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## State Bureaucracy in Indonesia and its Reforms: An Overview

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### ABSTRACT

New Public Management (NPM) as a part of neoliberalism has increasingly become a global phenomenon and has transcended national boundaries, irrespective of whether they are English-speaking countries or non-English-speaking countries. This label of public management has not been interpreted and implemented in a single language, but has been adapted and implemented based on the contextual condition of given nations in terms of their socio-culture, history and formation, ideological inclination, and polity system. This article aimed at providing support to the above supposition, taking Indonesian public governance reforms as an example. The review of Indonesian reforms on public governance is expected to enrich the proliferation of international reforms on public governance in terms of how NPM has been travelling global and has been recontextualized in the existing values of Indonesian people.

### KEYWORDS

Indonesia; neoliberalism; neo-Weberian state; NPM

### Introduction

NPM as a part of neoliberalism has increasingly become a global phenomenon and has transcended national boundaries, irrespective of whether they are English-speaking countries or non-English-speaking countries. This label of public management has not been interpreted and implemented in a single language, but has been adapted and implemented based on the contextual condition of given nations in terms of their socio-culture, history and formation, ideological inclination, and polity system Pollit and Bouckaert (2004), Pollit et al. (2007), Pollit (2009), Kickert (1997), Hood (1991), Haque (2000), Lynn (2008), and Ferlie et al. (2008). These scholars have provided examples on cases drawn from several Eastern European countries, including the former communist European countries. International literature has been highlighted with such issues examined in a wide range of different contexts, and less attention has been paid to the context of Indonesia, which has its distinctive characteristics in socio-culture, economy, and polity systems. Thus, the review of Indonesian reforms on public governance is expected to provide accounts on how these reforms have been constructed and how NPM has been travelling global and has been recontextualized in the existing values of Indonesian people. Thus, this may be used as the form of a comparative study (cross-national context) in terms of the examination of local and national contexts to

analyze the similarities, and the convergence of public service reforms evolution and characteristics in effectuating the reform processes in other national contexts.

Prior to elaborating this issue, it was felt reasonably important to provide an account of the indigenous Indonesian historical context vis-à-vis secular western colonialist contexts (Dutch Colonialist Government). The former context has been characterized by traditional patterns of “ascription, particularism, diffusion, patrimonialism, and authoritarianism” (Robison, 1981, p. 2), and the latter has been characterized by modern patterns of “secularism, universalism, rationalism, and achievement orientation” (Robison, 1981, p. 2). This dichotomy has given rise to a contradiction, wherein the former was juxtaposed with the latter in the process of modernization of the formation of Indonesia, mirrored in its evolution and the development of its state bureaucracy, economy, socio-culture, and politic (Levine, 1969, Liddle, 1991; Robison, 1981). The exposition of these contradictory contexts posed important tools to feed understandings on how the legacy of Dutch colonialists had influenced the establishment of bureaucracy in Indonesia, and how this legacy had been internalized in the socio-cultural, economic, and political system during and post the colonial times. It was also considered important to show these different contexts to provide a clearer understanding on the emergence and evolution of Western bureaucracy (advanced

capitalist colonialists), which fundamentally was born out of their original contexts, and which was incongruent with mostly developing countries' contexts (Haque, 1997), including Indonesia.

To carry this out, this article is divided into several sections to describe the historical, societal, economic, and political backgrounds of Indonesia, during colonization and in the decolonization era. This article likewise highlights the process of bureaucratic reforms taking place in the democratic era, which is analyzed and built upon the concept of NPM.

## Indonesian history and society

Indonesia is a diverse, multicultural, multiethnic, and secular democratic country with the largest Muslim population in the world (Indonesian Investment 2013, World Bank 2014). The Indonesian population is characterized by approximately 300 ethnic groups, ranging from indigenous to foreign ethnic groups (Chinese, Indians, and Arabic), acculturating to Indonesian people's social interactions (Indonesian Investment 2013). While these ethnic groups have their own particular characteristics in terms of languages, religions, and culture, they have likewise stringent similarities in traditional cultural patterns in governing their life, which are grounded on the principles of *family*, *friendship*, *mutual cooperation (gotong royong)*, *patrimonialism*, and *collectivism* (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). These ethnic diversities are epitomized and strengthened under the motto "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" (unity in diversity).

The formation of modern Indonesia and its society has involved the acculturation of indigenous elements—notably animism culture and foreign elements—particularly Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Islam cultures, coupled with the factor of colonialism (European influences)—which characterized the formation of culture, religion, polity, and the socioeconomic systems in Indonesia (Robison, 1981). Its history of acculturation can be framed in several periods, including *pre-*, *during*, and *post-colonial times*.

