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## 2 **INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTIES IN THE NATIONAL POLICE DEMON IN THE LEADING DEMOCRACY TIME**

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### **ABSTRACT**

1 During the guided democracy tends to focus on Disguised Autocracy. The Indonesian National Party (PNI), which was born in response to the government's announcement on November 3, 1945, and later succeeded in becoming a party that was quite influential at that time. This was proven by the PNI's ability to place representatives in various government agencies. This could happen because PNI was able to get closer to Soekarno as president at that time, and as a consequence PNI had to become a supporter of the political lines and policies pursued by Soekarno. This meant that the PNI at that time no longer appeared as a determinant in decision making and policy in the practice of state administration, but only as a follower and supporter of government policies.

Keywords: Indonesian National Party, Indonesian Politics, Guided Democracy.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The application of the Liberal Democracy system in Indonesia since 1950 has had various effects on domestic political conditions. From 1950 to 1955 there were four cabinet ruling. In addition to the problem of the ups and downs of the cabinet and the inability to deal with domestic economic problems, on the other hand there are also movements in the regions that want to break away from the central government because of their dissatisfaction with state administration. This

dissatisfaction is a result of the inability of the central government to do justice to the regions both from an economic and political perspective, in the sense that there are economic disparities (welfare and prosperity between regions) and the exclusion of regions when the central government takes political policies.

This situation is of course endangering the life of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia following various events which were later followed by actions demanding the parliament in various places such as in Semarang, Banjarmasin, Medan and Bandung (Bertrand, 2004). In various regions, security difficulties have emerged due to the unrecovered action of the DI / TII gangs in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi (Van Bruinessen, 2002). President Soekarno, on the commemoration of the Youth Pledge Day in 1956, stated that all the difficulties faced by the state at that time were caused by the large number of political parties that damaged the order and unity of the country. Because of that he took the initiative to disband political parties. With the excuse of saving the country President Soekarno proposed a conception known as guided democracy. As a result of this conception, the development of political movements was marked by the establishment of council groups which later increased to become the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the People's Struggle for the Universe (PRRI / Permesta) (Kartika, 2015). Sukarno's offer of conception, which was aimed at stabilizing the political conditions at that time, was responded to by various groups. There are those who support it and others who reject the idea.

Due to the increasingly precarious state of the country and because the constituents who were given the mandate to overcome domestic problems, apparently failed in carrying out their duties, on July 5, 1959, the President issued a decree which essentially dissolved the constituents and declared the re-enactment of the 1945 Constitution within the framework of democracy. In this guided democracy, all power was in Soekarno's grasp, although at that time there were state institutions such as the DPR, the MPRS, but with the formation of the National Council, automatically all power was centered on the president. Political decisions end in the hands of the president, and in each decision-making process, everything is carried out unanimously without going through a vote. The voting system is considered ineffective, because when there is a disagreement, it can become a big problem to confuse the domestic political atmosphere (Dhani et al., 2015). Likewise, the political parties at that time began to lose their power because everything was in the hands of Soekarno as President, including the Indonesian National Party (Hicks, 2012).

## FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

### A. Declaration of the Indonesian National Party

In the struggle to defend independence and in the struggle against the restoration of Dutch power in the early days of independence, not only military troops played a role but also many civil society groups, in this case political organizations. This became a concern for national figures at that time so that they tried to re-form the political organization that had been vacuumed during the Japanese occupation. On October 30, 1945, the Central Indonesian National Committee Worker Body (BP KNIP) proposed to leave the one-party system as originally intended by the PPKI to become a multi-party system (Sunny, 1986: 55). The formation of political parties was initiated by KNIP with the consideration that (1) various opinions in society will be channeled in an orderly manner (2) Political parties will strengthen the struggle to defend and maintain security.

<sup>6</sup> In accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia which contains instructions for the existence of freedom of association and assembly, BP-KNIP considers that the time has come to promote people's movements in constitutional ways. In addition, because the Indonesian state adheres to a democratic system, it is of course permissible for every citizen to establish political parties. Not long after the issuance of the government declaration on November 3, 1945, which gave the widest possible opportunity for <sup>8</sup> the people to establish political parties, a political party called the Indonesian People's Union (SERINDO) was founded in Jakarta by several nationalist figures. Mangunsarkoro was appointed chairman and Osa Maliki as secretary. These two figures were later recognized as initiators of <sup>9</sup> the establishment of the Indonesian National Party.

After <sup>1</sup> the formation of SERINDO, the party figures began to approach other nationalist political party leaders. In the first SERINDO congress in Kediri from 28 January to 1 February 1946, SERINDO merged with six groups of nationalist parties, namely PNI Pati led by Sorino, PNI Madiun, PNI Sumatra led by AK Gani, PNI Sulawesi led by Manai Sophian and the Republic of Indonesia Party led by Dr. . Soeradji (Ministry of Information RI, 1951: 110). <sup>2</sup> Then the congress decided that the newly established party would be called the Indonesian National Party (PNI) with an official date of birth 29 January 1946. And by its promoters the party was seen as the return of the 1927 Indonesian National Party (Ufen, 2008).

