support for the reliability and validity of the new scale is examined in multiple samples.

Study 1

Method

Participants

Sample 1. Participants were 523 college students (325 females, 198 males) who were recruited from a research participant pool at a large midwestern university during an academic semester for a study on student attitudes. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 years ($M = 20.5$ years, $SD = 3.5$). The majority of individuals reported that they had never been married (90.9%; $n = 467$); 5.6% ($n = 29$) reported that they were married or cohabitating; 1.2% ($n = 6$) reported that they were divorced or separated; and 2.3% ($n = 12$) reported themselves in the “other” category (9 participants failed to report marital status).

The majority of participants were European Americans (82.6%; $n = 432$); 3.1% ($n = 16$) were African Americans; 1.7% ($n = 9$) were Latinos or Hispanics; 4.8% ($n = 25$) were Native Americans; 5.4% ($n = 28$) were Asian or Asian Americans; and 2.5% ($n = 13$) placed themselves in the “other” category. Socioeconomic status (SES) was assessed using the two-factor index of social position (this index considers both education and occupation in assigning an SES; Myers & Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average participant fell into the middle class.

The majority of participants were heterosexual (98.8%; $n = 514$); 0.4% ($n = 2$) were gay men or lesbians, 0.6% ($n = 3$) identified themselves as bisexual; and 0.2% ($n = 1$) were undecided/questioning (3 participants failed to report sexual orientation). Finally, the majority of participants were Protestants (68.6%; $n = 358$); 13.6% ($n = 71$) were Catholics; 2.9% ($n = 15$) were
Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu; 3.3% \((n = 17)\) were agnostic or atheist; 0.2% \((n = 1)\) were Wiccan or pagan; 8.2% \((n = 43)\) were nonaffiliated; and 3.3% \((n = 17)\) identified themselves as “other” (1 participant failed to report a religious affiliation).

**Sample 2.** A second independent sample of 475 college students (181 females, 294 males) was recruited at the same large midwestern university in a subsequent academic semester from a research participant pool for a study on student attitudes. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 54 years \((M = 19.8\ years, SD = 2.9)\). The majority of individuals reported that they had never been married \((91.4%; n = 412)\); 4.2% \((n = 19)\) reported that they were married or cohabitating; 0.9% \((n = 4)\) reported that they were divorced or separated; and 3.5% \((n = 16)\) reported themselves in the “other” category (24 participants failed to report marital status).

The majority of participants were European Americans \((84.8%; n = 403)\); 2.1% \((n = 10)\) were African Americans; 2.7% \((n = 13)\) were Latinos or Hispanics; 4.0% \((n = 19)\) were Native Americans; 5.3% \((n = 25)\) were Asian or Asian Americans; and 1.1% \((n = 5)\) placed themselves in the “other” category. SES was assessed using the two-factor index of social position (Myers & Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average participant fell into the middle class.

The majority of participants were heterosexual \((97.9%; n = 463)\); 0.8% \((n = 4)\) were gay men or lesbians; 0.6% \((n = 3)\) identified themselves as bisexual; and 0.6% \((n = 3)\) were undecided/questioning (2 participants failed to report sexual orientation). Finally, the majority of participants were Protestants \((65.9%; n = 313)\); 12.6% \((n = 60)\) were Catholics; 1.3% \((n = 6)\) were Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu; 3.2% \((n = 15)\) were agnostic or atheist; 0.4% \((n = 2)\) were Wiccan or pagan; 0.2% \((n = 1)\) were Jewish; 11.4% \((n = 54)\) were nonaffiliated; and 5.1% \((n = 24)\) identified themselves as “other.”

**Measures**

**Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS).** The 15-item short version of the AWS (Spence et al., 1973) was developed to measure attitudes toward the rights and roles of women. The AWS (the original, Spence & Helmreich, 1972; and the short version, Spence et al., 1973) is over two decades old, yet continues to be the most commonly used measure of gender-related attitudes toward women (McHugh & Frieze, 1997; Spence & Hahn, 1997), although it has been suggested that the AWS measures old-fashioned sexism, rather than subtler, modern sexism (McHugh & Frieze, 1997).

The AWS includes items such as “There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promotion without regard to sex,” and “The intellectual
leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.” Respondents rate the items on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Items are summed to create a total score ranging from 0 to 45. Higher scores reflect more negative attitudes toward women.

Internal consistency has been demonstrated for the 15-item short version of the AWS (Spence et al., 1973). Specifically, Daugherty and Drambrot (1986) found a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 for the 15-item version. Internal consistency for the scale was calculated, after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .81. The 15-item version has a 3-week test–retest reliability of .82 and .86 for men and for women, respectively (Daugherty & Drambrot, 1986). The validity of the scale has also been supported, as the short form is almost perfectly correlated with the original version (Loo & Logan, 1977; Smith & Bradley, 1980; Spence & Hahn, 1997). In addition, the construct validity of numerous other measures of sexism, attitudes toward women, and attitudes toward gender roles have been established by their strong correlations with the AWS (e.g., Tougas et al., 1995).

Neosexism Scale. The Neosexism Scale (NS) was developed to measure the construct of modern sexism, or the conflict between negative attitudes toward women and egalitarian values (Tougas et al., 1995). Sample items include “Women shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted,” and “Due to social pressures, firms frequently have to hire underqualified women.” Responses are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Scores are calculated by averaging the ratings of the 11 items, and higher scores indicate greater levels of sexism.

The 11-item NS has demonstrated good internal reliability (α = .81), and corrected item-total correlations range from .10 to .76 (Campbell et al., 1997; Tougas et al., 1995). Internal consistency for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .82. Furthermore, principal components analysis reveals that the scale is unidimensional (Campbell et al., 1997). Construct validity of the NS has also been supported, as it is correlated with the Modern Sexism Scale, the Attitudes Toward Feminism Scale, and the Women’s Movement Scale (Campbell et al., 1997).

Modern Homophobia Scale (MHS). The 46-item MHS (Raja & Stokes, 1998) was used to assess sexual prejudice, and measures both attitudes toward lesbians and attitudes toward gay men. This is a strength, given that many previous sexual prejudice scales have not referred specifically to lesbians or gay men, but have referred instead to “homosexuals” in general. In addition, the MHS was developed to update existing sexual prejudice scales in an attempt to tap into modern, subtler forms of sexual prejudice.

Both lesbian (MHS-L; 24 items) and gay men (MHS-G; 22 items) subscales are scored from the instrument, and each reflects respondents’ institutional sexual prejudice, personal discomfort, and beliefs that homosexuality
is deviant and changeable. Sample items include “I wouldn’t mind working with a lesbian,” and “I welcome new friends who are gay.” Responses are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (do not agree) to 5 (strongly agree). Scores for each subscale are calculated by averaging subscale items, and lower scores indicate higher levels of sexual prejudice.

The 46-item MHS has demonstrated good internal consistency, with alphas of .95 for both the MHS-L and the MHS-G subscale (Raja & Stokes, 1998). In addition, internal consistency for both the MHS-L and MHS-G subscales was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in alphas of .91 and .95, respectively. There is also evidence to support the construct validity of the MHS (Raja & Stokes, 1998). For example, the MHS-L and the MHS-G correlated significantly with Hudson and Ricketts’ (1980) Index of Homophobia (Raja & Stokes, 1998).

Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale. The 14-item Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale contains two 7-item subscales that measure old-fashioned and modern racism (McConahay, 1986). The Old-Fashioned Racism Scale contains items that tap into pre-1965 civil rights issues related to equal rights for minorities and stereotypes related to those same issues. The Modern Racism Scale was created in an attempt to measure racial attitudes after 1965 and includes items that are less blatant (McConahay, 1986). In addition, the modern racism items tap into the idea that modern racism is founded on abstract principles of justice and generalized negative feelings toward racial minorities that are related to political and racial socialization, rather than personal competition or experiences with racial minorities.

A sample old-fashioned racism item is “Black people are generally not as smart as Whites”; while a sample modern racism item is “Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.” Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Scores for each scale are calculated by summing the ratings of the seven items in each scale. Scores range from 7 to 35, with higher scores indicating higher levels of both modern and old-fashioned racism.

Although McConahay’s (1986) instrument is focused on attitudes toward African Americans, the focus of the present study is racial prejudice against any ethnic minority group. Therefore, minority was substituted for Black in each item, as per Ducote-Sabey (1999).

Internal consistency of the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) was demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .82. In addition, internal consistency was demonstrated for the Old-Fashioned Racism Scale, with alphas ranging from .75 to .79 in various samples (McConahay, 1986). Ducote-Sabey (1999) calculated internal consistency for the minority modification to this scale and reported alpha coefficients of .77 and .63 for the Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scales, respectively. Internal consistency
for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in a Cronbach’s alpha of .80 and .70 for Modern Racism and Old-Fashioned Racism, respectively.

Fraboni Scale of Ageism. The Fraboni Scale of Ageism (FSA) is a 29-item scale that was developed to measure the affective and cognitive components of ageism (Fraboni et al., 1990). Sample items include “Complex and interesting conversations cannot be expected from most old people,” “It is best that old people live where they won’t bother anyone,” and “I sometimes avoid eye contact with old people when I see them.” Responses are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree).

Per scoring instructions from Fraboni et al. (1990), scores for each response were recoded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Unanswered items were scored as 3 (neutral). Scores for the scale were calculated by summing the ratings of the 29 items. Scores ranged from 29 to 145, with higher scores indicating lower levels of ageism. Internal consistency was demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 (Fraboni et al., 1990). Internal consistency for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .84. In addition, a significant negative correlation between the FSA and a measure of acceptance of others supports the construct validity of the FSA (Fraboni et al., 1990).

Modified Economic Beliefs Scale (M-EBS). The M-EBS is a modified version of the Economic Beliefs Scale (Stevenson & Medler, 1995), which was designed to measure classism (i.e., attitudes toward the economically disadvantaged). The original scale contained eight items. In the version used for the present study, the original items were retained, and seven additional items were created. Sample items from the original scale include “People who stay on welfare have no desire to work,” and “Equal educational opportunities exist for all people in our society.” Sample items that were created include “Poor people are lazy,” and “If given the chance, a poor person would be able to keep a job.”

Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Scores for the scale were calculated by summing the ratings of the 15 items. Scores ranged from 15 to 75, with lower scores indicating higher levels of classism. The internal consistency reliability coefficient for the original measure was .77 (Stevenson & Medler, 1995) and .85 for the modified version used in the present study.

Religious Intolerance Scale (RIS). Because there were no existing measures of religious intolerance that assess attitudes toward multiple religious groups at the time the present study was begun, the RIS was developed. The nine-item scale was developed using five items from Godfrey et al.’s (2000) measure of prejudice (i.e., M-GRISMS) and four additional items that were
created. Sample items from Godfrey et al.’s study include “Jewish people are deceitful and money-hungry,” and “Muslims are more treacherous than other groups of religious people.” Sample additional items include “Many of the social problems in the U.S. today are due to non-Christian religious groups,” and “Wiccan and pagan people practice thinly veiled evil.”

Responses were rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Scores for the scale were calculated by summing the ratings of the nine items. Scores ranged from 9 to 45, with lower scores indicating higher levels of religious intolerance. The alpha for the measure in the collapsed sample was .79.

Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability (MCSD) Scale–Short Form C. The MCSD scale was developed to measure the desire of individuals to present themselves in a favorable manner (Reynolds, 1982). The MCSD Short Form contains 13 True–False items. Sample items are “I have never intensely disliked anyone,” and “I never resent being asked to return a favor.” Responses were rated as socially desirable (0) or not socially desirable (1), and then were summed to result in a total score ranging from 0 (all socially desirable responses) to 13 (no socially desirable responses). Higher scores indicate lower levels of social desirability.

The internal consistency coefficient of the MCSD Short Form with the Kuder–Richardson Formula 20 was .76 (Reynolds, 1982). Internal consistency for the scale was calculated after collapsing Samples 1 and 2 together, resulting in an alpha of .70. In addition, the validity of the scale has been supported, as there are statistically significant correlations between the MCSD Short Form and the standard version of the MCSD scale, as well as the Edward Social Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982).

Life Experiences Questionnaire (LEQ). We used the LEQ (Long, 2000) solely to gather demographic information. The questionnaire is a self-report measure.

Procedure

All participants in each sample were recruited from a research participant pool (consisting of participants enrolled in Psychology classes, Marketing classes, or both), and all received course credit for their participation. Participants took part in small 1-hr group testing sessions, and all responses were kept confidential and anonymous. After they gave their informed consent, participants completed the questionnaire packet, which included all of the measures presented in random order.

For a number of participants, responses to individual items were missing. Values for missing data were imputed using the average response of the entire
sample to the missing item. However, if a participant failed to complete a measure entirely, or left more than 25% of the items blank, his or her data for that particular measure were not included.

Results

Initial Scale Construction

Given that it was the purpose of this study to create a short measure of intolerance that reflects the multidimensional nature of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance, data from the AWS, NS, MHS, M-EBS, FSA, and RIS were converted to a similar response format to allow comparability. The majority of the instruments employed a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5; therefore, this scale was chosen as the standard.

The MHS, RIS, FSA, and M-EBS were reverse-scored to ease interpretability, such that in each case, 1 reflected low levels of the intolerant belief system and 5 reflected the greatest levels of the belief system. The AWS was rescored such that the original responses were changed from 0 to 1, 1 to 2, 2 to 4, and 3 to 5. The NS was rescored such that original responses were changed from 1 to 1, 2 to 2, 3 to 2, 4 to 3, 5 to 4, 6 to 4, and 7 to 5. The MOFRS items required no rescoring. Permission was obtained from the authors of the AWS, NS, MHS, M-EBS, and M-GRISMS to use their items in our study. (The authors of the FSA and MOFRS could not be located.)

The initial pool of 146 items from the AWS, NS, MHS, M-EBS, FSA, RIS, and MOFRS were considered for inclusion in the to-be-created scale. Factor coefficients from a factor analysis of all items across both samples (Aosved, Long, Voller, & Borja, 2006), corrected item-total correlations, variability of item responses, and meaningfulness and redundancy of items were considered in selecting the 54 total items (9 for each of the 6 proposed subscales) to be included in the Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM). Items selected appear in the Appendix.

Factor Structure of ISM

Employing the first sample of 523 college students, the 54 items of the new ISM were subjected to a factor analysis using the principal components method with varimax rotation. As would be desired, inspection of eigenvalues, scree plot, and interpretability (Cattell, 1966) suggested that the data were best explained by six factors. The rotated factor pattern with each item’s
Table 1

Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Sample 1

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loading on the six factors is reported in Table 5. Items reflecting sexual prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40) on the first factor. Items reflecting classism loaded substantially on the second factor, while items reflecting sexism loaded on the third factor. Items loading substantially on Factors 4, 5, and 6 reflected racism, ageism, and religious intolerance, respectively. The six factors together accounted for 25.9% of the variance.

To replicate this factor structure, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted employing the second sample of 475 college students. Again, the results suggest that the data were best explained by six factors. The rotated factor pattern with each item’s loading on the six factors is reported in Table 2. Items reflecting sexual prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40) on the first factor. Items reflecting classism loaded substantially on the second factor, while items reflecting sexism loaded on the third factor. Items
Table 2

Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Sample 2

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loading substantially on Factors 4, 5, and 6 reflected ageism, racism, and religious intolerance, respectively. The six factors together accounted for 26.2% of the variance.

Minimal differences were noted in the factor loadings in Samples 1 and 2. Ageism items loaded on Factor 5 in Sample 1, but on Factor 4 in Sample 2. Similar content was noted in each factor, however. Small individual item loading differences were also seen across the factor structures, none of which affected general factor interpretability: MOFRS-11 loaded on racism only in Sample 1; RIS-1 loaded on both sexual prejudice and religious intolerance in Sample 1, but only on sexual prejudice in Sample 2; RIS-7 loaded on both sexual prejudice and religious intolerance in Sample 1, but only on religious intolerance in Sample 2; and MEBS-8 loaded on racism only in Sample 2.

Table 2

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Note. Factor coefficients > .40 appear in boldface for ease of interpretation. RMHSL/G = rescaled Modern Homophobia Scale; RAWS = rescaled Attitudes Toward Women Scale; RNS = rescaled Neosexism Scale; MOFRS = Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale; RFSA = rescaled Fraboni Scale of Ageism; RRIS = rescaled Religious Intolerance Scale; RMEBS = rescaled Modified Economic Beliefs Scale.
Despite these minor differences, the six factors appeared stable across the two samples. The six factors reflect Sexual Prejudice, Classism, Ageism, Sexism, Racism, and Religious Intolerance. Items loading on sexual prejudice reflect prejudiced attitudes and personal discomfort with gay men and lesbians (e.g., “I don’t mind companies using openly lesbian celebrities to advertise their products”) and negative attitudes toward legal or policy issues affecting gay/lesbian/bisexual/transsexual (GLBT) individuals (e.g., “Gay men want way too many rights”). Classism reflects stereotypes about individuals in poverty (e.g., “Poor people are lazy”), as well as negative attitudes toward people of low socioeconomic status (SES). Ageism reflects a combination of negative stereotypes about elderly individuals (e.g., “Most old people would be considered to have poor personal hygiene”) and personal discomfort with older adults (e.g., “I don’t like it when old people try to make conversation with me”). Sexism reflects negative stereotypes about women’s roles (e.g., “The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men”) and policy issues (e.g., “Over the past few years, women have gotten more from the government than they deserve”). Racism reflects negative attitudes toward policy issues (e.g., “It was wrong for the United States Supreme Court to outlaw segregation in its 1954 decision”) and prejudiced attitudes toward racial minorities (e.g., “Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten more economically than they deserve”). Finally, religious intolerance reflects negative stereotypes about various religious groups (e.g., “Christians are intolerant of people with other religious beliefs”).

Internal Consistency of the ISM

Cronbach’s coefficient alphas were examined across each subscale under consideration (i.e., sexual prejudice, classism, sexism, racism, ageism, and religious intolerance), as well as for an overall composite score within each sample. Alphas were fairly large in each case, ranging from .78 to .92 in each sample (see Tables 1 and 2). Internal consistency of all 54 items across the subscales was also assessed and was quite high. Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in each sample.

Preliminary Investigation of Criterion-Related Validity of the ISM

In order to examine the validity of the ISM scale, Samples 1 and 2 were collapsed. Both samples were collected from the same university research participant pool in successive semesters. Prior to collapsing these two samples, comparisons across demographic factors and other variables of
interest were conducted. The results of these comparisons suggest that Samples 1 and 2 did differ on some dimensions (e.g., age, SES). Validity analyses conducted separately for each group reveal the same pattern of results, however. Therefore, for simplicity, we report the results from the collapsed group only. This allowed for a larger sample size and greater power in examining expected relationships among variables.

Subscale scores across the six dimensions of the ISM were created by averaging the nine items falling within each dimension. A total ISM score, reflecting overall intolerance, was created by averaging all 54 items. For each subscale and the total, higher scores reflect greater intolerance. Descriptive statistics for each subscale are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Within Sample 1, the mean participant total score was 2.43 (SD = 0.53), with a range from 1.13 to 4.30 (Quartile1 = 2.06, Mdn = 2.41, Quartile3 = 2.83). Similar total scores on the ISM were seen in Sample 2. The mean participant score was 2.59 (SD = 0.53), with a range from 1.02 to 4.39 (Quartile1 = 2.22, Mdn = 2.59, Quartile3 = 2.93).

Given previous research literature showing that different forms of intolerance are related (e.g., Agnew et al., 1993; Aosved & Long, 2006; Campbell et al., 1997; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Polimeni et al., 2000; Raja & Stokes, 1998; Stevenson & Medler, 1995), it was expected that the subscales of the ISM would be similarly related. Significant relationships were seen among all subscales (all ps < .0003; see Table 3). Each subscale was also significantly correlated with a total ISM score calculated by averaging the 54 scale items (all ps < .0001; see Table 3).

Correlations between the ISM subscale scores and the full original instrument scores were also examined to investigate the scale's criterion-related

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<td>.76 (.982)</td>
<td>.64 (.983)</td>
<td>.78 (.987)</td>
<td>.76 (.985)</td>
<td>.48 (.991)</td>
<td>.66 (.986)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. p = .0001. Sample sizes appear in parentheses.
validity. It was expected that ISM subscales would be strongly related to full instruments, as the new scale was designed to do this with a reduced number of items. The results support this idea (see Table 4). The sexual prejudice subscale was significantly correlated with both the lesbian women \((r = -0.90, p = .0001)\) and the gay men \((r = -0.95, p = .0001)\) subscales of the MHS. The sexism subscale was significantly correlated with both the AWS \((r = 0.83, p = .0001)\) and the NS \((r = 0.83, p = .0001)\). The racism subscale was significantly correlated with the Modern \((r = 0.90, p = .0001)\) and Old-Fashioned \((r = 0.84, p = .0001)\) Racism scales; and the ageism, religious intolerance, and classism subscales were correlated with the Fraboni Scale of Ageism \((r = -0.88, p = .0001)\), the RIS \((r = 0.99, p = .0001)\), and the MEBS \((r = -0.96, p = .0001)\), respectively.

Criterion-related validity was also explored by examining ISM subscale score differences among key demographic subgroups. For example, based on previous findings, it was expected that members of minority races would report less racism than would Caucasians. Similarly, it was expected that men would report more sexism than would women. Likewise, gay men, bisexual men and women, and lesbians were expected to report less sexual prejudice in comparison to heterosexual individuals. The results provide support for these ideas. Men \((M = 2.51, SD = 0.78)\) reported more sexism on the ISM than did women \((M = 1.85, SD = 0.68)\), \(t(967) = 14.34, p = .0001\); heterosexuals \((M = 2.98, SD = 1.09)\) reported more sexual prejudice on the ISM than did GLBT individuals \((M = 1.57, SD = 0.59)\), \(t(16.8) = 9.39, p = .0001\); and Caucasians \((M = 2.25, SD = 0.73)\) reported more racism on the ISM than did members of other racial groups \((M = 2.06, SD = 0.71)\), \(t(990) = 3.00, p = .003\). Correlations were also examined between classism and SES, with the idea that greater classism might be associated with greater wealth; and between ageism and age, with the idea that greater ageism might be associated with lower age. Neither correlation reached conventional levels of significance, however (see Table 4).

Finally, the relationships between ISM scores and social desirability were examined (see Table 4). Small but significant correlations were seen between social desirability and classism, sexism, racism, ageism, religious intolerance, and the total score reflecting that greater social desirability was associated with reporting less of each of these traits. A larger, significant correlation was also seen with sexual prejudice, suggesting that those individuals reporting greater need to present themselves in a positive way reported greater levels of sexual prejudice. This finding is noteworthy, as it indicates the possibility that sexual prejudice may be a culturally sanctioned—or socially desirable—form of prejudice. Thus, in general, as social desirability increases, endorsement of intolerance decreases, with the exception of sexual prejudice, where endorsement of this form of intolerance increases as social desirability increases.
Table 4

**Correlations of ISM Subscales With Other Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Sexual prejudice</th>
<th>Classism</th>
<th>Sexism</th>
<th>Racism</th>
<th>Ageism</th>
<th>Religious intolerance</th>
<th>Total score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MHSL</td>
<td>-.90 (990), p = .0001</td>
<td>-.28 (980), p = .0001</td>
<td>-.42 (987), p = .0001</td>
<td>-.39 (985), p = .0001</td>
<td>-.04 (979), ns</td>
<td>-.34 (983), p = .0001</td>
<td>-.64 (979), p = .0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.10 (975), p = .001</td>
<td>-.14 (975), p = .001</td>
<td>-.07 (981), p = .03</td>
<td>-.01 (978), ns</td>
<td>-.03 (977), ns</td>
<td>-.07 (975), p = .04</td>
<td>-.11 (977), p = .0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>-.02 (939), ns</td>
<td>-.02 (940), ns</td>
<td>-.05 (945), ns</td>
<td>-.02 (942), ns</td>
<td>.01 (938), ns</td>
<td>.01 (940), ns</td>
<td>-.03 (938), ns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Sample sizes appear in parentheses. MHSL = Modern Homophobia Scale, attitudes toward lesbian women; MHSG = Modern Homophobia Scale, attitudes toward gay men; AWS = Attitudes Toward Women Scale; NS = Neosexism Scale; MRS = Modern Racism Scale (from the Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale); OFRS = Old-Fashioned Racism Scale (from the Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale); FSA = Fraboni Scale of Ageism; RIS = Religious Intolerance Scale; MEBS = Modified Economic Beliefs Scale; SES = socioeconomic status; MCSD = Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
Study 2

Method

Participants

Participants were 115 college students (84 female, 30 male, 1 did not identify gender) who were recruited at a small liberal arts university on the West Coast from undergraduate psychology and sociology classes for a study on student attitudes. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 55 years ($M = 22.0$ years, $SD = 6.2$). The majority of individuals reported that they had never been married (79.1%; $n = 87$); 14.6% ($n = 16$) reported that they were married or cohabitating; 2.7% ($n = 3$) reported that they were divorced or separated; 1 participant (0.9%) reported being widowed; and 2.7% ($n = 3$) reported themselves in the “other” category (5 participants failed to report a marital status).

Participants were ethnically diverse, representing the small private university from which they were recruited. The largest percentage of participants (40.9%, $n = 47$) were Latinos; 33.0% ($n = 38$) were European Americans; 13.0% ($n = 15$) were African Americans; 1.7% ($n = 2$) were Native American or Pacific Islanders; 2.6% ($n = 3$) were Asian/Asian Americans; 5.2% ($n = 6$) were biracial; and 3.5% ($n = 4$) placed themselves in the “other” category. SES was assessed using the two-factor index of social position (Myers & Bean, 1968) and ranged from lower to upper class. The average participant fell into the middle class.

The majority of participants were heterosexual (96.5%; $n = 111$); 2.6% ($n = 3$) were gay men or lesbians; and 0.9% ($n = 1$) was undecided/questioning. Finally, the largest percentage of participants were Catholics (39.8%; $n = 45$); 32.7% ($n = 37$) were Protestants; 0.9% ($n = 1$) were Jewish; 3.5% ($n = 4$) were Buddhist, Muslim, or Hindu; 8.8% ($n = 10$) were agnostic or atheist; 11.5% ($n = 13$) were nonaffiliated; and 2.7% ($n = 3$) identified themselves as “other” (2 participants failed to report a religious affiliation).

Measures

Intolerant Schema Measure. The 54-item ISM scale, developed in Study 1 and described previously, measures the constructs of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance and provides an overall index of general intolerance toward non-majority groups. Responses are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

A total intolerance scale can be calculated by averaging the ratings of all 54 items, after reverse-scoring selected items. Scores for the sexism, racism,
Table 5

Factor Loadings for ISM Items and Subscale Descriptors: Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>.60</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>−.38</td>
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</table>
sexual prejudice, ageism, classism, and religious intolerance subscales are calculated by averaging the nine items corresponding to each domain. Scores range from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater levels of intolerance. Descriptive statistics for each subscale are presented in Table 4. The mean participant total score was 1.98 (SD = 0.44) and ranged from 1.13 to 3.13 (Quartile1 = 1.65, Mdn = 1.96, Quartile3 = 2.31).

Social Dominance Orientation Scale, Version 6 (SDO6; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The 16-item SDO6 was developed to measure “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (p. 742; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Scores reflect support for the domination of certain socially constructed groups over other socially constructed groups, without defining which groups these are. Sample items include “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups,” “It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others,” and “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.” Responses are rated on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
Items are averaged (after reverse-scoring certain items) to create a total score, with higher scores reflecting more support for the domination of certain groups.

The SDO$_6$ was developed across 45 samples from a number of nations. Analysis shows the scale to measure a unitary concept, to have good internal consistency ($Mdn$ reliability across studies = .89), and to have good test–retest reliability (.86 over a 1-month period). The studies reported by Sida-nius and Pratto (1999) also provide support for its validity. Cronbach’s alpha within this sample of 115 participants was .90.

Demographics questionnaire. We used a questionnaire to gather participants’ demographic information. The questionnaire is a self-report measure.

Procedure

All of the participants were recruited from psychology and sociology courses, and the volunteers completed the described instruments during a portion of their class time. Participants received no credit for their participation and were allowed to leave the classroom or simply not participate if they preferred. All questionnaire responses were anonymous.

After they gave their informed consent, participants completed the questionnaire packet, which included the demographic instrument followed by the ISM and the SDO$_6$, which were counterbalanced in order. A subset of previously surveyed classes was revisited 2 weeks after initial data collection. A total of 84 participants who had participated in the first wave of data collection completed the ISM for the purpose of assessing test–retest reliability during this second wave of data collection.

Results

Factor Structure of ISM

The 54 items of the new ISM were subjected to a factor analysis using the principal components method with varimax rotation. As would be desired, inspection of eigenvalues, scree plot, and interpretability (Cattell, 1966) suggests that the data were best explained by six factors. The rotated factor pattern with each item’s loading on the six factors is reported in Table 4. The six factors together accounted for 51.5% of the variance.

Items reflecting sexual prejudice showed substantial loadings (> .40) on the first factor. Items reflecting ageism loaded substantially on the second factor, while items reflecting classism loaded on the third factor. Items
loading substantially on Factors 4, 5, and 6 reflected sexism, religious intolerance, and racism, respectively. This factor structure is similar to that found in Study 1 (i.e., the factors reflected the same content areas), yet it differs in that there was greater duplication of items across factors. For example, while the expected ISM items load on sexual prejudice, so do some items thought to reflect religious intolerance and sexism. Similarly, classism includes expected items, but also items thought to reflect racism. Further, the factors reflecting religious intolerance and racism were less cohesive in this sample.

While the factor loadings were less systematic in this sample, this may be a reflection of the diversity of the group. In contrast with Samples 1 and 2 in Study 1, the participants in Study 2 were much more ethnically and racially diverse, and more diverse in terms of class and religion. Interestingly, from the examination of scores on the ISM subscales (see Tables 1, 2, and 5), it appears that participants in Study 2 reported less intolerance in comparison to participants in both samples of Study 1. However, these differences must be interpreted cautiously, as they were not tested statistically. As questions on racism asked about beliefs toward “racial minorities,” and findings from Study 1 show that racial minorities reported less racism than did non-racial minorities, the findings of a less coherent Racism factor in this sample may not be surprising.

Internal Consistency of the ISM

Cronbach’s alphas were examined across each subscale (i.e., sexual prejudice, classism, sexism, racism, ageism, religious intolerance), as well as for an overall composite score. Alphas were satisfactory in each case, ranging from .70 to .88 (see Table 5). Internal consistency of all 54 items across the subscales was also assessed and was quite high. Cronbach’s alpha was .94.

Investigation of Criterion-Related Validity of the ISM

Again, it was expected that the subscales of the ISM would be related. Significant correlations were found between all pairs of subscales (all \(ps < .02\); see Table 6). Each subscale was also significantly correlated with a total ISM score calculated by averaging the 54 scale items (all \(ps < .0001\); see Table 6).

Correlations between ISM subscale scores and social dominance (total scores on the SDO\(_6\)) were also examined to investigate the scale’s criterion-related validity. The results support the validity of the ISM (see Table 6). While all correlations were significant, the strength of these relationships did
Table 6

*Correlations Between ISM Scales and SDO₆*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1. SDO₆</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ISM total</td>
<td>.64, <em>p = .0001</em></td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* *N* = 115. SDO₆ = Social Dominance Orientation Scale total; ISM total = Intolerant Schema Measure total score.
vary across areas assessed by the ISM. Racism, as measured by the ISM, showed the largest correlation with social dominance \((r = .65, p = .0001)\). Sexual prejudice, on the other hand, showed the weakest relationship with social dominance \((r = .30, p = .001)\). Overall, the total score from the ISM was strongly related to social dominance \((r = .64, p = .0001)\).

Criterion-related validity was also explored by examining ISM subscale score differences among key demographic subgroups. Hypothesized group differences were the same as described in Study 1, and the results provide some support for each hypothesis. Men \((M = 1.97, SD = 0.53)\) reported more sexism on the ISM than did women \((M = 1.50, SD = 0.49)\), \(t(112) = 4.43, p = .0001\); and Caucasians \((M = 1.98, SD = 0.65)\) reported more racism on the ISM than did members of other racial groups \((M = 1.74, SD = 0.54)\), \(t(113) = 2.08, p = .04\). Heterosexuals \((M = 2.14, SD = 0.82)\) reported slightly more sexual prejudice on the ISM than did GLBT individuals \((M = 1.58, SD = 0.55)\), but this difference did not reach conventional levels of significance. Similarly, correlations between classism and SES and between ageism and age did not reach conventional levels of significance.

**Test–Retest Reliability**

A subset of initially surveyed classrooms was revisited 2 weeks after initial data collection. A total of 84 participants (62 female, 22 male) completed the ISM for the purpose of assessing test–retest reliability. Reliability was very good across the total score \((r = .90, p = .0001)\), as well as subscale scores (sexism, \(r = .85, p = .0001\); racism, \(r = .86, p = .0001\); sexual prejudice, \(r = .91, p = .0001\); religious intolerance, \(r = .72, p = .0001\); classism, \(r = .84, p = .0001\); ageism, \(r = .78, p = .0001\)).

**General Discussion**

This project reflects initial attempts to develop a brief self-report measure assessing overall intolerance and containing subscales assessing sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, religious intolerance, classism, and ageism. The results provide support for a six-factor measure with preliminary evidence of criterion validity. Specifically, the results indicate that all six constructs included in the scale could be independently assessed and that each was internally coherent. In addition, the results provide initial support for the criterion validity of the subscales, as the subscale items were strongly correlated with the full-length measures from which they were derived and showed expected relationships with social desirability (significant, but small) and social domination.
Criterion validity for the subscales was further supported by group differences on certain subscales. Specifically, men reported higher sexism, as compared to women; Caucasians reported higher racism, as compared to racially diverse participants; and heterosexuals reported higher sexual prejudice, as compared to gay, lesbian, and bisexual participants. Finally, the results provide evidence for the test–retest reliability of the instrument.

It is notable that support for the psychometric strengths of this scale has been demonstrated across multiple independent samples. Further, participants in the second study represent a fairly diverse group of college students in terms of race, ethnicity, class, and religion. It is noteworthy that constructs of intolerance could be uniquely identified within this sample (although racism appeared to be somewhat less distinct in this sample). These results suggest that while the magnitude of such beliefs may vary across samples, intolerance can be identified in a variety of individuals with many different personal characteristics.

Importantly, aside from the primary scale development focus of the present study, the results provide support for the idea that multiple types of intolerance are unique and interrelated constructs, with some constructs being more highly intercorrelated (e.g., sexism and sexual prejudice; sexism and racism) than others (e.g., ageism and sexual prejudice). Specifically, the factor structure of the ISM and the validity checks conducted here suggest that there are unique facets of intolerance (e.g., sexism, racism, sexual prejudice).

While the constructs studied here appear to be distinct from one another, they are also strongly related to one another and to social dominance orientation. The strong relationship between each ISM subscale score, the ISM total score, and the SDO scale score indicates that there may also be an underlying construct into which each of these variables taps. It is possible that such an underlying construct is a more global type of intolerance, an SDO, or some type of personality factor (e.g., authoritarianism) that was not measured in the present study. In addition to the possibility of an underlying construct, the findings here point to the likelihood that various intolerant attitudes will co-occur. Thus, if someone holds one intolerant attitude, he or she will likely hold multiple intolerant attitudes simultaneously.