During the precolonial times, i.e. before the coming of the colonialists (Portuguese, British, Dutch, and Japanese), there had already been native ethnic groups and traditional kingdoms, such as Sudanese, Batakese, Javanese, Buginese, Balinese, Makassarese, and Minagkabau, inhabiting and spreading across the archipelago (Silaen & Smark, 2006)—with their distinctive well-defined territories, languages, and native religions (Bachtiar, 1972). These ethnic groups were ruled within their empires, largely based on the primordial system. These primordial societies were united and built based upon their similar backgrounds in ethnicity, religion, and

loyalty to region (Berger, 1997). Among these primordial societies of native ethnic groups, traditional Javanese ethnic groups was and is the largest ethnic groups in Indonesia and have given strong colors and characters in the evolution and development of socioeconomic and political systems in Indonesia (Bachtiar, 1972).

Javanese traditional kingdoms were ruled through class stratification. The ruling class of aristocrats occupied the highest level of caste, followed by the middle class of the ruling elite, and the masses, for example peasants, constituted the lowest caste (Crouch, 1979; Robison, 1981). The relationships between the rulers and the ruling elites were practiced in personal and mutual relationships. In such relationships, the rulers had no capacity to apply coercion in order for their rules and regulations to be accepted. To sustain their power and influence, they needed to gain loyalty and allegiance from key sections of the ruling elites (Crouch, 1979; Robison, 1981). This was carried out by endowing some privileges, mainly related to material benefits, which can be gained through the division of fiefdom and lands, in which the key sections of ruling elites could use and plant them, but they were not allowed to buy and own them (Anderson 1983). Through this system, as Anderson explained, the rulers could maintain their power through the loyalty and tribute paid by the ruling elites, who became the arm's length of the rulers to obtain loyalty from the masses (usually the poor).

The consequence of this sort of relationship was the creation of conflict and competition among the ruling elite themselves, in order to derive more influences and credentials from the rulers (Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983). In this situation, the rulers had to become mediators to bridge these conflicts, usually by accommodating the interests of the two conflicting groups. This concept was later used by Soekarno and Soeharto in their regimes to sustain loyalty from their officials and to endure their reign (Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983).

This practice was considered *patrimonialism*, a traditional administration of domination, which agreed well with Weber's concept of patrimonialism (Weber 1978). Patrimonial government, as per the classic definition by Max Weber, "lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the 'private' and the 'official' sphere." Patrimonial rulers may exploit their power as if it were their "personal property," unconstrained by "binding norms and regulations." The "office and the exercise of public authority serve the ruler and the official on whom the office was bestowed, they do not serve impersonal purposes" (Weber 1978, pp. 1028–1031). In line with this, Weber further argued that these characteristics that had distinguished this

traditional patrimonial administration with rational-legal bureaucracy, with the latter being practiced based on the impersonal relationships, and not for private or personal interests.

Patrimonialism, an indigenous Indonesian administration, remained in place when Dutch merchants under Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) came to look for export commodities to be traded in Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century (Silaen & Smark, 2006, Anderson 1983). The reason for this was because Dutch merchants did not dismantle this system as they did not have much interest in the political and economic system of the indigenous people, rather they adapted these political and economic systems to their own commercial interests to obtain huge benefits of exploiting cash crops from Indonesian peasants (Lev, 1985; Silaen & Smark, 2006). To do this, Dutch traders imposed new laws on land leasing and demanded greater monopoly from Javanese aristocrats in trade for cash crops (sugar, coffee, indigo, and pepper plantations) in Java (Lev, 1985; Silaen & Smark, 2006).

Indigenous patrimonial administration began to change when the Dutch Colonial Government took control and established its colony in Indonesia (Silaen & Smark, 2006). During this period, the caste system, largely structured based on racial discrimination, had come into existence (Wertheim 1955). This caste system placed the European ruling class on the top rung of the caste system, followed by the Chinese and other foreign Orientals at the intermediate level. In particular, the distinction between the Indonesian nobility and the common people was kept largely intact by the Dutch rule (Wertheim 1955). From this period as well, the Dutch colonialists introduced a new system of rational bureaucracy, which advocated traditional patrimonial administration. This new system was characterized by the establishment of a set of offices (bureau) that had salaried staff (bureaucrats), ran on rules and procedures, and had hierarchy (Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983).

Patrimonialism reemerged during the post-independence period in the Soekarno regime, when nationalist politicians saw that rational bureaucracy, introduced by Dutch colonialists, had not substantially benefited Indonesia, and worsened Indonesia's ruined economy, due to recession, revolution, and wars (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997, Anderson 1983). In the Soeharto era, patrimonialism reemerged partly because it had been the traditional style of the government in the precolonial times and partly also because the New Order views the world through a traditional Javanese cultural lens, which renders it unable to take the action necessary to fulfill the modernizing goals of national autonomy, economic growth, and bureaucratic rationalization (Anderson, 1983).

Patrimonialism had and has characterized the state bureaucracy in Indonesia, notably in the New Order regime, colored with the serving of personal or private interests of the ruling regime, achieved and endured through the loyalty and tribute of the ruling elites, and with the exclusion of the masses or society, as the latter were seen as clients without significant positions, as they did not possess significantly large amounts of wealth (Webber 2006).