## **B. PNI at the 1955 General Election**

Ten years after the independence of the Indonesian nation, for the first time, general elections were held. This delay was caused by several factors, namely (1) the revolution at that time, its activities were more directed at defending independence and stemming the colonial current, which under various pretexts wanted to regain control of Indonesia (2) Internal conflicts within political and government institutions, in addition to the absence of a law which regulating the implementation of elections (Budiharto & Meiliana, 2018). Until 1955, the nation of Indonesia was still engulfed by an atmosphere of restlessness and anxiety in the social and political fields. Gaps that occur in the political field are still very much felt. From such a situation, it is not surprising that the public has begun to demand immediate general elections in order to end the domestic political turmoil and to form a stable and strong government.

The preparations for the general elections were organized by the first Ali Sastroamidjoyo Cabinet (Priyonggo et al., 2019). Furthermore, as a first step in its implementation, the Central and Regional General Election Committees were formed on May 31, 1954. Then on April 16, 1955 the General Election Committee, determined September 29, 1955 as the election time to elect members of the DPR / Parliament and December 15 to elect members. The General Election, which had been prepared by Ali I's cabinet, had not yet been held. Ali I's cabinet had yet to hand over its mandate. The failures that led to the fall of the Ali I Cabinet included problems regarding the Army, the problem of inflation, the luxury that sprang up among the leadership in front of the impoverished people and rampant corruption which caused people's trust to decline. Finally, the cabinet realized that it was impossible to solve the country's problems, so it withdrew its cabinet members and returned its mandate to the President on July 24, 1955 (Juwono, 2018).

Immediately after Ali I's cabinet resigned, the vice president appointed Masyumi Burhanuddin Harahap to become the formature. The vice president stressed that the cabinet should focus its attention on restoring authority in holding general elections as planned. And finally during Burhanuddin Harahap's cabinet, the general election was carried out. From the results of the 1955 general election, it is known that there were 28 contestants of political parties participating in the general election who succeeded in obtaining seats in the DPR, where PNI and Masyumi received the same number of seats and the largest was 57 seats, followed by NU with 45 seats, while their

membership was in constituent election results, PNI received 118 seats, Masyumi 113 seats and NU 91 seats (Sanit, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> The success of the PNI in the 1955 general election cannot be separated from the influence of the implementation of the DPP strategy of the Indonesian National Party as follows:

1. Campaign propaganda centered on the state foundation Pancasila. The Indonesian National Party should be described as the only party that has succeeded in defending <sup>12</sup> Pancasila as the basis of the state ideology.
2. The party should make more use of PNI's organizational resources.
3. Campaigns or meetings should be reduced. And instead more attention should be paid to managing house-to-house visits for the sake of a personal-to-personal approach (Romli, 2020).

The results of the 1955 general election, totally beyond the estimation of the political parties in the government, saw the PNI's position as the party that received the most votes. Given that PNI is an opposition party that does not have a representative in the cabinet. After the general election, there were great hopes from the Indonesian people. However, the realization of the results of the general election that the Indonesian people so much crave has not yet been able to meet their expectations. In which case the new political configuration did not bring political stability. The conflicts between parties continued, coupled with the worsening socio-economic conditions which led to the heightened instability of government which could threaten national unity.

### C. PNI and the Marhaenisme Declaration

The Indonesian National Party, which was born on January 29, 1946, is difficult to separate from the Indonesian National Party that was founded by Soekarno in 1927. This is of course the intent and purpose, namely to gain support from the people, because at that time Soekarno was so popular with the public. However, beyond the consideration of political advantages, from the party composition, philosophy and program of the new party, it appears that the 1946 PNI is in a direct path to the 1927 factional and ideological legacy (Melawati & Kuswono, 2019). By these party figures the formation of PNI 1946 was seen as a revival of the 1927 PNI. The Marhaenism introduced by Soekarno around 1929-1930 was confirmed as the ideology of the PNI. Regarding Marhaenism as a PNI ideology by Soekarno in one of his speeches on the 50th anniversary of the death of Karl Marx in 1953, it was said that "Nationalism in the eastern world then married

Marxism, became a new nationalism, a new weapon of struggle, a new attitude of life. This new nationalism is now living among Marhaen Indonesia (Rocamora, 1970).