The findings have important implications related to measurement of oppressive attitudes in research, education, or clinical/intervention programs. Given the high intercorrelations between the study variables, these findings suggest that individuals who endorse one form of intolerance are likely to endorse multiple forms, thereby supporting the need to assess multiple types of intolerance, even when only one type of intolerance is the construct of interest for a given study. Previously, there was only one measure designed to measure multiple forms of intolerance simultaneously (M-GRISMS; Godfrey et al., 2000).
The M-GRISMS (Godfrey et al., 2000) is an innovative measure in that it assesses multiple intolerant attitudes with one instrument, thereby reducing participant burden. The ISM is quite similar to the M-GRISMS in that it also allows for the assessment of sexism, racism, and religious intolerance with one instrument. However, the ISM and the M-GRISMS differ in that the latter measures heterosexism (i.e., institutional and policy decisions that deny rights), while the former measures primarily sexual prejudice (i.e., negative attitudes), in addition to policy issues. Also, the ISM includes two additional subscales to assess classism and ageism. Thus, the development of the ISM provides researchers, educators, and clinicians with an additional measure for the assessment of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, classism, ageism, and religious intolerance with 54 items (or six 9-item subscales).

The results of the present study provide preliminary support for the ability of the questionnaire to measure six independent oppressive concepts and support for the criterion validity and test–retest reliability of the ISM. This new measure minimizes participant burden, as it contains only 54 items, and at the same time allows for the assessment of six forms of intolerance. The use of several rather large samples from different geographic locations—as well as standardized, reliable, and valid measures for assessment of the constructs of interest—represents an additional strength of the current study.

However, there are also limitations to the current study. For example, the use of college samples in the present studies limits the generalizability of the findings. Specifically, only approximately 23% of the population attends college (U.S. Census, 2000); thus, these findings are most relevant for that group. Similarly, it is important to note that the ISM factor structure held up very well with two predominantly Caucasian, Christian, and heterosexual samples, but not as well with a more diverse sample. Thus, an important limitation of this measure may be limited utility and generalizability to diverse samples.

Also, importantly, all indicants of intolerance are based on self-report. It is important to recognize that individuals may underreport such behaviors (as suggested by our findings with social desirability here) or may not be consciously aware of their own beliefs and how these beliefs impact their behaviors. In spite of these limitations, the results from the present research provide important implications for future research and interventions.

Additional research is needed to replicate these findings in additional samples and with more varied and diverse populations. Further research should also consider whether other intolerant beliefs (e.g., anti-fat attitudes, intolerance of people with disabilities) would be appropriately measured through additional subscales on the ISM. Similarly, exploring the role of politics, upbringing, and personality characteristics in addition to intolerance
might help to better understand the generally intolerant person and thereby create improvements to the ISM.

It will also be important to provide further support for the psychometric properties of the ISM, including both validity and reliability (e.g., administration of the ISM and other measures of sexism, racism, sexual prejudice, classism, ageism, and religious intolerance). In addition, it has been suggested that prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are three facets of intolerance that serve to oppress members of multiple minority groups (Lott & Maluso, 1995). The questionnaires used here are limited in their inclusion of items tapping each of these domains (e.g., sexual prejudice questions assess primarily prejudice; religious intolerance questions assess primarily stereotypes; sexism questions assess primarily discrimination). Additional study would be helpful implementing instruments that assess prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination content across each domain.

Finally, future investigations should explore the relationship between intolerant belief systems and intervention efforts directed at reducing the occurrence of such beliefs. Specifically, it was the goal of the present study to create a measure that might ultimately be helpful for individuals conducting research focused on oppression/intolerance or research that would benefit from the inclusion of measures of intolerant attitudes (even when this may not be a primary question). It is our hope that having a measure such as the ISM will allow researchers to explore issues of intolerance when they might not otherwise do so. We also hope that the ISM will be helpful for people planning education and prevention programs related to reducing intolerance and oppression and will allow for program evaluation when such work is conducted.

References


### Appendix

**Intolerant Schema Measure (ISM)**

Instructions: Please indicate how descriptive each statement is of your beliefs by circling the number that corresponds to your response. (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)

1. MHSL-7: Marriages between two lesbians should be legal. (R)
2. RIS-1: Christians are intolerant of people with other religious beliefs.
3. MEBS-1: People who stay on welfare have no desire to work.
4. MOFRS-5: I favor laws that permit racial minority persons to rent or purchase houses, even when the person offering the property for sale or rent does not wish to sell or rent to minorities. (R)
5. AWS-5: Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.
6. FSA-5: Complex and interesting conversation cannot be expected from most old people.
7. MHSL-19: I don’t mind companies using openly lesbian celebrities to advertise their products. (R)
8. RIS-2: Catholics have a “holier than thou” attitude.
9. MEBS-2: Welfare keeps the nation in debt.
10. MOFRS-4: Racial minorities have more influence on school desegregation plans than they ought to have.
11. AWS-8: It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man to darn socks.
12. FSA-7: Most old people would be considered to have poor personal hygiene.
13. MHSL-21: I don’t think it would negatively affect our relationship if I learned that one of my close relatives was a lesbian. (R)
14. RIS-3: Jewish people are deceitful and money-hungry.
15. MEBS-3: People who don’t make much money are generally unmotivated.
16. MOFRS-8: Racial minorities are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
17. AWS-9: The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the hands of men.
18. FSA-8: Most old people can be irritating because they tell the same stories over and over again.
19. MHSL-23: Lesbians should undergo therapy to change their sexual orientation.
20. RIS-4: Atheists and agnostics are more self-centered than people from other religious groups.
21. MEBS-5: Homeless people should get their acts together and become productive members of society.
22. MOFRS-9: It is a bad idea for racial minorities and Whites to marry one another.
23. AWS-13: In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in bringing up the children.
24. FSA-13: Old people don’t really need to use our community sports facilities.
25. MHSG-3: I welcome new friends who are gay. (R)
26. RIS-5: Muslims are more treacherous than other groups of religious people.
27. MEBS-6: Too many of my tax dollars are spent to take care of those who are unwilling to take care of themselves.
28. MOFRS-10: Racial minorities should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
29. AWS-15: There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over women in being hired or promoted.
30. FSA-15: It is best that old people live where they won’t bother anyone.
31. MHSG-4: I would be sure to invite the same-sex partner of my gay male friend to my party. (R)
32. RIS-6: Wiccan and pagan people practice thinly veiled evil.
33. MEBS-7: If every individual would carry his/her own weight, there would be no poverty.
34. MOFRS-11: If a racial minority family with about the same income and education as I have moved in next door, I would mind a great deal.
35. NS-3: Women shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted.
36. FSA-16: The company of most old people is quite enjoyable. (R)
37. MHSG-9: It’s all right with me if I see two men holding hands. (R)
38. RIS-7: Many of the social problems in the U.S. today are due to non-Christian religious groups.
39. MEBS-8: There are more poor people than wealthy people in prisons because poor people commit more crimes.
40. MOFRS-12: It was wrong for the United States Supreme Court to outlaw segregation in its 1954 decision.
41. NS-6: Women’s requests in terms of equality between the sexes are simply exaggerated.
42. FSA-20: I sometimes avoid eye contact with old people when I see them.
43. MHSG-18: Movies that approve of male homosexuality bother me.
44. RIS-8: The Hindu beliefs about reincarnation results in people not taking responsibility for their actions in this life since there is always the next life.
45. MEBS-9: Poor people are lazy.
46. MOFRS-13: Over the past few years, racial minorities have gotten more economically than they deserve.
47. NS-7: Over the past few years, women have gotten more from government than they deserve.
48. FSA-21: I don’t like it when old people try to make conversation with me.
49. MHSG-22: Gay men want too many rights.
50. RIS-9: Despite what Buddhist people may say, Buddhism isn’t really a religion, but more of a philosophy.
51. MEBS-13: Most poor people are in debt because they can’t manage their money.
52. MOFRS-14: Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to racial minorities than they deserve.
53. NS-8: Universities are wrong to admit women in costly programs such as medicine, when in fact, a large number will leave their jobs after a few years to raise their children.

54. FSA-27: I personally would not want to spend much time with an old person.

Note. MHSL/G = Modern Homophobia Scale Lesbian/Gay (Raja & Stokes, 1998); RIS = Religious Intolerance Scale (Items 1–5 originally developed by Godfrey et al., 2000, and included in M-GRISMS); MEBS = Modified Economic Beliefs Scale (Items 1–3 and Items 5–8 originally developed by Stevenson & Medler, 1995); MOFRS = Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986); AWS = Attitudes Toward Women Scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972); FSA = Fraboni Scale of Ageism (Fraboni et al., 1990); NS = Neosexism Scale (Tougas et al., 1995). Subscale scores are calculated by averaging the 9 items (resulting in a range from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating higher intolerance). A total score is calculated by averaging all 54 items. (R) = reverse-scored item.
Social Psychology and Multiculturalism

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Abstract
Questions of multiculturalism give rise to lively and important debates in many countries and in many spheres of life. Diversity is considered desirable and necessary for the development of secure ethnic identities and positive intergroup relations, but is also challenged for being inequitable and a threat to social cohesion. After considering conceptions of multiculturalism and relevant country differences, the paper discusses social psychological research on multicultural attitudes and the effect of multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Subsequently, three issues are addressed that are central in debates about multiculturalism and that present additional topics for social psychological research. The first concerns the importance of intragroup processes, the second the nature of religious identity and Islam in particular, and the third issue relates to tolerance and civil liberties.

How to incorporate immigrant minorities and how to deal with cultural diversity? That is a question that is hotly debated in many societies and in all kinds of settings, such as cities, neighbourhoods, organizations and schools. One answer to this question is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism comes in many variations but in one way or another they all focus on differences and the benefits of diversity. As a principle, multiculturalism emphasizes equality between and respect for the pluralism of cultures and group identities. Multiculturalism is argued for in terms of positive intergroup relations and ‘productive diversity’ claiming that it represents an important national, organizational or commercial asset. It would also represent a crucial condition for learning and for the development of cultural competence (Fowers & Davidov, 2006). Multiculturalism has also been criticized, for example, for supporting orthodox in-group factions, ignoring internal diversity, as well as legitimizing illiberal internal rules and in-group oppression, particularly of women and children (Barry, 2001; Okin, 1999; Reich, 2002). Furthermore, it has been suggested that multiculturalism can lead to reified and essentialist group distinctions that promote group stereotyping and negative out-group feelings and that endangers social unity and cohesion in society (e.g. Brewer, 1997). Thus, multiculturalism is offered by some scholars as the solution to incorporating immigrants and managing cultural diversity (e.g. Parekh, 2000), while for
others it is in itself an exacerbating cause of conflict (e.g. Huntington, 2004).

What do social psychologists have to say about all this? What kind of multicultural issues do social psychologists examine and what has received less attention? This paper will first discuss some country differences that can have implications for social psychological findings. Then, a short overview of the existing social psychological research on multiculturalism is given with an emphasis on multiculturalism attitudes and intergroup relations. Subsequently, I will discuss three topics that are central in debates about multiculturalism but less so in social psychological research on cultural diversity: intragroup processes, religious identity and tolerance. Many of the research examples that I will give are concerned with the Dutch context. One reason is that most of our research is conducted in this country. Another reason is that the most overt and ambitious European experiment in multiculturalism was developed in the Netherlands but the recent retreat of multiculturalism is also most evident in this country (Joppke, 2004).

Multi-Multiculturalisms

‘Multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ are ubiquitous terms. They are heard in political debates, in the language of ethnic group leaders, in local government strategies and budgets, in educational settings, in health care, in popular media, in commercial marketing and in scientific publications. The widespread use of the terms ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ can be seen as marking a significant change in the discourses in which societies, schools, organizations, and so on, describe and understand themselves. However, given the wide range of actors, contexts, interpretations and usages of these terms, it is apparent that there is no single view or strategy implied. Multiculturalism can mean many things and can refer to practices, policies, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies. The different meanings and interpretations has led to the use of adjectives for distinguishing between forms of multiculturalism, such as ‘critical and difference’ multiculturalism (Turner, 1993), ‘cosmopolitan and pluralist’ multiculturalism (Hollinger, 2000) and ‘liberal and illiberal’ multiculturalism (Appiah, 2005).

In addition, policies and ideologies regarding diversity, minorities and culture vary greatly from one society to another (see Baubock, Heller, & Zolberg, 1996). Societies do not have the same history, the same collective representations of the nation and the same minority groups. These differences can affect processes of integration and people’s attitudes. Social psychological research has shown, for example, that evaluations of multiculturalism and the endorsement of minority rights are influenced by categories of minority groups and the ways in which they are defined (Augoustinos & Quinn, 2003; Verkuyten, 2005a). Not all minority groups
are perceived to have equal moral claims. Multicultural recognition and rights is considered a more appropriate demand for ‘involuntary’ groups (original inhabitants, descendents of slaves, refugees) than for immigrant workers. These immigrants would have waived their demands and rights by voluntary leaving their country of origin. Self-determination implies a personal responsibility for one’s situation and position. Therefore, multiculturalism and minority rights tend to be endorsed less in relation to immigrant workers than in relation to involuntary minorities.

In the beginning of the 1970s, multiculturalism developed into an explicit political strategy in Canada that was formalized in the Multiculturalism Act in the 1980s. The idea spread to other immigration countries such as Australia and the USA, and multiculturalism developed into an official government policy term in the former but not in the latter country. In Australia, the multicultural ideology and policy started to develop in the mid-1970s and was directed against the idea of assimilation of immigrants and the, at the time, existing White Australian Policy. In the USA, the debate on multiculturalism is influenced by the civil rights movement, affirmative action policies, the ‘cultural wars’ in universities and education more generally, and minority-focused identity politics and politics of recognition.

Canada, Australia and the USA are settler societies or traditional countries of immigration. These countries are largely composed of immigrants and (in part) cultural diversity is a defining characteristic of these nations. Particularly in Canada and Australia, there have been attempts to equate ‘national’ with ‘multicultural’. This implies the possibility of a positive association between national identification and the endorsement of multiculturalism. In contrast, in most European countries, there is a long history of established majority groups and issues of integration and cultural diversity are relatively novel. Immigration does not play a role in the national self-image making it more difficult for immigrants to be included and to ‘belong’. European multiculturalism is not so much an identity option for society as a whole but has always been for immigrants and ethnic minorities only. This means that in European countries, there is more often a negative association between national identification and multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2005b). Furthermore, cross-national acculturation research has found a positive association between national and ethnic minority group identification in settler countries, but a negative association in non-settler, European societies (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006).

However, there are also important differences between European countries. For example, it has been argued that in France there is little room for multiculturalism because the republican ideology focuses on individuals as citizens and tries to ‘make Frenchmen out of foreigners’ (Withol de Wenden, 2004). In contrast, countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands have taken a more supporting view on diversity. As early as 1968, the British Home Secretary Roy Jenkins made a famous
speech in which he advocated a model of integration ‘not as a flattening process of uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Vertovec, 1998, 29). A state-sponsored ‘race relations’ industry emerged, backed by anti-discrimination legislation, and an emphasis on racial equality. Race was adopted as a category to address minority group disadvantages and was also meant to include immigrants of the Indian Subcontinent.

In the Netherlands, a policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the 1980s in response to the increased influx of ‘foreigners’. The recognition that many ‘guest worker’ migrants would remain in the country led to a policy for ‘integration with retention of the own identity’ (Entzinger, 2003, 63). Dutch policies saw immigrants according to their group membership and not primarily as individuals. The ‘pillarization’ tradition of institutionalized pluralism provided a wide range of cultural opportunities and group rights, such as local voting rights for non-nationals and public funding of Islamic schools. However, much has changed since the 1980s. The previous ‘ethnic minorities policy’ has gradually been replaced by a policy of civic integration with an emphasis on knowledge of Dutch society and command of the Dutch language (Entzinger, 2003). In public debates, multiculturalism has been described as a ‘drama’ and a ‘failure’, and assimilation has been proposed as the only viable option (e.g. Schnabel, 2000). This change in political and ideological discourse can have an impact on attitudes towards minority groups and on the patterns of group identification among these groups (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005).

**Multiculturalism Attitudes**

Social psychologists have tended to examine multiculturalism in terms of attitudes and ideologies. Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes indicate that the general support for multiculturalism is not very strong among majority groups in many Western countries. Apart from Canada where majority members have been found to favour multiculturalism (e.g. Berry & Kalin, 1995), studies in other countries have found moderate support, such as in Australia, (e.g. Ho, 1990) and the USA (e.g. Critin Sears, Muste, & Wong, 2001; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2006), or low support, such as in Germany, Switzerland, Slovakia and the Netherlands (e.g. Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Pionkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzáek, 2000; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998; Zick, Wagner, van Dick, & Petzel, 2001).

Multiculturalism is not only about the majority group accepting and recognizing minority groups, but implies acceptance and recognition on the part of minorities too. Some studies have examined the endorsement of multiculturalism among ethnic minority group members. In many (European) countries, multiculturalism is typically seen as identity threatening for the majority group and identity supporting for minority groups. For
minority groups, multiculturalism offers the possibility of maintaining their own culture and obtaining higher social status in society. Majority group members, on the other hand, may see ethnic minorities and their desire to maintain their own culture as a threat to their cultural dominance and group identity. Following social psychological theories that emphasize the role of group status and interests in the dynamics of intergroup relations (e.g. Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it can be expected that groups are more in favour of multiculturalism when they see gains for themselves. Hence, it is likely that multiculturalism appeals more to ethnic minority groups than to majority group members, who in turn endorse assimilation more strongly. Several studies in different countries have confirmed this expectation (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Verkuyten, 2005a, b, c; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006; Wolsko et al., 2006), including a study examining multicultural attitudes among majority and immigrant groups in 21 European countries (Schalk-Soekar, 2007). This group difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism is even stronger among majority and minority individuals who identify relatively strong with their own ethnic group (e.g. Simon, 2004; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006).

This difference in attitudes towards multiculturalism can lead to problematic relational outcomes. A lack of reciprocal attitudes and beliefs with minority groups favouring multiculturalism and majority groups putting more emphasis on assimilation may hamper the realization of a positively diverse and equal society. Acculturation research has traditionally focused on immigrants’ cultural changes and acculturation strategies (Berry, 2006). The outcome of the acculturation process depends not only on the immigrants’ attitudes but also on the host society’s preferences and ideas about what immigrants should do. In their interactive acculturation model, Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal (1997) argue that intergroup relations between immigrants and majority groups are best predicted by the relative fit of immigrant strategy preferences and host society strategy preferences. According to this model, the fit can be consensual, problematic or conflictual. Research has shown that an increased mismatch between host and immigrant preferred strategies yields more negative intergroup relations (e.g. Pionkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

**Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations**

A central aim of multiculturalism is to provide and promote a context for group acceptance and recognition. According to Berry (2006), multiculturalism tries to create a feeling of confidence among everyone living in a plural society. This confidence involves a sense of trust and acceptance of the other. In contrast, a lack of confidence implies feelings of threat and increased rejection of out-groups. Thus, multiculturalism is expected to
contribute to favourable intergroup relations. There is supporting evidence for this in educational settings (e.g., Hogan & Mallott, 2005) and also in social psychological research. Using survey data in the USA, Wolsko et al. (2006), for example, found that people who endorse multiculturalism see ethnic groups as more different from each other, but at the same time, view ethnic out-groups in a more positive manner. Thus, the group thinking inherent in multiculturalism seems to promote perceived group differences as well as a reduced tendency to evaluate the in-group more positively than the out-group. This latter association differs, however, between majority and minority groups. The endorsement of multiculturalism was associated with lesser evaluative bias for majority group participants than for ethnic minorities. Furthermore, in two studies in the Netherlands, it was found that the more strongly ethnic minority members endorsed the ideology of multiculturalism, the more likely they were to evaluate the in-group positively. In contrast, the more the Dutch majority participants endorsed multiculturalism the more likely they tended to be to evaluate the out-group positively (Verkuyten, 2005b).

These associations do not tell us anything about causal effects. A few experimental studies have directly examined the effects of multiculturalism on intergroup relations. Wolsko and colleagues (2000), for example, examined the impact of exposure to multicultural and colour-blind ideologies on intergroup judgements among white participants in the USA. They found stronger stereotyping and greater use of category information in their multicultural condition compared to colour-blindness. In addition, compared to the control participants, there was less pro-white attitudinal bias in both ideological conditions. Richeson and Nussbaum (2004) also studied white participants, examining them for automatic and explicit forms of racial attitudes. Participants exposed to a message endorsing colour-blindness showed greater racial bias on both forms of racial attitudes than those exposed to a message endorsing a multicultural perspective.

Both these studies were limited to white participants and the American context. In two studies in the Netherlands, an experimental questionnaire design was used in which multicultural and assimilation ideology were made salient in separate conditions (Verkuyten, 2005b). Multicultural recognition emphasizes a positive view of cultural maintenance by ethnic minority groups and acknowledges the distinctive identities of these groups. Hence, it can be expected that exposure to multicultural messages affects majority group members’ out-group evaluation and minority group members’ in-group evaluation particularly. Thus, the minority group participants were expected to show more positive in-group evaluation in the multicultural experimental condition than in the assimilation condition. In contrast, the majority group participants were expected to show less positive out-group evaluation in the assimilation condition than in the multicultural condition. The results of both studies were in agreement with the expectations. Hence, for both groups of
participants, multiculturalism was related primarily to the evaluation of the ethnic minority group rather than the majority group. This is in agreement with the multiculturalism discussion in the Netherlands and in other West European countries that focuses on the identity and societal position of ethnic minority groups.

These findings indicate that multiculturalism can have positive effects on intergroup relations, particularly for the evaluation of ethnic minority groups. However, multiculturalism raises many additional issues that have received less attention of social psychologists. Intragroup processes, the role of religious identity and (in)tolerance of concrete practices are among the more important issues and present three directions for social psychological research on multiculturalism.

**Intragroup Processes**

Research on multiculturalism tends to focus on intergroup issues in which minority group acceptance, recognition and positive evaluation are key terms. This is in agreement with social psychological perspectives, such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994), that are centrally concerned with relations between groups that differ in position, status or power. However, multiculturalism has important intragroup implications and is fuelled by dynamics inside cultural communities. Group identities are fundamentally shaped by interactions with co-ethnics and by discourses about ethnic and cultural authenticity (Verkuyten, 2005c). Ethnic minority group membership involves issues of in-group acceptance and support as well as in-group obligations and pressures. Furthermore, multiculturalism has been criticized for supporting and justifying conservatism and repressive in-group practices (e.g. Barry, 2001). The emphasis on cultural maintenance and equality of cultures and the recognition of cultural diversity can legitimize, for example, the inequality of women (e.g. Okin, 1999) and authoritarian and insular childrearing practices (Reich, 2002).

In multiculturalism, a communitarian perspective is typically taken. Constituent cultural communities would provide the central context within which identities are shaped and the moral framework for self-understanding is provided. Only through having access to their own culture, the argument goes, people would have access to a range of meaningful options and, therefore, would be able to develop a secure and positive sense of self (Parekh, 2000). Hence, a particular group identity is prioritized and the recognition of this identity would sustain feelings of self-respect and self-esteem. But what about individuals that do not (want to) identify with their ethnic minority group but emphasize personal autonomy and individualism? For them, the group thinking inherent in multiculturalism and the emphasis on cultural identities might be
threatening. Individual mobility, for example, implies a disidentification with the ethnic in-group and a focus on personal characteristics and qualities as a basis of positive self-esteem. Among ethnic minority group members, individualism has been found to be negatively related to the endorsement of multiculturalism (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). Furthermore, in two experimental studies, it was found that multiculturalism does provide an unfavourable context for low minority group identifiers to feel good about themselves (Verkuyten, 2007a). Thus, multicultural recognition has something to offer to high minority group identifiers but appears to be threatening to the self-esteem of low group identifiers.

Multiculturalism is not only problematic for some minority individuals but also tends to recognize and legitimize a particular version of group cultures, one that holds sway in more traditional circles. The focus is on cultural communities and their ‘essential’ or authentic group identity. Social psychological research has shown that for ethnic minority groups, a stronger endorsement of multiculturalism is associated with higher perceived in-group essentialism (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). Cultural essentialism allows multicultural notions to be used for claiming the right to cultural identity and the recognition of fundamental differences. The deconstruction of ethnicity and an emphasis on internal cultural heterogeneity is not very useful for those who want to make group claims and mobilize around notions of cultural recognition and rights. As a result ‘many exponents of identity politics are fundamentalists – in the language of the academy, “essentialists”’ (Gitlin, 1995, 164), and ‘in basing itself on relatively permanent groups ... [multiculturalism] mirror[s] the very prejudices it opposes’ (Wrong, 1997, 298). In multiculturalist policies and practices, there is a tendency of essentialist group thinking and to ignore the internal diversity and the critical, but less powerful, voices within communities. The notion of a singular ‘ethnic or cultural community’ belies the internal differences and tensions that exists and contradicts the liberal ideal of individual choice and voice.

Thus, there are many important and interesting intragroup issues that social psychologist can and should study when examining issues of multiculturalism. Rather than taking cultural groups and identities for granted social psychologists should examine how group understandings are produced and shaped by various community members in a vibrant field of identity debates and positions.

Religion

Discussions about multiculturalism and group rights often subsume the question of religion under those of cultural diversity or explicitly exclude religion from the politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994). Multiculturalism tends to exclude faith and faith identities (Modood & Ahmad, 2007), and the same can be said about acculturation research. Questions of diversity,
however, are increasingly questions of religious diversity. In particular, Islam has emerged as the focus of immigration and diversity debates in Europe (Zolberg & Long, 1999). This is illustrated by the Rushdie affair in Britain, the headscarf controversy in France, the debate about the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, and the national debates about Islamic schools and the place of other Islamic institutions, practices and claims within the deeply embedded secularism of most liberal democracies. It is clear that Islam has moved to the centre of debates and politics in European countries and is at the heart of what is perceived as a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’ (Modood & Ahmad, 2007). The Dutch majority, for example, considers ‘unequal’ gender practices and some family practices among Muslims as morally wrong, whereas Muslim immigrants reject the corresponding ‘liberal’ practices of the Dutch (e.g. Sniderman & Hagedoorn, 2007). Both groups see the same differences in, for example, family practices and values but evaluate these in opposite terms. A recent nation wide survey showed that 50% of the Dutch as well as 50% of the Muslim immigrants consider the Western and Muslim way of life as opposites that do not go together (Gijsberts, 2005).

Religious differences are increasingly being seen as contradictory and insurmountable. Muslim minorities know that the majority group reject some of their values and practices and the majority group knows that Muslims reject some of theirs. The result is a situation in which, for example, more than half of the Dutch majority population declares to have unfavourable opinions about Muslims (Pew Project, 2005), and more than half of Dutch Muslims report to have clear negative feelings towards Jews and non-believers (Verkuyten, 2007b). As Sniderman and Hagedoorn (2007, 26) conclude from their large-scale research ‘there are parallel barriers of prejudice: a desire of many Western Europeans to hold Muslims at a distance combined with a desire of Muslims to keep their distance’.

Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, Phalet and Güngör (2004) found that Islam was considered ‘very meaningful and important’ in one’s life by 87% of the Turkish and 96% of the Moroccan population. In addition, around two thirds of the Turks and Moroccans had a very strong Muslim identity. Furthermore, in two Dutch studies (Verkuyten, 2007b; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), it was found that around half of the Muslim participants had the highest possible score on a Muslim identification measure that consisted of six items that are commonly used in social psychological research (e.g. ‘My Muslim identity is an important part of my self’, and ‘I identify strongly with Muslims’). Furthermore, around 45% had the highest possible score on statements such as ‘the fact that I am a Muslim is the most important thing in my life’, and ‘being a Muslim is the only thing that really matters in my life’. These scores indicate ceiling level group identification and shows that it can be problematic to follow the standard practice in social psychological research
and treat group identification as a continuous variable. For the great majority of Muslims, Muslim identity is a given and not being a Muslim is not a real option. The same has been found in studies in Brussels, Belgium (Phalet, 2004), and in other European countries (Haddad & Smith, 2001; Vertovec & Rogers, 1999).

The strong Muslim identification found is probably related to global and national developments. The increased global tensions and divergences between the Western and Islamic world forces European Muslims to a position of having to defend and stress their religion. In addition, the public condemnation of Islam and the plea for assimilation in the Netherlands has increased the salience and importance of Muslim identification (Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). Islamic immigrant groups face high levels of threat to the value of their religious identity that leads to increased in-group identification among these groups and a politicized religious identity.

However, the total religious identification found is probably also related to the nature of monotheistic religions in general, and Islam in particular. Religion is often of profound importance to people’s lives and religious groups are among the more salient buttresses of identity. As argued by Seul (1999, 553), religions ‘supply cosmologies, moral frameworks, institutions, rituals, traditions, and other identity-supporting content that answers to individuals’ needs for psychological stability in the form of a predictable world, a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and even self-actualization’. Very strong Muslim identification among West European immigrants was also found in the 1990s when the religious group tensions were much less (e.g. Modood et al., 1997). In addition, being a Muslim seems to imply a normative group commitment that is related to Islamic religion. For many Muslims, the declaration of faith (Shahada) in front of two witnesses symbolizes one’s belief and commitment to Islam: one either is a Muslim who is committed to Islam or one is not. Religion is about convictions and divine truths, and for most observant believers, the core of the religious identity is non-negotiable making the idea of religious changes or compromises an oxymoron.

The success of multiculturalism depends on the existence of a larger society to which all groups belong. The recognition and valuing of group identities requires a sense of shared commonalities. Thus, a key question is whether it is possible to be at the same time a Muslim and a member of a (European) nation. Are Muslims accepted as co-nationals and do they want to belong? These questions are, of course, related because people who feel accepted do more easily want to belong. For the majority group, the question of loyalty to the nation is often central. Suspicions of disloyalty or a lack of commitment of European Muslims show up everywhere in society, in many countries, and seem to have a basis in reality. Almost half of the non-Muslim Dutch majority believe that Muslim immigrants are loyal to their country of origin and not to the
Netherlands (Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007). As a kind of mirror image, around 50% of Dutch Muslims have been found to have low identification with the Dutch, and around 40% showed high disidentification in which a so-called oppositional identity is developed (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). In addition, research has found that, for example, in Great Britain and Germany, the great majority of Muslims consider themselves primarily a Muslim rather than a citizen of their country (Pew Project, 2006).

Thus, many Muslim minorities wish to live in liberal Western societies but not really be part of them. One important reason is that they feel rejected and discriminated making them turn away from the society in which they live and even the Western world in general. This seems especially likely among young Muslims who have been born and raised, and are fully integrated in society, but feel that they are not really accepted and considered to belong (Buijs, Demant, & Hamdy, 2006). The patterns of racist exclusion and ethnic nationalism in many European countries do not make it easy to be a Muslim and a national at the same time. Another reason is that some Muslims argue that their religious tenets conflict with principles of a liberal democracy and, therefore, that they are not bound by these principles. A ‘true’ Islam is defined in contrast to Western thinking and a ‘true’ Muslim must distance him– or herself from the West. There is a clear conflict within Muslim groups between a growing minority that does not accept the norms of Western democracy and a moderate majority that does (Mirza, Senthilkumaran, & Ja’far, 2007). There is also growing evidence and concern about the increasing anti-Semitism and intolerance of sexual freedoms and homosexuals among Muslims living in Western countries (Schoenfeld, 2004). Compromises on the issue of sexuality is unacceptable for many Muslims who want to maintain their Islamic identities.

In Europe, questions of multiculturalism are increasingly questions of religious differences, and Islam in particular. Social psychology has paid relatively little attention to the nature of religious identity and to interreligious relations (but see, for example, Cairns, Kenworthy, Campbell, & Hewstone, 2006; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005; Verkuyten, 2007b). This is unfortunate because religion is an important dimension for developing a positive social identity and religion is an important factor in social divisions and conflicts in many societies around the world. In addition, a study of religious identification can make a contribution to our thinking about the important process of group identification. For example, by questioning the standard practice of assuming that group identification is a continuous variable or a matter of degree.

Tolerance

Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on multiculturalism attitudes, stereotypes and intergroup attitudes. Typically,
people are asked how they perceive and evaluate ethnic out-groups and it is examined whether an emphasis on the importance of acknowledging and respecting cultural diversity improves intergroup relations. Commentators and politicians, however, express worries about the relationship between democracy and multiculturalism. Cultural and religious pluralism is identified as an important obstacle for democratization because people can develop attachments to groups that are, in one way or another, inimical to democracy. This would be symbolized by the debate on free speech in relation to the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad, the fatwa against the British novelist Salman Rushdie, and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. In Great Britain, a recent survey showed that 28% of Muslim youth prefer to live under sharia law and 42% agreed that sharia law is absolute and should not be interpreted to fit in with Western values (Mirza et al., 2007). Furthermore, 56% agreed that a Muslim women may not marry a non-Muslim, and 36% believed that apostasy is forbidden and punishable by death.

The hotly debated questions and issues related to multiculturalism are about concrete practices and actions. Should it be allowed that Sikhs wear a turban rather than a helmet on construction sites or a crash helmet when riding a motorcycle; should the practice of forced marriages among some immigrant groups be accepted; should it be accepted that Muslim teachers refuse to shake hands with children’s parents of the opposite sex; should very light forms of female circumcision (sunna) be allowed; should all images of pigs be banned from pictures in public offices because these might offend Muslims’ feelings; should it be allowed that civil servants wear a headscarf and that students wear a burqa or a niqab. It is around these concrete questions that multiculturalism is put to the test and ways of life can collide.

Social psychological research tends to focus on group perceptions and evaluations, and on the endorsement of multiculturalism, assimilation and colour-blindness as abstract ideological notions and principles. However, as is well known from attitude research (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), principle considerations differ from (the lack of) support for practical implications and situations. Studies on political thinking and behaviour, for example, show that people tend to support democratic rights in the abstract but often do not endorse the same rights in concrete circumstances (see Vogt, 1997). It is one thing to endorse the freedom of speech and demonstration in general, and another thing to apply these freedoms to, for example, radical Muslim groups living in a secular or Christian country. In trying to maximize the relevance and validity of research, social psychology should examine how people perceive and reason about these concrete issues. For example, by focusing on the topic of (political) tolerance and by using questionnaires as well as experimental designs.

Tolerance can be conceptualized in various ways, such as the valuing and celebrating of difference, the absence of prejudice and the putting up
with something that one disapproves of or is prejudiced against. The latter meaning of tolerance is a key condition for citizenship and democracy (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). Tolerance for dissenting beliefs and practices is not the absence of prejudice but rather a separate construct that emphasizes forbearance and not begrudging other people their own ways. Tolerance is an option when one dislikes something or someone and is the opposite of discrimination; when one endures or refrains from action although other’s beliefs and practices are disapproved of or rejected. This kind of tolerance is crucial because it is the first and necessary step towards civility and a foundation for a diverse and just society (Vogt, 1997). People may disagree with one another, may have stereotypes and prejudiced attitudes but should at least agree about how to disagree. Historically, the concept of tolerance evolved from efforts to deal with the harmful and violent effects of religious conflicts (Sullivan & Transue, 1999). The presence of a great number of Muslims in Western European countries has given a renewed urgency to the idea of tolerance as a mechanism for dealing with diversity.

It is often argued that freedoms and rights characterize Western democratic societies and are of minimal concern to Muslims, or even contradictory to Islam (see Turiel, 2002). The right-based morality of Western societies would differ from the duty-based morality of Islam. There are some empirical findings that seem to support this line of thinking. These findings indicate that European Muslims are much less tolerant for dissenting beliefs and practices and for freedom of speech than non-Muslims. Among a representative sample from the city of Rotterdam, it was found, for example, that 75% of the ethnic Dutch, but only around 10% of the Turkish and Moroccan Muslims, agreed that it should be allowed that a magazine uses drawings and words to make God and religion ridiculous (Phalet & Güngör, 2004). This suggests that, compared to the ethnic Dutch, the two Muslim groups endorse core principles of civil liberties much less.

