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Research Article

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Arguing against Political and Religious Discriminations: Critical Discourse Analysis of Indonesian Ahmadiyya

Abstract: This article examines resistance discourses created and disseminated by a religious minority in Indonesia called *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (GAI) to counter any negative portrayals and religious-based discriminations. Ahmadiyah is a self-defined sect of Islam that has been the target of physical attacks and discursive discrimination in Indonesia. This analysis focuses on identifying discourse topics raised and strategies employed by one of the Ahmadiyya groups in the country called GAI to reveal their resistance and defend their 'Islamic' faith. Various texts produced in different genres namely statements and comments published in media, books, speeches and various articles published online in GAI's official websites are used as the data which were collected during field research in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The analysis found that, in order to counter discriminatory discourses, the GAI Ahmadis present various resistance discourse themes such as distinguishing themselves from *Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia*, justifying their Islamic understanding by highlighting religious freedom discourse, including themselves as Muslims and presenting themselves as peaceful movement.

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1 Introduction

In the interview between the author and Mulyono in Yogyakarta in 2013, this secretary of *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia*/Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement (henceforth the GAI) obviously and convincingly stated that:

> We (the GAI) do not want to force other people to have a similar belief with us because this belief should be based on comprehension and volunteerism. We never think and do not want to think to accuse other Muslims who have different understanding of Islam as non-believers. We develop this belief based on understanding that Islam is a peaceful religion.

This statement implicitly delivers meaning that the GAI (affiliated to Lahore Ahmadiyya) as a religious minority has peaceful religious views and GAI Ahmadis spread this view out to reveal the peaceful characteristic of Islam that respect differences both in terms of inter- and intra-religious relationships. Although the GAI Ahmadis have been consistently promoting themselves as peaceful movement in disseminating their Islamic faith, the fact shows that in the last 20 years, Ahmadis both those affiliated to the JAI (*Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia*), affiliated to Qadiani Ahmadiyya, and the GAI have been the target of verbal discrimination and physical attacks. Most attacks are actually addressed to JAI Ahmadis, in some cases; however, GAI Ahmadis are also treated unequally.

Indonesian Council of Ulama's (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*/MUI) religious decree issued in 2005, for instance, has labelled all Ahmadiyya groups as *kafir* (non-believer) and blasphemous sect. Both groups are not allowed to spread their religious understanding as it is considered to be deviation from Islamic true faith. It is also reported that some members of public consider two Ahmadiyya groups to have ruffled Islamic teaching. In some fiery speeches presented by the leader of *Front Pembela Islam*/FPI (Islamic Defender Front), Habib Rizieq Shihab, both JAI and GAI are considered to be the actors of blasphemy against Islam (Irawan 2017).

Some previous studies have examined how the Ahmadiyya sect is treated that most of these have focused on discriminatory actions addressed to the sect (Burhani 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Irawan 2017, 2021; Jamil 2002; Khanif 2009; Muktiono 2012; Nastiti 2014). However, study investigating how the Ahmadis discursively defend their faith and argue against negative presentations is under-researched. Previous studies have been very one-sided and deny voices of discriminated groups. This has leaves gap in Ahmadiyya existing scholarships as we need to pay close attention on what the minorities have conducted to maintain their belief.

This can be identified by analysing what discourses they have created and disseminated through texts in various genres namely online articles, speeches and books written by GAI Ahmadis and interviews that were collected during fieldwork in Yogyakarta.

Drawing on interdisciplinary framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that concerns on discriminatory and resistance discourses, this article investigates discourse topics and strategies used by religious minority to establish resistance discourse as the way to defend their faith and argue against discrimination. First, in CDA study, voices of vulnerable group, such as religious minorities, are rarely highlighted as most of the studies focusing on discriminatory discourse and second, from the perspective of Ahmadiyya existing scholarship, it is important to comprehend how certain vulnerable group, which is religiously based, create their defensive strategy and discursively arguing against discriminatory discourses undermining them.

The article provides a new insight into minority and religious discourse studies by introducing religious minority perspective into the study of resistance discourses by unpacking discourse topics and strategies to counter or argue against any negative portrayals and injustice treatments. The analysis of *self- and other-presentations* is carried out to reveal how the GAI Ahmadis create discourses in various text genres to defend their Islamic understanding. In promoting an ideology, individuals or groups try to identify themselves positively, while, at the same time, they present others negatively. This concept is called the 'ideological square' to create the positive self-presentation and negative-other presentation (Van Dijk 1989, 2006).