## Economy

Dutch colonialist legacies in economy had influenced the development of Indonesian economy, particularly after independence, during the reign of Soekarno (Old Order regime), and continued to be in the Soeharto era (New Order regime) (Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983; Lev, 1985). The legacy of what is well-known to Indonesia started during and after colonialization time, *ekonomi kolonial* (translated in English, Colonial economy), characterized by its dualistic goals between its little attention paid to the development of economy as a whole and the enhancement of foreign investment, notably in the sectors of lucrative plantation and mining (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). Apart from its dualistic nature, the Dutch colonialists had introduced and paved a rudimentary market, the liberal-economic system, into Indigenous Indies (a term used by the Dutch to denote its Indonesian colony). This event was initiated by the introduction of a cultivation system (*Cultuurstelsel*), where landowners and farmers were obliged to put aside their lands for plantation of exporting crops, such as sugar, indigo, tea, coffee, and spices (Crouch, 1979, Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983).

Referring to this, Western liberal cultures had come to be forced to be applied, which, according to Haque (1997), caused incongruity when they are juxtaposed with the traditional culture of colonies (developing nations). The backdrop against his argument was premised on the fact that colonies' social, political, and cultural systems were still underdeveloped (notably with their patrimonial bureaucracy), and where the western colonialists' contexts and colony contexts had undergone different evolution and development of their bureaucracy—by which the former had basically emerged out from their original cultural and historical contexts—as the scientific and industrial revolution broke out (Haque, 1997). This change that occurred in western societies had changed the landscape of their socio-cultural, economic, and political systems, which emphasized the tenets of rationalism, individualism, economic rationalism, and the separation of religion from the state (Haque, 1997).

Economic liberalism, as the legacy of the Dutch, had continued well toward the end of the Dutch rule in 1945. After the independence of Indonesia, specifically during the Old Order regime of Soekarno, a shift in economic orientation began (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997; Liddle, 1991). The shift of economic orientation from *economic colonial* to *economic populism* was substantially driven by the then condition, which was still under the euphoria of revolutionary and nationalism spirit (Chalmers & Hadiz 1997). The focus of economic development at this time was on improving the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions through the diversification of economy and equal distribution of wealth, which had been extremely ruined as the aftermath of the prolonged recession, wars, and revolutions (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997).

The economic populism was very much influenced by the Marxist principle of communitarian or collectivism, rather than individualism, in promoting a just and prosperous society for the newly created Indonesian state (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). The economic system of the then government, which was dominated by nationalist politicians, was managed and controlled with the view of common good and interest, achieved through mutual cooperation (*Gotong royong*), based on familial principles (Anderson 1983, Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997; Liddle, 1991). To achieve this common good and interest, the role of the state was seen as an important factor in controlling economic resources. The state was the principal actor mastering and controlling economic resources, to be used for the prosperity of indigenous Indonesia (Anderson 1983, Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). Here, the episode of *Statist-economy* began to emerge and continued well into the later part of Indonesian history under the Soeharto regime, and even in this reformation, a democratic society (Anderson 1983, Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). This conduct stands in contrast to the neoliberal economy, in which the premise of *free market economy* emphasizes the allocation of economic resources on the market as market is best seen as a more efficient and morally superior mechanism (Olssen & Peters 2005).

The backdrop against the western liberal economic system was largely influenced by the very bad impacts of imperialism, which had long been experienced by the newly independent Indonesia (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). As a result, things related to Westernism, including liberalism, were viewed as a form of imperialism—and the principles of neoliberalism were at odds with the indigenous Indonesian culture (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). In short,

this era was strongly marked by *guided economic development*, which relied on internal power and capacity, practiced as well in *guided democracy* (*demokrasi terpimpin*) society, adopting the socialist economic principles of Marxist.

Military coup d'état launched by Soeharto in 1965, preceded by the bloody revolt of the Indonesian Communist Party (*known as G-30 September*), had changed the face of the socio-cultural, economic, and political systems in Indonesia. The economic reorientation was undertaken through a more-open liberal economy, marking the shift from socialist collectivism toward capitalist individualism and rationalism. The adoption of liberal economic mechanism, in this era, was demonstrated by the open-door policy through the acceptance and respect for foreign aids, and foreign investments (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997; Crouch, 1979; Emmerson, 1983; Liddle, 1991). This policy was further practiced by encouraging and promoting individuals to become entrepreneurial for material expansion. This practice was manifested by the great support given to businesses in order to expand material expansion to boost economic growth. His economic advisors were mostly Western-educated economists, who laid down the fundamental-liberal foundation of economic development in Indonesia (Emmerson, 1983; Liddle, 1991).

However, the adoption of liberal ideologies in his economic policy and more open relationships with the Westerns did not substantially mean that the Soeharto regime placed more emphasis on individualism compared to collectivism. The extension of the Statist-economic policy and the legacy of guided democracy during the Soekarno regime remained seen and exercised (Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997). The economic sources were placed and controlled under the state and were used to benefit Soeharto's families and cronies (Anderson 1983, Emmerson, 1983).