This identification was carried out by PNI at every opportunity, in the hope that this would bring PNI closer to Soekarno. It is therefore not surprising that there is a perception that the victory of the PNI in the 1955 election was the result of the party's success in identifying itself with Soekarno (Mortimer, 2006). With the start of the seconds of guided democracy, since then the political parties other than the PKI began to lose their influence. In such conditions, the political parties in their efforts to regain their influence always tried to get closer to Soekarno. Of course, with the consequences of following Soekarno's political lines. In connection with this the PNI program has followed the rhythm set by Soekarno. Meanwhile, within the PNI itself there had been divisions caused by differences in views between PNI leaders who supported Soekarno and leaders who were reluctant to support Soekarno by submitting to and obeying Soekarno. In the end, the PNI leaders who were not happy with the policies that always followed Soekarno's political rhythm were marginalized.

This was proven in the IXth PNI congress, in Solo in 1960. Party figures or leaders such as Suwiryo and Wilopo were eliminated from the party and vice versa those who were close to and supported all Soekarno's policies, such as Ali Sastroamidjoyo and Ruslan Abdulgani, their positions in the party were getting stronger with shadows. given by Soekarno. Since the IX congress in 1960, Ali Sastroamidjoyo was the leader of the PNI until the moments of Soekarno's collapse in 1966. The composition of the members of the central leadership council at that time was as follows:

General Chairman	: Mr. Ali Sastroamidjoyo
Chairman I	: Mr. Hardi
Chairman II	: Osa Maliki
Chairman III	: Dr. Moh. Isa
Chairman IV	: Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani
Chairman V	: I.G.G. Subamia
Secretary General	: Ir. Surachman
Deputy Secretary General	: Moh. Isnaeni
Treasurer	: S. Hadikusumo
Chairman of the Department Organization	: Selamat Ginting.

In the IXth PNI congress in Solo, Soekarno suggested that Marhaenism be used as an ideology and adapted to his understanding of that ideology. Because of this, the congress failed to validate the doctrine of marhaenism, which had been drafted by the committee consisting of Sukiryo, Osa Maliki, Sayuti Melik, at the VIII PNI congress in Semarang. The reason for the congress's reluctance to ratify the marhaenism doctrine was that there was a concern that there were interpretations in the doctrine that were inconsistent with Soekarno's teachings. Therefore the Solo congress decided that the DPP PNI would draft a brief doctrine of Marhanism to be conveyed to Soekarno. The PNI DPP then formed a committee consisting of Suwirjo, Osa Maliki, Sajuti Melik, Ruslan Abdulgani and Ali Sastroamidjoyo himself as chairman of the committee. The committee that was formed by the 1960 PNI congress, like the previous committee, produced a work called *The Basics of Marhanism*, but this also never received approval from Soekarno (Umanailo, 2020). This rejection seems to have been caused by the interpretation of Marhanism that was not what Soekarno intended, namely marhaenism as Marxism which was applied in accordance with the situation and conditions of Indonesia. Due to a different interpretation of Marhaenism from what Soekarno wanted, the committee for compiling the basic principles of Marhaenism led Soekarno to the PNI congress in Poerwokerto on 28 August to 1 September 1963 to suggest that senior PNI figures resign from the party leadership.

A year later, in November 1964, at the BPK PNI trial in Lembang, the Marhenis declaration was born (Frederick & Worden, 1993). During the session the PNI provided an interpretation of Marhaenism as Marxism which was applied in accordance with the situation and conditions of Indonesia. There was also the content of the statement at the first BPK PNI session in connection with the promulgation of the Marhaenism Declaration, as follows:

There is no revolutionary movement that is not based on the theory of revolution. Marhaenism is a theory of revolution based on the past. Thus the conditions for the struggle for Marhaenism must be revolutionary and be based on a two-stage conception of revolution. The first is the national phase of democracy and the second is the socialist phase. Therefore, the struggle must be led by peasants and workers. The PNI was a revolutionary tool based on the workers and peasants. To achieve victory for the marhaens, they must be determined within the Marhaenis front which is dynamic, militant, radical, disciplined and fully dedicated to Marhaen's goals (Eliseorocamora, 1991: 381).

From this statement, it seems that the declaration of Marhanism wants to highlight Marhaenism as a revolutionary idea that stands on the pillars of revolutionary mass action and



aims to establish the PNI as the vanguard party. Regarding Soekarno's response to the Marhaenisme declaration, in his amantation to the work conference of the Indonesian National Student Movement (GMNI) throughout Indonesia in Pontianak on December 16, 1964, he stated that he fully agreed with the content and spirit of Marhaenisme. Then Sukarno asked GMNI to continuously light the pure Marhaenism flames and burn the impure Marhaenism flames.