However, for two reasons these kind of findings should be interpreted with great care. First, developmental and political science research has shown that tolerance is not a global construct. Tolerance depends on whom, what and when people are asked to tolerate dissenting beliefs and practices. For example, Wainryb, Shaw, and Maianu (1998) found that adolescents tolerated the holding of beliefs about harmful practices more than acting on these beliefs, and that they were more tolerant towards dissenting information than dissenting moral values. The same has been found in an experimental study among ethnic Dutch adolescents examining tolerant judgements of Muslims’ political rights and dissenting beliefs and practices (Verkuyten & Sloo ter, 2007a). Participants took into account various aspects of what they were asked to tolerate and the sense in which they should be tolerant. The type of actor, the nature of the social implication of the behaviour, and the underlying belief type all
made a difference to the tolerant judgements. For example, the level of tolerance was lower when the social implications were greater, and participants were more tolerant of practices based on dissenting informational beliefs than on dissenting moral beliefs. Furthermore, participants were more tolerant of people campaigning for public support for a particular practice (e.g. differential treatment of sons and daughters) than for the actual act itself.

The intergroup context is the second reason why findings on the endorsement of civil liberties by Muslims should be interpreted with care. In another study, we examined how non-Muslim and Muslim adolescents living in the Netherlands reason about civil liberties, including free speech, using concrete cases and publicly debated issues (Verkuyten & Slooter, 2007b). The differences found between the Muslim and non-Muslim participants were in agreement with their specific group positions in Dutch society. The rejection of freedom of speech was stronger among the Muslim than the non-Muslim participants when it involved offending God and religion and when it concerned Islam. Their support for civil liberties were quite similar to non-Muslims, however, when their religious group was not at stake but involved, for example, general psychological and physical harm. Thus, the results did not support the idea that freedoms and rights are of little concern to Muslims or contradictory to Islam (see also Turiel & Wainryb, 1998).

These findings for tolerance and civil liberties show that it is important to examine the social reasoning behind the evaluation of cultural practices. Social psychological research on multiculturalism tends to focus on stereotypes and group evaluations. What is also needed, however, is an understanding of the underlying criteria that people use to determine whether particular acts and practices are acceptable. Social domain theory (see Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 2002), for example, proposes that people use moral (e.g. fairness, justice), social–conventional (e.g. group norms, traditions) and psychological (e.g. self-understanding, preferences) reasoning to evaluate and reason about specific behaviours and situations. Hence, a combination of social psychological intergroup theories and social domain theory (see Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2005) might improve our understanding of the many and hotly debated multicultural controversies.

**Conclusion**

Multiculturalism is concerned with complex issues that involve many questions and dilemmas. There are promises and there are important pitfalls. Considering the psychological and social importance of ethnic and racial identities, a focus on groups and group differences is understandable and, to a certain extent, useful, for example, for improving intergroup relations. It can, however, also lead to a situation in which these identities
become overwhelming or unidimensional and society, out-groups and in-groups oblige people to place this particular identity in the forefront of their minds and make it central in their behaviour. Multiculturalism can turn into an obsession with differences and group identities, leading to a widening of divisions between groups and a hampering of individual choices and opportunities.

Multiculturalism is about the delicate balance between recognizing differences and developing meaningful communalities, between differential treatment and equality, between group identities and individual liberties. There are different kinds of diversity and different forms of multiculturalism that try to accommodate cultural differences. Some differences are relatively easy to accept and to recognize, but others go against moral convictions and basic premises of society. There are limits to pluralism and moral diversity as there are limits to tolerance and what is acceptable. Tolerance does not imply the relativism found in some forms of multiculturalism that celebrate diversity and argue that one should refrain from value judgements in assessing other groups. Tolerance always has limits and does not imply a full acceptance and valuing of all social practices of other groups, such as potentially harmful activities, illiberal internal rules and undemocratic actions.

The debate on the way to manage cultural diversity continues and social psychologists increasingly try to make a contribution to these debates. In doing so, it is important to examine not only ethnic and cultural identities and intergroup relations, but also to focus on differences within groups and intragroup processes, on the ways that religious identities are understood and used in society and for organizing collective action, and on people’s reasoning about tolerance and civil liberties related to concrete dissenting practices and behaviours.

**Short Biography**

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**Endnote**

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**References**


Religious diversity and religious toleration

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Awareness of religious diversity is nothing new under the sun. The early Christian martyrs were doubtless aware that others in the Roman Empire did not share their religious beliefs. Yet it is arguable that awareness of religious diversity has recently assumed qualitatively new forms. Among the factors that might account for this transformation is the increased contact people now have with religions other than their own. Modern technologies of travel and communication foster interchanges between adherents of different religions. Modern scholarship has made available translations of and commentaries on texts from a variety of religious traditions, and cultural anthropologists have recorded fascinating thick descriptions of the practices of many such traditions. People who live in religiously pluralistic democracies have ample opportunities to acquire personal familiarity with religions other than their own without leaving home. It now is therefore harder than it once was to hang onto negative stereotypes of or rationalize hostile reactions to the practitioners of religions other than one’s own. But many people succeed in doing so; increased contact often enough produces greater friction. News media have bombarded us with the sights and sounds of religious conflict in Belfast, Beirut and Bosnia. In Africa Muslims clash with animists, in India Hindus and Muslims struggle bitterly, and in Europe Catholic Croats go to war with Orthodox Serbs. The city of Jerusalem remains a focal point for religious quarrels among Jews, Christians and Muslims. In the eighteenth century, Kant complained that the history of Christianity could justify Lucretius’s exclamation, tantum religio potuit suadere malorum! At the beginning of the twenty-first century, support for Lucretius comes from several religions and many parts of the world. The religions of the world may be able to understand one another better now than ever before, but their ability to live together in peace still has not yet been secured.

Recent philosophical work that is responsive to the contemporary challenge of religious diversity has centered in the areas of epistemology and political philosophy. In epistemology, the main issue has been whether or not, given what we now know about religious diversity, exclusivism remains a defensible position. Exclusivism is the view that one religion is basically correct and all the others go astray in one or more ways. It has several dimen-
sions. Doctrinal exclusivism is the view that the doctrines of one religion are mostly true while the doctrines of all the others, where there is conflict, are false. Soteriological exclusivism is the view that only the path proposed by one religion leads securely to the ultimate religious goal, salvation or liberation. And experiential exclusivism is the view that the religious experiences typically enjoyed by the adherents of one religion are mostly veridical and conflicting experiences typical of all the others are nonveridical. It is, of course, entirely consistent to accept exclusivism in one of these dimensions while rejecting it in another. For example, some Christians who are doctrinal exclusivists hold that salvation is available to devout members of other religious traditions, though such Christians often insist that, unbeknownst to those outside Christianity, their salvation comes through Jesus Christ. Starting from the observation that, as far as we can tell empirically, all the world religions are more or less equal in their salvific efficacy, that is, their ability to transform their practitioners from being self-centered to being centered on a transcendent reality, John Hick has mounted a powerful attack on exclusivism in all three dimensions. While admitting that religious diversity does, or at least can, undermine the epistemic credentials of experiential or doctrinal exclusivism to some extent, William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have replied with arguments aimed at showing that Christian exclusivism of some sort continues to enjoy an epistemic status high enough to make it a rational option even when religious diversity is taken into account. And other philosophers have added their voices to the discussion of this issue. In my opinion, the debate on this topic has more or less reached a stand off. The positions that are live philosophical options have been fairly thoroughly mapped out, and the main arguments for and against each of them have been developed in some detail. I doubt that there is a realistic prospect of the issue which divides exclusivists from their philosophical opponents being decisively settled or even moved appreciably closer to a resolution by additional arguments.3

One might think of exclusivism of another kind as the chief problem addressed by the response to religious diversity within contemporary political philosophy. In this case, exclusivism is the view, advocated by several liberal political philosophers, that religion ought to be excluded from the public square in modern liberal democracies. More precisely, political exclusivists hold that religious arguments should be excluded from the public political discourse of religiously pluralistic democratic societies on certain fundamental questions.4 Robert Audi has argued vigorously for a version of exclusivism that includes a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or policy that restricts conduct unless one has and is willing to offer adequate secular reason for such advocacy or support. Appealing to grounds of fairness, Nicholas Wolterstorf has challenged Audi’s position
and forcefully criticized the general exclusivist point of view of which it is an instance. The most nuanced liberal exclusion of the religious so far developed is contained in the political philosophy of John Rawls. According to its ideal of public reason, which imposes a duty of civility, we are not to introduce into public political discourse on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, religious doctrines all being understood to be comprehensive, unless we satisfy the proviso that we do so in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself. My impression is that, unlike the debate about exclusivism in epistemology, this dispute remains in flux to some extent and has not yet reached a stand off. Confirming evidence for this impression may be derived from the fact that Rawls has modified his position to allow that reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced into public political discussions at any time subject to the proviso that in due course reasons in compliance with the ideal of public reason are presented to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines were invoked to support. To be sure, the modified view still has a proviso attached, but it is more permissive than the proviso of the original view and so is less likely to raise the hackles of religious citizens of a democracy.

I confess I find it a bit odd that the main response to religious diversity in recent liberal political philosophy has focused on the issue of whether or not religious argument should be excluded from public discourse. Given the widespread religious conflict mentioned previously, I cannot help thinking that religious toleration is a more urgent global political issue and that the rather narrow focus on religious discourse in liberal democracies is a bit parochial. I have some ideas about factors that may contribute to explaining the narrow focus, though they are somewhat speculative. One factor is fear of divisiveness. It would be natural to search for moral grounds for constraints on the use of religious arguments in the public square if one were afraid that in a religiously divided society their use would be likely to be destabilizing. Jeffrey Stout expressed such fear not so long ago. Arguing against Basil Mitchell’s proposal that traditional theism be employed in order to revitalize public discourse, Stout claims that ‘the risks of reviving religious conflict like that of early modern Europe are too great’. I myself reckon that the probability of reigniting the Wars of Religion by including religious arguments in public political discourse is quite low, and so I think that such fear, however real it may be, is unrealistic. It seems to me that, even if the practice of religious toleration in Western democracies is no more than a modus vivendi, it is supported both by the settled habits of religious citizens and by the weight of their traditions to a degree that lends it great robustness. Another factor that may play an explanatory role is complacency about the historical achieve-
ments of political philosophy. It would be understandable if people saw no
need for new arguments to clinch the case for religious tolerance because
they thought conclusive arguments were already available in the classic works
of liberal political philosophy. One might, for example, look to John Locke’s
work as a source of arguments for religious toleration. According to Locke,
religious persecution is bound to be ineffective and hence is irrational because
its goal is to get people to adopt different religious beliefs and people do not
have direct voluntary control over their religious beliefs. However, as Jeremy
Waldron has recently shown Locke’s case for this position falls apart under
critical scrutiny, and there is no way to reconstruct it to meet the objections.
Or one might look to John Stuart Mill for an argument for religious toleration
that at least is successful by utilitarian standards. But David Lewis has
shown that Mill will lose his case if he argues against a clever utilitarian
religious Inquisitor. So complacency about the justification of religious
tolerance is, I think, unwarranted.

My main aim in this paper is to broaden the focus of the discussion of
religious diversity in political philosophy to include arguments against reli-
gious intolerance. I shall not try to refurbish the arguments of Locke or Mill;
indeed, I shall depart altogether from the British historical tradition of liberal
thought. I shall instead exploit the historical resources of a continental tradi-
tion of liberal thought by examining arguments against religious intolerance
developed by Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. I choose these particular
arguments for scrutiny because they enable me to reach a secondary goal,
which is to bring the discussion of religious diversity in political philosophy
into contact with the discussion in epistemology and to try to establish some
connections between them. The idea that there should be such connections
has been rendered intuitively vivid by Avishai Margalit. He draws attention
to the parable of the three rings, made famous in Lessing’s play Nathan the
Wise. In Margalit’s version of the story, a king leaves a legacy of three rings
in his three sons; one of the rings is of great value while the other two are
no more than good imitations. The religious analogy is clear. The king is
God; the real ring is revealed truth; and the three sons are Moses, Jesus and
Muhammad. Reflecting on the parable, Margalit points out that, apart from
the king, ‘no one else knows for certain which ring is the real one. This doubt
should lead to an attitude of “respect and suspect”, because it is possible that
the truth is in another religion’. It is precisely the connection Margalit sees
between epistemic uncertainty and the relatively tolerant attitude of respect
and suspect that interests me. I propose to explore that connection and to try
to clarify what its implications are through an examination of the arguments
of Bayle and Kant. I do not pretend to return a final verdict on the general line
of philosophical thought to which those arguments are meant to contribute.
In this paper, I shall ignore some of the issues that have been prominent in other recent treatments of toleration in political philosophy. I am not going to investigate the topic of whether ordinary language marks a conceptual distinction between toleration and tolerance. Nor do I plan to take a stand on whether it is a necessary truth that one can only tolerate things one views as bad or evil. I do not have a definition or an analysis of toleration to offer. I shall work with an intuitive notion of religious intolerance that has within its extension behaviors such as killing people for heresy or apostasy, forced conversions and preventing people from engaging collectively in worship. My interest here is restricted to the fairly specific topic of the ethical or moral status of such intolerant behaviors.¹⁴

The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. In the first, I rehearse arguments about the negative epistemic consequences of religious diversity. The other two parts address the question of what impact the conclusions of such arguments might have on further arguments against intolerance. The second part subjects to critical analysis an argument by Bayle; the third does the same to an argument of Kant.

1. Alston and others on religious diversity

William P. Alston acknowledges that religious diversity gives rise to an epistemological problem for his view that experience of God confers prima facie justification or beliefs about how God is manifested to the experiencer. He defends this view from within the perspective of a doxastic practice approach to epistemology.¹⁵ A doxastic practice is a practice of forming beliefs together with a series of possible overiders for the prima facie justification a belief derives from having been generated by the practice. Doxastic practices are to be evaluated, from an epistemic point of view, in terms of their likelihood of producing true beliefs, that is, in terms of their reliability. Basic doxastic practices, for example, sense perception, are socially established practices whose reliability cannot be established in a noncircular manner. Alston thinks it rational to grant prima facie acceptance to all basic doxastic practices that are not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified from rational acceptance. In other words, basic practices are innocent until proven guilty. He also observes that a practice’s claim to rational acceptance is strengthened if it enjoys self-support. When he turns his attention to the religious realm, he supposes that each of the major traditions has within it a practice of forming beliefs about how Ultimate Reality, whatever it may be, manifests itself in or through religious experience. As he divides up the pie, different religions have different experiential practices because the systems of possible overiders vary so much from one religion to another. Among
them is the Christian practice (CP). For Alston, CP is a basic practice that is not demonstrably unreliable and derives self-support from, for instance, the way in which its promises of spiritual development can be seen, from within the practice, to be fulfilled in the lives of some of its practitioners. However, he allows that other religious doxastic practices are basic too, are also not demonstrably unreliable, and enjoy as much self-support as CP does. In short, CP has rivals that are on an epistemic par with it, and this is why religious diversity creates an epistemological problem for it. And, needless to say, each of these rivals is in the same situation; CP’s problem is also a problem for Buddhist practice (BP), Hindu practice (HP) and so forth. Does this disqualify CP and its rivals from rational acceptance?

Alston thinks not. He does admit that religious diversity decreases the justification its practitioners have for engaging in CP, but he denies that it does so to such a degree that it is irrational for them to engage in it. His main argument for this denial deploys an analogy with a counterfactual scenario involving rival sense-perceptual doxastic practices. Imagine that there were, in certain cultures, a socially established ‘Cartesian’ practice of construing what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium more or less concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our ‘Aristotelian’ practice, as made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. Further imagine that there were, in yet other cultures, an established ‘Whiteheadian’ practice in which the visual field is taken to be made up of momentary events growing out of one another in a continuous process. Suppose that each of these three practices served its practitioners equally well in their dealings with the environment and had associated with it a well-developed physical science. Suppose also that we were as firmly wedded to our ‘Aristotelian’ practice as we in fact are but were unable to come up with any non-question-begging reason for regarding it as more accurate than either of the others. Alston concludes that, absent any non-question-begging reason for thinking that one of the other two practices is more accurate than my own, ‘the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world’. But the sheerly hypothetical sense-perceptual scenario is precisely parallel to our actual situation with regard to CP and its religious rivals. Hence, by parity of reasoning, the rational thing for a practitioner of CP to do is to sit tight with it and continue to form beliefs making use of it. And, again by parity of reasoning, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other uneliminated rivals of CP.

Alston’s critics have argued that he has not established his conclusion. Though he concedes that it is pragmatically rational for its practitioners to sit tight with CP, William J. Wainwright contends that Alston has not shown
it to be epistemically rational for them to do so. The fact that CP is socially established, significantly self-supporting and not demonstrably unreliable is, he grants, a good reason for regarding it as prima facie reliable. However, the existence of rival religious experiential practices that are also prima facie reliable is, he claims, a good reason for thinking that CP is prima facie unreliable. It is epistemically rational to engage in CP if the good reason for viewing it as prima facie unreliable neither counterbalances nor outweighs the good reason for viewing it as prima facie reliable. It is not epistemically irrational to engage in CP if the good reason for considering it prima facie unreliable does not outweigh the good reason for considering it prima facie reliable. According to Wainwright, the most Alston’s argument shows is that the good reason for thinking that CP is reliable is not outweighed, in which case engaging in it is not epistemically irrational. It does not show that it is not counterbalanced, and so it does not show that engaging in CP is epistemically rational. Wainwright therefore thinks the most Alston establishes is that engaging in CP ‘is pragmatically rational, and not epistemically irrational’.17

My objection to Alston’s conclusion can be traced back to a disagreement between us about the lesson to be derived from his sense-perceptual analogy. As I see it, one way to explain the success of the three sense-perceptual practices in the analogy is to suppose that each of them is reliable with respect to the appearances the physical environment presents to its practitioners, but none is reliable with respect to how the physical environment is in itself. Hence it would be rational to modify the Aristotelian practice from within so that the new outputs are beliefs about the appearances the physical environment presents to its practitioners rather than beliefs about how the physical environment really is independent of the practitioner. And, of course, this Kantian turn would be equally rational for Cartesian and Whiteheadean practitioners. So while I grant that sitting tight would be a rational option, I deny Alston’s stronger claim that it would be the rational thing to do. By parity of reasoning, then, I conclude that, though it would be rational for practitioners of CP to continue to engage in it, it is not the only rational course of action for them in light of the facts of religious diversity. It would also be rational for them to revise CP in a Kantian direction and to make efforts to get the modified practice socially established. And, again, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other religious experiential doxastic practices.18

Despite their disagreements on points of detail, Alston and his critics concur in thinking that religious diversity has a negative impact on the justification for engaging in CP or its rivals such as BP and HP. At least for those who are aware of it, religious diversity seriously diminishes the justification for continuing to form beliefs in any of these ways. What remains in dispute is whether justification decreases to the extent that there are rational alternatives
to sitting tight with CP, for example, taking the Kantian turn, or even to such a
degree that it is epistemically not rational or irrational to continue engaging in
CP. In what follows I shall make use of the shared agreement that justification
for engaging in CP or any of its rivals is substantially decreased by religious
diversity: I shall not appeal to any of the disputed claims about the exact
extent of the decrease. Of course, experiential doxastic practices are not the
only sources of support for the systems of belief of the world religions. As
Alston reminds us, Christianity also purports to derive support from other
sources such as the arguments of natural theology, tradition and revelation,
which he takes to include divine messages to prophets, divine inspiration
of oral or written communications and divine action in history. However,
though additional sources may mitigate the epistemic problem of religious
diversity, they clearly cannot eliminate it. After all, some of the other sources
confront their own problems of religious diversity. The conclusions of the
metaphysical arguments of natural theology conflict with the conclusions of
impressive metaphysical arguments in nontheistic religious traditions. The
claims of the texts and traditions Christians take to be religiously authoritative
must be set against conflicting claims derived from the texts and traditions
to which non-Christians grant religious authority. And, as Hume’s essay on
miracles reminds us, Christian claims about divine action in history compete
with the claims of other religions about which historical events have decisive
religious significance. Moreover, as Alston insists, the various sources of
Christian belief are supposed to provide one another with mutual support and
to contribute to a cumulative case for Christianity. So when religious diversity
decreases the justification for relying on one of them, it also weakens the
others it is supposed to support as well as the cumulative case that rests on
all of them. Using a familiar metaphor, Alston summarizes his position this
way: ‘Though each of these considerations can itself be doubted and though
no single strand is sufficient to keep the faith secure, when combined into a
rope they all together have enough strength to do the job’. Fair enough, but
by the same token, when one or more stands is weakened or cut due to the
problem of religious diversity, the rope is weakened and its ability to keep the
faith secure is diminished. Thus, absent a special reason to think otherwise, I
shall assume that religious diversity has a negative epistemic bearing not only
on the beliefs that are outputs of CP but also on other parts of the total system
of Christian belief and that the same goes for rivals such as BP and HP and
the total religious belief systems for which they are sources.

It is worth noting in passing that even Alvin Plantinga, who is more
intransigent than some other defenders of Christian exclusivism, acknowledg-
edes that awareness of religious diversity can and often does have a negative
epistemic impact on religious beliefs. According to his account of warrant,
which is what, when enough of it is added to true belief, yields knowledge, warrant is directly proportional to level of confidence in, or degree of strength of, belief. Awareness of religious diversity therefore can and often does decrease warrant by acting directly to reduce confidence in or strength of belief. Indeed, it can even deprive one of knowledge. It is possible, Plantinga thinks, that someone who would have had religious knowledge in the absence of an awareness of religious diversity lacks knowledge in its presence because of the reduction of confidence and hence warrant produced by that awareness. However, Plantinga goes on to claim that this loss of confidence need not happen and, even if it does happen, need not be permanent. As he sees it, then, the reduction of warrant produced by an awareness of religious diversity can be counteracted simply by a return of the confidence whose loss gave rise to the reduction. Whether Plantinga is right about this last point depends, of course, on whether his account of warrant is correct. Since his development of that account is spread out over three rather large volumes, I cannot in this paper even begin to address the issue of its correctness with the attention to detail that would be needed to settle it. So I will leave it an open question whether the negative epistemic impact to which awareness of religious diversity gives rise can be counteracted in the simple way Plantinga thinks it can.

2. Bayle in defense of religious toleration

Born in 1647, Pierre Bayle was raised a Protestant in predominantly Roman Catholic France. Both his father, Jean, and his older brother, Jacob, were ordained ministers. When he went to study at the Jesuit Academy at Toulouse in 1669, Pierre converted to Catholicism, but he returned to Protestantism after eighteen months. Fearing persecution on account of his relapsed status, he fled in Geneva in 1670. In 1675 he became a professor of philosophy at the Protestant Academy of Sedan. The Academy was closed by royal decree in 1681, and he moved to Rotterdam, where he lived for a quarter of a century. Persecution of Protestants by Catholics grew worse during these years. Jean Bayle died in March 1685. On June 10, 1685, Jacob Bayle was arrested and imprisoned. Pierre learned that he had indirectly caused his brother's arrest. Angered by criticism Pierre had published, the French authorities were treating his brother as his surrogate because they could not reach him in Rotterdam. Jacob was tortured, and his health was broken in an unsuccessful attempt to compel him to renounce his religious loyalties. On October 22, 1685, the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the persecution of Protestants in France thereafter increased in intensity. On November 12, 1685, Jacob Bayle died in prison. The following year Pierre published his most impassioned and sustained defense of religious toleration.
Its full title is *Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ, ‘Contrain-les d’entrer’* (Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Jesus Christ, ‘Compel Them to Come In’). The words of Jesus referred to in its title come from the Parable of the Great Dinner in the Gospel of Luke. In the story, when the invited guests make excuses for not coming to the dinner and even poor folk brought in from the neighborhood do not fill all the places, the angry host says to his servant: ‘Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be filled’ (Luke 14:23). Starting at least as far back as Augustine, Christians used this verse as a proof-text to provide biblical warrant for forced conversions. The first part of Bayle’s *Philosophical Commentary* contains nine arguments against interpreting the verse according to what Bayle describes as its literal sense, by which he means the sense in which it can be used to serve this intolerant purpose. Though it bills itself as a reply to objections to the arguments of the first part, the second part also sets forth some of Bayle’s positive views on religious toleration, including his historically influential doctrine of the rights of an erring conscience. The nine arguments of the first part cover a lot of territory. For example, one of them is a clever *ad hominem* (or, perhaps, *ad ecclesiam*) argument. Bayle points out that if Christians who think Luke 14:23 justifies them in making forced conversions were honest about their intentions, the rulers of non-Christian peoples such as the Chinese would have reasonable grounds for excluding Christian missionaries from their realms. Another should strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of readers of scripture who reject the practice of proof-texting. After arguing that Luke 14:23 should be interpreted in the light of its context, Bayle tries to show that interpreting the verse in a way that supports forced conversion ‘is contrary to the whole tenor and general spirit of the Gospel’ (p. 39). However, the argument of greatest philosophical interest is one which combines morality and epistemology. I shall concentrate on that argument.

According to Bayle, the general principle on which the argument rests is ‘that any particular dogma, whether advanced as contained in Scripture or proposed in any other way, is false, if repugnant to the clear and distinct notions of natural light, principally in regards to morality’ (p. 33). As the reference to clear and distinct notions of natural light suggests, Bayle is working with a Cartesian epistemology in which the epistemic status of deliverances of the natural light is sufficiently high to guarantee their truth. Examples he gives of deliverances of the natural light of reason that come from outside morality are such truths as ‘that the whole is greater than its parts; that if from equal things we take away equals, the results will be equal; that it’s impossible that two contradictories be true; or that the essence of a subject actually subsists after the destruction of the subject’
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(p. 28). We should, of course, view the last of these examples with suspicion. It is tantamount to the thesis, which is in dispute between Platonists and Aristotelians, that properties can exist uninstated. Still, in philosophy three out of four is not a bad record, and the other examples make it clear enough what sorts of propositions are supposed to be deliverances of the natural light. So I think we should grant Bayle the principle that if a doctrine is contrary to the natural light, then it is false.

At the beginning of the second chapter of the first part, Bayle tells us how he proposes to make use of this principle. He says: ‘The literal sense of these words is contrary to the purest and most distinct ideas of natural reason; it is therefore false. The business now is only to prove the antecedent, because I presume the consequence was sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter’ (p. 35). His argument will thus have the following form:

1. If the words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, yield a proposition contrary to the natural light, that proposition is false.
2. The words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, do yield a proposition contrary to the natural light.
3. Hence that proposition is false.

We are committed to allowing Bayle to assume (1), because it is an instance of the principle we have already granted him. So if he establishes (2), as he has promised, he will be in a position to infer (3) from (1) and (2) by modus ponens.

The argument for (2) has four steps. I shall quote the first and last of them in full because I want to comment on each of them at some length. Bayle first claims ‘that by the purest and most distinct ideas of reason, we know there is a being sovereignly perfect who governs all things, who ought to be adored by mankind, who approves certain actions and rewards them, and who disapproves and punishes others’ (p. 35). His next point is that we also understand by the natural light that the principal worship we owe to the supreme being consists of inner acts of the mind. It would be as silly to suppose that God would be pleased by mere external behavior, Bayle remarks, as it would be to imagine that a king would regard as homage a situation in which the wind posed statues in deferential postures by knocking them over whenever he happened to pass by. It follows, Bayle then observes, that even when worship involves exterior signs it must also include inner mental acts. His fourth and final point is this:

It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings, torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signification of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments
of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion, it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and, consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it (p. 36).

What are we to make of this argument?

I think that, as it stands, it is a mess. Consider first Bayle’s first step. It is plausible to suppose he thinks that a Cartesian ontological argument is the source of our knowledge of God’s existence from the purest and most distinct ideas of reason (‘les plus pures et les plus distinctes idées de la raison’). But, unlike Descartes, we do not believe that the premises of a Cartesian ontological argument are deliverances of the natural light. Indeed, even if, unlike Kant, we think there is a valid ontological argument whose premises are rationally acceptable, we do not believe they have an epistemic status as high as the law of noncontradiction or other things that are supposed to be known by the natural light. Cosmological arguments for the existence of God are in the same boat. And so too, it seems to me, are all other known arguments of natural theology. So I think Bayle’s first step is already a misstep. It insures that he will not get to a conclusion, guaranteed by the natural light, to which the interpretation of Luke 14:23 he wants to reject is a contrary.

Consider now Bayle’s final step. He asserts that compulsive measures are incapable of forming in the soul the judgments of the will in respect to God, whatever they may be, that constitute the essence of religion (‘ne peuvent pas former dans l’âme les jugements de volonté, par rapport à Dieu, qui constituent l’essence de la religion’). We may be sure, I think, that if compulsion really cannot produce the internal acts of mind that are essential to true worship, then Jesus has not commanded compulsion, at least not for this purpose. But is it evident by the natural light that compulsion in incapable of producing those interior acts? It seems not. It may be that religious beliefs, for example, are not under the direct control of the will so that people threatened with religious persecution cannot simply become converts by deciding to do so. But even if compulsion is incapable of producing converts in the short run, it may be effective in the long run in the manner imagined in the distopian fiction of the twentieth century. Or perhaps Pascal was right when he advised the libertine wagerer to attend mass and use holy water, thinking that outward practice would eventually generate inward belief. If so, compelling outward practice would be a rational means to the end of inducing belief. Issues about whether or not various techniques of brainwashing will produce changes in belief are empirical; we would not expect them to be settled solely by the natural light of reason. Like Locke, Bayle is vulnerable to empirical confutation on this point.
After having raised similar objections to Locke’s view, Waldron remarks that ‘what one misses above all in Locke’s argument is a sense that there is anything morally wrong with intolerance, or a sense of any deep concern for the victims of persecution or the moral insult that is involved in the attempt to manipulate their faith’.29 This suggests that we would be doing Bayle a favor if we substituted explicitly moral considerations for claims about the efficacy of compulsion at this point in his argument. Even if compulsion of certain sorts turns out to be effective in causing the inner mental acts that are essential to religion, it may nevertheless be wrong to use it for that purpose. We know that Bayle means to appeal to moral considerations sooner or later. Near the beginning of the first chapter of the first part, he announces that he is ‘relying upon this single principle of natural light, that any literal interpretation which carries an obligation to commit iniquity is false’ (p. 28). So maybe Bayle’s best bet is simply to insist that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion. If he does, he has available to him the following argument. According to the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23, Jesus has commanded the use of compulsion to produce those inner acts. This command carries with it an obligation to use compulsion for that purpose, since commands of Jesus are divine commands and so impose obligations. But the obligation to make such a use of compulsion is an obligation to commit an iniquity, because it is morally wrong to use compulsion thus. Hence the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23 is false, and so Jesus has not commanded the use of compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion. This argument has the merit of giving Bayle the conclusion he wants at the fourth step of his larger argument.

However, next we must ask about the epistemic status of the moral principle we have allowed Bayle to assume for the sake of this argument. Is it evident by the natural light that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion? I doubt it. What is more, I think Bayle himself could not consistently even hold that this principle is true unless it is qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. This is because he allows that God ‘may dispense with His own laws in certain cases’ (p. 121). Indeed, he believes that God can dispense from the Decalogue’s prohibition on homicide. There are, he affirms, circumstances that ‘change the nature of homicide from a bad action into a good action, a secret command of God, for example’ (p. 171). And he goes on to claim that such circumstances are sometimes actual, that God sometimes does dispense from this precept (Dieu dispense quelquefois de ce précepte).30 The cases Bayle has in mind are, of course, the biblical stories in which God commands homicide. The most famous of them is the akedah, the binding of Isaac, recounted in Genesis 22; according to that story, which serves as the basis for Kierekegaard’s teleolog-
ical suspension of the ethical, God commanded Abraham to slay his son. 31
Since Bayle is prepared to make exceptions even to the prohibitions of the
Decalogue in such cases, he has left a loophole open to religious persecutors.
He cannot consistently deny at least the possibility that they are right if they
claim they have been dispensed from the principle that it is morally wrong to
use compulsion to make converts or claim they have received a secret divine
command to employ compulsion for this purpose. Proving a negative is often
very difficult, and I think the present case is one of the hard ones. I do not
see how Bayle could hope to prove that the religious persecutors have not, in
fact, been thus divinely dispensed or secretly divinely commanded.

In my opinion, though at this point I am going beyond anything to be
found in Bayle’s text, the best strategy for the defender of toleration is
to conduct the argument entirely in epistemic terms and not to make any
dubious appeals to the Cartesian natural light. The epistemic credentials of
two conflicting claims are to be assessed and then compared. One is a moral
principle to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is wrong;
the other is a conflicting religious claim about that intolerant behavior. The
applicable epistemic principle is that, whenever two conflicting claims differ
in epistemic status, the claim with the lower status is to be rejected. If it can
be shown that the epistemic status of the moral principle is higher than the
epistemic status of the conflicting religious claim, then the epistemic principle
licenses an inference to the conclusion that the religious claim is the one to be
rejected. It is fortunate for the defenders of toleration that the strategy depends
only on qualitative judgements of comparative epistemic status, for it seems
likely that we are incapable of discovering a precise quantitative account of
levels of epistemic status. It would be nice for the defenders of toleration if all
our moral principles to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is
wrong had the very highest epistemic status possible. But since there may be
few if any moral principles about the wrongness of intolerant behavior with
this status, it is again fortunate that the strategy still has a chance of success
even if it uses a moral principle with a somewhat less exalted epistemic status.
Yet the strategy does not guarantee success, because it does not preclude
the possibility that in some cases a religious claim supporting intolerant
behavior will turn out to have a higher epistemic status than a conflicting
moral principle. Hence the strategy does not beg the question against advo-
cates of religious intolerance, though the defenders of toleration will naturally
hope that it may serve at least to limit the scope of epistemically respectable
intolerance. And the epistemic consequences of religious diversity may have
a role to play, at least in some cases, in applications of the strategy that yield
successful arguments for religious toleration of one kind or another. It may
happen that a religious claim supportive of a certain sort of intolerance has a
lower epistemic status than a conflicting moral principle favoring toleration entirely or in large part due to the decrease in the religious claim’s status resulting from an awareness of religious diversity.

To help fix ideas, let us return briefly to the issue that vexed Bayle. A valid argument parallel to the one he offered that employs the strategy outline above has the following shape:

(4) If the moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion is wrong has a fairly high epistemic status and the religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory because Jesus commanded it has a lower epistemic status, then the religious claim is to be rejected.

(5) The moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion is wrong does have a fairly high epistemic status.

(6) The religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory because Jesus commanded it does have a lower epistemic status.

(7) Hence, the religious claim is to be rejected.

The proposition expressed by (4) is an instantiation of the strategy’s governing epistemic principle. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the moral principle cited in (5) does have a reasonably high epistemic status but falls short of being evident by the natural light, absolutely certain or anything similar. It is an intuitively plausible principle. And even if, strictly speaking, it needs to be qualified by a *ceteris paribus* clause to handle things like secret divine commands, the possibility of a violation of such a clause is not at issue in the present context. Debate can then focus on the epistemic status of the religious claim cited in (6). Some of Bayle’s own arguments in the *Philosophical Commentary* bear on this question. If he is correct in thinking that this religious claim is contrary to the tenor and spirit of the Gospels, this consideration will do something to decrease its epistemic status. But the religious claim is not without a certain amount of support. It has behind it the authority of a tradition of Christian thought and practice in which it is entrenched. I think considerations of religious diversity can play a valuable role in defeating the epistemic authority of this tradition. They do so indirectly by diminishing the epistemic rationality of the whole Christian package or worldview of which the tradition is a part. And, since Christianity itself is internally complex and contains competing traditions, some of which are more tolerant than the Augustinian tradition that endorses compulsion, such considerations also operate more directly to decrease the epistemic status of that tradition in particular and hence of the religious claim about what Jesus commanded embedded in it. By my lights, the total evidence strongly support (6), and so I think the argument of which it is a premise is sound.
In a couple of ways, it is of course a weak argument. Even if it is successful, it eliminates only one ground for the use of compulsion by the religiously intolerant. However, if we are committed to the project of trying to persuade the intolerant by arguments, it may be practically desirable to be able to argue against their grounds for intolerance one at a time. In addition, the argument does not aspire to eliminate the grounds of all forms of religious intolerance at one fell swoop. But, again, it may be of practical importance to be in position to argue against various forms of intolerance piecemeal, starting with the worst. The strategy I have outlined and illustrated can be used repeatedly provided enough moral principles of fairly high epistemic status can be mobilized for inclusion in the premises of its multiple implementations. So my illustrative argument should be understood as part of a cumulative case against religious intolerance.