In the Old Order, the New Order regime, and today, in democratic society, social stratification has vanished. In the democratic society, Indonesians have enjoyed extensive political freedom, freedom of information, checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of the government, and a depoliticized military (Bhakti 2000, Webber 2006). Currently, Indonesia is also enjoying rapid economic growth, and poses as Southeast Asia's largest economy, and is increasingly mentioned as an appropriate candidate to be included in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as the country is rapidly showing signs of similar newly advanced economic development (Indonesian Investment 2013, World Bank 2014).

## Theoretical framework

### *New public management (NPM)*

NPM is the term developed by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) in the context of the USA. NPM and New Public Governance (NPG) shared similar principles in terms of practicing relationships through networks (Pollit & Bouckaert 2011). These constructs were fundamentally developed from democratic-society values. Therefore, the relationship between state and society was built upon the premise of the participation and the empowerment of society by state to self-govern themselves (Dreschler, 2009; Dunn & Miller, 2007; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). This democratic participation of the society was effectively practiced through the elimination of bureaucracy (anti-bureaucracy), supplanted by flat hierarchies, minimal state interference, customer orientation, competition, and depoliticization (Dreschler, 2009; Dunn & Miller, 2007).

NPM is a term coined to denote the process of reforms in public administration during the 1980s as a critique of the Weberian model of bureaucracy (du Gay 2000), which is too rigid, inefficient, and inflexible and thus can constrain any endeavors of economic development, especially for rich Western countries (the UK, the USA, Canada, and Australia). These countries have been assumed to be exporters of NPM to developed countries of Europe, such as The Netherlands, Germany, and Norway (Ferlie, Andresani et al. 2008).

NPM is not an ideology or configuration of ideas (Deem & Brehony, 2005). It is a form of management reform that is largely governed in the perspective of economic rationalism associated with public choice theory (Hood 1994, Deem & Brehony, 2005; Olssen & Peters, 2005). Within this theory, markets, instead of being seen as spontaneous, natural, and self-regulating orders (*laissez-faire*), can be turned into a positive order as institutional regulations for public service organizations through “the technique of government’s positive power” (Olssen & Peters, 2005, p. 317). In this, NPM is then closely related to technical activities rather than political activities in which less-bureaucratic and quasi-markets public service organizations with the auspice of regulatory governance from governments are promoted and advocated (Deem & Brehony, 2005, Deem 1998).

To be more specific, NPM is the derivative idea of neoliberalism with its *Homo economicus* and *free market economy* (Lorenz, 2012). Guided within these two basic underlying concepts, NPM advocates that the best practice of management can be practiced within the tenets of “free market, competition, value for money, and optimum efficiency” (Lorenz, 2012, p. 601) and the

enabling function of states. The enabling function of states is conceptualized in their roles to provide and create appropriate infrastructures (law, regulations, and institutions) to enable the market to operate appropriately (Olssen & Peters, 2005). Here, the positive roles or techniques of governments are articulated in the procedures of accounting, auditing, and management (Olssen & Peters, 2005).

All these principles taken together, NPM can be conceptualized as an ethos driven by the business-like management of the market, which emphasizes competition. It is mainly characterized by the practice of accountability to ensure effectiveness, quality assurance, performance appraisal, and productivity. To do this, performance indicators have been included, which are focused on measurable outcome assessments (Ball 2000, Lorenz, 2012; Olssen & Peters, 2005). These measurements, known as regulatory governance (Deem & Brehony, 2005), are set by governments, which sometimes are considered as the disguised intervention of governments, as called by Shore and Wright (1999) a *political technology*. These measurements are also complemented by the reward and sanction mechanisms to elicit compliance and reduce resistance (Sabatier, 1986), and also as forms of contract in enhancing performance (Olssen & Peters, 2005).

### **Polity system and reforms on public governance service in Indonesia**

This section is concerned with the examination of public governance reforms at the macro level in Indonesia, analyzed from the lens of NPM tenets. In my attempt to denote the process of public governance service reforms in Indonesia, I will deploy and refer to the concept of “bureaucratic reform” and “bureaucratic polity.” When I refer to bureaucratic polity in this study, I was very much influenced by the notion brought forth by Jackson and Pye (1980) who argued that:

a bureaucratic polity is a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state, particularly the officer corps and the highest levels of the bureaucracy, including especially the highly trained specialists known as the technocrats (p.3).

The embeddedness of “bureaucratic polity” into the “bureaucratic reforms” in this study was considerably triggered by the consideration in my mind that it has been a construct that has made up the governmental system and public service delivery during the course of Indonesian public governance history from the Soekarno

regime to reformation or democratic government (Hendarto, 2012; Prasodjo, 2007). The spirit of this still resonates within the process of ongoing bureaucratic reforms in Indonesia up to the present time, taking its distinctive recontextualization characteristics (Hall, 2013) of policy transfer (Halpin & Troyna, 1995), in its implementation tailored by the contextual background of Indonesia's polity system, and cultural and socio-economic conditions. This is in line with the notion proffered by Pollit and Bouckaert (2004), Pollit et al. (2007), Pollit (2009), Kickert (1997), Hood (1991), Haque (2000), Lynn (2008), and Ferlie et al. (1997), who argued that public management reforms have inundated many countries irrespective of whether they are categorized as English-speaking countries or non-English-speaking countries during the 1980s within a single label under NPM as part of neoliberalism. This label of public management, notwithstanding, has not been interpreted and implemented in a single language, but it has been adapted and implemented based on the contextual condition of given nations in terms of their socio-cultural history and formation, ideological inclination, polity system, and their culture (Haque, 2000; Pollit et al., 2007; Pollit, 2009).