It is hypothesised that, in order to argue against negative presentation, vulnerable groups also ground their discourse in positive self- and negative-other presentations framework. When dealing with self-presentation, they will create positive portrayals to themselves as their defensive strategy and conversely, construct negative discourses to present powerful individuals, groups or institutions that have undermined them. To address this issue, the article will answer question; *what discourse topics and strategies used by GAI Ahmadis to argue against negative presentations of non-believers and blasphemous sect that have undermined them?*

2 Literature Review

2.1 Gerakan Ahmadiyya Indonesia

In Indonesia, studies on Ahmadiyya have been conducted by several scholars. Most of them have concentrated on analysing the Ahmadiyya issue from the

perspectives of the establishment of human rights (Muktiono 2012), democracy and the protection of minority rights (Freedman and Tiburzi 2012), the issue of Ahmadiyya issue from the perspective of the implementation of Indonesian Constitution (Khanif 2009), the contribution of Ahmadiyya to the development of Indonesian religious discourse (Burhani 2013), and the analysis of minoritisation and persecution of Ahmadiyya (Abel 2013; Nastiti 2014).

Ahmadiyya was established in India more than a hundred years ago. Its establishment in 1889 cannot be separated from the figure of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. He was born in Qadian, in the province of Punjab, India, on 18 February 1835, and he died in Lahore on 26 May 1908. When Ghulam Ahmad was still alive, there was only one Ahmadiyya. This sect became separated into two groups 1914 when the second Caliph, Mirza Basyiruddin Mahmud, led this sect, namely Qadiani and Lahore Ahmadiyya. Amongst the followers, at that time, there was an irreconcilable view that led them to separate. It was an understanding about the position of Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer or a prophet. The Qadiani acknowledged the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad after the Prophet Muhammad (they claim that this new prophet does not bring a new teaching), whereas the Lahore claimed that this founder of Ahmadiyya is just a reformer, and that Muhammad is the seal of prophethood. In Indonesia, the former established *Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (the JAI) and the latter established the GAI where the religious teachings of these two groups were introduced to Indonesian archipelago at around 1920s.

Historically, the GAI has been present in Indonesia since the movement era or before independence period of the country at around 1920s (Burhani 2014a). Due to its long history in Indonesian archipelago, according to Burhani, the GAI has contributed to the history of modern Indonesia; at the very least, this movement became the 'safeguard' of the Islamic (*keislaman*) movement and of some figures at that time, such as Ruslan Abdul Ghani, Cokroaminoto, Soekarno, and Haji Agus Salim. The thoughts of these figures, more or less, have been influenced by Islamic thought brought and disseminated by the GAI. In addition, the GAI has also contributed to Islamic literature, particularly in the literature addressing the issue of Christian missionaries in Indonesia (Burhani 2013).

The GAI was established officially in Yogyakarta on 10 December 1928. The term 'officially' here is used because the Islamic interpretation of the Lahore Ahmadiyya had actually been introduced to Java Island, especially in Yogyakarta, in 1924 (Yasir and Yatimin 1989). A decision to establish this Ahmadiyya organisation aimed at propagating the thought or understanding of the Lahore Ahmadiyya as a new Islamic movement. Yogyakarta is known as the centre of Muhammadiyah, which is one of the largest Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Based on this geographical location, there was a close relationship between the

Lahore Ahmadiyya and Muhammadiyah from 1924 to 1928. The founders of the GAI were former members of Muhammadiyah.

In 1924, several months after the death of Ahmad Dahlan (the founder of Muhammadiyah), two Lahore Ahmadiyya figures arrived in Yogyakarta: Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig. They had originally planned to go to China to spread Lahore Ahmadiyya thought; however, when they arrived in Singapore, they received information that the spread of Christianity on Java Island had been largely successful. Therefore, they changed their plan and decided not to go to China, but to Java. The central board of Muhammadiyah, at that time, "welcomed their arrival in Yogyakarta enthusiastically" (Yasir and Yatimin 1989).

At the very earlier stage, the relationship between the Lahore Ahmadiyya and Muhammadiyah was very close. Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig were free to introduce their understanding to Muhammadiyah followers. Some Muhammadiyah members even learned new Islamic views from these two figures. However, this situation resulted in the emergence of dispute and hatred against Baig and Maulana Ahmad. The dispute and hatred culminated in 1927 when Abdul Alim Assidiqi arrived on Java Island and Yogyakarta from India to propagate an anti-Ahmadiyya movement.