3. Kant on conscience and inquisitors

The argument by Kant I wish to consider is set forth in the fourth section of the second part of the fourth book of his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. In that section, he presents a doctrine of conscience. As he defines it, ‘conscience is a consciousness which is of itself a duty’. The definition poses for Kant the question of how a state of conscious awareness can be an unconditional duty. In attempting to answer his question, Kant starts from the moral principle, which he says needs no proof, that we ‘*ought to venture nothing where there is danger that it might be wrong* (quod dubitas, *ne feceris!* Pliny)’ (pp. 202–203). He takes it to be a consequence of this principle that I have an unconditional duty to be aware that any action I want to perform is morally right. I do not have to know, with respect to human actions generally or with respect to all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. But concerning any action I propose to perform, ‘I must not only judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it is’ (p. 203). Kant contrasts his view with probabilism, which he defines as ‘the principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself sufficient for undertaking it’ (p. 203). As I see matters, the probabilist thinks that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform if I am aware that it is probable that it is right. Holding us to a higher standard, Kant insists that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform only if I am aware that it is certain that it is right. The comparison thus forces us to view the certainty at stake in Kant’s claim as epistemic rather than merely psychological. I may not go ahead with my proposed action if all I am aware of is strongly believing or being utterly convinced that it is right. In short, I have a duty to be aware
that it is epistemically certain that an action I propose to perform is morally right before I perform the action. If I act in the absence of this awareness, I act unconscientiously and hence violate this duty, even if the action I perform is, in fact, right and so I violate no further duty in performing it. The demands of conscience are therefore very strict according to Kant.

Kant supplements his brief and abstract treatment of his general views on conscience with an application of his doctrine to a particular case of some interest to the defenders of religious toleration. He asks us to imagine an inquisitor whose exclusivist faith is so firm that he is willing to suffer martyrdom for it, if need be, and who must judge the case of someone, otherwise a good citizen, charged with heresy. If the inquisitor condemns the heretic to death, Kant wonders, should we say that the inquisitor acted in accord with an erring conscience or should we say instead that he acted with a lack of conscience and hence consciously did wrong? Kant allows that the inquisitor acted with firm conviction and for a reason. He builds it into the case that the inquisitor "was indeed presumably firm in the belief that a supernaturally revealed divine will (perhaps according to the saying, compellere intrare) permitted him, if not even made a duty for him, to extirpate supposed unbelief together with the unbelievers" (p. 203). Could such an inquisitor get off the hook by pleading to the lesser charge of acting in accord with an erring conscience and so, as Bayle thought, acting within his rights. Kant thinks not. His famous argument for this negative conclusion deserves to be quoted in full. Kant says:

That to take a human being's life because of his religious faith is wrong is certain, unless (to allow the most extreme possibility) a divine will, made known to the inquisitor in some extraordinary way, has decreed otherwise. But that God has ever manifested this awful will is a matter of historical documentation and never apodictically certain. After all, the revelation reached the inquisitor only through the intermediary of human beings and their interpretation, and even if it were to appear to him to have come from God himself (like the command issued to Abraham to slaughter his own son like a sheep), yet it is at least possible that on this point error has prevailed. But then the inquisitor would risk the danger of doing something which would be to the highest degree wrong, and on this score he acts unconscientiously (pp. 203–204).

In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant returns to the case of the akedah, which is alluded to in the second parenthetical remark in the passage quoted above, in order to say more about Abraham’s epistemic situation. He there insists that ‘Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “That I
ought not to kill may good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition,
are God – of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice
rings down to me from (visible) heaven.”

According to Kant, then, Abraham cannot be epistemically certain that the
voice he hears comes from God. Hence he cannot be aware that it is certain
that killing his son is right or even obligatory. If he proceeds to kill his son, he
violates the duty of conscience to have such an awareness and so acts uncon-
scientiously. He thus displays a lack of conscience because he consciously
violates this duty. Moreover, Abraham can be certain that killing his son is
wrong unless, allowing for the most remote possibility, God commands it.
If he proceeds to kill his son, he also runs the very great risk of wrongly
doing so. Therefore if Abraham proceeds to kill Isaac, he surely violates a
duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not to kill his
son. Similarly, Kant’s inquisitor cannot be epistemically certain that scripture
actually records a divine command to eliminate unbelievers along with their
heresies. So if he condemns the person accused of heresy to death, he surely
violates a duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not
to kill people on account of their religious faith.

It is, I think, illuminating to view Kant as working with the epistemic
argumentative strategy I outlined in my discussion of Bayle. The inquis-
itor can be almost certain that it is wrong to kill people on account their
religious faith; he falls short of complete certainty only because he allows
for the remote possibility of a divine command to do so. But the inquisitor
cannot be anywhere close to certain that it is right or even obligatory to kill
unbelievers because God decrees it, since he cannot achieve anything close
to certainty that scripture expresses such a divine command. Hence the claim
that it is right or even obligatory to kill unbelievers is to be rejected. In order
to keep the subsequent discussion simple, let us set aside the complications
that Kant’s doctrine of conscience would introduce into this picture of the
basic argumentative strategy.

Difficulties with Kant’s use of this strategy are similar to those that arise
in the case of Bayle. Kant has a very optimistic view of the ability of human
cognitive faculties to deliver epistemic certainty about principles of moral
wrongness. Those of us who live in societies that are, morally speaking, less
homogeneous than his was may well reasonably be less optimistic than he
was on this score. It seems to me no accident that his examples, killing one’s
good son or killing people on account of their religious faith, are among
the most favorable cases for his position. Ignoring the remote possibility of
special divine commands, I am willing to grant that it is certain that killing
people for their religious faith is wrong. But I doubt that the principles of
wrongness that cover the full range of intolerant practices to which I am
opposed can all achieve the lofty status of epistemic certainty, though of course I believe they are all true. Consider, for instance, exile, which in a passage quoted above Bayle offers as an example of compelling. Is it really epistemically certain that sending people into exile or, more generally, expelling or excluding them from a political community because of their religious faith is morally wrong? Is it certain that the magistrates of Calvin’s Geneva would have done wrong if they had expelled Roman Catholics from the city under conditions in which the exiles were compensated for lost property? Is it certain that the elders of a contemporary Amish farming community would do wrong if they excluded non Amish from their community? Living in a religiously homogeneous community can realize some very important values. It does not seem certain to me that it is always wrong, even apart from special divine commands, to endeavor to defend or preserve such values. Hence I think the argumentative strategy I am discussing will not rule out all the forms of intolerance I oppose if it can only be successfully employed with principles of moral wrongness that are epistemically certain or nearly so.

However, another difficulty becomes urgent if we envisage making use of the strategy with principles of moral wrongness that fall a good deal short of epistemic certainty. As traditionally conceived, God is omnipotent or, at least, very powerful. It would thus seem to be within God’s power to communicate to us a sign that transmits to the claim that God commands some intolerant behavior, such as issuing threats to heretics, a fairly high epistemic status. Kant, to be sure, would not have found this idea congenial. Speaking rather dismissively, he insists: ‘For if God should really speak to a human being, the latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such’. 36

Suppose we concede to Kant that one who hears a booming voice resounding from the visible heaven cannot be absolutely or apodictically certain that it is God speaking, because, as the quoted remark suggests, some alternative possibilities cannot be conclusively eliminated, so that one cannot know, in some emphatic sense, that it is God speaking. It does not follow that hearing such a voice cannot confer on the claim that God has commanded what it is taken to command a fairly high epistemic status. Therefore it seems possible for even sense-perceptual experience to bestow on the claim that an intolerant act is obligatory because it is divinely commanded an epistemic status higher than that of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that falls a good deal short of certainty, in which case, according to the argumentative strategy under consideration, it is the moral principle that is to be rejected. What is more, if philosophers such as Alston are correct, as I think they are, then divine commands can also be communicated to us by means of a
kind of religious perception that is distinct from, though analogous to, sense perception. And, other things being equal, this perceptual source can also contribute to raising the epistemic status of the claim that an intolerant action is obligatory because divinely commanded to a level in excess of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that is less than certain. So if we apply the argumentative strategy in question to cases in which the moral principle we appeal to has an epistemic status appreciably less than certainty, we cannot guarantee that it will not lose out in competition with a conflicting religious claim about an obligation imposed by divine command that has achieved a higher epistemic status. In short, there is no good reason to deny that claims about divine speech, communicated to us by means of sense perception or by means of a distinctively religious sort of perception, can acquire a fairly high epistemic status in some cases, other things being equal, a status elevated enough to exceed that of conflicting moral principles.\(^3\)

It is at this point, I think, that the epistemic consequences of religious diversity can do something to advance the cause of religious toleration. The existence of religious diversity will reduce the epistemic status of claims that God has commanded and thereby made right or obligatory intolerant behavior to a level below that which they would occupy were there no epistemic consequences of religious diversity. So when the argumentative strategy we are examining is applied to moral principles that are less than certain, it is likely to succeed more often, given the epistemic consequences of religious diversity, than it would otherwise. It is probably impossible to say with precision how many cases of success will be the result of this factor. And there is no guarantee that, even with its assistance, the strategy will be successful for all the cases in which the champions of religious toleration would like to have strong arguments against intolerant individual actions and social practices.

What is the upshot? I have tried to show that there is an epistemic strategy for arguing against various forms of religious intolerance to be found in the neighborhood of arguments actually offered by Bayle and Kant. The strategy involves attempting to establish that moral principles which support toleration have a higher epistemic status than conflicting religious claims which support intolerance. My objection to both Bayle and Kant is that they were excessively sanguine about the epistemic prospects of moral principles. In light of our greater experience with the reasonable moral disagreements of modernity, it is not plausible for us to suppose that all the moral principles needed to develop a case for a doctrine of religious toleration that is broad in scope using the strategy will be evident by the natural light or apodictically certain. But when the strategy is employed in cases of moral principles with a lower epistemic status, it may well turn out, other things being equal, that religious claims which support intolerance have a higher epistemic status than such
moral principles do. Recent work in religious epistemology becomes relevant at this point in the discussion. The negative epistemic impact of religious diversity reduces the epistemic status of religious claims supporting intolerance below what it would otherwise be. It thereby can contribute to improving the success rate of the strategy when it is applied to construct piecemeal arguments against religious intolerance of various kinds. Religious diversity thus both creates the need for toleration and contributes to its epistemic grounds.

I do not claim to have exhausted the contributions Bayle or Kant can make to contemporary philosophical discussions of religious toleration. It seems to me their work is of lasting importance not only on account of its high quality but also because they address the topic from within a broadly Christian religious perspective. Their arguments can speak on behalf of religious toleration in a way religious believers may find sympathetic or, at any rate, so I hope. In expressing this hope, I am clearly disagreeing with those who regard Bayle and Kant as hostile to Christianity and to religion generally, skeptics at best and unbelievers at worst. In this controversy, I side with those who have argued that Bayle and Kant were believers, though not orthodox Christians by various traditional standards. I think they were exploring, in ways from which we still have something to learn, possibilities for religious existence within modern pluralistic societies. If religious people today ignore what they have to teach, they run the risk, as Robert M. Adams puts it, of blinding themselves to permanently important possibilities of religious life. Since I share with Adams the aspiration to be religious while living fully within a religiously pluralistic cultural environment, I consider it valuable to look to thinkers such as Bayle and Kant for lessons about how this might be accomplished.

Notes

1. ‘Religion has been able to persuade to such great evils!’ Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1, 101. Quoted in Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 159.

2. Some of the important contributions to this discussion, including presentations of their view by Hick, Alston and Plantinga, have been collected in Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 4 whose title is ‘God and Religious Diversity’.

3. For confirmation of this doubt, see the inconclusive exchange involving Hick, Alston, Plantinga and others in Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997) and the discussion of some of the contributions to it in the introduction to the collection edited by Quinn and Meeker cited in note 2 above.

5. Audi and Wolterstorff debate the issues on which they disagree in Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). See also their contributions to the volume edited by Weithman cited in note 4 above.


23. Pierre Bayle, Philosophical Commentary, trans. Amie Godman Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1987). Page references to this work will be made parenthetically in the body of my text. This volume also contains a lengthy interpretive essay by the translator that contains helpful historical background information.


27. For discussion of the epistemic status of the premises of a clearly valid cosmological argument, see William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), especially Chapter 6 whose title is ‘The Cosmological Argument as a Justification for Belief in God’.


33. ‘What you doubt, do not do!’ As an editorial note points out, Kant is quoting Pliny out of context and fails to represent his thought accurately.

34. Kant’s inquisitor thus turns out to be, so to speak, among the targets of Bayle’s arguments, since *compellite intrare* is, of course, Latin for the ‘compel them to come in’ of Luke 14:23.


37. For arguments in support of the conclusion that there is an actual case in which someone was epistemically entitled to believe God had spoken to her, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Divine Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter 15 whose title is ‘Are We Entitled?’


40. Was Kant influenced, directly or indirectly, by Bayle’s work on toleration? Karl Ameriks, the expert I consulted on this question, has not been able to provide me with an answer, which inclines me to the belief that the answer is not known.

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Social Discrimination and Tolerance in Intergroup Relations: Reactions to Intergroup Difference

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In this article, we present a theoretical approach to social discrimination on the one hand and intergroup relations characterized by tolerance and plurality on the other hand. Central to the analysis is the question of how members deal with intergroup difference. If the outgroup's difference is judged to be nonnormative and inferior, devaluation, discrimination, and hostility are likely responses toward the outgroup. Judging the outgroup's difference to be normative or positive leads to acceptance and appreciation of this group. Following self-categorization theory, the criteria—being norms and values for judging intergroup differences—are derived from the superordinate category that is perceived to include both groups. More specifically, they are derived from the prototype, or representation, of this inclusive category. Social discrimination results from the generalization of ingroup attributes to the inclusive category, which then become criteria for judging the outgroup. Tolerance, on the other hand, is conceptualized as either a lack of inclusion of both groups in a higher order category or as the representation of the inclusive category in such a way as to also include the other group and designate it as normative.

Behavior between social groups has been for a long time an important topic of social psychology. The interest in this area of study might stem from a fascination with the psychological transformations of individuals when they consider themselves to be members of a social group, as well as an awareness of the enormous societal consequences of intergroup behavior. There is no doubt that intergroup phenomena like social discrimination, prejudice, and hostility between groups still constitute important problems and challenges, even in today’s apparently more and more individualized and “enlightened” society. In fact, one might argue that these problems are today more urgent than ever before, as, in the age of new communication technologies, high mobility, and economic globalization, diverse cultures and ethnic groups encounter each other at an increasing rate.

Being conscious of these societal problems, social psychological research has focused primarily on the negative aspects and qualities of intergroup relations, such as ethnocentrism, stereotyping, prejudice, and social discrimination, to suggest solutions derived from scientific knowledge. In considering the societal transformations, however, the question of how different social groups may live positively together and have positive relationships toward each other becomes more pressing and requires research to deal more explicitly with the positive side of intergroup relations. The concepts of tolerance and plurality that designate positive qualities of relationships between groups deserve scientific endeavors in their own right. As prosocial behavior cannot be simply identified with lack of aggressive behavior (even though research findings on both topics inform each other), tolerance cannot properly be understood simply as a lack of social discrimination. A common theoretical perspective is needed from which both tolerance and discrimination can be studied while considering their special characteristics.

With regard to social discrimination, social psychologists have tried to formulate its necessary conditions and, hence, its essential underlying psychological processes. Based on the findings of “mere” categorization effects (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) constitutes here a major contribution. However, according to recent research findings on the so-called positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination (Mummendey & Otten, 1998; Otten,
Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996), the same conditions as those commonly studied in the positive domain do not elicit social discrimination to the same extent when negative rather than positive resources are to be allocated, or when negative rather than positive evaluative attributes are to be assigned. Hence, the question concerning the necessary conditions and processes of social discrimination has been raised anew.

We assume that the evaluation of intergroup difference is of critical importance for the quality of relationships between social groups. Dissimilarity or “foreignness” has a Janus-faced character as it may elicit either attraction or aversion (Graumann, 1992; Mummendey, 1993). When the outgroup’s difference is evaluated negatively, perhaps as a challenge or threat to the ingroup’s opinions and attributes and hence to the ingroup itself, the outgroup should experience devaluation and discrimination. When the outgroup’s difference is, however, evaluated positively, for instance as enrichment or as a variation that in a more abstract sense still confirms the ingroup’s views, then the difference should be accepted and the differing outgroup should be treated positively. Such a general perspective would shift the attention from the role of mere ingroup versus outgroup categorization to the contents of these categories, their specific attributes, positions, and values and how these are evaluated. It thus reflects a greater variety of possible intergroup relationships; whereas the outgroup is per definition merely outgroup (and thus different), its difference may be evaluated differently depending on the specific context.

In this article we outline a concept of social discrimination and tolerance between groups based on assumptions about the psychological processes underlying the evaluation of intergroup difference. Turner’s (1985; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) self-categorization theory (SCT) is the main theoretical background. In the following discussion, existing approaches to intergroup behavior are briefly reviewed and the theoretically challenging findings of a positive–negative asymmetry presented. We then focus on dealing with intergroup difference, starting from the important role of categorization processes and central assumptions of SCT. Based on the concepts of inclusion and prototypicality, we finally present our own approach to social discrimination and tolerance that should form the basis of an empirical research program.

Approaches to Social Discrimination

In social psychological research, social discrimination is frequently operationalized as favoring one’s own group relative to a relevant outgroup. In contrast to the usual research paradigms, however, the explicit downgrading and relative disadvantaging of an outgroup should be viewed as equally, if not more, important. This is also expressed in Allport’s (1954) frequently quoted definition of social discrimination as “... deny[ing] to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish” (p. 51). This definition, furthermore, implies a discrepancy between ingroup and outgroup concerning their adequate evaluation and treatment, which we would seek to further emphasize and regard as the core of the discrimination phenomenon (Graumann, 1995; Otten & Mummendey, in press): Social discrimination is an ingroup’s subjectively justified unequal, usually disadvantageous, evaluation or treatment of an outgroup, that the latter (or an outside observer) would deem unjustified. Definitions are, of course, a matter of theoretical conceptualization; our theory will be outlined in more detail in this article. In the following we first discuss some developments of social psychological research on social discrimination.

Sherif’s Functional Theory and Tajfel’s SIT

Based on the classic summer camp studies, Sherif (1967) argued for a functional perspective on intergroup behavior. From this viewpoint, the quality of intergroup relations is a function of the perceived goal interdependence between groups. A negative interdependence of the groups involved (one group can achieve its goals only to the detriment of the other group’s goals) is the basis for negative attitudes, hostility, and discrimination against the outgroup. Conversely, a positive interdependence (two groups have a common goal or one group can achieve its goal only when the other group also achieves its goal) leads to positive attitudes and behaviors toward the outgroup. It was demonstrated, however, in studies using the minimal group paradigm (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971), that for social discrimination to occur no negative interdependence with regard to material goals and resources was necessary (for reviews, see Brewer, 1979; Brown, 1995; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Wilder, 1986). These findings led Tajfel (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to develop the tenets of SIT. SIT rests on the assumptions that individuals derive part of their self-concept, that is, their social identity, through belonging to social categories and that, in line with a motivation to evaluate oneself positively, they try to achieve or maintain a positive social identity. The latter depends on social comparisons with a relevant outgroup on relevant consensually valued comparison dimensions that are favorable to the ingroup. Hence,
social discrimination is understood to be an attempt to establish the ingroup's positive distinctiveness relative to the outgroup. For social discrimination to occur, no realistic group conflict in Sherif's sense is necessary; however, social competition for a relatively positive evaluation of one's own group is crucial (Turner, 1975).

Concerning the possibilities of positive relationships between social groups, SIT appears more pessimistic than Sherif's (1967) functional theory because the mere salience of a group context seems to imply, in principle, social competition between the groups. Thus, it is possible that a superordinate goal could even enhance discriminatory tendencies (Skewington, 1980). On the one hand, a common goal brings both groups closer together, but on the other hand, the two groups' distinctiveness is thereby threatened. However, one could envisage a situation in which a division of labor assigns to both groups different but complementary roles for the purpose of achieving a common goal. In this way, a common goal may promote the establishment of shared values that may become the basis for a shared consensus on mutual inferiorities and superiorities (Brown & Wade, 1987; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Turner, 1981).

Similarity and Dissimilarity Between Groups

These considerations are based on the assumption that the effect of superordinate goals and cooperation is mediated by the perception of similarities and by the processes of group formation; more specifically, the formation of a higher order group that includes ingroup as well as outgroup (Turner, 1981). Thus the discussion leads, on a more abstract level, to the general role of intergroup similarities and differences. According to SIT, perceived similarities between groups may increase tendencies to favor the ingroup, as they threaten the positive distinctiveness of the ingroup that members are motivated to establish. This hypothesis is contrary to the prediction derived from belief congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960), which assumes that similarity promotes interpersonal as well as intergroup attraction and hence positive relationships, whereas perceived dissimilarities or differences lead to devaluation and discrimination against others (see also Bar-Tal, 1990; Schwartz & Struch, 1989).

A number of studies investigating the impact of similarities and differences between groups on group behaviors and evaluations yielded rather ambiguous results (Brown, 1984; Brown & Abrams, 1986; Diehl, 1988; Grant, 1993; Mummendey & Schreiber, 1984; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993; Turner, 1978). Various authors tried to conceptualize the relation between intergroup similarities and dissimilarities and intergroup relation in more differentiated ways (Brown, 1984; Diehl, 1988; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993). On the whole, however, the findings remain inconsistent. We assume that the problem requires intergroup similarities and differences to be considered in terms of their contextual meaning (see also Jetten, 1997).

As Turner (1981) also pointed out, the intergroup background against which similarities are perceived and cooperation is established is important. Similarities and cooperation do not trigger attraction per se, thereby reducing intergroup conflict, but rather through a new definition of the situation in terms of belonging to a more inclusive category (see also Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Worchel, 1986). In this respect, aspects of the group history may be important, as they also shape the salient intergroup context. For instance, in a study by Worchel, Andreoli, and Folger (1977), cooperation leading to failure increased attraction between two groups, when these were not previously in a competitive relationship to each other; however, it decreased attraction when the groups' previous relationship was a competitive one. Worchel (Worchel, 1996; Worchel, Coutant-Sassic, & Grossman, 1992) argued generally that group history and group development should be taken more into account when analyzing intergroup relations. However, even a “cross-sectional” perspective requires a more differentiated analysis to reach a better theoretical understanding of the meaning of intergroup similarities and differences against the background of a given social context. Is it only possible to reduce intergroup conflict through reducing the differences between groups, through abandoning the former group identities? Or is a positive relationship between groups, despite their differences, possible? (see Gaertner et al., 1993).

Answering these questions could contribute to a social psychological conception of plurality and tolerance and, hence, add to the body of research that is concerned with possibilities of positive intergroup relations, for instance in the context of the contact hypothesis (e.g., Brewer & Miller, 1984; Hewstone, 1996; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Vivian, Hewstone, & Brown, 1997) or with regard to strategies of acculturation (e.g., Berry, 1984, 1992; Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997).

Positive–Negative Asymmetry of Social Discrimination

Evaluations of intergroup similarity and difference are, thus, an important aspect of intergroup behavior and require further clarification and consideration in the context of SIT. This notion is further stressed when
linked to a second critical aspect of previous research. Recent research calls into question interpretations of the minimal group findings that were crucial for developing SIT and thus raises again the issue of which conditions are essential for discriminatory behavior to occur. Mummendey and colleagues (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995a, 1995b; Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten et al., 1996) investigated whether findings concerning allocations of positively valued resources between groups could be replicated in the empirically neglected domain of negative resources and socially problematic behaviors. These studies yielded the robust finding of a positive–negative asymmetry of social discrimination: When aversive resources (e.g., noise, unpleasant tasks, etc.) are allocated between groups, or when groups are evaluated on negatively valued dimensions, there is less discrimination against the outgroup than in the positive realm, particularly under clearly minimal conditions (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten et al., 1996). A variety of explanations for this finding, in terms of norms, information-processing, and category salience, have been pursued and tested empirically and need not be further discussed here (for a review, see Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Most generally, the phenomenon may be taken as a warning not to simply extrapolate findings from the positive to the negative domain. The meaning of earlier results, which were actually fundamental for the development of theories on social discrimination, needs to be carefully reassessed (Mummendey, 1995).

More specifically, what needs consideration is whether ingroup favoritism (i.e., the relatively positive evaluation and treatment of the ingroup) and outgroup antagonism (i.e., the explicit derogation and aversive treatment of outgroups) should be conceptually differentiated from each other. Regarding ingroup favoritism under minimal group conditions in particular, it might be considered whether this actually constitutes a case of discrimination against the outgroup rather than expression of solidarity with the ingroup, or perhaps even an unreflected positive default, that is, a simple generalization from positively valued (individual) self to ingroup (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Gaertner et al., 1993; Maass & Schaller, 1991; Otten, 1996). Conversely, we need to answer the question of which conditions are necessary, or sufficient, for the occurrence of outgroup antagonism. Real-life experiences demonstrate that people do discriminate on negative dimensions, and social discrimination is in fact usually understood as negative, disadvantageous, devaluing, hostile, and aggressive treatment of an outgroup. The studies by Mummendey and others (Blanz et al., 1995a, 1995b; Mummendey et al., 1992; Otten et al., 1996) show that ingroup favoritism involving allocation of negative stimuli can be observed under conditions that imply, according to SIT (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a heightened motivation to favor the ingroup (i.e., status-inferior minorities, high identification); further, these conditions are more enriched than in minimal situations and thus better allow construction of some legitimation for the differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup.

Consequences for Research on Social Discrimination

From this research, we draw the important conclusion that social discrimination in the sense of outgroup antagonism requires, first, a sufficient motivation to establish positive distinctiveness of the ingroup and, second, a sufficient subjective legitimation of the negative behavior against the outgroup. On the one hand, social discrimination serves the shared interests and socially defined group goals of one’s own group—among other things, the positive evaluation of the ingroup. On the other hand, behavior toward the outgroup needs to be consistent with norms shared with other group members, and with values that are socially defined as important for one’s group. The differences of the outgroup might, under certain conditions, be seen as a challenge to the validity of ingroup norms and values, so that it appears necessary and, from the ingroup’s view, legitimate, to evaluate and treat the outgroup negatively.

Interestingly, from these considerations we can infer a twofold meaning of intergroup difference. Lack of difference between the groups may increase the motivation to establish a positive distinctiveness, through differentiation and differential treatment in favor of one’s ingroup (see the previous discussion). In contrast, perceived difference may be the basis for legitimizing negative outgroup treatment, when the difference is perceived as norm violation, deviance, and inferiority, as an expression of a false perception of the world and therefore a challenge to the ingroup’s views and identity-relevant values. The perceived difference of the outgroup would thus have two opposite effects on discriminatory tendencies: one mediated by motivation (maintaining positive distinctiveness) and the other mediated by legitimation (defending identity-relevant values). This is not to say, however, that motivation and legitimation are independent from each other; rather, as we argue later with respect to the projection process, in being motivated to establish positive distinctiveness, group members may construe a subjectively sufficient legitimation for outgroup antagonism.

In this article we do not further compare discriminatory behavior based on positive versus negative stimuli. To us, this distinction had, and may continue

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to have, high heuristic value in pointing to aspects that may otherwise be rather neglected in intergroup research. Findings regarding the negative realm of social discrimination pointed to the necessity of legitimation processes for outgroup antagonism (which may be also involved in, but maybe not necessary for, instances of ingroup favoritism, as suggested previously). We elaborate here on the crucial role of subjective legitimations for the occurrence of social discrimination in the sense of conscious, deliberate, and reasoned negative treatment of outgroups. Social discrimination is thus understood as relatively negative treatment of the outgroup that is justified and legitimized from the ingroup’s view, whereas it is unjustified and illegitimate from the outgroup’s view (see Markovsky, 1991). This disagreement between groups on evaluation and legitimation should be considered an essential defining criteria of social discrimination (Graumann, 1995; Otten & Mummendey, in press; see also Mummendey, Linneweber, & Löschper, 1984; Mummendey & Otten, 1989). The disagreement reflects intergroup difference, namely the groups’ differing views, norms, and perceptions of the world (Schütz, 1972).

We assume that under certain conditions the outgroup’s difference puts into question the positions and values, world views, and self-concepts of the ingroup. The evaluation of intergroup difference should, thus, play an important role for the phenomenon of social discrimination (without denying the importance of realistic group conflicts; Sherif, 1967). Group members may experience perceived or expected intergroup difference in itself as threatening their social identity, when the difference jeopardizes, from their view, the validity, superiority, and positivity of the group’s central values and positions. They would try to defend and maintain their identity through devaluation and hostility toward the outgroup. Hence, specifying the essential conditions and processes underlying evaluations of intergroup difference is an important research goal.

**Theoretical Contributions to Dealing With Difference**

Dealing with difference and deviance is of importance for various social psychological theories of intragroup processes, and we can refer to these theories when considering the role of intergroup difference for social discrimination and tolerance. In the following, various contributions and findings are briefly discussed. As will become apparent, all of them emphasize a higher order inclusion of the differing parties as the background on which differences are evaluated. This is the fundamental premise for our own theoretical perspective, which originates from Turner’s SCT (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987).

**Deviance**

With respect to opinion deviance of group members, Festinger (1950) assumed in his theory of informal social communications that the less the deviant person is perceived as a member, or is wished to be a member, of one’s group, the less the pressure toward uniformity. Deviance here is not threatening or disturbing unless there is some degree of inclusion of the deviant within one’s own group. Thus, as a third reaction to opinion deviance—next to (a) the group influencing the deviant or (b) the deviant influencing the group—Festinger considered (c) the redefinition of the group boundaries. The group may be redefined in a way that excludes the deviant from the group (see Schachter, 1951). Festinger (1950) made the further assumption, supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Schachter, 1951), that as pressures toward uniformity, agreement of opinions, and reduction of difference increase, the more homogeneous and cohesive the group is perceived to be: that is, the more salient the shared categorization.

**Social Influence**

Via processes of social influence, the group may try to change the deviant’s position or, conversely, the deviant may try to change the group’s position (Festinger, 1950). A basic assumption underlying SCT’s conceptualization of social influence (Turner, 1987a, 1991) is that a precondition for a discrepant or deviant opinion becoming influential is the expectation that there should be agreement. It is assumed that this expectation is based on the perception of the persons as equals, hence, on a perception of belonging to the same social category. A person’s deviation and difference of opinion is not unexpected when the person is perceived as belonging to an outgroup and thus as not being equal. However, the situation in which equally categorized persons have different opinions elicits subjective uncertainty, which the persons try to reduce.

Returning to the level of social groups, the SCT assumes that for a minority to influence a majority, a shared categorization of minority and majority is a necessary precondition (David & Turner, 1996; Turner, 1991). A minority could exert influence only if members of the majority consider it to be part of their own group in the given social context. As a consequence, a minority has to fight for the promotion of its societal image to be potentially influential: It must be
Minority, if received group for the unattractive regarded perspective. Implications for resulting from the (p. prototypicality" based attraction "Inter-member interaction. In the basis of attraction that is the member's low attractiveness is regarded as a deviation from the positive group norm, and devaluing the member preserves the positivity of the group. The low attractiveness of outgroup members, however, does not threaten, but rather confirms the positive ingroup norm.

Intragroup Attraction

In a similar vein, Hogg (1992, 1993) argued for a conceptualization of group cohesiveness, or intragroup attraction, on the basis of SIT and SCT. He argued that attraction between group members needs to be differentiated from interpersonal attraction. In contrast to interpersonal attraction that is based on individual relationships and experiences between two persons, Hogg (1993) defined "Inter-member attraction ... as depersonalized liking for an individual group member based on group prototypicality" (p. 105). Members are evaluated on the basis of belonging to the group, and the group's prototype constitutes the relevant norm. Attractiveness of group members is a function of their prototypicality for the group.

Implications for the General Theoretical Perspective

Deviance of a person leads to pressures of the group toward uniformity as long as he or she is perceived to belong to the group. A deviant person, or minority, if considered part of the larger group, elicits uncertainty and has thus potential to exert influence. An unattractive person is evaluated more negatively as a member of one's positively represented ingroup than as a member of a negatively evaluated outgroup. An ingroup member is perceived to be less attractive, the less he or she corresponds to the group's positive prototype or representation. In all these instances, deviance or difference is evaluated against the background of a shared group membership; that is, the extent to which a person belongs to that group as well as the representation and image of that group. When there is no inclusion in a common group, deviance is less disturbing and can be "explained" through the perception of belonging to a different social category. A deviant person is designated as eccentric; a deviating minority are called lunatics. In fact, what exactly is deviant is a function of the representation of the common group: The prototype of the inclusive group constitutes the norms by which it is possible to judge what is different. If somebody is different and deviates from the representation of the shared social category, in other words, from norms relevant in the given context, he or she creates uncertainty and is devalued and rejected.

This discussion points to the important role of superordinate categorization processes for the evaluation of difference. SCT (Turner et al., 1987) offers itself as a theoretical framework for analysing the conditions of positive versus negative evaluations of intergroup difference. This theory continues the theoretical and metatheoretical tradition of SIT. As a theory with a relatively large scope, it offers approaches for a number of inter- and intragroup phenomena such as, among other things, social discrimination and social influence (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). In our opinion, SCT constitutes a promising framework for an analysis of the relation between social discrimination and intergroup difference and for elaborating the possibilities of a social psychological conception of tolerance.

SCT: Inclusion and Prototypicality

Concepts and Assumptions of SCT

Central to SCT is the assumption that persons derive part of their self-concept from their membership of social categories, hence, their self-categorization. They consider themselves equal to, or interchangeable with, other members of their own self-category as opposed to members of other categories (Turner, 1987b). Self-categories vary in their level of inclusiveness. Persons may self-categorize themselves in inclusive ways, for instance as human beings as opposed to other forms of life; or they may self-categorize in less inclusive ways as members of social groups, for instance Germans in contrast to Turks, or
even less inclusively as individuals different from other individuals, and so forth. Self-categories are, furthermore, hierarchically related to each other, in that social categories are compared to each other on the basis of their shared next more inclusive social category. Germans and Turks may be compared in terms of their shared citizenship of Europe, in contrast to, for example, Asians; or two Germans may be compared in terms of their common identification as Germans, in contrast to Turks.

This hierarchical relation between social categories also plays an important theoretical role in intergroup evaluations and social discrimination (Turner, 1987b). It is assumed that self-categories tend to be evaluated positively (in the sense of a positive social identity). The evaluation of self-categories is based on comparisons with other relevant social categories. Comparisons require comparability, residing in the groups' identity on a higher level of abstraction. In contrast to a popular saying, it is possible to compare apples and pears with each other—however, only on the basis of a shared superordinate category such as fruit, which may be sweet, sour, juicy, aromatic, and so forth. “[T]he comparison of different stimuli depends upon their categorization as identical (the same, similar) at a higher level of abstraction, and takes place on dimensions that define their higher level identity” (Turner, 1987b, p. 48). The superordinate identity thus implies the relevant dimensions for comparison. It also implies the value connotations of the dimensions; that is, which positions on these dimensions are positively valued. Attributes that are prototypical for the (positively valued) superordinate category are the positively valued positions. Hence, the fundamental assumption is that a self-category (the individual self, the ingroup) is evaluated more positively relative to a comparison category (another individual, an outgroup), the more relatively prototypical it is perceived to be for the superordinate category relevant in the given social context (cf. Turner, 1987b, p. 59).