With this in mind, it was reasonably felt relevant to provide the description on general bureaucratic reform in Indonesia to show what forces have fuelled the Indonesian government to reform their system, what model of reform they have applied, and how this reform has been effectuated in public service sectors.

### **The characteristics of state bureaucracy in Indonesia before the process of reform**

As a newly established democratic country, Indonesia is in its transition period of moving toward the achievement of creating a more accountable, efficient, effective, neutral, professional, and transparent government system within an envisioned democratic society (Hendarto, 2012; Hermawan, 2013; Prasodjo, 2007). This vision and movement have marked the end of the politicization of bureaucracy of the then powerful ruling regime under the Soeharto era, where he utilized bureaucracy as his political vehicle to endure the power of supremacy (Thoha, 2002). It is accordingly in this era that bureaucracy in Indonesia lost its actual function and path as a public service for public good. It was no longer intended to serve the public, rather it was rendered in its trajectories to serve the interests of the ruling elite via the arms' length of its political party and the supporting regional government at both the provincial and regencial levels (Prasodjo, 2007, Hermawan 2012, Thoha, 2002).

The participation of people to engage with the national decisions were stultified and excluded, supplanted by the hegemonic power of the ruling elite, represented by state officers who served the interests of the ruling elite. Thus, the face of bureaucracy in this period was engulfed within the practice of bureaucratic polity (Emmerson, 1983; Jackson & Pye, 1980; King, 1982; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992), and the traditional patrimonialism form of domination (Weber 1978, Anderson 1983, Crouch, 1979; Robison, 1981)

Strongly gripped and shackled by the interest of political parties that backed up the ruler, in this sense, represented by GOLKAR, and the partisan State officers, bureaucracy in Indonesia was no longer neutral or discriminative (to serve the ruling elite), not professional, inefficient, ineffective, not accountable, centralistic, and hierarchical (Hermawan, 2013; Prasodjo, 2007; Thoha, 2002). The characteristics of bureaucratic public service in this era were featured by strong hands of the government or state-centered, civil servants, big portion of government officials, formalization, rule-bound, internal orientation to follow and comply with rules and procedures rather than emphasis on the external results of public services and the parsimonious use of resources (Hood, 1991; Pollit, 2009; Pollit et al. 2007; Thoha, 2002). To strengthen and endure the political power and position of the ruling regime, it was solidified not only through hierarchical bureaucracies with their partisan state officers, but also through the integration or embeddedness of military forces of the Armed forces of Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). This marked the rise of politics-of-order as another form of requirement for the modernization of the state in addition to the growth in economy and socio-culture (Berger, 1997).

Berger (1997) illustrated the history of the rise of the New Order regime of Soeharto's rule in which the process of revision of classical modernization theory, which projected an image of transition from the tradition of primordial society (ethnicity, religion, and loyalty to region) to modern society took root. One manifestation of the revision of the classical modernization theory was the rise of patrimonialism (the legacy of post- and precolonial era of Javanese Empires) toward the process of "politics-of-order" (Berger, 1997, p. 323), which focused on the state. The characteristic of this politics-of-order was marked by the stringent role of military in administrative roles and technical skills to facilitate political and economic modernization (Berger, 1997).

To ensure longevity, the doctrine of paradigm attached to the function of state officers or corps as "servers of State" was felt important as well to

implement and internalize. To do so, the doctrine of “civil servants constitute State apparatus which must serve the State” was evident in the civil servant legislations enacted and legitimated in the Act of 1978 through the stipulation of the then president of Soeharto (Hermawan, 2013).

This complexity of the Indonesian government system had given rise to the debate and analysis on what type of government system the Soeharto regime had followed. Dwight Y. King (1982) argued that Indonesian bureaucracy under the Soeharto regime was suitably named as “bureaucratic authoritarian regime,” characterized by “the willingness to work within a framework of an apathetic acceptance of the regime by mass of the population and a corresponding lack of interest on the part of the ruling elite in mobilising mass support on a continual basis.” Emmerson (1983) on the other hand argued that the bureaucratic system in Indonesia posed a hybrid system, “neither monistic enough to be totalitarian, nor pluralistic enough to be democratic” (p. 122).

The collapse of the Soeharto regime by the reformation movement broke out in 1998, which had enabled the transition to the new era under the new democratic society. This movement was initially sparked by the extreme economic crisis, which caused the then government to lose its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of people as corruption, nepotism, and collusion had been so massive and rife (Beerkens 2008; Chalmers & Hadiz, 1997; Webber, 2006).