After its establishment in 1928, in 1929 the members of the GAI moved to several parts of Java Island, including Purwokerto, Purbalingga, Malang, Bandung, Sukabumi, and Madiun. While working in their new professions in those districts, they also disseminated their Islamic understanding and established new GAI branches. The GAI has been continually promoting the Islamic understanding of the Lahore Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, this belief is not adopted by the Islamic mainstream. The GAI relies for its belief on the Islamic understanding brought by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. This can be found in many books written by some prominent figures of the GAI, such as S. Ali Yasir, Susmoyo Djoyosugito, Nanang RI Iskandar, and Mulyono.

The GAI and all Lahore Ahmadiyya followers around the world believe that Ghulam Ahmad was an Islamic reformer in the nineteenth century, and represents the figures of the promised *Messiah* as well as the awaited Mahdi (Djoyosugito 1984; Iskandr 2005; Mulyono 2013; Yasir 2012). They believe that the coming of Ghulam Ahmad (the founder of Ahmadiyya) and his Ahmadiyya movement will result in the revival of Islam.

Membership of the GAI is voluntary (*prinsip sukarela*). In 1930, the GAI were recognised as a corporation (*Badan Hukum/Rechtspersoon*) by the Indonesian Government, Number IX (Extra Bijvoegsel Jav. Courant 22 April 1930 No. 32), and it was registered in the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1963, Number 18/II. The first chairman of the GAI was H. dr. Susmoyo Djoyosugito (Yasir and Yatimin 1989). As

stated in its *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga*,[1] this organisation is based on the principle of *Pancasila*. The acceptance of *Pancasila* as the basic principle of the GAI was decided in 1947 at a congress (*Muktamar*) conducted in Purwokerto (Ali 2013).

The GAI also proposes a movement to develop Islam as a peaceful religion through *jihad*. For GAI members, *jihad* is not understood to be a holy war that uses weapons or swords to kill those who are considered to be the non-believers or the enemy of Islam. *Jihad* should be implemented in peaceful ways, or by the so-called *jihad* by the pen (e.g. writing and publishing books). According to Yasir (2006), *jihad* is not similar to war. On the contrary, it is a serious attempt to struggle against lust (*hawa nafsu*), Satan (*setan/syaitan*), and all enemies who use violence to destroy the religious truth of Islam. To some extent, this concept is actually contrary to the understandings of *jihad* of some Islamic groups that consider it to be a holy war to maintain Islam by, for example, suicide bombing.

In the 1940s, the GAI established a school in Yogyakarta called *Perguruan Islam Republik Indonesia* (the Islamic School of the Republic of Indonesia), abbreviated as PIRI. PIRI was established on 1 September 1947, and it then became an independent education foundation on 3 February 1959 (Ali 2013). This educational foundation is used as a medium to spread and maintain the Islamic teaching of the GAI through educational efforts. Although this educational foundation is no longer administered by the GAI, as it became independent in 1959, it has remained an integral part of the GAI movement.

In an interview in Yogyakarta in 2013, Mulyono – the secretary of the GAI – said that another inclusive effort created by the GAI is to invite preachers from other Islamic organisations to give Friday sermons or other religious speeches in the GAI's mosque. This activity is important for learning other Islamic views from others. Further, GAI members are also invited by other Islamic groups to give sermons and speeches. The GAI also invites religious leaders from other religions and beliefs. This activity is carried out to share religious thought and knowledge and to build a close relationship with people from different religions and beliefs.

Up to the present, the GAI still exists in Indonesia and its head office is in Yogyakarta. The precise number of its followers is not well recorded. Mulyono[2] argues that the GAI does not concern itself with recruiting members, but focuses on

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1 *Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga* is a constitution that is based on mutual agreement of the members of an organisation. This constitution was published by Pedoman Besar Gerakan Ahamdiyya Indonesia (PB GAI) in 1995.
2 This is a content of personal communication/interview between the author and Mulyono, the secretary of GAI conducted in Official office of GAI in Yogyakarta in 2013. This personal statement tries to explain about the core movement of GAI and distinguish it with the JAI that tries to link its members in Indonesia with its international organization around the world.

disseminating or propagating its Islamic teaching as a cultural movement. GAI grounds its activity on disseminating religious teaching of Islam as defined, viewed and understood by its followers where this teaching is engaged with peaceful ideas and thoughts. Additionally, Mulyono says that there is no organisational relationship between GAI Ahmadis in Indonesia with Ahmadiyya Lahore as an international organisation.