The evaluation of ingroup and outgroup is, hence, dependent on the superordinate category that is used to define oneself in a more inclusive way. For example, in self-defining as German and valuing this category positively, a person will evaluate the salient subgroups East versus West Germans more positively, the more prototypical he or she considers them to be for the inclusive category. Ingroup favoritism is therefore, according to Turner (1987b), a function of the extent to which the ingroup is perceived to be prototypical, relative to some salient outgroup, for the category including both ingroup and outgroup. Thus, the concept of relative prototypicality on valued dimensions of the inclusive category corresponds to SIT’s concept of positive distinctiveness.

Consequences

With respect to their assumed role for social discrimination, the concepts of an inclusive category and its prototype have so far received hardly any attention in empirical research. We proceed from these assumptions and, on that basis, analyze in more detail the role of intergroup difference. In this respect, it may be argued that social discrimination not only reflects favoritism toward the ingroup due to its greater degree of perceived prototypicality for the inclusive category, but also that the outgroup’s differences are experienced as a challenge to one’s own positions and attributes that are seen as prototypical for the inclusive category and, consequently, as normative and positively valued. The outgroup deviates from this prototype of the inclusive category, which, however, should still be a valid norm for them as a subgroup of the inclusive category. These considerations are consistent with SCT’s conception of social influence (Turner, 1991), according to which shared inclusion in a social category is a precondition for the experience of subjective uncertainty through disagreement (McGarty, Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1993). The inclusion implies a shared norm as given by the prototype of the inclusive category. The approach to social discrimination and tolerance as outlined in the remainder of this article focuses on these concepts of inclusion and prototypicality.

An Approach to Social Discrimination and Tolerance Between Groups

The Role of Inclusion and Prototypicality for Social Discrimination

Based on the theoretical considerations presented, it is hypothesized that an outgroup’s difference will be evaluated negatively if both ingroup and outgroup are sufficiently included in a more abstract social category and if the ingroup’s attributes are perceived as prototypical for the inclusive category. Group members should be inclined to the latter perception given SCT’s assumption of a general tendency to positively evaluate self-categories (or SIT’s assumption of striving toward a positive social identity). By pronouncing the positions and attributes of the ingroup to be

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1 A corresponding role of relative prototypicality has been considered in research so far only for the level of group members and for intragroup phenomena (Hogg, 1993). Also, in regard to intergroup behavior, only the prototypicality of members for their group has been considered so far, for instance concerning the impact of stereotype-inconsistent information on stereotype change (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992) or concerning reactions to threatened group distinctiveness (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997).
prototypical for the inclusive category, the ingroup claims to be the more prototypical and thus superior subgroup, compared to the relevant outgroup. For instance, following the political unification of East and West Germany, West Germans might consider typically West German attributes, like efficiency and diligence, to be central for Germans in general. They would thus evaluate East and West Germans according to their perceived positions on these attributes and conclude that West Germans would be superior. This process, which is, according to our approach, central to the phenomenon of social discrimination, may be called projection of ingroup attributes onto the inclusive category, or, generalization from ingroup to the inclusive category. Through this generalization, specific ingroup attributes are rendered as general norms claiming validity and superiority. In contrast, differing outgroups in the inclusive category, for whom these norms should also apply, are considered nonnormative and inferior and their positions are deemed false.

For the phenomenon of false consensus effect, as it is known at the level of individuals (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), a similar motivational function may be assumed; by overestimating the extent to which one’s own opinion is shared by others, the subjective validity and adequacy of the attitude is established and self-esteem is maintained (Marks & Miller, 1987). With respect to the role of an inclusive category as assumed here, there is the interesting finding that a consensus for one’s own opinion is only overestimated for other ingroup members, but not for outgroup members (Krueger & Zeiger, 1993; Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992; Spears & Manstead, 1990). To validate their opinions, individuals refer to a relevant inclusive category; its prototypical positions constitute valid norms relative to which one’s own opinions are normative and other positions are antinormative. Correspondingly, before the German unification, West Germans were probably less likely to evaluate East Germans with regard to efficiency and diligence (i.e., typical West German attributes), because it was clear that East Germans lived in a different political system and East and West Germans’ common identity was less salient. Hence, a shared inclusive category onto which West Germans could have projected their own attributes and values was less salient or relevant to evaluations of group differences.

Following this discussion, which is certainly reminiscent of Sumner’s (1906) definition of ethnocentrism but tries to go beyond and specify the processes involved, the concepts of inclusion and prototype play a central role in the phenomenon of social discrimination and the evaluation of intergroup difference. Inclusion of ingroup and outgroup leads to the expectation of equality or agreement between the groups. The prototype of the inclusive category is the norm against which ingroup and outgroup are evaluated and that the ingroup may claim to better represent. Wenzel (1998, in press) proposed that the same processes underlie perceptions of justice; he assumed that inclusive categorization is the basis for the equality principle and the (ethnocentric) representation of the inclusive category is the basis for subjectively just differentiations. What is regarded as legitimate differentiation from the one party’s viewpoint, however, may be regarded as social discrimination from the other party’s viewpoint. Social discrimination and justice are thus two sides of the same coin.

There is a dialectical relation between difference and identity; two groups are differentiated from each other on the basis of their identity, and the differences between the groups are evaluated with reference to their shared identity. Although the groups are perceived as equal in terms of their inclusion in the same superordinate category, they are perceived as different in terms of their prototypicality for this inclusive category.

Contrary to these conditions conducive to social discrimination, it is also possible that the difference between the two groups is considered a more fundamental one, so that the groups are not perceived as part of a superordinate category and, hence, no shared norms and prescriptions exist. It would be crucial to clarify which factors influence the representation of the situation, either as one of inclusion despite differences or as one lacking inclusion. This question could possibly only be answered when dynamic aspects of group development are taken into account. For instance, a history of shared group membership, in contrast to a prolonged history of intergroup differentiation, might make newly separated subgroups refer to an inclusive category, namely their previously shared group, when evaluating their differences. Interested in the processes involved in such schisms, Sani and Reicher (1998) studied the case of the Italian Communist Party and its split into two new parties. Consistent with our argument, they observed that both new parties claimed to represent the true essence of the former common party and portrayed the other party as subverting it. In our terminology, derogation of the outgroup is based on an ethnocentric generalization of ingroup attributes through their projection onto the formerly common ingroup, which remains the inclusive background. With respect to the inclusive category, the ingroup regards itself as pars pro toto, as if it alone defines the whole.

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2 According to Sumner’s (1906) definition, “Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it ....” (p. 12).
Disagreement on the social-categorical representation. It is an important implication of this tendency to generalize one’s own group’s attributes that it applies equally to the perspectives of both groups involved, leading to possible disagreement between the groups. For instance, although West Germans may characterize Germans primarily as self-confident and resolute (corresponding to West German self-stereotypes), rather than as sincere and social (corresponding to East German self-stereotypes), East Germans may portray Germans more in terms of the latter attributes. Generally speaking, both groups construe social reality on the basis of their respective normative notions and goals and, correspondingly, may represent the social context differently. They differ with respect to the ways in which they categorize the social world. There is a conflict over the adequate social categorization itself; social discrimination is the secondary phenomenon (McGarty & Grace, 1995).

This disagreement or conflict is essential for the phenomenon of social discrimination. If the groups agree on the relative prototypicality of either group for a consensually evaluated inclusive category, then a different evaluation of the groups is not experienced as social discrimination. Members may perceive their own group as more prototypical for the inclusive category and, thus, evaluate it more positively than the outgroup; however, the latter may actually have the same notion of the superordinate category. As a consequence, they would evaluate the two groups in the same way, perceive their group as inferior, and regard the self-favoritism of the other group not as social discrimination but as a legitimate evaluative differentiation between the groups. Referring to the same example as before, it might well be the case that East and West Germans (partly) agree that Germans are typically efficient and resolute (being stereotypically West German attributes) and, as a consequence, would agree that East Germans are of lower status than West Germans. Indeed, although it assumes a general tendency to evaluate self-categories positively, SCT does not exclude the possibility of negative evaluations:

On the contrary, one’s personal self may compare unfavorably with other ingroup members in terms of a positively valued ingroup self-category, and an ingroup category may be perceived less favorably than an outgroup in terms of one’s definition of ideal human beings.” (Turner, 1987b, p. 58)

The important conclusion is that a disagreement between the two groups involved is the essence of social discrimination, potentially resulting from the reciprocal process of projecting ingroup attributes onto the inclusive category.

From our theoretical approach, disagreements between groups can be derived on at least two aspects, namely the degree of inclusion and the representation of the inclusive category through its prototype. Firstly, the groups might differ in their perceptions of equivalence on a higher level of abstraction. High-status groups or majorities might be particularly prone to further increase the value of their attributes, by pronouncing them to be norms of a more inclusive category. For example, an English person, opposing Welsh people, could hold the view that Welsh was a dying language and that there was therefore no reason to still want to learn this language (Bourhis & Giles, 1977)—thereby implying that “all” should speak English. Secondly, groups could differ in their views on the prototype of the inclusive category. Whereas their common inclusion in the category Germans may be equally salient to West and East Germans, West Germans might think Germans are characterized more by stereotypically West German qualities, and East Germans could disagree and argue in favor of reopening discussion about what should constitute the prototype of Germans and for considering the inclusion of stereotypically East German qualities. The vehement discussions on a new constitution, occurring in the context of Germany’s political unification, may constitute a good illustration of this point.

The extent of inclusion and the representation of the inclusive category are both aspects of using social categories to structure the social world and as such are dependent on consensus and shared goals and norms of the ingroup. Social categorizations are rooted in the social identity of the perceivers; they are partisan perceptions of the social world (Oakes et al., 1994). Hence, on the one hand, social categorizations imply norms, as given by the prototype of the inclusive category, but on the other hand, they can themselves be conceived of as norms of social groups (McGarty & Turner, 1992) and therefore subject to intergroup competition (McGarty & Grace, 1995). Therefore, superordinate categories and subcategories have mutual normative implications and are reciprocally related to each other.

The aspect of inclusion and the level of abstraction of social categories is also an integral part of approaches to reducing intergroup conflicts. Vivian et al. (1997) differentiated three kinds of theoretical approaches to the contact hypothesis on the basis of the respective level of categorization that is postulated to be conducive for the development of positive relationships between members of different groups: (a) categorization on a lower level of abstraction, “decategorization,” and personalization (Brewer & Miller, 1984); (b) categorization on a higher level of abstraction, “recategorization,” and establishment of
a common ingroup identity (Gaertner et al., 1993); or (c) maintaining the ingroup–outgroup categorization level and mutual positive intergroup differentiation (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Only in the latter model, mutual positive intergroup differentiation, can the groups continue to exist psychologically, and only this model deals with intergroup relations, in a more restricted sense. Although the other two models are also instructive in regard to questions of intergroup relations, the third model has the advantage in that it acknowledges the reality of social groups and reflects diversity as a social value rather than assimilation, as this is inherent in the recategorization model (Hewstone, 1996; see also Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998). The aim of the approach presented in this article may indeed be understood as a psychological conceptualization of this pluralistic notion of intergroup relations that does not aim at reducing intergroup diversity by changing to a lower or higher level of categorization but rather involves the general perception, acceptance, and positive evaluation of intergroup differences. The shared inclusion in a superordinate category is meant to be only the background for evaluating intergroup difference, not to replace the latter as the figure.

The Role of Inclusion and Prototypicality for Tolerance and Plurality

The theoretical analysis of social discrimination in terms of inclusion and prototypicality also offers the possibility of a more differentiated understanding of plurality and tolerance; that is, the acceptance and positive estimation of intergroup difference. Briefly, tolerance may be conceptualized as the perceived categorical disparity of ingroup and outgroup, so that there is no inclusion of the groups and thus no prescriptions exist according to which the outgroup’s difference would be regarded as norm violation. Tolerance may also be conceptualized as a complex and vague representation of the inclusive category, in the sense of an “undefined” prototype that qualifies many different attributes and positions as normative and acceptable.

Concerning the term plurality, or tolerance, some authors plead for a differentiation (Allport, 1954; Chong, 1994; Graumann, 1996) that might be corroborated and further psychologically elaborated by our approach. Allport (1954) distinguished between a type of tolerance that involves enduring something that we dislike or find aversive and a “warmer grade of tolerance” (p. 425), which means a feeling of friendliness toward all kinds of people and, thus, not only enduring but accepting them. Similarly, Chong (1994) criticized the treatment of the concept of tolerance in the social sciences as the capacity to endure, suffer, or put up with, something that one disapproves of or dislikes. They fail to consider that for tolerance to develop, changes in feelings and beliefs are essential, which should be understood as social adjustments and changes of societal norms. Only in a superficial sense should tolerance be seen as endurance of deviation on the basis of self-restriction or disengagement; the more substantial form of tolerance implies changes in the notions of what is good. We think it may be possible to theoretically conceptualize these different meanings of tolerance in terms of our concepts of inclusion and prototype.

Undefined prototype. We argued that, when there is a salient inclusion of ingroup and outgroup, an outgroup’s difference will be measured by the norms of the inclusive category, that is (following SCT) by the latter’s prototypical positions. We further assumed that the groups involved may project their own attributes and values onto the inclusive category, thus perceiving their own group as relatively prototypical and positive and the outgroup as deviant and negative. Proceeding from these assumptions, it may be possible to identify some structural properties of the inclusive category’s prototype that would prevent it from being ethnocentrically construed by the groups involved. For instance, Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, and Holzworth (1993) assumed that the prototype of a social category can be defined with varying degrees of clarity. In our opinion, at least four structural properties that make up a prototype’s degree of definition can be conceptually differentiated (even if they may be empirically correlated):

1. A prototype may be represented clearly or unclearly; that is, the clarity of notions on the prototype can vary (corresponding to Hogg et al., 1993).
2. A prototype may have a small or large scope; that is, it can be defined by few or many dimensions and it can affect few or many aspects of life.
3. A prototype may be narrow or broad; that is, the distribution of representative members on the prototypical dimension has small or great variance.
4. A prototype may be simple or complex; that is, the distribution of representative members on the prototypical dimension is unimodal or multimodal.

The implications for intergroup relations and dealing with intergroup difference are as follows: From Property 1, a weak representation of the prototype, tolerance of difference follows because no clear evaluative standard is perceived, whereas from Property 2, a prototype’s small scope, it follows that certain differing attributes of the outgroup are beyond pre-
scriptions as implied by the prototype of the inclusive category. From Property 3, a scattered and broad prototype, it follows that a bigger variance around the normative position may be accepted, and from Property 4, a complex multimodal prototype, it follows that various distinctive positions on the underlying dimension may be perceived as prototypical and normative. Each of these characteristics of the inclusive category’s perceived prototype—lack of clarity, small scope, large variance, and high complexity—should contribute to the acceptance or even the positive evaluation of intergroup difference.

On the basis of this conceptual differentiation, it may even be possible to make predictions about when intergroup difference would be only accepted and when it would actually be positively esteemed (referring to the different conceptions of tolerance mentioned before). It might be worthwhile to pursue the plausible hypothesis that an outgroup’s difference will be accepted if its differing attributes are not covered by the perceived prototype and hence are not subject to relevant prescriptions, because the prototype is weakly defined (see Property 1), or because it has a restricted scope and does not apply to the attributes in question (see Property 2). In contrast, the outgroup’s difference will be positively esteemed if the differing attributes are themselves part of the perceived prototype, and thus normative, because the prototype is broad and scattered (see Property 3), or because it contains several distinctive positions (see Property 4).

The option mentioned last, tolerance on the basis of a complex representation of the inclusive category (Property 4), may be regarded as the most dramatic and theoretically challenging form of tolerance. It also deserves particular attention because it is the notion of plurality that predominates in theory and politics. For instance, Berry (1984) defined integration as an option of interethnic acculturation that retains the cultural identity, mores, and values of the immigrant group that, at the same time, attempts to integrate itself into the existing dominant group (see also Bourhis et al., 1997). This option corresponds to the ideal of multiculturalism as it was expressed in Canada’s official policy in the early 1970s. Prime Minister Trudeau declared in those days that there would not be any official Canadian culture and no ethnic group would take precedence over the other. No citizen, or group of citizens, was anything else other than Canadian and all would be treated equally (as cited in Bourhis et al., 1997). Thus, the inclusion of all groups in a superordinate category of Canadians was stressed, for which, however, there was no official culture and no simple representation. The various groups should continue to exist with their peculiarities, but simultaneously constitute the higher order Canada, like a “mosaic” (Porter, 1965, as cited in Berry, 1984). Regarding the inclusive category of Canadians, the prototype is diverse and diversity is prototypical.

Another interesting example refers to the current debate in Germany on the introduction of “double citizenship” that would allow foreigners to keep their former citizenships when becoming German citizens. Whereas right-wing politicians object that such a policy would lead to disintegration and “parallel societies”, it could be argued that (next to making it easier for foreigners to decide to become German and fully participate in and integrate themselves into society) such a policy would officially acknowledge the diversity of the people living in Germany. It may lead to a more complex representation of the inclusive category “Germany’s inhabitants” that would reduce the tendency of “German” Germans to feel themselves to be the only true and legitimate inhabitants.

Finally, it should also be considered that intergroup difference may not necessarily question the normative positions of the inclusive category, but on the contrary could contribute to their perceived validity and may, thus, be attractive. Theories of social influence (see Turner, 1991) stress that information, to be influential, must be perceived as independent from other information. That is, to be informative and capable of validating a shared position, information must not be regarded as being shaped by the normative pressure of other (similar) positions (Goethals & Darley, 1977; Wilder, 1977). The positions of different groups may be regarded as independent, because it can be assumed that they were developed on the basis of different experiences, cultures, and histories. Positions and notions of different groups that are equal in a more abstract sense are validated by the consensus between independent groups. Hence, intergroup difference may corroborate a group’s position if there is consensus beyond the difference or, by means of abstraction, in the difference between the groups. Diversity allows validation by dissimilarity.

**Categorical difference.** From our perspective, an outgroup’s difference will be measured by the norms of the inclusive category when there is a salient inclusion of ingroup and outgroup, that is, when ingroup and outgroup share an evaluative background. For both groups, then, the same norms should apply which, however, are ethnocentrically construed. It can be derived that when no such inclusion is perceived, but the outgroup is instead regarded as fundamentally different, then there is no shared normative system and the outgroup’s difference will not be considered a norm violation. Processes of exclusion and emphasis on categorical difference were similarly postulated by Festinger (1950; see the previous section) to be reac-
tions to deviance within groups: Group boundaries may be redefined so that deviants are no longer perceived to belong to the group and are no longer expected to follow group norms.

We assume that corresponding processes apply when dealing with intergroup difference. If categorical or “insurmountable” differences between an ingroup and an outgroup are perceived and thus a shared inclusion is not sufficiently salient, then there will be plurality or tolerance in the sense of unrelated coexistence, a lack of relevance, low comparability, disconnection, or exclusion. The strange lifestyle of a far-off “exotic” people will not be experienced as a threat because the distance, psychological as well as spatial, renders a common inclusion with the ingroup improbable. The difference can be tolerated because the validity of one’s own views are not questioned. In this way, we may also understand the apparent paradox that many Germans, although on the one hand generally having negative attitudes towards Turks living in Germany, on the other hand love to spend their holidays in Turkey. Because during their holidays they are on Turkish territory and in the Turkish culture, they may to a lesser extent represent Turks and themselves as belonging to the same higher order category and thus experience strange habits and customs as less of a norm violation or deviance. Similar processes could be at work in strongly segregated societies: Despite an inclusion of ingroup and outgroup in the sense of belonging to the same society or state, a wide-ranging segregation of the groups might reduce their psychological inclusion to such an extent that the outgroup’s difference is of no concern to the ingroup. Acculturation strategies like segregation and separation (Berry, 1984; Bourhis et al., 1997) might yield some psychological utility through these processes.

Lack of inclusion is, however, only the basis for a limited understanding of tolerance characterized by ignorance and disregarding the other. Furthermore, a negative evaluation and treatment of the outgroup is still possible. The process of redefining boundaries and the exclusion of deviant groups is usually accompanied by their devaluation: labelling “rigid” and “undiscerning” minorities as lunatics not only explains their different behavior, but devalues them and their views at the same time (Papastamou, 1986). The redefinition of group boundaries may thus go along with a negative evaluation. This may be even more likely if there existed a strong historical inclusion (as in schisms), or if the minority itself claims to belong to the same group with a claim to the same rights, or both.

Finally, it should be considered that lack of inclusion may not only imply that the same norms and behavioral prescriptions do not apply to the outgroup, but, at the same time, that the same rights do not apply and can therefore be withheld from the outgroup. In the situation of a moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), there are, from the perspective of the ingroup, no normative restrictions with respect to treating the outgroup negatively or cruelly (see also for the concept of delegitimization; Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990).

Here, it may be objected that our approach might not cover all, and possibly not even the most important, cases of social discrimination. For instance, is it plausible to assume that Nazi Germans perceived themselves as sharing an inclusion with Jews in a higher order category? Indeed, it would seem evident that they excluded Jews from humanity altogether to legitimate their genocide. We believe, however, that an exclusion from humanity would not suffice to explain the mass killing of Jews. It is not probable that somebody would just kill and destroy everything considered to be nonhuman. Other factors could also be responsible for the Nazi crimes against the Jews. In fact, consistent with a higher order inclusion, Jews had been part of the society in Germany and countries occupied by Germans, and indeed often in prominent and influential roles or professions; also, the Nazi conspiracy theories certainly implied the ascription of human features to the Jews. To us, it seems that the Jews were persecuted exactly because they belonged to the society, but were accused of not fitting in and, more than that, subverting it, and because they were human, but considered an inferior and dangerous kind. Indeed, the horror of the genocide against the Jews seems to correspond to the extremity of the Nazi ideology of the Aryan race. This ideology, the absolute glorification of the tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed, and light-skinned Nordic man, may be regarded as an extreme and prototypical case of the projection process we propose. More generally, although we are not at all claiming that it would sufficiently explain the complex phenomenon of genocide (see Staub, 1993), we propose an important factor to be the extreme elevation of one’s own group and the corresponding perceived worthlessness of the outgroup, based on a standard applied to both groups but being purely represented by one’s own group. Subsequently, exclusion rhetorics may be used to legitimate some degree of severity, violence, and cynicism of negative acts against the outgroup.

Cross-Sectional and Temporal–Dynamic Analyses

Our discussion makes it clear that there is no simple answer to the question about the role of intergroup similarity and difference for group relations and that it constitutes a major theoretical challenge. Jetten (1997; see also Jetten, Spears, & Manstead,
1998) was also interested in the theoretical contradiction that, on the one hand, intergroup dissimilarity should increase the salience of a group distinction and thus the probability of social discrimination, whereas, on the other hand, intergroup similarity should threaten an ingroup’s positive distinctiveness and thus provide a motivation for positive differentiation and social discrimination. In terms of our approach, this fundamental problem can be restated as similarity and dissimilarity influencing both the figure of perceived intergroup difference and the background of perceived inclusion. Dissimilarity may increase the salience of intergroup difference, leading, given a background of unaltered inclusion, to more negative intergroup evaluations. In contrast, similarity may increase the extent of shared inclusion within which the perceived intergroup difference, when it is unaltered, is evaluated more negatively.

The question of which aspect of the intergroup situation is affected by perceived similarity and dissimilarity requires taking account of both the given social context and aspects of development and change within and between groups. In our opinion, the apparent paradox, as stated previously, demonstrates that a purely cross-sectional analysis of intergroup difference, which tries to pinpoint the evaluation of intergroup difference at a given time against the background of the current social-categorical representation, is not sufficient but should be complemented by a temporal–dynamic analysis. For an understanding of the role of intergroup difference, the groups’ respective developmental stages and the history of intergroup relations need to be considered (Worchel, 1996; Worchel et al., 1992). Jetten’s (1997) finding that for real-life groups, as compared to ad hoc groups, similarity rather than dissimilarity increases social discrimination, may be explained, in the context of developmental aspects, by the existence of more established intergroup differentiations between real-life groups (which have a longer history). A “one-shot” similarity may not influence the established intergroup differentiation; however, it might affect the degree of perceived inclusion, hence, the shared evaluative background onto which groups project their ingroup positions.

In addition to cross-sectional analyses on the basis of current social contexts, it is possible to distinguish between at least three dynamic perspectives: the consideration of (a) a group’s phase (with respective goals) as a stage of its broader history or long-term development (Moreland & Levine, 1988; Tuckman, 1965; Worchel et al., 1992); (b) the direction of the changes in the intergroup relations and respective prescriptions (e.g., acculturation options; Berry, 1984); and (c) the previous state of the intergroup relations, for instance, whether both groups previously constituted one group or had been for a longer time established as distinctive groups (cf. Worchel et al., 1992). The latter aspect can be most directly expressed in terms of the concepts we presented. The previous state of intergroup relations may function as a background against which the current difference can be evaluated, and may be analyzed, as for the present state, in terms of salience and content (representation) of social categorizations. For example, if ingroup and outgroup were originally one single group (schism), or if their inclusion was very salient, then this inclusive category could further operate as a salient evaluative background. As a consequence, both groups should compete to be viewed as the “better” subgroup of this shared inclusive category. Each group might claim to be more prototypical for the original common group. It would follow that intergroup differences would be experienced as threatening, as they would question the ingroup’s prototypicality for the inclusive category (Sani & Reicher, 1998).

The other two dynamic aspects should not be neglected, as they are related to the important role played by group goals in the relationship between groups. Group goals are, first, dependent on the group’s developmental stage. For example, at a particular stage of group formation, the primary goals may be the demonstration of boundaries to the outgroup, establishing distinctiveness and justifying the group’s separate existence (Worchel et al., 1992). Group goals are, second, dependent on the developmental direction of the intergroup relations that may be made explicit by means of metanorms. For example, following the political unification of East and West Germany, the official goal for intra-German relations is that East and West Germany are to become one Germany, differences are to be reduced, and finally, intergroup differentiation is to be abolished (i.e., a merger goal). In a similar vein, the Canadian doctrine of multiculturalism may be understood as a metanorm. Acculturation options as differentiated by Berry (1984) may be conceived of as prescriptions for the relationship between the respective groups. As norms they are, of course, again based on social identities and the consensus that is perceived to exist within the ingroup. These norms are not necessarily shared between the groups. Rather, the situation in which affected groups differ in their notions of acculturation may lead to particularly delicate conflicts. Bourhis et al. (1997) were therefore very much interested in the impact of certain configurations of two groups’ acculturation goals on their intergroup relations and on the success of acculturation. Here, we find again an illustration of McGarty and Turner’s (1992) notion that social categorizations—here conceptualized as representations of what the correct re-
relationship between two ethnic groups should be—are themselves norms. Therefore, they do not only underlie social identities, but are themselves also a function of social identities.

Conclusions

The approach put forward in this article, appearing to us theoretically consistent and plausible, now requires empirical tests. First, studies need to be designed that test the assumed projection process, that is, the tendency to generalize attributes and positions from an ingroup to an inclusive category. For instance, the perceived relative similarity of ingroup and outgroup to a salient higher order category may be used as a measure of relative prototypicality. We would expect, and indeed have found (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 1999), that both groups would disagree on their relative prototypicality and that perceived relative prototypicality would significantly predict intergroup attitudes. Second, the role of an inclusive category’s salience in social discrimination and tolerance needs to be investigated. For instance, laboratory experiments could include two phases. In the first phase, a common group identity could be made salient or not salient; in the second phase, subgroup differences could be made apparent and the subgroups would have to be evaluated. We would expect stronger derogation of the outgroup when the inclusion of the groups would have been previously made salient. Third, evaluations and behaviors towards outgroups need to be studied as a function of clarity and complexity of the inclusive category’s prototype. For instance, a false feedback manipulation could be used that would suggest that people have more or less clear (e.g., more or less shared) views on the prototype of some inclusive category. We would expect that there would be less ingroup projection, and thus more positive attitudes towards the differing outgroup, when the inclusive prototype is apparently less clearly defined. The research, in particular concerning the two latter questions, should take dynamic aspects of group development into account.

To sum up, we argue that the essential conditions of discriminatory behavior need to be specified anew and with more precision, although remaining in the tradition of SIT. Furthermore, in addition to a new conceptualization of social discrimination, the possibilities of positive relationships between groups, in the sense of tolerance and plurality, should be analyzed from the same perspective. From our viewpoint, the evaluation of intergroup difference is crucial for the quality of intergroup relations. The classification of persons into ingroup and outgroup alone is not sufficient for social discrimination to occur; rather, it is essential to understand what meaning is ascribed to these categories, what content they convey, and how they are evaluated on the basis of perceived norms. In addition, the extent of dissimilarity between groups alone is not decisive; rather, it is essential how the similarity and dissimilarity between groups is evaluated, against the background of a shared understanding of the given social context within one’s ingroup. Following SCT, the inclusive category (including ingroup and outgroup) constitutes the evaluative basis and, as its perceived prototype, yields the norms and standards according to which the groups are evaluated. As a consequence, under certain circumstances seemingly small differences will bear a greater potential for conflict than larger ones; namely if the groups’ inclusion is more salient in the former than the latter case, or if the inclusive category’s prototype is clearer and more exclusively defined by ingroup positions.

According to our approach, social discrimination reflects a disagreement between groups on the adequate social categorization (Turner, 1996), in other words, on one or several of the aspects mentioned: on the differentiation between ingroup and outgroup; on these categories’ attributes and contents; on the kind and extent of their shared inclusion; and on the representation, or prototype, of the inclusive category. Conceptualizing social discrimination as a conflict of opinion or disagreement does not, however, mean a simple recurrence of conflict-theory notions on intergroup behavior. Rather, in line with the SIT and SCT tradition, negative interdependence and conflict are considered as variables resulting from social categorizations and self-definition that need to be explained. Perceiving a conflict requires first the social categorization into ingroup and outgroup and, then, as stressed here, their discrepant mutual evaluations that may be based on discrepant social-categorical understandings of the evaluative context. Negative interdependence consists therefore of a perceived inclusion of ingroup and outgroup in a superordinate category that is ethnocentrically construed by either group. Conversely, tolerance may be possible if either a lack of inclusion is perceived and insurmountable differences are accepted, so that prescriptions are not shared between groups, or if the inclusive category is represented in a vague or complex way, so that a variety of groups are normative.

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PERSONAL RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION AND PREJUDICE

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3 generalizations seem well established concerning the relationship between subjective religion and ethnic prejudice: (a) On the average churchgoers are more prejudiced than nonchurchgoers; (b) the relationship is curvilinear; (c) people with an extrinsic religious orientation are significantly more prejudiced than people with an intrinsic religious orientation. With the aid of a scale to measure extrinsic and intrinsic orientation this research confirmed previous findings and added a 4th: people who are indiscriminately pro-religious are the most prejudiced of all. The interpretations offered are in terms of cognitive style.

Previous psychological and survey research has established three important facts regarding the relationship between prejudiced attitudes and the personal practice of religion.

1. On the average, church attenders are more prejudiced than nonattenders.
2. This overall finding, if taken only by itself, obscures a curvilinear relationship. While it is true that most attenders are more prejudiced than nonattenders, a significant minority of them are less prejudiced.
3. It is the casual, irregular fringe members who are high in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the extrinsic order. It is the constant, devout, internalized members who are low in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the intrinsic order.

The present paper will establish a fourth important finding—although it may properly be regarded as an amplification of the third. The finding is that a certain cognitive style permeates the thinking of many people in such a way that they are indiscriminately pro-religious and, at the same time, highly prejudiced.

But first let us make clear the types of evidence upon which the first three propositions are based and examine their theoretical significance.

Churchgoers Are More Prejudiced

Beginning the long parade of findings demonstrating that churchgoers are more intolerant of ethnic minorities than nonattenders is a study by Allport and Kramer (1946). These authors discovered that students who claimed no religious affiliation were less likely to be anti-Negro than those who declared themselves to be protestant or Catholic. Furthermore, students reporting a strong religious influence at home were higher in ethnic prejudice than students reporting only slight or no religious influence. Rosenblith (1949) discovered the same trend among students in South Dakota. The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 212) stated that scores on ethnocentricism (as well as on authoritarianism) are significantly higher among church attenders than among nonattenders. Gough's (1951) findings were similar. Kirkpatrick (1949) found religious people in general to be slightly less humanitarian than nonreligious people. For example, they had more punitive attitudes toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals, and those in need of psychiatric treatment. Working with a student population Rokeach (1960) discovered nonbelievers to be consistently less dogmatic, less authoritarian, and less ethnocentric than believers. Public-opinion polls (as summarized by Stember, 1961) revealed confirmatory evidence across the board.

Going beyond ethnic prejudice, Stouffer (1955) demonstrated that among a representative sample of American church members those who had attended church within the past month were more intolerant of nonconformists (such as socialists, atheists, or communists) than those who had not attended. It seems that on the average religious people show more intolerance in general—not only toward ethnic but also toward ideological groups.

Is this persistent relationship in any way...
spurious? Can it be due, for example, to the factor of educational level? Many studies show that people with high education tend to be appreciably less prejudiced than people with low education. Perhaps it is the former group that less often goes to church. The reasoning is false. Sociological evidence has shown conclusively that frequent church attendance is associated with high socioeconomic status and with college education (Demerath, 1965). Furthermore, Stouffer’s study found that the intolerant tendency among churchgoers existed only when educational level was held constant. Struening (1963), using as subjects only faculty members of a large state university (all highly educated), discovered that nonattenders were on the average less prejudiced than attenders. These studies assure us that the association between churchgoing and prejudice is not merely a spurious product of low education.

Turning to the theoretical implications of these findings, shall we say that religion in and of itself makes for prejudice and intolerance? There are some arguments in favor of such a conclusion, especially when we recall that certain powerful theological positions—those emphasizing revelation, election (chosen people), and theocracy (Allport, 1959, 1966)—have throughout history turned one religion against another. And among sociological factors in religion we find many that make for bigotry. One thinks of the narrow composition of many religious groups in terms of ethnic and class membership, of their pressure toward conformity, and of the competition between them (see Demerath, 1965; Lenski, 1961). It does seem that religion as such makes for prejudice.

And yet it is here that we encounter the grand paradox. One may not overlook the teachings of equality and brotherhood, of compassion and humanheartedness, that mark all the great world religions. Nor may one overlook the precept and example of great figures whose labors in behalf of tolerance were and are religiously motivated—such as Christ himself, Tertullian, Pope Gelasius I, St. Ambrose, Cardinal Cusa, Sebastian Castellio, Schwenckfeld, Roger Williams, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many others, including the recently martyred clergy in our own South. These lives, along with the work of many religious bodies, councils, and service organizations would seem to indicate that religion as such unmakes prejudice. A paradox indeed.

THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIP

If religion as such made only for prejudice, we would expect that churchgoers who expose themselves most constantly to its influence would, as a result, be more prejudiced than those who seldom attend. Such is not the case.

Many studies show that frequent attenders are less prejudiced than infrequent attenders and often less prejudiced even than nonattendees. Let us cite one illustrative study by Struening (1963). The curvilinear trend is immediately apparent in Table 1. In this particular study nonattendees had lower prejudice scores than any group, save only those devotees who managed to attend 11 or more times a month. Without employing such fine time intervals other studies have shown the same curvilinear trend. Thus, in *The Authoritarian Personality* (p. 212) we learned that in 12 out of 15 groups “regular” attenders (like nonattendees) were less prejudiced than “seldom” or “often” attenders. Employing a 26-item Desegregation Scale in three separate studies, Holtzman (1956) found the same trend as shown in Table 2. If more evidence for the curvilinear relationship is needed, it will be found in community studies made in New Jersey (Friedrichs, 1959), North Carolina (Tumin, 1958), New England (Pettigrew, 1959), and Ohio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of attendance (times per mo.)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Prejudice score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8–10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 or more</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—From Struening (1957).
and California (Pinkney, 1961). One could almost say there is a unanimity of findings on this matter. The trend holds regardless of religion, denomination, or target of prejudice (although the case seems less clear for anti-Semitism than for prejudice against other ethnic groups).