### The reform in the reformation ERA

In the era of reformation, the process of bureaucratic reform has been very much influenced by the ideologies of the market of NPM, reflected in the positive arms of the government via the agency states to regulate and manage the bureaucracy. The aim of this reform is to create a professional, clean, accountable, neutral, and effective state bureaucracy that will be able to provide excellent services to the society and enable the establishment of a democratic management of public governance to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first century (Kemenpan-RB, 2013). In parallel with this, the process of depoliticization of bureaucratic polity has been strongly encouraged, manifested in the decentralization and autonomization as part of the process of restructuring the public bureaucracy, which has long been contaminated by political interests, and has been hailed into being. There is a need to adopt a new way or mechanism to organize, design, and regulate how the government should work amidst the increased global competition, the advent of new technologies, and

neoliberalism (Hendarto, 2012; Thoha, 2002). One of the manifest actions has been taken by the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reformation (henceforth Kemenpan-RB) through the so-called “a Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform” (Kemenpan-RB, 2013). The formulation of bureaucratic reform has been firmly focused on the reformulation of the role of the government in designing and organizing the work of the government and its apparatus, encompassing aspects of local, regional, and national governmental levels through the process of decentralization or through the practitioner model of agencification (Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004, cited in Roness & Verhoest 2008). To materialize this, the government’s role is enabling the function via the art or positive power of the government to manage state bureaucracy embedded in the set of regulatory mechanisms of accounting and auditing systems to increase the productivity of state bureaucrats. This situation is in parallel with the function of the government as *marketizers* and at the same time as *modernizers* in relation to reforms on state bureaucracy (Dreschler, 2009, Pollit & Bouckaert 2011).

To become marketizers, the government has promoted the process of “good governance” (Pollit & Bouckaert 2011, p. 21), through wide and active participation of the society and actors in policy-making, in addition to the government itself. Good governance has been explicitly found in the NPM, and in what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) called NPG. Within these two concepts, society steering can be considered effective if it is involved with networks and partnerships between the government, business corporations, and civil society association (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Osborne (1998, p. ix) called this “catalytic government’ or ‘reinventing government,” in which the role of governments as an entrepreneurial agent is highly recommended. In a sense, the government’s role is best conceptualized as steering rather than rowing, reflected in the premise of community-owned governments (Osborne 1998). Accordingly, the autonomy is widely given to all levels of authorities to manage their institutions and their local government to disaggregate them from their core parents (the ministry).

To become modernizers, the Indonesian government needed to modernize the existing traditional bureaucracy of Weber embedded in patrimonial bureaucracy. For Weber, bureaucracy was a requirement to build effective and cost-effective administration, through its rationality values, reflected upon the setting of offices, filled with appointed civil servants, who are selected based on merit, personality, division of labor, written forms, and legality (cited in Dreschler, 2009).



Despite the enabling function of the government being embedded in the autonomy process in the Indonesian bureaucratic system, its implementation is still seen as characterizing and displaying the strong hands of the government reflected in the rationalization of bureaucratic management. This rationalization process is manifested through the government's regulations and evaluations to ensure the accountability and quality assurance of the provision of Indonesian state bureaucracy and the services it provides (Gaus 2015). These mechanisms of control have been further concretized in the audit culture in the form of monitoring, controlling, punishing, rewarding, and reporting mechanisms to uphold the credibility of the government. The establishment of remuneration and performance indicators has been the real manifestation of this process. In this case, the reaffirmation of the state is visible amidst the endeavor of minimizing or even diminishing the roles of the government. This fact agrees well with "the steering at a distance" (Kickert, 1995) and "the political technology" (Shore & Wright, 1999), leading to dual modes of control mechanism in Indonesian state bureaucracy.

Clarke and Newman (1997), Hoggett (1996), Kickert (1995), and Farrel and Morris (2003) have addressed these dual modes of control in the system of public service control mechanism. Clarke and Newman (1996) associated the power delegation and fiduciary relationship between the government and professionals with the concept of *bureau-professional*. In this context, professionals' experts and skills are placed in the foreground in association with the "machinery of State" (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 7) for social improvement for public good. This interplay of relationship is carried out in the neutrality principle among the two parties. This means that professionals are entrusted with their expertise and skills within the overall control of the state (Clarke & Newman, 1997). Kickert (1995) described this as a "steering at a distance" mechanism performed by the government and professionals. A different perspective concerning the dual systems of control mechanisms within public services was developed by Hoggett (1996). In his analysis, Hoggett indicated the coexistence of the centralized and decentralized control systems, which are conducted concomitantly or simultaneously, particularly in UK's public service system. If Clarke and Newman used the construct of bureau-professional, Hoggett applied the terms *post-bureaucratic* and *the bureaucratic management*, whilst Farrel and Morris (2003) preferred to delineate it as *post-bureaucracy* and *NPM*.