2.2 The Difference between the GAI and the JAI

According to (Faruqui 1983, p.v), there are at least two basic distinctions between the Qadiani and the Lahore. They are listed as follows:

1. The founder of Ahmadiyya, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, was a *mujaddid* (reformer) as believed by the Lahore, or a Prophet as believed by the Qadiyyani; and
2. For the Lahore, those who do not believe in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad remain Muslims. For the Qadiani, such people are considered to be *kafirs* (non-believers).

These two distinctive principles – the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad and the labelling of other Muslims who do not believe it as non-believers – are claimed to be the reasons for establishing the Lahore movement. With regard to the difference in this basic understanding, Azis (1995, p. 1) also argues that there are at least four distinctions between the Qadiani and the Lahore. The four distinctions are as follows:

1. The Qadiani belief that no person can be a Muslim without accepting Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet of God, *versus* the founder's own belief that everyone who acknowledges the well-known Islamic *Kalima*[3] is a Muslim;
2. The Qadiani's practical treatment of other Muslims as not being fellow-Muslims by refusing to say their funeral prayers, *versus* the Messiah's (Mirza Ghulam Ahmad) teaching of being fraternal with all other Muslims except hostile opponents;
3. The Qadiani belief that a prophet can come after the holy Prophet Muhammad and that the Lahore regard the holy Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet; and

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3 *Kalima* or *Kalima shahada, Ash-Hadu an la ilaha ill-Allahu, wa ash-hadu anna Muhammad-ar rasul-ullah* is the expression that should be expressed by a person to be acknowledged as a Muslim. This expression means 'I testify that there is no God but *Allah*, and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of *Allah*'.

3. The Qadiani system of rule by an autocratic *Khalifa* (Caliphate) possessing absolute power, *versus* the system set up by the promised Messiah of the supremacy of the collective decision of the *Anjuman* (the Central Executive Body).

Besides the difference in understanding Islam, the establishment of the Lahore Ahmadiyya was also considered to have a political motive. According to Fathoni (2002), Maulana Muhammad Ali established the Lahore group because he was disappointed at not being selected as the second Ahmadiyya caliph. At that time, Mirza Basyiruddin Mahmud, Ghulam Ahmad's first child, was appointed as the second caliph. The first caliph was Hakim Nuruddin. However, Fathoni then clarifies the matter by stating that the main reason for the separation was actually due to *Aqidah*, the principle understanding about the prophethood.

With regard to the prophethood of Ahmad, the Qadiani followers believe that in this world, there are two kinds of prophets: those who bring *sharia* (Islamic law and teaching) and those who do not. They base their belief upon the concepts of *Khaatamun Nabiyyin* (the last prophet) and *Laa nabiyya ba'di* (i.e. no longer on a prophet who brings a new teaching).

They interpret the two concepts – *khatamun nabiyyin* and *laa nabiyya ba'di* – by saying that a prophet who brings a new teaching will not come after Muhammad, but that a prophet who does not bring a new teaching or who continues the teaching of Muhammad could possibly come. Ghulam Ahmad belongs to this second kind of prophethood. The Qadiani followers believe that the coming of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet is to continue the teachings that have been previously brought and disseminated by Muhammad.

2.3 Religious Freedom and Religious Minorities in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the issue religious freedom can be clearly found in some laws and in the constitution since this country declared its independence on 17 August 1945. On 8 August 1945, One day after proclaiming its independence, Indonesia adopted its first constitution, called the 1945 Constitution. At that time, the constitution only consisted of 37 articles, including the fundamental issue of religious freedom under the heading 'Religion', as in Chapter XI, article 29 of the constitution.[4] This article was the legal reference for all religious matters at that time.

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4 The paragraphs of article 29 are that "the state shall be based upon belief in One Almighty God" (Paragraph 1); and that "the state guarantees everyone the freedom of worship, each according to his/her own religion or belief" (Paragraph 2).