What are the theoretical implications? To find that prejudice is related to frequency of church attendance is scarcely explanatory, since it may reflect only formal behavior, not involvement or commitment to religious values. And yet it seems obvious that the regular attenders who go to church once a week or oftener (and several studies indicate that oftener than once a week is especially significant) are people who receive something of special ideological and experiential meaning. Irregular, casual fringe members, on the other hand, regard their religious contacts as less binding, less absorbing, less integral with their personal lives.

At this point, therefore, we must pass from external behavioral evidence into the realm of experience and motivation. Unless we do so we cannot hope to understand the curvilinear relationship that has been so clearly established.

**Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Motivation**

Perhaps the briefest way to characterize the two poles of subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated person *uses* his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated *lives* his religion. As we shall see later, most people, if they profess religion at all, fall upon a continuum between these two poles. Seldom, if ever, does one encounter a "pure" case. And yet to clarify the dimension it is helpful to characterize it in terms of the two ideal types.

**Extrinsic Orientation**

Persons with this orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. The term is borrowed from axiology, to designate an interest that is held because it serves other, more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways—to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self.

**Intrinsic Orientation**

Persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he *lives* his religion.

A clergyman was making the same distinction when he said,

Some people come to church to thank God, to acknowledge His glory, and to ask His guidance. . . . Others come for what they can get. Their interest in the church is to run it or exploit it rather than to serve it.

Approximate parallels to these psychological types have been proposed by the sociologists Fichter (1954) and Lenski (1961). The former, in studying Catholic parishioners, classified them into four groups: the dormant, the marginal, the modal, and the nuclear. Omitting the dormant, Fichter estimated in terms of numbers that 20% are marginal, 70% modal, and less than 10% nuclear. It is, of course, the latter group that would most closely correspond to our conception of the "intrinsic." Lenski distinguished between church members whose involvement is "communal" (for the purpose of sociability and

### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PREJUDICE AMONG STUDENTS IN THE BORDER STATES</th>
<th>1956 study</th>
<th>1958 study</th>
<th>1960 study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% intolerant</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a mo.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice a mo.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a wk. or oftener</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—Adapted from Holtzman (1956), Kelley, Person, and Holtzman (1958), Young, Benson, and Holtzman (1960).
status) and those who are “associational” (seeking the deeper values of their faith).

These authors see the significance of their classifications for the study of prejudice. Fichter has found less prejudice among devout (nuclear) Catholics than among others (see Allport, 1954, p. 421). Lenski (1961, p. 173) reported that among Detroit Catholics 59% of those with a predominantly “communal” involvement favored segregated schools, whereas among those with predominantly an “associational” involvement only 27% favored segregation. The same trend held for Detroit Protestants.

The first published study relating the extrinsic-intrinsic dimension directly to ethnic prejudice was that of Wilson (1960). Limiting himself to a 15-item scale measuring an extrinsic (utilitarian-institutional) orientation, Wilson found in 10 religious groups a median correlation of .65 between his scale and anti-Semitism. In general these correlations were higher than he obtained between anti-Semitism and the Religious-Conventionalism Scale (Levinson, 1954). From this finding Wilson concluded that orthodoxy or fundamentalism is a less important factor than extrinsicness of orientation.

Certain weaknesses may be pointed out in this pioneer study. Wilson did not attempt to measure intrinsicness of orientation, but assumed without warrant that it was equivalent to a low score on the extrinsic measures. Further, since the items were worded in a unidirectional way there may be an error of response set. Again, Wilson dealt only with Jews as a target of prejudice, and so the generality of his finding is not known.

Finally, the factor of educational level plays a part. Wilson used the California Anti-Semitism scale, and we know that high scores on this scale go with low education (Christie, 1954; Pettigrew, 1959; Titus & Hollander, 1957; Williams, 1964). Further, in our own study the extrinsic subscale is negatively correlated with degree of education \( (r = -0.32) \). To an appreciable extent, therefore, Wilson’s high correlations may be “ascribed” to educational level.

At this point, however, an important theoretical observation must be made. Low education may indeed predispose a person toward an exclusionist, self-centered, extrinsic, religious orientation and may dispose him to a stereotyped, fearful image of Jews. This fact does not in the least affect the functional relationship between the religious and the prejudiced outlooks. It is a common error for investigators to “control for” demographic factors without considering the danger involved in doing so. In so doing they are often obscuring and not illuminating the functional (i.e., psychological) relationships that obtain (see Allport, 1950).

Following Wilson the task of direct measurement was taken up by Feagin (1964) who used a more developed scale—one designed to measure not only extrinsic orientation but also the intrinsic. His scales are essentially the same as those discussed in a later section of this paper. In his study of Southern Baptists Feagin reached four conclusions: (a) Contrary to expectation, extrinsic and intrinsic items did not fall on a unidimensional scale but represented two independent dimensions; (b) only the extrinsic orientation was related to intolerance toward Negroes; (c) orthodoxy as such was not related to the extrinsic or intrinsic orientation; (d) greater orthodoxy (fundamentalism of belief) did, however, relate positively to prejudice.

Taking all these studies together we are justified in assuming that the inner experience of religion (what it means to the individual) is an important causal factor in developing a tolerant or a prejudiced outlook on life.

Yet, additional evidence is always in place, and new insights can be gained by a closer inspection of the rather coarse relationships that have been established up to now.

**The Present Study**

We wished to employ an improved and broader measure of prejudice than had previously been used. And since direct measures of prejudice (naming the target groups) have become too sensitive for wide use, we wished to try some abbreviated indirect measures. Further, we wished to make use of an improved Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale, one that would give reliable measures of both extrinsic and intrinsic tendencies in a person’s reli-
gious life. For these reasons the following instruments were adopted.

Social Problems Questionnaire

This scale, devised by Harding and Schuman (unpublished; see also Schuman & Harding, 1963, 1964), is a subtly worded instrument containing 12 anti-Negro, 11 anti-Jewish, and 10 anti-other items (pertaining to Orientals, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans). The wording is varied so as to avoid an agreement response set.

Indirect Prejudice Measures

Six items were taken from Gilbert and Levinson's (1956) Custodial Mental Illness Ideology Scale (CMI). Example: "We should be sympathetic with mental patients, but we cannot expect to understand their odd behavior. a) I definitely disagree, b) I tend to disagree, c) I tend to agree, d) I definitely agree."

Four items are related to a "jungle" philosophy of life, suggesting a generalized suspiciousness and distrust. Example: "The world is a hazardous place in which men are basically evil and dangerous. a) I definitely disagree, b) I tend to disagree, c) I tend to agree, d) I definitely agree."

In all cases the most prejudiced response receives a score of 5 and the least prejudiced response, 1. No response was scored 3.

From Table 3 we see that while the indirect measures have a positive correlation with each other and with direct measures the relationship is scarcely high enough to warrant the substitution of the indirect for the direct. The high correlations between prejudice for the three ethnic target groups once again illustrate the well-established fact that ethnic prejudice tends to be a broadly generalized disposition in personality.

Religious Orientation Measure

The full scale, entitled "Religious Orientation," is available from ADI. It separates the intrinsically worded items from the extrinsic, gives score values for each item, and reports on item reliabilities. In all cases a score of 1 indicates the most intrinsic response, a score of 5, the most extrinsic. While it is possible to use all 20 items as one continuous scale, it will soon become apparent that it is often wise to treat the two subscales separately. A sample item from the extrinsic subscale follows: "What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike. a) I definitely disagree, 1. b) I tend to disagree, 2. c) I tend to agree, 4. d) I definitely agree, 5." A sample item from the intrinsic subscale: "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. a) this is definitely not so, 5. b) probably not so, 4. c) probably so, 2. d) definitely so, 1."

Sample

While our sample of six groups of churchgoers shows some diversity of denomination and region, it is in no sense representative. Graduate-student members of a seminar collected the 309 cases from the following church groups: Group A, 94 Roman Catholic (Massachusetts); Group B, 55 Lutheran (New York State); Group C, 44 Nazarene (South Carolina); Group D, 53 Presbyterian (Pennsylvania); Group E, 35 Methodist (Tennessee); Group F, 28 Baptist (Massachusetts).

We labeled the groups alphabetically since such small subsamples could not possibly lead to valid generalizations concerning denominations as a whole. All subjects knew that they were invited to participate as members of a religious group, and this fact may well have introduced a "proreligious" bias.

Gross Results

If we pool all our cases for the purpose of correlating religious orientation with prejudice

---


TABLE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anti-Jewish</th>
<th>Anti-Other</th>
<th>Jungle</th>
<th>CMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Negro</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Jewish</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td></td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Other</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—N = 309.

dice, we discover that while the findings are in the expected direction they are much less impressive than those of previous studies, especially Wilson's.

**Correlations with Extrinsic Subscale**

Since Wilson employed an extrinsic scale similar to ours, we first present in Table 4 our findings using this subscale and the various measures of prejudice. Whereas Wilson found a correlation of .65 between his extrinsic and anti-Semitic measures, our correlation falls to .21. In part the reason no doubt lies in certain features of Wilson's method which we have criticized.

**Correlations with Combined Extrinsic-Intrinsic Scale**

From the outset it was our intention to broaden Wilson's unidirectional (extrinsic) measure to see whether our hypothesis might hold for the total scale (combined scores for the 11 extrinsic and 9 intrinsic items). As Table 5 shows, matters do not improve but seem to worsen. The logic of combining the two subscales is of course to augment the continuum in length and presumably enhance the reliability of the total measure. It soon became apparent, however, that subjects who endorse extrinsically worded items do not necessarily reject those worded intrinsically, or vice versa. It turns out that there is only a very low correlation in the expected direction between the two subscales (r = .21). Obviously at this point some reformulation is badly needed.

**Reformulation of the Approach**

Examination of the data reveals that some subjects are indeed "consistently intrinsic," having a strong tendency to endorse intrinsically worded items and to reject the extrinsically worded. Correspondingly others are "consistently extrinsic." Yet, unfortunately for our neat typology, many subjects are provokingly inconsistent. They persist in endorsing any or all items that to them seem favorable to religion in any sense. Their responses, therefore, are "indiscriminately pro-religious."

The problem is essentially the same as that encountered by the many investigators who have attempted to reverse the wording of items comprising the F scale, in order to escape an unwanted response-set bias. Uniformly the effort has proved to be frustrating, since so many subjects subscribe to both the positive and negative wording of the same question (see Bass, 1955; Chapman & Bock, 1958; Chapman & Campbell, 1959; Christie, 1954; Jackson & Messick, 1957).

An example from our own subscales would be: "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life" (intrinsic). "Though I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life" (extrinsic).

The approach used by Peabody (1961) offers us a model for analyzing our data in a meaningful way. Peabody administered both positive and negative F-scale items to subjects at two different testing sessions. By comparing each individual's responses to the same question stated positively at one time and in reverse at another he was able to separate out those who were consistently pro or anti toward the content of authoritarian items. But he found many who expressed double agreement (or disagreement) with both versions of the same question. Table 6 applies Peabody's paradigm to our data.

In assigning our 309 cases to these categories we employed the following criteria. **Intrinsic type** includes individuals who...
TABLE 6
FOUR PATTERNS OF RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement with intrinsic choice</th>
<th>Disagreement with intrinsic choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrees with extrinsic choice</td>
<td>Indiscriminately proreligious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagrees with extrinsic choice</td>
<td>Consistently intrinsic in type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistently extrinsic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indiscriminately antireligious or nonreligious*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not found in present sample.

_agrees with extrinsically worded items on the intrinsic subscale, and who disagree with extrinsically stated items on the extrinsic subscale. By the scoring method employed these individuals fall below the median scores on both subscales.

*Extrinsic type* includes individuals who agree with extrinsically stated items on the extrinsic subscale, and who disagree with items on the intrinsic subscale. By our scoring method these individuals all fall above the median scores on both subscales.

*Indiscriminately proreligious* includes those who on the intrinsic subscale score at least 12 points less than on the extrinsic subscale. (This figure reflects the fact that a subject gives approximately 50% more intrinsic responses on the intrinsic subscale than we should expect from his extrinsic responses to the extrinsic subscale.)

*Indiscriminately antireligious or nonreligious* includes those who would show a strong tendency to disagree with items on both subscales. Since nonchurchgoers are excluded from our samples, such cases are not found. (Some pilot work with markedly liberal groups indicates that this type does exist, however, even among members of "religious" organizations.)

Table 7 gives the percentage of the three types.

**RESULTS OF THE REFORMULATION**

The five measures of prejudice were analyzed by a 6 (Groups) × 3 (Religious Types) analysis of variance. Table 8 presents the overall effects for religious types for each of the five measures of prejudice. The multivariate analysis of variance indicates that there is both a significant difference between the three types of religious orientation and between the six subsamples in the level of prejudice. Examination of the means shows two trends: (a) The extrinsic type is more prejudiced than the intrinsic type for both direct and indirect measures; (b) the indiscriminate type of religious orientation is more prejudiced than either of the two consistent types. Statistically all these trends are highly significant.

_LATIN SQUARES EXPERIMENT WITH RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION (KULP, 1958)*

* The multivariate F reported here is Wilk's lambda (Anderson, 1958). Statistical computations are summarized by Bock (1963) and programmed for the IBM 7090 by Hall and Cramer (1962). The univariate tests to be reported are adjusted for unequal Ns to obtain orthogonal estimates according to mathematical procedures described in Hall and Cramer.

**TABLE 8**

PREJUDICE AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of prejudice</th>
<th>Intrinsic type (N = 108)</th>
<th>Extrinsic type (N = 106)</th>
<th>Inconsistent type (N = 95)</th>
<th>(P ) ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Negro</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>8.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitic Jewish</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>11.1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Other</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>10.9**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMU</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.4**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multivariate analysis of variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variation</th>
<th>(F) ratio</th>
<th>(df)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious type (A)</td>
<td>5.96***</td>
<td>10,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample groups (B)</td>
<td>3.19**</td>
<td>25,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A × B</td>
<td>1.11*</td>
<td>50,1312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \(p > .25\), ** \(p > .001\), *** \(p > .0005\).
We note especially that the scores of the indiscriminate type are markedly higher on all measures than the scores of the intrinsic type. Corresponding F ratios for paired comparisons range from 8.4 for the jungle scale to 20.4 for the CMI scale. The differences between the indiscriminate and extrinsic types are smaller. For the anti-Jewish and CMI scales these differences are, however, beyond the .005 level; for the anti-other and jungle scales, at the .05 level. For the anti-Negro the difference falls below significance.

The relationship between the indiscriminately proreligious orientation and prejudice receives support (see Table 9) when we compare subjects who are moderately indiscriminate with those who are extremely indiscriminate. (In the first group the scores on the intrinsic subscale average 16 points lower than on the extrinsic subscale, whereas the extreme cases average 23 points less on the intrinsic than on the extrinsic subscale.)

The discovery that the degree of indiscriminateness tends to relate directly to the degree of prejudice is an important finding. It can only mean that some functional relationship obtains between religious muddle-headedness (for that is what indiscriminate scores imply) and antagonism toward ethnic groups. We shall return to this interpretation in the concluding section of this paper.

RESULTS FOR SUBSAMPLES

It would not be correct to assume that the variance is distributed equally over all the subsamples, for it turns out that the denominational groups differ appreciably in prejudice scores and in religious type, as Tables 10 and 11 indicate.

The discovery that the degree of indiscriminateness tends to relate directly to the degree of prejudice is an important finding. It can only mean that some functional relationship obtains between religious muddle-headedness (for that is what indiscriminate scores imply) and antagonism toward ethnic groups. We shall return to this interpretation in the concluding section of this paper.

### TABLE 9

**Degrees of Indiscriminateness and Average Prejudice Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target of prejudice</th>
<th>Moderately indiscriminate</th>
<th>Extremely indiscriminate</th>
<th>F ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Negro</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Jewish</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Other</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>3.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jungle</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMI</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3.99*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p > .05.

### TABLE 10

**Anti-Negro Prejudice: Mean Scores on Social Problems Scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious group</th>
<th>Intrinsic type</th>
<th>Extrinsic type</th>
<th>Indiscriminate type</th>
<th>Group M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>27.4 (34)</td>
<td>34.8 (32)</td>
<td>32.2 (28)</td>
<td>31.4 (94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>27.2 (19)</td>
<td>32.3 (20)</td>
<td>31.9 (16)</td>
<td>30.4 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>22.4 (16)</td>
<td>36.2 (17)</td>
<td>35.0 (11)</td>
<td>30.9 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>35.5 (17)</td>
<td>28.7 (16)</td>
<td>42.5 (20)</td>
<td>36.1 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>40.5 (11)</td>
<td>35.5 (10)</td>
<td>43.0 (14)</td>
<td>40.1 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>22.6 (11)</td>
<td>27.9 (11)</td>
<td>28.7 (6)</td>
<td>26.0 (28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type M: 28.7 (108) 33.0 (106) 36.0 (95) 32.5 (309)

Analysis of variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variation</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious type (A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1077.8</td>
<td>8.6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group (B)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>952.2</td>
<td>7.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A × B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>251.1</td>
<td>2.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (w)</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>125.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p > .10.  ** p > .001.

It is true that when we combine subsamples all the trends are in the expected direction, but troublesome exceptions occur for single groups as indicated by the nearly significant interaction effects. The most troublesome contradictions appear in relation to the anti-Negro measures based on the Harding-Schuman scale. Table 10 discloses certain sore points, even though the average trend over all the subsamples is in the predicted direction.

For Groups A, B, and C we note that the indiscriminate type is slightly less prejudiced than the extrinsic type, and for Groups D and E the extrinsic type seems actually less prejudiced than the intrinsic. (Groups D and E are consistently more troublesome than other subsamples, perhaps because of some salient racial issue in the local community. It will be noted that both these groups are considerably more anti-Negro than the other subsamples.)

By way of contrast we present in Table 11 the results for the short (five-item) CMI scale. With the exception of the indiscriminate type in Group F, the progression of scores is precisely as expected. Each subsample shows that the intrinsic type is less prejudiced toward the mentally ill than the extrinsic type, and the extrinsic type is less
TABLE 11
INDIRECT (CMI) MEASURE OF PREJUDICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious group</th>
<th>Intrinsic type</th>
<th>Extrinsic type</th>
<th>Indiscriminate type</th>
<th>Group M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>11.2 (34)</td>
<td>12.4 (32)</td>
<td>13.6 (28)</td>
<td>12.3 (94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>10.1 (19)</td>
<td>10.8 (20)</td>
<td>13.4 (16)</td>
<td>11.3 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>9.5 (16)</td>
<td>12.2 (17)</td>
<td>12.6 (11)</td>
<td>11.3 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>10.6 (17)</td>
<td>11.4 (16)</td>
<td>14.8 (20)</td>
<td>12.4 (53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>8.6 (11)</td>
<td>12.9 (10)</td>
<td>13.6 (14)</td>
<td>11.8 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>9.2 (11)</td>
<td>10.7 (11)</td>
<td>9.2 (6)</td>
<td>9.8 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type M</td>
<td>10.2 (108)</td>
<td>11.8 (106)</td>
<td>13.4 (95)</td>
<td>11.9 (309)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of variation</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious type (A)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>255.0</td>
<td>20.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group (B)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>2.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A X B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error (w)</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p > .05.
** p > .001.

If we apply a more severe test, asking whether all differences between groups are significant, we find the following results. In four of the six groups (in both Tables 10 and 11) the extrinsic type is significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic. Likewise in four out of six groups (Table 10) and five out of six (Table 11), the indiscriminate type is significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic. However, in only two of the six groups (in both Tables 10 and 11) is the indiscriminate type significantly more prejudiced than the extrinsic.

**EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES**

Computing the actual years of schooling for all groups we find that the indiscriminate type has significantly less formal education than the intrinsic cases (p > .005, F = 18.29), and somewhat less than the extrinsic type (p > .10, F = 2.89). Comparing extrinsic with intrinsic types we find that the former has finished fewer years of schooling (p > .10, F = 3.45). (Oddly enough the groups with highest average education are D and E, which also displayed the highest anti-Negro and anti-Semitic prejudice—perhaps because of particular local conditions.)

In our survey of earlier studies we saw that educational level is often a factor in the various relationships discovered between religion and prejudice. We have also argued that demographic factors of this sort should not be allowed to obscure the functional (psychological) analysis that the data call for. Granted that low education makes for indiscriminate thinking, the mental confusion that results from low education may have its own peculiar effects on religious and ethnic attitudes.

TABLE 12
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMBINED EXTRINSIC-INTRINSIC RELIGIOUS SCORES (FOR CONSISTENT SUBJECTS) AND PREJUDICE (KENDAL'S TAU)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious group</th>
<th>Anti-Negro</th>
<th>Anti-Jewish</th>
<th>Anti-Other</th>
<th>Jungle</th>
<th>CMI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.26*</td>
<td>.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p > .01.
** p > .05.
* p > .10.
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS

At the outset we stated three propositions that seem to be firmly established: (a) Churchgoers on the broad average harbor more ethnic prejudice than nonchurchgoers; (b) in spite of this broad tendency a curvilinear relationship in fact exists; (c) the intrinsically motivated churchgoers are significantly less prejudiced than the extrinsically motivated. Our present research supplies additional strong support for the second and third of these propositions.

To these propositions we add a fourth: churchgoers who are indiscriminately proreligious are more prejudiced than the consistently extrinsic, and very much more prejudiced than the consistently intrinsic types.

The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed in a series of papers by Allport (1959, 1963, 1966). In brief the argument holds that a person with an extrinsic religious orientation is using his religious views to provide security, comfort, status, or social support for himself—religion is not a value in its own right, it serves other needs, and it is a purely utilitarian formation. Now prejudice too is a “useful” formation: it too provides security, comfort, status, and social support. A life that is dependent on the supports of extrinsic religion is likely to be dependent on the supports of prejudice, hence our positive correlations between the extrinsic orientation and intolerance. Contrariwise, the intrinsic religious orientation is not an instrumental device. It is not a mere mode of conformity, nor a crutch, nor a tranquilizer, nor a bid for status. All needs are subordinated to an overarching religious commitment. In internalizing the total creed of his religion the individual necessarily internalizes its values of humility, compassion, and love of neighbor. In such a life (where religion is an intrinsic and dominant value) there is no place for rejection, contempt, or condescension toward one’s fellow man. Such is our explanation for the relationship between extrinsic religion and prejudice, and between intrinsic religion and tolerance.

Our present task is to discover, if we can, some similar functional tie between prejudice (as measured both directly and indirectly) and the indiscriminately proreligious orientation. The common factor seems to be a certain cognitive style. Technically it might be called “undifferentiated thinking,” or excessive “category width,” as defined by Pettigrew (1958). Rokeach (1960) notes the inability of the “dogmatic” mind to perceive differences; thus, whereas some people distinguish in their thinking and feeling between Communists and Nazis, the undifferentiated dogmatist has a global reaction (cognitive and emotional) toward “Communazis.”

We have no right, of course, to expect all our subjects to make discriminations exactly corresponding to our own logic. Nor should we expect them to read and respond to every item on the Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale according to its full meaning as intended by the investigators. Perhaps we should be gratified that two-thirds of our cases can be safely classified as “consistent” (i.e., having about the same strength of disposition toward an extrinsic or intrinsic orientation across most of the items). These consistent cases, as we have seen, support the hypothesis with which we started. It is the remaining (indiscriminate) one-third of the cases which obscure the trend (or diminish its statistical significance).

In responding to the religious items these individuals seem to take a superficial or “hit and run” approach. Their mental set seems to be “all religion is good.” “My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole life”—Yes! “Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life”—Yes! “Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life”—Yes! “The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships”—Yes!

There seems to be one wide category—“religion is OK.” From the way in which the scale is constructed this undifferentiated endorsement can be the product of an agreement response set. Our inconsistently proreligious may be “yeasayers” (Couch & Keniston, 1960). But if so, we are still dealing with an undifferentiated cognitive
disposition. We recall likewise that the inconsistent cases have a lower level of formal education than the consistent cases. This factor also is relevant to the formation and holding of overwide categories.

But why should such a disposition, whatever its source, be so strongly related to prejudice, in such a way that the more undifferentiated, the more prejudiced—as Table 9 shows?

The answer is that prejudice itself is a matter of stereotyped overgeneralization, a failure to distinguish members of a minority group as individuals (Allport, 1954, Chaps. 2, 10). It goes without saying that if categories are overwide the accompanying feeling tone will be undifferentiated. Thus, religion as a whole is good; a minority group as a whole is bad.

It seems probable that people with undifferentiated styles of thinking (and feeling) are not entirely secure in a world that for the most part demands fine and accurate distinctions. The resulting diffuse anxiety may well dispose them to grapple onto religion and to distrust strange ethnic groups. The positive correlation between the jungle items and other prejudice scales (Table 3) is evidence for this interpretation.

Our line of reasoning, readers will recognize, is compatible with various previous contributions to the theory of prejudice. One thinks here of Rokeach's concept of dogmatism; of Schuman and Harding's (1964) discovery of a "confused" type in their study of the relation between rational consistency and prejudice; of the same authors' work on sympathetic identification (1963); of studies on the dynamics of scapegoating, the role in insecurity, of authoritarian submission, of intolerance for ambiguity, and of related concepts.

All in all we conclude that prejudice, like tolerance, is often embedded deeply in personality structure and is reflected in a consistent cognitive style. Both states of mind are meshed with the individual's religious orientation. One definable style marks the individual who is bigoted in ethnic matters and extrinsic in his religious orientation. Equally apparent is the style of those who are bigoted and at the same time indiscriminately proreligious. A relatively small number of people show an equally consistent cognitive style in their simultaneous commitment to religion as a dominant, intrinsic value and to ethnic tolerance.

One final word: our research argues strongly that social scientists who employ the variable "religion" or "religiosity" in the future will do well to keep in mind the crucial distinction between religious attitudes that are intrinsic, extrinsic, and indiscriminately pro. To know that a person is in some sense "religious" is not as important as to know the role religion plays in the economy of his life. (The categories of nonreligious and indiscriminately antireligious will also for some purposes be of central significance, although the present research, confined as it is to churchgoers, does not employ them.)

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(Received July 6, 1966)
Fundamental(ist) Attribution Error: Protestants Are Dispositionally Focused

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University of Hong Kong

Attribution theory has long enjoyed a prominent role in social psychological research, yet religious influences on attribution have not been well studied. We theorized and tested the hypothesis that Protestants would endorse internal attributions to a greater extent than would Catholics, because Protestantism focuses on the inward condition of the soul. In Study 1, Protestants made more internal, but not external, attributions than did Catholics. This effect survived controlling for Protestant work ethic, need for structure, and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Study 2 showed that the Protestant–Catholic difference in internal attributions was significantly mediated by Protestants’ greater belief in a soul. In Study 3, priming religion increased belief in a soul for Protestants but not for Catholics. Finally, Study 4 found that experimentally strengthening belief in a soul increased dispositional attributions among Protestants but did not change situational attributions. These studies expand the understanding of cultural differences in attributions by demonstrating a distinct effect of religion on dispositional attributions.

Keywords: attribution, religious differences, cultural differences, belief in a soul

Thomas McIlvane was a postal worker in Michigan who lost his job and was unable to appeal the decision. Soon thereafter, he shot his supervisor, several coworkers, other bystanders, and himself. Why would an individual engage in such behavior? There are many possibilities. Attribution theory, one of the cornerstones of the study of social cognition, concerns people’s explanations for behavior. Usually, attributions are divided into two broad categories. If one thinks that McIlvane acted as he did because of something about him as a person, this is an internal (or dispositional) attribution. On the other hand, if one thinks that McIlvane’s behavior was due to circumstances external to him as a person—in other words, that the situation, other actors, or context might have elicited the behavior—then “external” or “situational” attributions are being made (Heider, 1958; Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Kelley, 1971).

Social psychologists had long thought that individuals have a strong, but often erroneous, tendency to attribute behavior to others’ personalities and dispositions, ostensibly because the actors’ behaviors swamp the perceptual field. This tendency to overuse internal attributions, and to underuse external attributions, has been dubbed the fundamental attribution error or correspondence bias—an error or bias due to the failure of people to appreciate the power of the situation (Jones & Nisbett, 1971; Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). This view of attribution was unchallenged until research demonstrated that members of certain ethnic cultures (e.g., East Asians) were less prone to these errors in social cognition than were North Americans (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994), ostensibly because East Asians are more likely to engage in holistic thinking (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007; Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) or because they have an interdependent sense of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995).

Religious Differences in Attribution

While the effects of Eastern versus Western national cultural identities on attribution have been well explored, other cultural influences on attribution have not been well studied. However, this is an important and timely new direction for work on culture and attribution. Recent work has begun to document differences in attributions to fate according to both ethnicity and religion. East Asian Canadians were more likely than European Canadians, and Christians were more likely than non-Christians, to attribute events to fate. For Christians, this was due to greater religious devotion, but for East Asians, it was attributed to more holistic thinking (Norenzayan & Lee, 2010). There is a dearth of literature investigating how religious beliefs and cultural identities might influence other kinds of attribution—and none that address religious
variation in the tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error. In the present research, we focus on religious group differences in attributions. Specifically, we predicted that Protestants would be particularly dispositionally inclined in their attributions compared with Catholics. Further, we theorized that this difference arises because of a greater belief in a soul among Protestants.

Belief in a Soul

The concept of a soul is rooted in both the Hebrew nefesh and the Greek psyche, meaning “breathing” creature. Although the same word is used for both animals and humans, the term soul, as presented in the Scriptures, indicates the inner nature and entire personality of a human as it proceeds from God (Unger, 1988/1957). In the Abrahamic religions (e.g., Judaism, Islam, and Christianity), the idea of the soul may have added metaphysical meanings associated with religion, morality, or the afterlife (Bering, 2006).

The concept of the soul became particularly important in Western thought with the Greek philosophers who tried to resolve the logical problem of changes they observed across time (Brown, Murphy, & Maloney, 1998; Martin & Barresi, 2006). The question was, How could a person be both the human who attended the theater last night and the being who will, for example, travel to Rome next month? There were three solutions. Atomists held a material view that individual change occurred as atoms came together, remained stable for a time, and then moved apart. There was no need for an ethereal component to explain human phenomena. Aristotle argued, instead, that there must be a changeless, but not necessarily immortal, principle (i.e., the Aristotelian “form”) within humans. However, the Platonic view, similar to that of the early Christians (or adopted from Plato by the Christians), was that there was an essential self—a psyche, or soul—that primarily resides in a changeless realm, a spiritual dimension (i.e., the Platonic “Idea”), in which the soul is immortal.

In Western thought, these three differing notions of the soul have a long history. The writings of the early Christian leaders such as the apostle Paul, Justin Martyr, Augustine, and Thomas à Kempis each reflected Aristotelian or Platonic explanations of the soul (Brown et al., 1998; Turner, 1911). These church fathers elaborated on the importance of the cultivation of inward virtue, the concept of an ideal (Christ-like) human, and the possibility of the afterlife of the soul in another realm. The apostle Paul writes, “Though the outward man perish, the inward man is renewed day by day” (2 Corinthians 4:16).

In the medieval period of Western history, the Holy Catholic Church had become virtually the only religion in western Europe. The clergy alone had access to the Scriptures, the papacy had become corrupt, and sins and souls were atoned for by payment to the church (Hopfe & Woodward, 2004). Thus, in 1517 Martin Luther posted his theses on the door of the Catholic Church in Germany, declaring that individuals were able to relate directly with God, without the mediation or intercession of the institutional church and its clergy. These so-called Protestants had been handed a fearsome mandate by Luther. They as individuals, and not the church, were now responsible for the condition of their own souls (Williams, 2002).

John Calvin’s teachings strengthened the Protestant focus on personal salvation and spiritual growth, and these beliefs have often been cited as contributing to the legacy of individualism in America (e.g., de Tocqueville, 1969; Hopfe & Woodward, 2004; Weber, 1958/1988; Williams, 2002). Among the early American settlers, for example, great care was taken to record one’s conversion narrative, internal religious experiences, and phases of spiritual growth in order to “prove” one’s salvation and good standing with God. The focus on individual salvation gained momentum in later American Protestant revivalist movements with an increasing emphasis on emotional conversion experiences and the internal sense of being “saved” or “born again.”

We suggest that for religious people, and for Protestant Christians especially, the soul is very much a salient concept and that belief in a soul promotes a tendency to attribute behavior to dispositions, not situations. For Protestants, the soul is commonly emphasized. The pastorate is defined as the “care of souls” (E. L. Johnson, 2007; Moreland, 2007), and Horatio G. Spafford’s (1828–1888) hymn It Is Well With My Soul has been recorded by at least six different Christian music groups in the past decade. Consequently, we hypothesized that belief in a soul may be especially salient and meaningful to Protestants for the following three reasons: (1) Adherence to a belief that psychological states continue after death necessitates belief in some form of mind–body dualism (e.g., Bering, 2006); (2) the unique emphasis on individual attainment of salvation by faith rather than ritual participation remains a fundamental doctrine in Protestant Christianity (e.g., Cohen, Siegel, & Rozin, 2003; Williams, 2002); and (3) Protestant Christians’ reliance on the Scriptures as the word of God may provide reinforcement for religious beliefs regarding the soul. Protestants are not the only religious groups to believe in a soul, of course, but their beliefs about the soul are in some ways different from those in other religions, in ways that we propose have implications for dispositional attributions.

Indeed, we propose that this notion of the soul is different enough even from Catholic views of the soul that Protestants, to a greater extent than Catholics, will show an increased tendency toward internal attributions. Although all forms of Christianity—including Catholicism and Protestantism—teach that Jesus Christ is the Savior, the role played by individual persons versus reliance on church rituals is widely diverse. Since the Protestant Reformation, most non-Catholic Christians have believed, for example, that repenting of one’s sins and trusting in Jesus Christ as the Savior will assure rewards in the afterlife. This “inner” form of religion, described by the sociologist Max Weber (1922/1993, 1958/1988) and later measured as intrinsic religiosity by Allport and Ross (1967) and Gorsuch and McPherson (1989), is typically contrasted with both intrinsically and “extrinsically” motivated Catholicism with its more ecclesiastical requirements for salvation (Cohen, Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2005). While inward devotion remains important for the Catholic, participation in the sacraments and recognition of papal authority and priestly mediation are central in attaining salvation. The catechism of the Catholic Church (1995), for example, lists 54 entries for sacraments or sacramentals but only six entries for the word soul.

Thus, although many religious groups recognize the existence of the soul, Protestant Christians may place special emphasis on the inward state and beliefs of the individual (i.e., orthodoxy) rather than the rituals, ethnicity, or governance of the community (i.e., orthopraxy; Cohen et al., 2003, 2005; Cohen & Hill, 2007). The...
Christian theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) summed up the inward nature of his faith tradition in this way:

[It] springs necessarily and by itself from the interior of every better soul, it has its own province in the mind in which it reigns sovereign, and it is worthy of moving the noblest and the most excellent by means of its innermost power and by having its innermost essence known by them. (Schleiermacher, 1799/1888, p. 17)

It is our hypothesis that enduring Protestant teachings and beliefs about the soul result in an attribution style for that group that is distinct even from those of Catholics.

**Overview of the Present Research**

Given this theological and historical overview, our goal was to investigate whether and how history and theology shape the existing psychological tendencies of Catholics and Protestants (Cohen, 2009). Prior work has shown that such theological and cultural differences between members of different religious groups include differences in domains such as relationality in work contexts (Sanchez-Burks, 2002), moral judgment (Cohen & Rozin, 2001), religiosity (Cohen et al., 2003), and forgiveness (Cohen, Malka, Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006). In the present research, we investigate how the history, culture, and theology of religious groups have shaped psychological processes—in this case, attribution.