Referring back to the application of auditing, accounting, reporting, recording, punishing, and

rewarding mechanisms in Indonesian state bureaucracy, these reflected an adoption of corporate technologies and techniques to extract compliance, spur performance, and hold accountable the state apparatus and bureaucracy. Further manifestation of this has been realized in the adoption of NPM elements as proffered by Hood (1991) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992). NPM is "a term coined in the late 1980s to denote a new (or renewed) stress on the importance of management and 'production engineering' in public service delivery, often linked to doctrines of economic rationalism" (Hood 1989, Pollitt 1993). In the case of Indonesia, this concept is being implemented too in all departments. The introduction of corporate principles of management, such as performance-based payment and performance indicators through remuneration programs, is, among others, something that can be seen from this reform process. Generally, the doctrines of bureaucratic reforms in public service in Indonesia are very similar to those of NPM doctrines developed by Hood (1991, pp. 4–5), which state that:

- (1) Hands-on professional management in the public sector, which emphasizes active, visible discretionary control of organizations from named persons at the top, "free to manage." Typical justification: Accountability requires clear assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power.
- (2) Explicit standards and measures of performance, which means that definition of goals, targets, indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms, especially for professional services with typical justification: Accountability requires clear statement of goals; efficiency requires "hard look" at objectives.
- (3) Greater emphasis on output control, meaning that resource allocation and rewards linked to measured performance; breakup of centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel management. Typical justification: Need to stress results rather than procedures.
- (4) Shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector, which means that to break up of formerly "monolithic" units, unbundling of U-form management systems into corporatized units around products, operating on decentralized "one-line" budgets, and dealing with one another on an "arms-length" basis. Typical justification: Need to create "manageable" units, separate provision and production interests, gain efficiency advantages of use of contract

or franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public sector.

- (5) Shift to greater competition in public sector, which means that to move to term contracts and public tendering procedures with justification: Rivalry as the key to lower costs and better standards.
- (6) Stress on private-sector styles of management practice, meaning: Move away from military-style “public service ethic,” greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; greater use of PR techniques. Justification: Need to use “proven” private sector management tools in the public sector.
- (7) Stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use, meaning: cutting direct costs, raising labor discipline, resisting union demands, limiting “compliance costs” to business. Justification: Need to check resource demands of public sector and ‘do.

These elements are evident in the programs launched by the government reflected in the eight areas of targeted changes along with the intended targeted results, which will be achieved as shown in the table below:

| Targeted areas of changes            | Intended targeted results achieved  |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1.Organization                       | Organizations that are right function and size  |
| 2.Business processes                 | Clear, effective, efficient systems of the work process and procedures based on the principles of good governance |
| 3.State apparatus<br>Human Resources | Committed, integrated, neutral, competent, dedicated, and professional state apparatus human resources            |
| 4.Law and Legislation                | Orderly, conducive, and not overlap.  |
| 5.Surveillance                       | The increase in the management of bureaucracy, which is clean and free from nepotism, corruption, and collusion.  |
| 6.Accountability                     | The increase in the performance capacity and accountability of state bureaucracy.                                 |
| 7.Public services                    | Good public service based on the needs and expectations of society.   |
| 8.Culture and Mind set               | Bureaucracy with high integrity and performance   |

Source: *Book Guidance of the Grand design of Bureaucratic Reform.*

It has been clear from the table above that the bureaucratic reform initiated by the government adopted corporate techniques and technologies to measure the productivity and performance of state apparatus and state bureaucracy as indicated in the principles of NPM proffered by Hood (1991).

Nonetheless, indeed, in the context of Indonesian state bureaucratic reforms, although NPM principles have been adopted, it does not mean that the whole of NPM’s ideologies are practiced. Given the unstable

and not-solid socio-cultural, economic, and political condition as a result of the transition periods from the New Order Regime (authoritarian and patrimonial bureaucracy) to democratic society, the state has to take on an architect role through its presence and steering through structured and solid bureaucracy—and democratic administrative law—to provide rules, formality, strong ethical standards, and laws—are evidently needed. These are evident in the process of reform in Indonesia (see no. 4 in the table). This means that the reaffirmation of state apparatus poses fundamental bases to bridge the transition process of shifting existing patrimonial societal behavior due to the prolonged practice of bureaucratic polity or patrimonial bureaucracy, as the legacy of New Order Regime toward achieving a democratic society, built primarily upon democratic values. Therefore, via the government’s hand these cultural mindsets are to be changed. With regard to this, bureaucracy then is not abandoned, but is still maintained, through the process of modernization (Dreschler, 2009, Lynn 2006; Dunn & Miller, 2007, Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004).

This is reasonably understood, due to the fact that “NPM does not provide for a strong state that can manage the many internal and external challenges facing newly independent states, including civil services plagued by domestic ethnic strife, hyper-pluralistic political party systems, weak systems of economic, health, and environmental regulation...”(Dunn & Miller, 2007, p. 350). With regard to this, therefore, the government views that reforms in Indonesia have come to be a state action, supporting and facilitating the process of these reforms.