In the reformation era, the case of religion and religious policies in Indonesia has been complex and challenging. This observation is reflected in a number of legal proclamations issued from 1999 to the present. The issuing of the proclamations was also encouraged by the various religious matters triggered by multi-issues such as human rights, the issuing of *sharia* laws (Islamic laws) in local contexts, called *Perda Syariah*, and the emergence of intolerant religious/hardliner groups who perpetrate violent acts against religious minority groups. In 1999, the Indonesian Government issued Law Number 39 concerning human rights to provide a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, as stipulated in article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2[5] of the law.

This law enforces freedom of religions and beliefs as one of the many basic rights for everyone in Indonesia that should be guaranteed by the state. At that time, the emergence of this law can be understood in the context of the reformation era when democracy returned to Indonesia in 1998 after the fall of the authoritarian regime of Soeharto and the demand for human rights protection was very strong and forceful.

One year later, by 18 August 2000, the Indonesian Government enacted the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution to reinforce religious freedom. The amendment introduced several new articles, including articles 28E,[6] 28I,[7] and 28J,[8] which provide details on the guarantee by which the freedom of religion and belief is integrated with other rights.

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5 "Everyone has the right to have the freedom to choose his/her religion and to worship according to the teachings of their religion and beliefs" (Paragraph 1); "The state guarantees everyone the freedom to choose and practice their religion and to worship according to their religion and beliefs" (Paragraph 2).

6 "All persons shall be free to adhere their respective religion and to worship according to their religion, to choose their education and learning, their work or occupation, their citizenship, as well as their place of residence within the nation's territory, and shall be free to depart from it and to return to it" (Paragraph 1); "All persons shall have the right to freedom of belief, and freedom of expression in accordance with their conscience" (Paragraph 2); and "All persons shall have the right to be free to organise, assemble, and express opinions" (Paragraph 3).

7 "The right to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances" (Paragraph 1); "Every person shall have the right to be free from discriminative treatment based upon any grounds whatsoever and shall have the right to protection from such discriminative treatment" (Paragraph 2); and "The protection, advancement, enforcement, and fulfilment of human rights are the responsibility of the state, especially the government" (Paragraph 4).

8 "Everyone shall have the duty to respect the human rights of others within the orderly context of living in a community, nation, and state" (Paragraph 1).

Religious freedom in Indonesia was extended further to include the individual's civil and political rights. The extension of religious freedom led to the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), issued by the United Nations (*Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa*), into Law Number 12/2005, especially article 18.[9] By this ratification, Indonesia is expected to fully implement the international standard on religious freedom and include such freedom as a part of international probity and tolerance.

Despite this new development in the level of recognition of freedom of religion, there is restriction found in some other laws and paragraphs of the 1945 Constitution. Freedom of religion is not totally free as in Western sense. The Indonesian Government usually argues it is necessary that the restriction remain in place because unrestricted freedom may pose social problems associated with morality, public order and security, as well as violation against human rights. The restriction can be found in some of the following features: article 28J in the 1945 Constitution,[10] Law Number 12/2005 about the ratification of ICCPR (article 18, par. 3),[11] Law Number 39/1999 about human rights (articles 70 and 73),[12] and Law PNPS (*Penetapan Presiden*) Number 1/1965.

Another form of restriction can also be found in the establishment of some official institutions that have the task of controlling religious matters in Indonesia:

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9 "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, or freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching" (Paragraph 1); and "No one shall be subject to coercion, which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice" (Paragraph 2).

10 Article 28J (paragraph 2) Chapter XA, concerning human rights of 1945 Constitution, paragraph 2:

> In exercising his/her rights or freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes for guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.

11 "Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others" (Paragraph 3).

12 "In executing his rights and obligations, everyone shall observe the limitations set forth in the provisions in this Act, in order to ensure that the rights and freedoms of others are respected, and in the interests of justice, taking into account the moral, security, and public order considerations of a democratic society" (Article 70); and "The rights and freedoms governed by the provisions set forth in this Act may be limited only by and based on law, solely for the purposes of guaranteeing recognition and respect for the basic rights and freedoms of another person, fulfilling moral requirements, or in the public interest" (Article 73).

the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Indonesian Council of Clerics, and *Bakorpakem* (*Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat*/The Coordinating Body to Monitor the Development of Religious or Belief Streams in Society).

The Ministry of Religious Affairs was established in 1946, one year after the proclamation of Indonesian Independence. Up to the present, the ministry has been authorised to administer religious matters in Indonesia. The Indonesian Council of Clerics, which was established in 1975, has an authority to interpret religious teachings to provide direction on social and religious issues by issuing a religious decree (*fatwa*) in line with Islamic teaching (e.g. *fatwa* relating to religious sects) (Colbran 2010). Both of these institutions have been given legal authority to administer the issue of religious minorities in the country.