Would one expect Protestants, relative to Catholics, to endorse greater internal attributions, lesser external attributions, or both? Although it may seem intuitive that internal and external attributions are logical opposites (Heider, 1958), there is evidence that they can be independent (Kashima, 2001). That is, for a person to say that a behavior is caused by internal factors is not to say that the person does not also see situational influences on that behavior. More specifically, when confronted with a behavior, North Americans seem to first make a dispositional attribution and then adjust that attribution based on awareness of contextual factors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Krull, 1993; Trope, 1986). Therefore, in these studies, we made separate predictions regarding internal and external attributions. We hypothesized that Protestants would prefer internal attributions to a greater extent than would Catholics, because the soul is internal to the person. In addition, lay beliefs of the soul suggest people ascribe purpose and intentionality to behaviors (Bering, 2006). On the other hand, there is no reason to suspect Protestants would make more or less external attributions than would Catholics; thus, we did not expect to find any difference in external attributions between these religious groups.

To summarize, we assert that being raised in Protestant religion, even compared with Catholic religion, results in distinct cultural representations. Among these representations for Protestants is a strong belief in individual souls. This belief in (or representation of) a soul then leads Protestants to endorse internal attributions to a particularly high degree. Thus, in the present studies, we investigated (a) the extent to which Protestant religion exerts a distinct influence on attributions and (b) the process by which this occurs. In all of these studies, we compared Protestants with Catholics, which we believe yields a rigorous and conservative test of our theorizing that historical and theological concerns about the soul continue to exert an influence on Protestants’ social cognition today.

In Study 1, we tested the hypothesis that Protestants would prefer internal attributions more than Catholics would, even when controlling for a number of potential confounds—the need for structure, the Protestant work ethic, and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. We predicted no such difference for external attributions. In Study 2, we again tested whether Protestants would make more dispositional attributions compared with Catholics and, further, whether belief in a soul would mediate this effect.

Although correlational tests of mediation are commonly used in social psychological research, experimental tests are more rigorous (MacKinnon, 2008; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). In Study 3, we sought to experimentally demonstrate the link between Protestant (vs. Catholic) religion and belief in a soul by use of a priming manipulation. Finally, to garner further support for belief in a soul as a driver of Protestants’ dispositional attributions, we manipulated belief in a soul in Study 4. If belief in a soul actually mediates Protestants’ dispositional bias, then experimentally strengthening belief in a soul should cause Protestants to become more dispositionally focused.

**Study 1**

In this study we examined the internal and external attributions of Protestants and Catholics. We also sought to rule out plausible but theoretically irrelevant confounds such as the need for structure, the Protestant work ethic, and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Thus, we sought to provide evidence for Protestants’ greater tendency to make dispositional attributions compared with Catholics and to dispel criticism that this religious difference is simply an artifact of other psychological processes or tendencies that are not of current theoretical relevance.

One potential confound in our study was that Protestants could be more cognitively rigid—valuing structure and clear answers, rather than being able to entertain and tolerate ambiguity (Barrett, Patock-Peckham, Hutchinson, & Nagoshi, 2005; Cohen, Shariff, & Hill, 2008). A relatively greater need for structure could relate to focusing on the individual when explaining behavior, rather than taking a more holistic approach by focusing on how an individual’s behavior is caused by contextual factors. We measured such tendencies with the Need for Structure scale (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001), an adaptation of Neuberg, Judice, and West’s (1997) Need for Closure Scale.

Another confound that might be greater among Protestants than Catholics is the value of hard work—the Protestant work ethic. Weber (1958/1988) claimed that Protestantism promoted capitalism because the status of one’s soul as saved or damned (preordained in Calvinist theology) could be gleaned from one’s earthly prosperity (see also Sanchez-Burks, 2002). Nowadays, however, treatments in the social sciences of the Protestant work ethic focus on the value of hard work, which is quite distinct from notions about the status of the soul and its original theological underpinnings (Christopher, Zabel, Jones, & Marek, 2008; Miller, Woehr, & Hudspeth, 2001). For this reason, we treated Protestant work ethic as a potential confound and not as an explanation of any effects.

In this study, we also used measures of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) to rule out the possibility that it is some general aspect of religiosity among Protestants that explains their particularly dispositional attributions.
Method

Participants. Participants were 233 students from a large public university in the southwestern United States. There were 104 Catholics (42 men; 62 women) and 131 Protestants (41 men; 90 women). Participants were allowed to select more than one ethnicity. Among Catholics, there were 3 Asian Americans, 1 African American, 34 Hispanics, and 69 Caucasians. Among Protestants, there were 5 Asians, 5 Asian Americans, 15 African Americans, 11 Hispanics, 4 Native Americans, and 95 Caucasians.

To verify that religious group was not confounded with other demographic variables, we ran correlations between them (coding Caucasians as 0 and every other ethnicity as 1). Results revealed no significant relationship between religious group and sex \( (r = .08, p = .21) \) or ethnicity \( (r = .05, p = .42) \).

Procedure. Measures of attribution were borrowed from Kitayama, Imada, Ishii, Takemura, and Ramaswamy (2006). Participants were presented with four short scenarios probing attributions for both moral and immoral behaviors and were then asked to rate statements about internal and external attributions. A sample scenario was

Sara Martin is a top executive at a pharmaceutical company that recently developed a new and expensive drug for treating malaria. Shortly after the company developed the drug, there was a significant outbreak of malaria in Africa. In response, Sara Martin decided to donate a lot of medicine to the countries in Africa needing assistance.

There was another positive scenario in which the protagonist, a professional baseball player, donated his time to hold baseball camps for poor children. There were also two negative scenarios—one about a doctor who hid a mistake that led to a patient’s death and another about a municipal official who took bribes or kickbacks.

For the present research, these scenarios have the advantage of having moral connotations. Because of our theoretical perspective that it is the Protestant concern with the nature of the individual soul (likely to be saved or damned) that would drive differences in attributions, we selected morally charged scenarios that could be seen as being diagnostic about the condition of the soul.

For each scenario, participants rated on 7-point scales their agreement with two items reflecting internal attributions and two items reflecting external attributions (one an attribution per se and the other a counterfactual that behavior would be different if the individual’s features or the situation had been different). For example, we asked people to rate their agreement with the following sentences: “Features of Sara Martin (such as her character, attitude, or temperament) influenced her behavior (donating malaria medicine to countries in Africa needing assistance)” and “Sara Martin would have acted differently if her features (such as her character, attitude, or temperament) had been different” versus “Features of the environment that surround Sara Martin (such as the social atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors) influenced her behavior (donating malaria medicine to countries in Africa needing assistance)” and “Sara Martin would have acted differently if features of the environment that surround her (such as the atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors) had been different.” The reliability was good for both the external \( (\alpha = .72) \) and internal \( (\alpha = .81) \) attribution scales.

We measured need for structure (Thompson et al., 2001) to examine the possibility that Protestants and Catholics could differ in rigid or dogmatic thinking, which could relate to attributions. The Need for Structure Scale has two subscales: Desire for Structure (four items; sample item: “I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life”) and Response to Lack of Structure (seven items; sample item: “I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear”). In this sample, these two subscales were highly correlated \( (r = .50) \), and we did not have different predictions about the two subscales. In the interest of parsimony we thus combined them into one scale, which we refer to as Need for Structure.

We measured Protestant work ethic with 19 items from Mirels and Garrett (1971). Sample items are “Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time” and “If one works hard enough he is likely to make a good life for himself.” We dropped one item because of a typographical error (we inadvertently presented “Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements” as “Most people spend too much time in profitable amusements”). We combined all items into a Work Ethic scale (consistent with one factor reported by Mirels & Garrett, 1971).

We also measured intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). Intrinsic religiosity is usually seen as reflecting ultimate goals and as internalized, mature religious motivations. Extrinsic religiosity is often taken to relate to an instrumental, immature use of religion, such as for social contacts (Allport & Ross, 1967). Given that intrinsic religiosity is theoretically about sincere religious motivation, one could theorize that the value that Protestantism places on intrinsic religiosity could be an explanation for differences in patterns of attributions. We did not take this approach for several reasons. One is the criticism that the guiding theory behind these constructs may be apt only in an American, Protestant cultural context and less applicable among Catholics given Catholics’ greater emphasis on communal religion (Cohen et al., 2005). Indeed, intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were correlated in very different patterns among Protestants (negatively correlated), Catholics (uncorrelated), and Jews (positively correlated) in a study by Cohen and Hill (2007). Furthermore, it is not especially clear on the basis of inconsistent factor analytic properties or on the basis of face validity that intrinsic religiosity measures sincere religiosity as an ultimate goal or that extrinsic religiosity measures insincere religiosity as a means to an end (Pargament, 1992). We felt we were on safer ground treating these items as general indications of religiosity, and we therefore treated them as covariates.

Results and Discussion

We first calculated correlations between religious group (Protestant vs. Catholic) and potential confounds. Protestants were higher than Catholics in intrinsic religiosity \( (r = .14, p < .05) \), marginally higher in extrinsic religiosity \( (r = .11, p = .10) \), and not significantly different in work ethic \( (r = .03, p = .68) \) or need for structure \( (r = -.07, p = .28) \). We controlled for these variables in our analyses discussed next, to make sure that differences in attribution were not due to variations between religious groups in these confounds. The result yielded a very conservative comparison between Protestants and Catholics.
Because we made a priori directional predictions regarding religious group and internal attributions, we report one-tailed tests of this hypothesis throughout the article. In a multiple regression analysis (see Table 1)—controlling intrinsic religiosity, extrinsic religiosity, work ethic, and need for structure—being Catholic versus Protestant had a significant effect on internal attributions ($b = 0.20, SE = 0.12, \beta = .12, p < .05$). In a similar regression analysis, consistent with our hypotheses, there was no effect of religious group on external attributions ($b = -0.06, SE = 0.14, \beta = -.03, p = .66$).

This study supported our hypothesis that Protestants would endorse internal attributions more than Catholics would. It further supported our view that there is no such difference in external attributions.

**Study 2**

In Study 2, we attempted to replicate the internal attribution differences seen in Study 1 and then examined the mediating role of belief in a soul.

**Method**

**Participants and procedure.** The participants in this study were 154 Protestants (32 men; 122 women) and 118 Catholics (28 men; 90 women; 1 did not report sex) from a large public university in the southwestern United States. Among Catholics there were 3 Asians, 3 Native Americans, 35 Hispanics, 76 European Americans, and 1 who failed to report ethnicity. Among Protestants there were 99 European Americans, 31 African Americans, 12 Hispanics, 3 Asian Americans, 3 Native Americans, 3 Asians, 1 “other,” and 2 who did not report ethnicity. Participants received course credit in a sociology course for completing the survey. As in Study 1, we ran correlations between religious group and demographic variables to make sure there was no confound between religious group and sex or ethnicity. Results showed no correlation between religious group and either participant sex ($r = .04, p = .54$) or ethnicity ($r = -.001, p = .98$).

Belief in a soul was measured using eight items, including several reverse-scored items ($\alpha = .81$; “I believe that every person has a soul”; “People are not just physical, but they also have a soul”; “After death, the soul lives on”; “I do not believe in a soul”; “Death ends all forms of life forever”; “Earthly existence is the only existence we have”; “There is an immortal part of a person”; and “People are no more than a physical body”). Internal and external attributions were measured as in Study 1.

**Results and Discussion**

In a multiple regression analysis, and as in Study 1, Protestants endorsed internal attributions to a greater extent than did Catholics ($b = 0.24, SE = 0.10, \beta = .15, p = .008$). For mediation analyses, this is the direct path of the independent variable, religious group, on the dependent variable, internal attributions (see the horizontal path in Figure 1). Again, there was no effect of religious group on external attributions ($b = 0.15, SE = 0.14, \beta = .07, p = .27$).

We next set out to find whether Protestants had greater belief in a soul than Catholics (see the ascending path from the independent variable, religious group, to the theorized mediator, belief in a soul, in Figure 1). Results revealed that Protestants did indeed have greater belief in a soul than did Catholics ($b = 0.32, SE = 0.13, \beta = .15, p = .007$).

Controlling for belief in a soul reduced to marginal significance the effect of being Protestant versus Catholic on internal attributions ($b = 0.15, SE = 0.09, \beta = .09, p = .06$). In addition, belief in a soul had a significant effect on internal attributions, while controlling religious group (see the descending path in Figure 1; $b = 0.30, SE = 0.04, \beta = .38, p < .001$). A Sobel (1982) test confirmed a significant indirect effect of being Protestant versus Catholic on internal attributions via belief in a soul ($z = 2.32, p = .02$). These analyses satisfy all the conditions for partial mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Thus, in Study 2, we replicated our finding from Study 1 that Protestants are more dispositionally, but not more situationally, focused than Catholics are. In addition, we found support for the hypothesis that this effect is mediated by belief in a soul.

**Study 3**

Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence for our hypothesis that the activation of cognitive representations of Protestant religion activates belief in a soul, which then leads to internal attributions. In Study 3, we sought to provide experimental evidence for the causal pathway between the activation of cognitive representations of Protestant religion and belief in a soul. Consequently, we primed religious representations among Protestants and Catholics and expected to find that belief in a soul would increase among

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Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Internal attributions</th>
<th>External attributions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious group*</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for structure</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrinsic religiosity</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extrinsic religiosity</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant work ethic</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Catholic (1) versus Protestant (2).
* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. 

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Protestants to a greater extent than among Catholics after the prime.

**Method**

Participants and procedure. Sixty-eight Catholics (31 men; 37 women) and 75 Protestants (29 men; 45 women; 1 person who did not report sex) who were psychology undergraduates at a large public university in the southwestern United States participated for course credit. Sixty-three percent of the Catholic participants were European American, and 69% of the Protestant participants were European American.

We reasoned that religious representations would be accessible among those who were currently practicing their religion and those who had been raised in the Christian religious tradition. Therefore, we counted participants as Catholic or Protestant if they either currently identified themselves as such (ns = 46 and 51, respectively) or had been raised in a Catholic or Protestant household even if they no longer identified themselves as belonging to those religions (ns = 22 and 24, respectively). This also allowed us to overcome potential ceiling effects if people who identify themselves as currently Protestant are highly likely to chronically endorse belief in a soul.

We primed religion by asking participants to write a few sentences about being a member of their faith or tradition. In the control condition, we asked participants to write a few sentences about their hobbies. We then measured belief in a soul using the belief in a soul scale from Study 2 (α = .92).

Finally, we asked participants to complete the following scales: Need for Structure (Thompson et al., 2001), work ethic (Mirels & Garrett, 1971), and intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). These scales were used as covariates in the analyses in the next section.

**Results and Discussion**

There was a main effect of religion, whereby Protestants believed in a soul more than did Catholics, replicating our prior findings, $F(1, 135) = 4.10, p = .045$. There was also a significant interaction between prime (religion vs. control) and religion (Catholics vs. Protestants), $F(1, 135) = 5.01, p = .027$. Protestants who were primed with religion believed in a soul significantly more than did Protestants who were in the control condition ($p = .04$), while there was no such difference for Catholics ($p = .26$; see Figure 2). Thus, in support of our hypothesis, priming religion activated belief in a soul to a greater extent for Protestants than for Catholics.

**Study 4**

If belief in a soul is indeed the reason that Protestants are especially prone to making dispositional rather than situational attributions, strengthening belief in a soul should lead Protestants to make even more internal attributions but should not change external attributions. We tested these hypotheses in Study 4.

**Method**

Participants and procedure. The participants in this study were 55 Protestants (28 men; 27 women) at a large public university in the southwestern United States. There were 7 Asians, 3 Asian Americans, 9 African Americans, 8 Hispanics, 5 Native Americans, 32 Caucasians, and 2 “other.” Participants received partial course credit for filling out the questionnaire.

We experimentally manipulated belief in a soul by asking participants to write an essay for or against the existence of a soul. Before they began writing, participants were given the following instructions:

*You will be RANDOMLY selected to be either “for” or “against” this issue. Please try to write a convincing essay EVEN IF YOU DO NOT AGREE with the side you were assigned to. The mark of a successful writer is that they can write about any topic convincingly, and we would like to see how well students can do that.*

In addition, we gave participants a few arguments to start off with, to further prime the idea that a soul does or does not exist. For example, we told participants writing against the existence of a soul that “people often report having after death or out of body experiences.” Participants spent about 5 min writing about their assigned topic.

Previous research on persuasion has suggested that writing an essay for or against a randomly assigned topic can strengthen belief in that topic, even if the opinion is not one that the partic-
ipant originally held (Cooper, Mirabile, & Scher, 2005). Thus, the
priming task could experimentally strengthen or weaken belief in
a soul, which should already be a belief that exists to varying extents in Protestants.

After writing their essay, participants read and answered ques-
tions about the same attribution scenarios as in the previous
studies.

Results and Discussion

In a regression analysis, our experimental manipulation had a
significant effect on internal attributions ($b = 0.72$, $SE = 0.32$,
$\beta = .29$, $p = .02$). Protestants who wrote an essay for the existence
of a soul made more internal attributions than did Protestants who
wrote an essay against the existence of the soul. As predicted, there
was no such effect for external attributions ($b = 0.14$, $SE = 0.26$,
$\beta = .07$, $p = .59$). The results of this study provide further
evidence that belief in a soul leads Protestants to make more internal, but not external, attributions.

General Discussion

We have argued that Protestant Christians are more likely to offer more internal explanations for behavior, even compared to Catholics. We showed this was so in Study 1, even after control-
ling for several potential confounds (the need for structure, intrin-
sic and extrinsic religiosity, and the Protestant work ethic).

Our demonstration that Protestants are prone to internal attribu-
tions is important because one could imagine that theological and historical differences among religious groups in the United States exert little or no influence on people’s current psychological tendencies. We suggest that distal historical and theological circumstances can still be reflected in people’s judgments (Cohen, 2009; Conner Snibbe & Markus, 2002). These results are consist-
tent with other research showing that members of religious groups still differ in theologically determined ways, in domains including work ethic (Sanchez-Burks, 2002), moral judgments (Cohen & Rozin, 2001), the extent to which religiousness depends on prac-
tice and faith (Cohen et al., 2003), intrinsic and extrinsic religious motivation (Cohen & Hill, 2005), and forgiveness (Cohen et al.,
2006).

Our findings are also informative because there is a strong alternative theoretical possibility. One could theorize that Protest-
tants may actually be more prone to making external or situational attributions than members of other religions. Despite the fact that Protestantism can be dubbed an individualistic religion inasmuch as it is primarily concerned with individual faith (Cohen et al.,
2005), it could also be argued that, historically and psychologically,
Protestants were collectivists with a desire to form a com-
munity based on codified social norms. In many ways, the Puritan immigrants exemplified collectivist values of being voluntarily bound by mutual covenant to live in community, to establish a proper social order, and to maintain harmony within the community. An individual’s identity was defined not only by personal choice but also by good standing in the religious community, everyone being subject to jeremiads aimed at shuffling stray Chris-
tians back into the fold.

Moreover, religion has also been explained as a culturally evolved way to promote cooperation, a solution to the problem of
living in large-scale societies of unrelated individuals (Atran &
Norenzayan, 2004; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Shariff & Noren-
zayan, 2007; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Wilson, 2002).

Indeed, religious people from many religious traditions, includ-
ing Protestantism, are more likely to espouse what are viewed as collectivistic values, including tradition and conformity (e.g.,
Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Using the independent and interdependent self-construal scales of Singelis (1994), Cohen and Rozin (2001) found that interdepen-
dence, but not independence, was correlated with religiosity for both Jews and Protestants. Thus, Protestants—who are more fo-
cused on tradition, conformity, cooperation, and interdependence—could have been theorized to be more prone to making external and less prone to making internal attributions than are Catholics. However, we found support for the exact opposite prediction—Protestants make more internal, but not external, attribu-
tions compared with Catholics.

What is it about Protestant religion that makes people more internally focused? We theorized that this is because Protestants believe more strongly in, and are more concerned about, the condition of souls. In Study 2 we found that belief in a soul partially and significantly mediated differences between Protes-
tants and Catholics in tendencies to endorse internal attributions. One problem with the interpretation of many mediation analyses is that they rely on correlational evidence without evidence of cau-
sality (MacKinnon, 2008). Study 3 found that Protestants primed with religion had the highest belief in a soul compared with Catholics and compared with Protestants not primed with religion. Furthermore, Study 4 found that strengthening belief in a soul increased the tendency of Protestants to provide internal, but not external, attributions. We are confident from the results of these studies that Protestants have greater representations of belief in a soul relative to Catholics and that this partially accounts for Protestants’ relatively greater tendency to be dispositionally bi-
ased.

Martin Luther introduced the Protestant Christian belief that salvation comes through grace and faith alone, unmediated by a priest or religious institution. Many years later, a persecuted Protes-
tant contingent immigrated to the New World, not only seeking religious freedom but also aiming to build a righteous “City on a Hill” (Morone, 2004). Each later Revivalist movement, including the fundamentalist and charismatic movements of the previous century, reinforced Protestants’ concern for the status of one’s soul. It seems that this focus on the soul causes Protestants to be more concerned than members of other religions (here, Catholics) with dispositional causes for the behavior of others—often committ-
ing what has been termed in the social psychology literature as the fundamental attribution error.

The debate about the soul that began among the Atomists, Aristotelians, and Platonists has not diminished and, indeed, is reflected in the psychological literature today. Although forgotten by some, the term psychology is literally translated as “the study of the soul,” and some early psychologists referred to the field as the study of souls. However, by 1957, Gordon Allport complained, “As every reader knows, modern empirical psychology . . . sepa-
rated itself sharply with religion. ‘Psychology without a soul’ became its badge of distinction and pride” (p. v).
Future Directions

We now consider two recommendations for future research, one on the distinction between internal and external attributions and the other on how religious differences in attribution may relate to research regarding East–West differences.

With regard to the measure of attributions we have used across studies, two directions for future research are warranted. First, we used scenarios that depicted highly moral (e.g., charitable) and highly immoral (e.g., taking a bribe) behaviors. We chose these scenarios because it is our theory that Protestants scrutinize the internal motivations for behavior because they are attempting to gauge the condition of a person’s soul. Moral scenarios seemed well suited to addressing this research question. It would be interesting to discover in future research whether Protestants explain other kinds of behavior (ones that are not moral or immoral) in terms of dispositional or internal determinants. If attribution differences exist for only moral scenarios, this would lend further support to the notion that Protestants make attributions for behavior primarily with an eye toward the moral condition of the soul. If attribution differences also exist for nonmoral scenarios, however, it would suggest that the Protestant tendency to make dispositional attributions is either more general or more multiply determined than just being concerned with the condition of the soul. In other words, the moral attributional outlook may generalize to causal explanations for a broader set of behaviors.

A second future direction for work on religion and attributions has to do with finer distinction between types of attributions. To say that a behavior was driven by a person’s dispositions or internal factors is not necessarily to say that a person was responsible, or agentic, for that behavior (Hilton, Smith, & Kin, 1995; Kashima, 2001; Semin & Marsman, 1994). However, we point to this as an important direction for future research; that is, to see whether Protestants are particularly likely to hold people agentically or morally responsible for the behaviors that Protestants see as internally or dispositionally driven.

Another recommendation for future work concerns the relationship between religion and previously found East–West differences in attributions. Although the present research focuses on whether North American Protestants are particularly dispositional, it alludes to a broader potential direction for future research—the relationship between religion and nationality as influences on attribution. Is it possible that some of the attribution findings commonly attributed to East–West differences could actually be due to religious disparities between those countries? In some preliminary research, we found that Hong Kong Protestants were more likely to make internal compared with external attributions than nonreligious individuals or people of other faiths (Li, Johnson, & Cohen, 2009). This implies that Protestants in countries other than the United States have similar attribution styles to those in the United States. On the other hand, the effect of religion can vary in different ethnic groups. For example, religiousness is correlated with political conservatism among European Americans and Asians but not among African Americans and Latinos, because different values correlate with religiousness in these different groups (Cohen et al., 2009). How various cultural identities (including ethnicity, nationality, religion, and others) interact is an important direction for future psychological research (Cohen, 2009).

Broader Theoretical Implications

Religious ideologies have played an important role in U.S. history and continue to do so today. Approximately 77% of U.S. citizens self-identify as Christian (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008), including 49.8% Protestant, 24.5% Roman Catholic, 1.3% Mormon ( Latter-day Saints), and 1.1% others. Yet the influence of religion on research outcomes in psychology is often overlooked (Conner Snibbe & Markus, 2002). Over the last century, Christianity in America has developed into a marketplace of ideas with many different denominations and sects as well as professions of being “spiritual but not religious.” One could well imagine, therefore, that members of various religious groups would show similar psychological tendencies, given that the current religious culture and climate in the United States would be seen as a homogenizing force and one that reflects people’s individual choices, not their historically descended group identities.

However, the historical roots of Protestantism continue to flourish in America, with over 23% of Americans being affiliated with Renewalist (e.g., Pentecostal or Charismatic) churches and over 51% of all Christians being identified as Baptist—denominations that continue to emphasize the internal, personal nature of religiosity (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2008). We suggest that the beliefs and values of these groups should not be glossed over in social psychological research. Furthermore, it is an important theoretical issue in the study of culture to elucidate whether and how historical and theological developments influence the psychological processes and tendencies of modern members of those religious groups.

Previously, there has been little research on the influence of religion on attribution (but see Norenzayan & Lee, 2010). Differences in attribution between groups were usually compared between Easterners and Westerners and explained by factors such as collectivism versus individualism, or holistic versus analytic thinking. The studies described in this article, on the other hand, suggest that religious cultural identities strongly and specifically influence whether someone is more likely to make internal attributions.

More broadly, we believe the connection between religion and various cultural processes is vastly underexplored. Psychology as a field has made commendable strides in cross-cultural research, but it is important to consider the possibility that religions also have distinct histories, cultures, and worldviews (Cohen, 2009; K. A. Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2010). Though sometimes difficult to separate, the study of the effects and interactions of varying cultural identities may make unique contributions to the psychological processes being researched.

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Religious diversity and religious toleration

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Awareness of religious diversity is nothing new under the sun. The early Christian martyrs were doubtless aware that others in the Roman Empire did not share their religious beliefs. Yet it is arguable that awareness of religious diversity has recently assumed qualitatively new forms. Among the factors that might account for this transformation is the increased contact people now have with religions other than their own. Modern technologies of travel and communication foster interchanges between adherents of different religions. Modern scholarship has made available translations of and commentaries on texts from a variety of religious traditions, and cultural anthropologists have recorded fascinating thick descriptions of the practices of many such traditions. People who live in religiously pluralistic democracies have ample opportunities to acquire personal familiarity with religions other than their own without leaving home. It now is therefore harder than it once was to hang onto negative stereotypes of or rationalize hostile reactions to the practitioners of religions other than one’s own. But many people succeed in doing so; increased contact often enough produces greater friction. News media have bombarded us with the sights and sounds of religious conflict in Belfast, Beirut and Bosnia. In Africa Muslims clash with animists, in India Hindus and Muslims struggle bitterly, and in Europe Catholic Croats go to war with Orthodox Serbs. The city of Jerusalem remains a focal point for religious quarrels among Jews, Christians and Muslims. In the eighteenth century, Kant complained that the history of Christianity could justify Lucretius’s exclamation, tantum religio potuit suadere malorum! At the beginning of the twenty-first century, support for Lucretius comes from several religions and many parts of the world. The religions of the world may be able to understand one another better now than ever before, but their ability to live together in peace still has not yet been secured.

Recent philosophical work that is responsive to the contemporary challenge of religious diversity has centered in the areas of epistemology and political philosophy. In epistemology, the main issue has been whether or not, given what we now know about religious diversity, exclusivism remains a defensible position. Exclusivism is the view that one religion is basically correct and all the others go astray in one or more ways. It has several dimen-
sions. Doctrinal exclusivism is the view that the doctrines of one religion are mostly true while the doctrines of all the others, where there is conflict, are false. Soteriological exclusivism is the view that only the path proposed by one religion leads securely to the ultimate religious goal, salvation or liberation. And experiential exclusivism is the view that the religious experiences typically enjoyed by the adherents of one religion are mostly veridical and conflicting experiences typical of all the others are nonveridical. It is, of course, entirely consistent to accept exclusivism in one of these dimensions while rejecting it in another. For example, some Christians who are doctrinal exclusivists hold that salvation is available to devout members of other religious traditions, though such Christians often insist that, unbeknownst to those outside Christianity, their salvation comes through Jesus Christ. Starting from the observation that, as far as we can tell empirically, all the world religions are more or less equal in their salvific efficacy, that is, their ability to transform their practitioners from being self-centered to being centered on a transcendent reality, John Hick has mounted a powerful attack on exclusivism in all three dimensions. While admitting that religious diversity does, or at least can, undermine the epistemic credentials of experiential or doctrinal exclusivism to some extent, William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have replied with arguments aimed at showing that Christian exclusivism of some sort continues to enjoy an epistemic status high enough to make it a rational option even when religious diversity is taken into account. And other philosophers have added their voices to the discussion of this issue. In my opinion, the debate on this topic has more or less reached a stand off. The positions that are live philosophical options have been fairly thoroughly mapped out, and the main arguments for and against each of them have been developed in some detail. I doubt that there is a realistic prospect of the issue which divides exclusivists from their philosophical opponents being decisively settled or even moved appreciably closer to a resolution by additional arguments.

One might think of exclusivism of another kind as the chief problem addressed by the response to religious diversity within contemporary political philosophy. In this case, exclusivism is the view, advocated by several liberal political philosophers, that religion ought to be excluded from the public square in modern liberal democracies. More precisely, political exclusivists hold that religious arguments should be excluded from the public political discourse of religiously pluralistic democratic societies on certain fundamental questions. Robert Audi has argued vigorously for a version of exclusivism that includes a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or policy that restricts conduct unless one has and is willing to offer adequate secular reason for such advocacy or support. Appealing to grounds of fairness, Nicholas Wolterstorff has challenged Audi’s position...
and forcefully criticized the general exclusivist point of view of which it is an instance. The most nuanced liberal exclusion of the religious so far developed is contained in the political philosophy of John Rawls. According to its ideal of public reason, which imposes a duty of civility, we are not to introduce into public political discourse on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, religious doctrines all being understood to be comprehensive, unless we satisfy the proviso that we do so in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself. My impression is that, unlike the debate about exclusivism in epistemology, this dispute remains in flux to some extent and has not yet reached a stand off. Confirming evidence for this impression may be derived from the fact that Rawls has modified his position to allow that reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced into public political discussions at any time subject to the proviso that in due course reasons in compliance with the ideal of public reason are presented to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines were invoked to support. To be sure, the modified view still has a proviso attached, but it is more permissive than the proviso of the original view and so is less likely to raise the hackles of religious citizens of a democracy.

I confess I find it a bit odd that the main response to religious diversity in recent liberal political philosophy has focused on the issue of whether or not religious argument should be excluded from public discourse. Given the widespread religious conflict mentioned previously, I cannot help thinking that religious toleration is a more urgent global political issue and that the rather narrow focus on religious discourse in liberal democracies is a bit parochial. I have some ideas about factors that may contribute to explaining the narrow focus, though they are somewhat speculative. One factor is fear of divisiveness. It would be natural to search for moral grounds for constraints on the use of religious arguments in the public square if one were afraid that in a religiously divided society their use would be likely to be destabilizing. Jeffrey Stout expressed such fear not so long ago. Arguing against Basil Mitchell’s proposal that traditional theism be employed in order to revitalize public discourse, Stout claims that ‘the risks of reviving religious conflict like that of early modern Europe are too great’. I myself reckon that the probability of reigniting the Wars of Religion by including religious arguments in public political discourse is quite low, and so I think that such fear, however real it may be, is unrealistic. It seems to me that, even if the practice of religious toleration in Western democracies is no more than a modus vivendi, it is supported both by the settled habits of religious citizens and by the weight of their traditions to a degree that lends it great robustness. Another factor that may play an explanatory role is complacency about the historical achieve-
ments of political philosophy. It would be understandable if people saw no need for new arguments to clinch the case for religious toleration because they thought conclusive arguments were already available in the classic works of liberal political philosophy. One might, for example, look to John Locke’s work as a source of arguments for religious toleration. According to Locke, religious persecution is bound to be ineffective and hence is irrational because its goal is to get people to adopt different religious beliefs and people do not have direct voluntary control over their religious beliefs. However, as Jeremy Waldron has recently shown Locke’s case for this position falls apart under critical scrutiny, and there is no way to reconstruct it to meet the objections. Or one might look to John Stuart Mill for an argument for religious toleration that at least is successful by utilitarian standards. But David Lewis has shown that Mill will lose his case if he argues against a clever utilitarian religious Inquisitor. So complacency about the justification of religious toleration is, I think, unwarranted.

My main aim in this paper is to broaden the focus of the discussion of religious diversity in political philosophy to include arguments against religious intolerance. I shall not try to refurbish the arguments of Locke or Mill; indeed, I shall depart altogether from the British historical tradition of liberal thought. I shall instead exploit the historical resources of a continental tradition of liberal thought by examining arguments against religious intolerance developed by Pierre Bayle and Immanuel Kant. I choose these particular arguments for scrutiny because they enable me to reach a secondary goal, which is to bring the discussion of religious diversity in political philosophy into contact with the discussion in epistemology and to try to establish some connections between them. The idea that there should be such connections has been rendered intuitively vivid by Avishai Margalit. He draws attention to the parable of the three rings, made famous in Lessing’s play Nathan the Wise. In Margalit’s version of the story, a king leaves a legacy of three rings in his three sons; one of the rings is of great value while the other two are no more than good imitations. The religious analogy is clear. The king is God; the real ring is revealed truth; and the three sons are Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. Reflecting on the parable, Margalit points out that, apart from the king, ‘no one else knows for certain which ring is the real one. This doubt should lead to an attitude of “respect and suspect”, because it is possible that the truth is in another religion’. It is precisely the connection Margalit sees between epistemic uncertainty and the relatively tolerant attitude of respect and suspect that interests me. I propose to explore that connection and to try to clarify what its implications are through an examination of the arguments of Bayle and Kant. I do not pretend to return a final verdict on the general line of philosophical thought to which those arguments are meant to contribute.
In this paper, I shall ignore some of the issues that have been prominent in other recent treatments of toleration in political philosophy. I am not going to investigate the topic of whether ordinary language marks a conceptual distinction between toleration and tolerance. Nor do I plan to take a stand on whether it is a necessary truth that one can only tolerate things one views as bad or evil. I do not have a definition or an analysis of toleration to offer. I shall work with an intuitive notion of religious intolerance that has within its extension behaviors such as killing people for heresy or apostasy, forced conversions and preventing people from engaging collectively in worship. My interest here is restricted to the fairly specific topic of the ethical or moral status of such intolerant behaviors.14

The remainder of the paper is divided into three part. In the first, I rehearse arguments about the negative epistemic consequences of religious diversity. The other two parts address the question of what impact the conclusions of such arguments might have on further arguments against intolerance. The second part subjects to critical analysis an argument by Bayle; the third does the same to an argument of Kant.