#### **D. The turmoil in the PNI's body**

Since the Xth PNI Congress in Purwokerto in 1963, the seeds of disharmony and misunderstanding among some of the PNI leaders began to bloom. Which in the following periods the difference in understanding between party leaders seems to have sharpened. It cannot be denied that directly or indirectly, the PKI also actively participated in creating divisions within the party body. PNI, which was one of the political parties that received significant votes in the 1955 election, turned out to be an easy target for the PKI to intensively infiltrate. This PKI infiltration program towards socio-political organizations was actually identified at the end of 1964, when the leader of the People's Consultative Assembly (Murba) announced that there was a document in the form of a long-term PKI program, which fell into the hands of Dr. Chaerul Saleh. In the document, it was explained, among other things, that the PKI justified all means to achieve its goals and every obstacle that tried to get in the way of pursuing the PKI's goals had to be removed (Soeripto, 1966: 25).

If we look at the political situation at that time, it turns out that what was contained in the PKI's long-term program was true, by looking at the following facts:

1. That the PKI had succeeded in getting its cadres into the PNI, such as Ir. Surachman, Karim D.P and so on, so that in the end PNI split into PNI Ali-Surachman and PNI Osa-Usep.
2. Whereas under pressure from the PKI, with the Presidential Decree / Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia / Highest Operations Command, No. 1 KOTI / 1965, the Murba Party has been prohibited from carrying out any activities in the political field, which was then followed by the Presidential Decree / Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia / Supreme Operations Command No 291 / KOTI / 1965, regarding the dissolution of the Murba Party throughout the Republic of Indonesia.

3. Whereas the National Front is increasingly becoming a tool of the PKI, successfully recruiting its cadres, so that it can be said that the National Front is the center or basis for PKI propaganda (Wiyona, 1982: 33).

However, the PKI with all its expertise succeeded in convincing Soekarno that the document was fake and could destroy the unity between the Nationalist, Religious and Communist groups which were the breath of the nation and state at that time. Soekarno accepted and asked all political party leaders to sign the Bogor Declaration on 12 December 1964. The main points contained in the Bogor Declaration at that time were:

Fostering a progressive revolutionary national unity promoted Nasakom by not interpreting the teachings of other groups, to the detriment of it. Resolving national problems by deliberation by means of consultation, for example in implementing the Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria (UUPA) and Undang-Undang Perjanjian Bagi Hasil (UUPBH), especially regarding land disputes (Kasdi, 2001).

The Bogor Declaration was often abused by the PKI to trick the non-communist parties. PKI used the Bogor Declaration as a powerful weapon to get rid of its political opponents. For example, the unilateral action in the Kanigoro incident (the Indonesian Islamic Youth was attacked by the Barisan Tani Indonesia and Pemuda Rakyat). To resolve this, the PKI presented the Bogor Declaration, where often the opposing party was first harmed physically and non-physically, to then be consulted for the sake of peace in society. If the aggrieved party is not willing, then he is labeled as a troublemaker or a source of conflict which can cause unrest and social conflict.

On May 14, 1965, a Central Executive Council decree signed by General Chairman Ali Sastroamidjoyo and Secretary General Surachman issued a series of organizational actions against several PNI figures. In the decree, Hadisubeno, as chairman of the Central Java PNI DPD, who is concurrently a member of the PNI Plenary DPP, was ordered to resign from his first position. In addition, Oemar Said as chairman of the III DPD PNI Central Java and Soetopo Koesomadirdjo and Sugeng Tirtosiswoyo, respectively as chairman of PNI in the Pati and Cilacap branches, were also subject to heavier organizational sanctions, namely temporary dismissal for one year from their membership. in the party (McIntyre, 1972). The reason for the imposition of sanctions by PNI figures above in the form of a series of organizational actions was the circulation of a brochure entitled *Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis Djawa Tengah*, by Hadisubeno and a pamphlet in Javanese

language, den patities of the marhaenis declaration, published and circulated by PNI Central Java. Sugeng and Soetopo were blamed for acting as the main signatures of the brochure, while Oemar Said was not only responsible for being the main signatories but also responsible for the flyer. In connection with the development of such a situation, on 22 May 1965, a working conference for the PNI branches in Central Java was held in Semarang. Meanwhile at the center of the party itself the situation continued to develop and opened up more opportunities for conflicts between the leadership. Such was the chaos that swept the PNI, which had resulted in divisions among PNI leaders and figures.

## CONCLUSION

With the government's declaration of November 3, 1945 signed by Vice President Muhammad Hatta, it is clear that political parties have a solid footing line. On the basis of this government declaration, in January 1986 in Jakarta, a political party called the Indonesian People's Union (Serindo) was established. Then in its first congress in Kediri on January 28, 1946, Serindo merged with several other parties and was later called the Indonesian National Party (PNI). And in 1955, PNI emerged victorious. However, PNI was often hit by turmoil in the sense that there was a conflict between the party elites so that the PNI's position in the government was not so solid and only as a sealer of policies issued by the Government.

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