Referring to this, it is clear that the practice of Neo-Weberian State (NWS) has been hailed into existence. This is undertaken with efforts of making the traditional bureaucracy of Weber more professional, efficient, and citizen-friendly (Pollit & Bouckaert 2011). “State is still perceived as the main facilitators to solve problems as the consequence of globalisation, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental threat” (Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 99). Within this condition, the involvement of state can become a backbone for Indonesian reforms to counter-balance arising social problems. As a manifestation of the strong state, the process of bureaucratic reforms is concretized in the role played by the state to design and organize the procedures and the implementation of the bureaucratic reforms, described in the “Book Guidance of the Grand design of Bureaucratic Reform,” formulated by the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform (2010–2014). By so doing the roles and functions of the representative democracy

have not changed radically, indicating the preservation and modernization of the Weberian concept of state to the neo-Weberian state (Kickert, 1997; Pollit et al., 2007; Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004).

NWS entails Weberian concepts of bureaucracy with additional new elements, as follows:

### **Weberian elements**

- Reaffirmation of the state as the main facilitator of solutions to the new problems of globalization, technological change, shifting demographics, and environmental threat;
- Reaffirmation of the role of representative democracy (central, regional, and local) as the legitimating elements within the state apparatus;
- Reaffirmation of the role of administrative law suitably modernized in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen–state relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions;
- Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinctive status, culture, and terms and conditions.

### **Neo elements**

- Shift from an internal orientation toward bureaucratic rules toward an external orientation toward meeting citizens' needs and wishes. The primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service.
- Supplementation (not replacement) of the role of representative democracy by a range of devices for consultation with, and the direct representation of, citizens views (this aspect being more visible in the northern European states and Germany at the local level than in Belgium, France or Italy).
- In the management of resources within the government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation on the achievement of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure. This is expressed partly in a shift to the balance from *ex ante* to *ex post* controls, but not a complete abandonment of the former.
- A professionalization of the public service, so that the bureaucrat becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizens/users.

This approach was put forward by some scholars, such as Pollit and Bouckaert (2004), Dreschler (2005), Lyn (1996), and Liiv (2008) as a challenge to NPM. One of its criticisms is that NPM is “a new form of ‘managerialism’ that neglects wider governmental, political, and socio-cultural contexts” (Dunn & Miller, 2007, p. 350). Some examples of state action reforms in higher education are best exemplified by countries such as Estonia (Drechsler 2004), Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland (Nemec 2010).

### **Conclusion**

Indonesia, born out of its distinctive history bounded in the formation of its culture, society, economy, and polity system, gives a concrete example of how public reform on bureaucracy has been recontextualized based on Indonesia's particular contextual characteristics. The government of Indonesia has taken the right step in becoming an architect in implementing reforms on public governance, given that the existing patrimonial values governed Indonesian bureaucrats and their systems have been assumed to be an obstacle to the change-shirking behavior of bureaucrats to achieve the goals of the reforms.

However, Indonesian bureaucratic reform seemed to have traded off this situation by advocating the market as new technology as institutional regulation in Indonesian state bureaucracy under government's positive power reflected upon regulatory governance of accounting and editing to extract accountable management of state bureaucracy. As a developing country possessing its distinctive history, polity system, culture, and socioeconomic conditions, which have been strongly constructed upon its traditional patrimonial values, shifting existing state bureaucrats behavior into quasi-market manners as advocated by NPM of neoliberalism can be a complex and arduous undertaking. As such, the process of shift is certainly in need of assistance and guidance from the state, in order to provide fundamental grounds to achieve the goals of the change process. Since NPM tenets do not acknowledge the power of the state in the provision of public services and citizen activities, the process of change in Indonesian state bureaucracy adopting corporate techniques is ideally carried out under the guidance and steering from the state. Thus, the process of state bureaucracy reform, to refer to Dreschler's (2009) work, can be said as a state action, characterized by “its monopoly on power, force, and coercion on one side, and its focus on the public good” (Dreschler, 2009, p. 9).

The traces of NWS in this reform are evident in the attempts made by the Indonesian government to

modernize the existing Weberian rational bureaucracy embedded in the patrimonial bureaucracy, which have governed the way bureaucracies in Indonesia carry out their management. In this way, the role of the state is back to becoming an architect, while at the same time maintaining the existing Weberian rational bureaucracy, equipped with principles of NPM in order to achieve maximum results. It is accordingly within the NWS model of reform, where there is a changing role between the state and bureaucracy between the state and professionals.

To this extent, however, the implementation of NPM in Indonesia has exhibited how policy has been taking its distinctive recontextualization characteristics of policy transfer (Halpin & Troyna, 1995), in its implementation tailored by the contextual background of Indonesia's polity system, and cultural and socio-economic conditions. This is in line with the notion proffered by Pollit and Bouckaert (2004), Pollit et al. (2007), Pollit (2009), Kickert (1997), Hood (1991), Haque (2000), Lynn (2008), and Ferlie et al (1997) who argued that public management reforms have inundated many countries irrespective of whether they are categorized as English-speaking countries or non-English-speaking countries during the 1980s within a single label under NPM as part of neoliberalism.

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