1. Alston and others on religious diversity

William P. Alston acknowledges that religious diversity gives rise to an epistemological problem for his view that experience of God confers prima facie justification or beliefs about how God is manifested to the experiencer. He defends this view from within the perspective of a doxastic practice approach to epistemology.15 A doxastic practice is a practice of forming beliefs together with a series of possible overiders for the prima facie justification a belief derives from having been generated by the practice. Doxastic practices are to be evaluated, from an epistemic point of view, in terms of their likelihood of producing true beliefs, that is, in terms of their reliability. Basic doxastic practices, for example, sense perception, are socially established practices whose reliability cannot be established in a noncircular manner. Alston thinks it rational to grant prima facie acceptance to all basic doxastic practices that are not demonstrably unreliable or otherwise disqualified from rational acceptance. In other words, basic practices are innocent until proven guilty. He also observes that a practice’s claim to rational acceptance is strengthened if it enjoys self-support. When he turns his attention to the religious realm, he supposes that each of the major traditions has within it a practice of forming beliefs about how Ultimate Reality, whatever it may be, manifests itself in or through religious experience. As he divides up the pie, different religions have different experiential practices because the systems of possible overiders vary so much from one religion to another. Among
them is the Christian practice (CP). For Alston, CP is a basic practice that is not demonstrably unreliable and derives self-support from, for instance, the way in which its promises of spiritual development can be seen, from within the practice, to be fulfilled in the lives of some of its practitioners. However, he allows that other religious doxastic practices are basic too, are also not demonstrably unreliable, and enjoy as much self-support as CP does. In short, CP has rivals that are on an epistemic par with it, and this is why religious diversity creates an epistemological problem for it. And, needless to say, each of these rivals is in the same situation; CP’s problem is also a problem for Buddhist practice (BP), Hindu practice (HP) and so forth. Does this disqualify CP and its rivals from rational acceptance?

Alston thinks not. He does admit that religious diversity decreases the justification its practitioners have for engaging in CP, but he denies that it does so to such a degree that it is irrational for them to engage in it. His main argument for this denial deploys an analogy with a counterfactual scenario involving rival sense-perceptual doxastic practices. Imagine that there were, in certain cultures, a socially established ‘Cartesian’ practice of construing what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended medium more or less concentrated at various points, rather than, as in our ‘Aristotelian’ practice, as made up of more or less discrete objects scattered about in space. Further imagine that there were, in yet other cultures, an established ‘Whiteheadian’ practice in which the visual field is taken to be made up of momentary events growing out of one another in a continuous process. Suppose that each of these three practices served its practitioners equally well in their dealings with the environment and had associated with it a well-developed physical science. Suppose also that we were as firmly wedded to our ‘Aristotelian’ practice as we in fact are but were unable to come up with any non-question-begging reason for regarding it as more accurate than either of the others. Alston concludes that, absent any non-question-begging reason for thinking that one of the other two practices is more accurate than my own, ‘the only rational course for me is to sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world’.16 But the sheerly hypothetical sense-perceptual scenario is precisely parallel to our actual situation with regard to CP and its religious rivals. Hence, by parity of reasoning, the rational thing for a practitioner of CP to do is to sit tight with it and continue to form beliefs making use of it. And, again by parity of reasoning, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other uneliminated rivals of CP.

Alston’s critics have argued that he has not established his conclusion. Though he concedes that it is pragmatically rational for its practitioners to sit tight with CP, William J. Wainwright contends that Alston has not shown
it to be epistemically rational for them to do so. The fact that CP is socially established, significantly self-supporting and not demonstrably unreliable is, he grants, a good reason for regarding it as prima facie reliable. However, the existence of rival religious experiential practices that are also prima facie reliable is, he claims, a good reason for thinking that CP is prima facie unreliable. It is epistemically rational to engage in CP if the good reason for viewing it as prima facie unreliable neither counterbalances nor outweighs the good reason for viewing it as prima facie reliable. It is not epistemically irrational to engage in CP if the good reason for considering it prima facie unreliable does not outweigh the good reason for considering it prima facie reliable. According to Wainwright, the most Alston’s argument shows is that the good reason for thinking that CP is reliable is not outweighed, in which case engaging in it is not epistemically irrational. It does not show that it is not counterbalanced, and so it does not show that engaging in CP is epistemically rational. Wainwright therefore thinks the most Alston establishes is that engaging in CP ‘is pragmatically rational, and not epistemically irrational’.

My objection to Alston’s conclusion can be traced back to a disagreement between us about the lesson to be derived from his sense-perceptual analogy. As I see it, one way to explain the success of the three sense-perceptual practices in the analogy is to suppose that each of them is reliable with respect to the appearances the physical environment presents to its practitioners, but none is reliable with respect to how the physical environment is in itself. Hence it would be rational to modify the Aristotelian practice from within so that the new outputs are beliefs about the appearances the physical environment presents to its practitioners rather than beliefs about how the physical environment really is independent of the practitioner. And, of course, this Kantian turn would be equally rational for Cartesian and Whiteheadian practitioners. So while I grant that sitting tight would be a rational option, I deny Alston’s stronger claim that it would be the rational thing to do. By parity of reasoning, then, I conclude that, though it would be rational for practitioners of CP to continue to engage in it, it is not the only rational course of action for them in light of the facts of religious diversity. It would also be rational for them to revise CP in a Kantian direction and to make efforts to get the modified practice socially established. And, again, the same goes for practitioners of BP, HP and other religious experiential doxastic practices.

Despite their disagreements on points of detail, Alston and his critics concur in thinking that religious diversity has a negative impact on the justification for engaging in CP or its rivals such as BP and HP. At least for those who are aware of it, religious diversity seriously diminishes the justification for continuing to form beliefs in any of these ways. What remains in dispute is whether justification decreases to the extent that there are rational alternatives.
to sitting tight with CP, for example, taking the Kantian turn, or even to such a degree that it is epistemically not rational or irrational to continue engaging in CP. In what follows I shall make use of the shared agreement that justification for engaging in CP or any of its rivals is substantially decreased by religious diversity: I shall not appeal to any of the disputed claims about the exact extent of the decrease. Of course, experiential doxastic practices are not the only sources of support for the systems of belief of the world religions. As Alston reminds us, Christianity also purports to derive support from other sources such as the arguments of natural theology, tradition and revelation, which he takes to include divine messages to prophets, divine inspiration of oral or written communications and divine action in history. However, though additional sources may mitigate the epistemic problem of religious diversity, they clearly cannot eliminate it. After all, some of the other sources confront their own problems of religious diversity. The conclusions of the metaphysical arguments of natural theology conflict with the conclusions of impressive metaphysical arguments in nontheistic religious traditions. The claims of the texts and traditions Christians take to be religiously authoritative must be set against conflicting claims derived from the texts and traditions to which non-Christians grant religious authority. And, as Hume’s essay on miracles reminds us, Christian claims about divine action in history compete with the claims of other religions about which historical events have decisive religious significance. Moreover, as Alston insists, the various sources of Christian belief are supposed to provide one another with mutual support and to contribute to a cumulative case for Christianity. So when religious diversity decreases the justification for relying on one of them, it also weakens the others it is supposed to support as well as the cumulative case that rests on all of them. Using a familiar metaphor, Alston summarizes his position this way: ‘Though each of these considerations can itself be doubted and though no single strand is sufficient to keep the faith secure, when combined into a rope they all together have enough strength to do the job’.19 Fair enough, but by the same token, when one or more stands is weakened or cut due to the problem of religious diversity, the rope is weakened and its ability to keep the faith secure is diminished. Thus, absent a special reason to think otherwise, I shall assume that religious diversity has a negative epistemic bearing not only on the beliefs that are outputs of CP but also on other parts of the total system of Christian belief and that the same goes for rivals such as BP and HP and the total religious belief systems for which they are sources.

It is worth noting in passing that even Alvin Plantinga, who is more intransigent than some other defenders of Christian exclusivism, acknowledges that awareness of religious diversity can and often does have a negative epistemic impact on religious beliefs.20 According to his account of warrant,
which is what, when enough of it is added to true belief, yields knowledge, warrant is directly proportional to level of confidence in, or degree of strength of, belief. Awareness of religious diversity therefore can and often does decrease warrant by acting directly to reduce confidence in or strength of belief. Indeed, it can even deprive one of knowledge. It is possible, Plantinga thinks, that someone who would have had religious knowledge in the absence of an awareness of religious diversity lacks knowledge in its presence because of the reduction of confidence and hence warrant produced by that awareness. However, Plantinga goes on to claim that this loss of confidence need not happen and, even if it does happen, need not be permanent. As he sees it, then, the reduction of warrant produced by an awareness of religious diversity can be counteracted simply by a return of the confidence whose loss gave rise to the reduction. Whether Plantinga is right about this last point depends, of course, on whether his account of warrant is correct. Since his development of that account is spread out over three rather large volumes, I cannot in this paper even begin to address the issue of its correctness with the attention to detail that would be needed to settle it. So I will leave it an open question whether the negative epistemic impact to which awareness of religious diversity gives rise can be counteracted in the simple way Plantinga thinks it can.

2. Bayle in defense of religious toleration

Born in 1647, Pierre Bayle was raised a Protestant in predominantly Roman Catholic France. Both his father, Jean, and his older brother, Jacob, were ordained ministers. When he went to study at the Jesuit Academy at Toulouse in 1669, Pierre converted to Catholicism, but he returned to Protestantism after eighteen months. Fearing persecution on account of his relapsed status, he fled in Geneva in 1670. In 1675 he became a professor of philosophy at the Protestant Academy of Sedan. The Academy was closed by royal decree in 1681, and he moved to Rotterdam, where he lived for a quarter of a century. Persecution of Protestants by Catholics grew worse during these years. Jean Bayle died in March 1685. On June 10, 1685, Jacob Bayle was arrested and imprisoned. Pierre learned that he had indirectly caused his brother’s arrest. Angered by criticism Pierre had published, the French authorities were treating his brother as his surrogate because they could not reach him in Rotterdam. Jacob was tortured, and his health was broken in an unsuccessful attempt to compel him to renounce his religious loyalties. On October 22, 1685, the Edict of Nantes was revoked, and the persecution of Protestants in France thereafter increased in intensity. On November 12, 1685, Jacob Bayle died in prison. The following year Pierre published his most impassioned and sustained defense of religious toleration.
Its full title is Commentaire philosophique sur ces paroles de Jésus-Christ, ‘Contrain-les d’entrer’ (Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Jesus Christ, ‘Compel Them to Come In’). The words of Jesus referred to in its title come from the Parable of the Great Dinner in the Gospel of Luke. In the story, when the invited guests make excuses for not coming to the dinner and even poor folk brought in from the neighborhood do not fill all the places, the angry host says to his servant: ‘Go out into the roads and lanes, and compel people to come in, so that my house may be filled’ (Luke 14:23). Starting at least as far back as Augustine, Christians used this verse as a proof-text to provide biblical warrant for forced conversions. The first part of Bayle’s *Philosophical Commentary* contains nine arguments against interpreting the verse according to what Bayle describes as its literal sense, by which he means the sense in which it can be used to serve this intolerant purpose. Though it bills itself as a reply to objections to the arguments of the first part, the second part also sets forth some of Bayle’s positive views on religious toleration, including his historically influential doctrine of the rights of an erring conscience. The nine arguments of the first part cover a lot of territory. For example, one of them is a clever *ad hominem* (or, perhaps, *ad ecclesiam*) argument. Bayle points out that if Christians who think Luke 14:23 justifies them in making forced conversions were honest about their intentions, the rulers of non-Christian peoples such as the Chinese would have reasonable grounds for excluding Christian missionaries from their realms. Another should strike a sympathetic chord in the minds of readers of scripture who reject the practice of proof-texting. After arguing that Luke 14:23 should be interpreted in the light of its context, Bayle tries to show that interpreting the verse in a way that supports forced conversion ‘is contrary to the whole tenor and general spirit of the Gospel’ (p. 39). However, the argument of greatest philosophical interest is one which combines morality and epistemology. I shall concentrate on that argument.

According to Bayle, the general principle on which the argument rests is ‘that any particular dogma, whether advanced as contained in Scripture or proposed in any other way, is false, if repugnant to the clear and distinct notions of natural light, principally in regards to morality’ (p. 33). As the reference to clear and distinct notions of natural light suggests, Bayle is working with a Cartesian epistemology in which the epistemic status of deliverances of the natural light is sufficiently high to guarantee their truth. Examples he gives of deliverances of the natural light of reason that come from outside morality are such truths as ‘that the whole is greater than its parts; that if from equal things we take away equals, the results will be equal; that it’s impossible that two contradictories be true; or that the essence of a subject actually subsists after the destruction of the subject’
We should, of course, view the last of these examples with suspicion. It is tantamount to the thesis, which is in dispute between Platonists and Aristotelians, that properties can exist uninstantiated. Still, in philosophy three out of four is not a bad record, and the other examples make it clear enough what sorts of propositions are supposed to be deliverances of the natural light. So I think we should grant Bayle the principle that if a doctrine is contrary to the natural light, then it is false.

At the beginning of the second chapter of the first part, Bayle tells us how he proposes to make use of this principle. He says: ‘The literal sense of these words is contrary to the purest and most distinct ideas of natural reason; it is therefore false. The business now is only to prove the antecedent, because I presume the consequence was sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter’ (p. 35). His argument will thus have the following form:

1. If the words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, yield a proposition contrary to the natural light, that proposition is false.
2. The words ‘Compel them to come in’, interpreted literally, do yield a proposition contrary to the natural light.
3. Hence that proposition is false.

We are committed to allowing Bayle to assume (1), because it is an instance of the principle we have already granted him. So if he establishes (2), as he has promised, he will be in a position to infer (3) from (1) and (2) by modus ponens.

The argument for (2) has four steps. I shall quote the first and last of them in full because I want to comment on each of them at some length. Bayle first claims ‘that by the purest and most distinct ideas of reason, we know there is a being sovereignly perfect who governs all things, who ought to be adored by mankind, who approves certain actions and rewards them, and who disapproves and punishes others’ (p. 35). His next point is that we also understand by the natural light that the principal worship we owe to the supreme being consists of inner acts of the mind. It would be as silly to suppose that God would be pleased by mere external behavior, Bayle remarks, as it would be to imagine that a king would regard as homage a situation in which the wind posed statues in deferential postures by knocking them over whenever he happened to pass by. It follows, Bayle then observes, that even when worship involves exterior signs it must also include inner mental acts. His fourth and final point is this:

It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings, torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signification of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments
of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion, it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and, consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it (p. 36).

What are we to make of this argument?

I think that, as it stands, it is a mess. Consider first Bayle’s first step. It is plausible to suppose he thinks that a Cartesian ontological argument is the source of our knowledge of God’s existence from the purest and most distinct ideas of reason (‘les plus pures et les plus distinctes idées de la raison’).25 But, unlike Descartes, we do not believe that the premises of a Cartesian ontological argument are deliverances of the natural light. Indeed, even if, unlike Kant, we think there is a valid ontological argument whose premises are rationally acceptable, we do not believe they have an epistemic status as high as the law of noncontradiction or other things that are supposed to be known by the natural light.26 Cosmological arguments for the existence of God are in the same boat.27 And so too, it seems to me, are all other known arguments of natural theology. So I think Bayle’s first step is already a misstep. It insures that he will not get to a conclusion, guaranteed by the natural light, to which the interpretation of Luke 14:23 he wants to reject is a contrary.

Consider now Bayle’s final step. He asserts that compulsive measures are incapable of forming in the soul the judgments of the will in respect to God, whatever they may be, that constitute the essence of religion (‘ne peuvent pas former dans l’âme les jugements de volonté, par rapport à Dieu, qui constituent l’essence de la religion’).28 We may be sure, I think, that if compulsion really cannot produce the internal acts of mind that are essential to true worship, then Jesus has not commanded compulsion, at least not for this purpose. But is it evident by the natural light that compulsion in incapable of producing those interior acts? It seems not. It may be that religious beliefs, for example, are not under the direct control of the will so that people threatened with religious persecution cannot simply become converts by deciding to do so. But even if compulsion is incapable of producing converts in the short run, it may be effective in the long run in the manner imagined in the distopian fiction of the twentieth century. Or perhaps Pascal was right when he advised the libertine wagerer to attend mass and use holy water, thinking that outward practice would eventually generate inward belief. If so, compelling outward practice would be a rational means to the end of inducing belief. Issues about whether or not various techniques of brainwashing will produce changes in belief are empirical; we would not expect them to be settled solely by the natural light of reason. Like Locke, Bayle is vulnerable to empirical confutation on this point.
After having raised similar objections to Locke’s view, Waldron remarks that ‘what one misses above all in Locke’s argument is a sense that there is anything morally wrong with intolerance, or a sense of any deep concern for the victims of persecution or the moral insult that is involved in the attempt to manipulate their faith’.29 This suggests that we would be doing Bayle a favor if we substituted explicitly moral considerations for claims about the efficacy of compulsion at this point in his argument. Even if compulsion of certain sorts turns out to be effective in causing the inner mental acts that are essential to religion, it may nevertheless be wrong to use it for that purpose.

We know that Bayle means to appeal to moral considerations sooner or later. Near the beginning of the first chapter of the first part, he announces that he is ‘relying upon this single principle of natural light, that any literal interpretation which carries an obligation to commit iniquity is false’ (p. 28). So maybe Bayle’s best bet is simply to insist that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion. If he does, he has available to him the following argument. According to the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23, Jesus has commanded the use of compulsion to produce those inner acts. This command carries with it an obligation to use compulsion for that purpose, since commands of Jesus are divine commands and so impose obligations. But the obligation to make such a use of compulsion is an obligation to commit an iniquity, because it is morally wrong to use compulsion thus. Hence the literal interpretation of Luke 14:23 is false, and so Jesus has not commanded the use of compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion. This argument has the merit of giving Bayle the conclusion he wants at the fourth step of his larger argument.

However, next we must ask about the epistemic status of the moral principle we have allowed Bayle to assume for the sake of this argument. Is it evident by the natural light that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to produce the inner acts that are essential to religion? I doubt it. What is more, I think Bayle himself could not consistently even hold that this principle is true unless it is qualified by a ceteris paribus clause. This is because he allows that God ‘may dispense with His own laws in certain cases’ (p. 121). Indeed, he believes that God can dispense from the Decalogue’s prohibition on homicide. There are, he affirms, circumstances that ‘change the nature of homicide from a bad action into a good action, a secret command of God, for example’ (p. 171). And he goes on to claim that such circumstances are sometimes actual, that God sometimes does dispense from this precept (Dieu dispense quelquefois de ce précepte).30 The cases Bayle has in mind are, of course, the biblical stories in which God commands homicide. The most famous of them is the akedah, the binding of Isaac, recounted in Genesis 22; according to that story, which serves as the basis for Kierkegaard’s teleolog-
ical suspension of the ethical, God commanded Abraham to slay his son.\textsuperscript{31} Since Bayle is prepared to make exceptions even to the prohibitions of the Decalogue in such cases, he has left a loophole open to religious persecutors. He cannot consistently deny at least the possibility that they are right if they claim they have been dispensed from the principle that it is morally wrong to use compulsion to make converts or claim they have received a secret divine command to employ compulsion for this purpose. Proving a negative is often very difficult, and I think the present case is one of the hard ones. I do not see how Bayle could hope to prove that the religious persecutors have not, in fact, been thus divinely dispensed or secretly divinely commanded.

In my opinion, though at this point I am going beyond anything to be found in Bayle’s text, the best strategy for the defender of toleration is to conduct the argument entirely in epistemic terms and not to make any dubious appeals to the Cartesian natural light. The epistemic credentials of two conflicting claims are to be assessed and then compared. One is a moral principle to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is wrong; the other is a conflicting religious claim about that intolerant behavior. The applicable epistemic principle is that, whenever two conflicting claims differ in epistemic status, the claim with the lower status is to be rejected. If it can be shown that the epistemic status of the moral principle is higher than the epistemic status of the conflicting religious claim, then the epistemic principle licenses an inference to the conclusion that the religious claim is the one to be rejected. It is fortunate for the defenders of toleration that the strategy depends only on qualitative judgements of comparative epistemic status, for it seems likely that we are incapable of discovering a precise quantitative account of levels of epistemic status. It would be nice for the defenders of toleration if all our moral principles to the effect that intolerant behavior of a certain kind is wrong had the very highest epistemic status possible. But since there may be few if any moral principles about the wrongness of intolerant behavior with this status, it is again fortunate that the strategy still has a chance of success even if it uses a moral principle with a somewhat less exalted epistemic status. Yet the strategy does not guarantee success, because it does not preclude the possibility that in some cases a religious claim supporting intolerant behavior will turn out to have a higher epistemic status than a conflicting moral principle. Hence the strategy does not beg the question against advocates of religious intolerance, though the defenders of toleration will naturally hope that it may serve at least to limit the scope of epistemically respectable intolerance. And the epistemic consequences of religious diversity may have a role to play, at least in some cases, in applications of the strategy that yield successful arguments for religious toleration of one kind or another. It may happen that a religious claim supportive of a certain sort of intolerance has a
lower epistemic status than a conflicting moral principle favoring toleration entirely or in large part due to the decrease in the religious claim’s status resulting from an awareness of religious diversity.

To help fix ideas, let us return briefly to the issue that vexed Bayle. A valid argument parallel to the one he offered that employs the strategy outline above has the following shape:

(4) If the moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion is wrong has a fairly high epistemic status and the religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory because Jesus commanded it has a lower epistemic status, then the religious claim is to be rejected.

(5) The moral principle that using compulsion to produce the inner acts essential to religion is wrong does have a fairly high epistemic status.

(6) The religious claim that using compulsion for this purpose is obligatory because Jesus commanded it does have a lower epistemic status.

(7) Hence, the religious claim is to be rejected.

The proposition expressed by (4) is an instantiation of the strategy’s governing epistemic principle. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the moral principle cited in (5) does have a reasonably high epistemic status but falls short of being evident by the natural light, absolutely certain or anything similar. It is an intuitively plausible principle. And even if, strictly speaking, it needs to be qualified by a *ceteris paribus* clause to handle things like secret divine commands, the possibility of a violation of such a clause is not at issue in the present context. Debate can then focus on the epistemic status of the religious claim cited in (6). Some of Bayle’s own arguments in the *Philosophical Commentary* bear on this question. If he is correct in thinking that this religious claim is contrary to the tenor and spirit of the Gospels, this consideration will do something to decrease its epistemic status. But the religious claim is not without a certain amount of support. It has behind it the authority of a tradition of Christian thought and practice in which it is entrenched. I think considerations of religious diversity can play a valuable role in defeating the epistemic authority of this tradition. They do so indirectly by diminishing the epistemic rationality of the whole Christian package or worldview of which the tradition is a part. And, since Christianity itself is internally complex and contains competing traditions, some of which are more tolerant than the Augustinian tradition that endorses compulsion, such considerations also operate more directly to decrease the epistemic status of that tradition in particular and hence of the religious claim about what Jesus commanded embedded in it. By my lights, the total evidence strongly support (6), and so I think the argument of which it is a premise is sound.
In a couple of ways, it is of course a weak argument. Even if it is successful, it eliminates only one ground for the use of compulsion by the religiously intolerant. However, if we are committed to the project of trying to persuade the intolerant by arguments, it may be practically desirable to be able to argue against their grounds for intolerance one at a time. In addition, the argument does not aspire to eliminate the grounds of all forms of religious intolerance at one fell swoop. But, again, it may be of practical importance to be in position to argue against various forms of intolerance piecemeal, starting with the worst. The strategy I have outlined and illustrated can be used repeatedly provided enough moral principles of fairly high epistemic status can be mobilized for inclusion in the premises of its multiple implementations. So my illustrative argument should be understood as part of a cumulative case against religious intolerance.

3. Kant on conscience and inquisitors

The argument by Kant I wish to consider is set forth in the fourth section of the second part of the fourth book of his *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. In that section, he presents a doctrine of conscience. As he defines it, ‘conscience is a consciousness which is of itself a duty’. The definition poses for Kant the question of how a state of conscious awareness can be an unconditional duty. In attempting to answer his question, Kant starts from the moral principle, which he says needs no proof, that we ‘ought to venture nothing where there is danger that it might be wrong (quod dubitas, ne feceris! Pliny)’ (pp. 202–203). He takes it to be a consequence of this principle that I have an unconditional duty to be aware that any action I want to perform is morally right. I do not have to know, with respect to human actions generally or with respect to all possible actions, whether they are right or wrong. But concerning any action I propose to perform, ‘I must not only judge, and be of the opinion, that it is right; I must also be certain that it is’ (p. 203). Kant contrasts his view with probabilism, which he defines as ‘the principle that the mere opinion that an action may well be right is itself sufficient for undertaking it’ (p. 203). As I see matters, the probabilist thinks that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform if I am aware that it is probable that it is right. Holding us to a higher standard, Kant insists that I may go ahead with an action I propose to perform only if I am aware that it is certain that it is right. The comparison thus forces us to view the certainty at stake in Kant’s claim as epistemic rather than merely psychological. I may not go ahead with my proposed action if all I am aware of is strongly believing or being utterly convinced that it is right. In short, I have a duty to be aware
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that it is epistemically certain that an action I propose to perform is morally right before I perform the action. If I act in the absence of this awareness, I act unconscientiously and hence violate this duty, even if the action I perform is, in fact, right and so I violate no further duty in performing it. The demands of conscience are therefore very strict according to Kant.

Kant supplements his brief and abstract treatment of his general views on conscience with an application of his doctrine to a particular case of some interest to the defenders of religious toleration. He asks us to imagine an inquisitor whose exclusivist faith is so firm that he is willing to suffer martyrdom for it, if need be, and who must judge the case of someone, otherwise a good citizen, charged with heresy. If the inquisitor condemns the heretic to death, Kant wonders, should we say that the inquisitor acted in accord with an erring conscience or should we say instead that he acted with a lack of conscience and hence consciously did wrong? Kant allows that the inquisitor acted with firm conviction and for a reason. He builds it into the case that the inquisitor "was indeed presumably firm in the belief that a supernaturally revealed divine will (perhaps according to the saying, compellite intrare) permitted him, if not even made a duty for him, to extirpate supposed unbelief together with the unbelievers" (p. 203).34 Could such an inquisitor get off the hook by pleading to the lesser charge of acting in accord with an erring conscience and so, as Bayle thought, acting within his rights. Kant thinks not. His famous argument for this negative conclusion deserves to be quoted in full. Kant says:

That to take a human being’s life because of his religious faith is wrong is certain, unless (to allow the most extreme possibility) a divine will, made known to the inquisitor in some extraordinary way, has decreed otherwise. But that God has ever manifested this awful will is a matter of historical documentation and never apodictically certain. After all, the revelation reached the inquisitor only through the intermediary of human beings and their interpretation, and even if it were to appear to him to have come from God himself (like the command issued to Abraham to slaughter his own son like a sheep), yet it is at least possible that on this point error has prevailed. But then the inquisitor would risk the danger of doing something which would be to the highest degree wrong, and on this score he acts unconscientiously (pp. 203–204).

In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant returns to the case of the akedah, which is alluded to in the second parenthetical remark in the passage quoted above, in order to say more about Abraham’s epistemic situation. He there insists that ‘Abraham should have replied to this supposedly divine voice: “That I
ought not to kill may good son is quite certain. But that you, this apparition, are God – of that I am not certain, and never can be, not even if this voice rings down to me from (visible) heaven."^35

According to Kant, then, Abraham cannot be epistemically certain that the voice he hears comes from God. Hence he cannot be aware that it is certain that killing his son is right or even obligatory. If he proceeds to kill his son, he violates the duty of conscience to have such an awareness and so acts unconscionently. He thus displays a lack of conscience because he consciously violates this duty. Moreover, Abraham can be certain that killing his son is wrong unless, allowing for the most remote possibility, God commands it. If he proceeds to kill his son, he also runs the very great risk of wrongly doing so. Therefore if Abraham proceeds to kill Isaac, he surely violates a duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not to kill his son. Similarly, Kant’s inquisitor cannot be epistemically certain that scripture actually records a divine command to eliminate unbelievers along with their heresies. So if he condemns the person accused of heresy to death, he surely violates a duty to act conscientiously and most likely also violates a duty not to kill people on account of their religious faith.

It is, I think, illuminating to view Kant as working with the epistemic argumentative strategy I outlined in my discussion of Bayle. The inquisitor can be almost certain that it is wrong to kill people on account their religious faith; he falls short of complete certainty only because he allows for the remote possibility of a divine command to do so. But the inquisitor cannot be anywhere close to certain that it is right or even obligatory to kill unbelievers because God decrees it, since he cannot achieve anything close to certainty that scripture expresses such a divine command. Hence the claim that it is right or even obligatory to kill unbelievers is to be rejected. In order to keep the subsequent discussion simple, let us set aside the complications that Kant’s doctrine of conscience would introduce into this picture of the basic argumentative strategy.

Difficulties with Kant’s use of this strategy are similar to those that arise in the case of Bayle. Kant has a very optimistic view of the ability of human cognitive faculties to deliver epistemic certainty about principles of moral wrongness. Those of us who live in societies that are, morally speaking, less homogeneous than his was may well reasonably be less optimistic than he was on this score. It seems to me no accident that his examples, killing one’s good son or killing people on account of their religious faith, are among the most favorable cases for his position. Ignoring the remote possibility of special divine commands, I am willing to grant that it is certain that killing people for their religious faith is wrong. But I doubt that the principles of wrongness that cover the full range of intolerant practices to which I am
opposed can all achieve the lofty status of epistemic certainty, though of course I believe they are all true. Consider, for instance, exile, which in a passage quoted above Bayle offers as an example of compelling. Is it really epistemically certain that sending people into exile or, more generally, expelling or excluding them from a political community because of their religious faith is morally wrong? Is it certain that the magistrates of Calvin's Geneva would have done wrong if they had expelled Roman Catholics from the city under conditions in which the exiles were compensated for lost property? Is it certain that the elders of a contemporary Amish farming community would do wrong if they excluded non Amish from their community? Living in a religiously homogeneous community can realize some very important values. It does not seem certain to me that it is always wrong, even apart from special divine commands, to endeavor to defend or preserve such values. Hence I think the argumentative strategy I am discussing will not rule out all the forms of intolerance I oppose if it can only be successfully employed with principles of moral wrongness that are epistemically certain or nearly so.

However, another difficulty becomes urgent if we envisage making use of the strategy with principles of moral wrongness that fall a good deal short of epistemic certainty. As traditionally conceived, God is omnipotent or, at least, very powerful. It would thus seem to be within God’s power to communicate to us a sign that transmits to the claim that God commands some intolerant behavior, such as issuing threats to heretics, a fairly high epistemic status. Kant, to be sure, would not have found this idea congenial. Speaking rather dismissively, he insists: ‘For if God should really speak to a human being, the latter could still never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such’. 36

Suppose we concede to Kant that one who hears a booming voice resounding from the visible heaven cannot be absolutely or apodictically certain that it is God speaking, because, as the quoted remark suggests, some alternative possibilities cannot be conclusively eliminated, so that one cannot know, in some emphatic sense, that it is God speaking. It does not follow that hearing such a voice cannot confer on the claim that God has commanded what it is taken to command a fairly high epistemic status. Therefore it seems possible for even sense-perceptual experience to bestow on the claim that an intolerant act is obligatory because it is divinely commanded an epistemic status higher than that of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that falls a good deal short of certainty, in which case, according to the argumentative strategy under consideration, it is the moral principle that is to be rejected. What is more, if philosophers such as Alston are correct, as I think they are, then divine commands can also be communicated to us by means of a
kind of religious perception that is distinct from, though analogous to, sense perception. And, other things being equal, this perceptual source can also contribute to raising the epistemic status of the claim that an intolerant action is obligatory because divinely commanded to a level in excess of a conflicting principle of moral wrongness that is less than certain. So if we apply the argumentative strategy in question to cases in which the moral principle we appeal to has an epistemic status appreciably less than certainty, we cannot guarantee that it will not lose out in competition with a conflicting religious claim about an obligation imposed by divine command that has achieved a higher epistemic status. In short, there is no good reason to deny that claims about divine speech, communicated to us by means of sense perception or by means of a distinctively religious sort of perception, can acquire a fairly high epistemic status in some cases, other things being equal, a status elevated enough to exceed that of conflicting moral principles.37

It is at this point, I think, that the epistemic consequences of religious diversity can do something to advance the cause of religious toleration. The existence of religious diversity will reduce the epistemic status of claims that God has commanded and thereby made right or obligatory intolerant behavior to a level below that which they would occupy were there no epistemic consequences of religious diversity. So when the argumentative strategy we are examining is applied to moral principles that are less than certain, it is likely to succeed more often, given the epistemic consequences of religious diversity, than it would otherwise. It is probably impossible to say with precision how many cases of success will be the result of this factor. And there is no guarantee that, even with its assistance, the strategy will be successful for all the cases in which the champions of religious toleration would like to have strong arguments against intolerant individual actions and social practices.

What is the upshot? I have tried to show that there is an epistemic strategy for arguing against various forms of religious intolerance to be found in the neighborhood of arguments actually offered by Bayle and Kant. The strategy involves attempting to establish that moral principles which support toleration have a higher epistemic status than conflicting religious claims which support intolerance. My objection to both Bayle and Kant is that they were excessively sanguine about the epistemic prospects of moral principles. In light of our greater experience with the reasonable moral disagreements of modernity, it is not plausible for us to suppose that all the moral principles needed to develop a case for a doctrine of religious toleration that is broad in scope using the strategy will be evident by the natural light or apodictically certain. But when the strategy is employed in cases of moral principles with a lower epistemic status, it may well turn out, other things being equal, that religious claims which support intolerance have a higher epistemic status than such
Recent work in religious epistemology becomes relevant at this point in the discussion. The negative epistemic impact of religious diversity reduces the epistemic status of religious claims supporting intolerance below what it would otherwise be. It thereby can contribute to improving the success rate of the strategy when it is applied to construct piecemeal arguments against religious intolerance of various kinds. Religious diversity thus both creates the need for toleration and contributes to its epistemic grounds.

I do not claim to have exhausted the contributions Bayle or Kant can make to contemporary philosophical discussions of religious toleration. It seems to me their work is of lasting importance not only on account of its high quality but also because they address the topic from within a broadly Christian religious perspective. Their arguments can speak on behalf of religious toleration in a way religious believers may find sympathetic or, at any rate, so I hope. In expressing this hope, I am clearly disagreeing with those who regard Bayle and Kant as hostile to Christianity and to religion generally, skeptics at best and unbelievers at worst. In this controversy, I side with those who have argued that Bayle and Kant were believers, though not orthodox Christians by various traditional standards. I think they were exploring, in ways from which we still have something to learn, possibilities for religious existence within modern pluralistic societies. If religious people today ignore what they have to teach, they run the risk, as Robert M. Adams puts it, of blinding themselves to permanently important possibilities of religious life. Since I share with Adams the aspiration to be religious while living fully within a religiously pluralistic cultural environment, I consider it valuable to look to thinkers such as Bayle and Kant for lessons about how this might be accomplished.

Notes

1. ‘Religion has been able to persuade to such great evils!’ Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 1, 101. Quoted in Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 159.

2. Some of the important contributions to this discussion, including presentations of their view by Hick, Alston and Plantinga, have been collected in Philip L. Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). See also Jerome I. Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Belief (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), especially Chapter 4 whose title is ‘God and Religious Diversity’.

3. For confirmation of this doubt, see the inconclusive exchange involving Hick, Alston, Plantinga and others in Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997) and the discussion of some of the contributions to it in the introduction to the collection edited by Quinn and Meeker cited in note 2 above.

5. Audi and Wolterstorff debate the issues on which they disagree in Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Religion in the Public Square* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). See also their contributions to the volume edited by Weithman cited in note 4 above.


23. Pierre Bayle, *Philosophical Commentary*, trans. Amie Godman Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1987). Page references to this work will be made parenthetically in the body of my text. This volume also contains a lengthy interpretive essay by the translator that contains helpful historical background information.


33. ‘What you doubt, do not do!’ As an editorial note points out, Kant is quoting Pliny out of context and fails to represent his thought accurately.

34. Kant’s inquisitor thus turns out to be, so to speak, among the targets of Bayle’s arguments, since *compellite intrare* is, of course, Latin for the ‘compel them to come in’ of Luke 14:23.


37. For arguments in support of the conclusion that there is an actual case in which someone was epistemically entitled to believe God had spoken to her, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Divine Discourse* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), Chapter 15 whose title is ‘Are We Entitled?’


40. Was Kant influenced, directly or indirectly, by Bayle’s work on toleration? Karl Ameriks, the expert I consulted on this question, has not been able to provide me with an answer, which inclines me to the belief that the answer is not known.

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