2.4 Resistance Discourse Analysis

The resistance discourse analysis obviously uncovers that most policies, social attitudes, treatments, texts and talks to address minorities, raised by powerful groups or those who want to gain as well as maintain power over others, have been misleading as they deny the rights of minorities. Minorities, in this case, are not given equal treatment and access to social resources as the majorities and powerful ones have. Such unequal treatment has created social injustice and inequality and it has impacted negatively upon the life of minorities. Due to this unequal treatment, minorities can create resistance, either physical or discursive, by arguing against or oppose the discrimination. Wodak and Reisigl (1999, 2001), in their study of racism and discrimination, argue that social groups that have been oppressed and exploited in discourses have adopted the idea of racism and turned to construct an alternative discourse, such as positive self-identity, to resist. According to Foucault as cited in Medina (2011), resistance is something inherent in the exercise of (political) power, that is, "resistance is never in position of exteriority in relation to power". The relationship between power or power abuse and resistance could be seen as 'two sides of a coin', where the existence of one side is determined by the existence of the other side. Because power or power abuse creates inequality by providing a privilege to certain individuals or groups while denying others, the resistance should be seen as an attempt to regain equality.

Controlled or discriminated individuals or groups are those who have no or less power to access public resources, such as knowledge, media, wealth, and political access. Less access to public resources, however, does not mean that they cannot challenge or argue against the discriminatory discourses that may have undermined them. Some studies have revealed that resistance against

discrimination or an attempt to defend their own belief or existence from discourse attacks have been organised by some minority groups.

According to Lazarus-Black and Hirsch as cited in Becket and Hoffman (2005), resistance is "any actions that lay bare the historical and constructed nature of hegemonic social structures and the inequalities they generate and sustain". In a study of anti-racist talk, Tilbury argues that anti-racist talk opposes discourse that tries to establish, sustain, and reinforce oppressive power on those who have been defined as being racially or ethnically different (2000).

In their argument about the relationship between discourse and racism, Wodak and Reisigl (1999) argue that discourse can serve to criticise, delegitimise, and argue against racist opinions and practices. [1] means that in a discourse analysis study, any discriminatory discourses can be argued against. According to this concept, dominant discourses that are considered to be discriminatory against certain individuals or groups can be challenged. Those who are discriminated against may use particular discursive strategies in their texts to resist discourse attacks.

Several studies of resistance discourse have revealed various discourse strategies used by minorities to defend themselves and to oppose discourses created by powerful groups. Tilbury examines resistances created by ethnic minorities in New Zealand. They use linguistic strategy of naming tactics, directed against NZ government, to challenge the racism discourse (Tilbury 2000). Similarly, study conducted by Jansen (2000) also presents an interesting analysis of Serbian politics that uncovers the use of three discursive strategies of resistance concerning self-image, namely victimisation, underdog, and rebel.

Another study of resistance discourse, in the workplace setting, was carried out by Van Laer and Janssens (2009) in Belgium. In their study, resistance discourse was created by a minority group of employees of Turkish and Maghrebi descent (Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian) that were stereotypically associated with or linked to social problems, criminality, abusing the social security system, and increased unemployment, terrorism, and extremism against dominant discourses that were trying to control them. These employees portrayed themselves as individuals who are suitable for specific economic position and rejected being identified based on their ethnic descent.

Based on this theoretical framework, it is believed that other minorities including GAI has created similar resistance although, in the existing scholarship of minority, it is under-developed. Within the social exclusion and negative prejudice of this sect as non-believers, blasphemers, and creator of national instability, many GAI Ahmadis, either in international world or particularly in Indonesia, have tried to counter this labelling. The following section provides analysis of texts that

GAI Ahmadis have produced and disseminated; what discourse topics they have deliberately selected and strategies they use to build resistance discourses.

3 Finding and Discussion

In Indonesian context, GAI members might also have been a target of attacks but no violent attacks on them have been reported. The three Ahmadiyya followers who were killed in Cikeusik were members of the JAI. The GAI in Yogyakarta was a target in January 2012, but, based on an investigation by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, it was a false target.[13] Likewise, the joint ministerial decree and the MUI *fatwa* 1980 are addressed to the JAI, not the GAI. However, *fatwa* 2005 and discourse presentations created by the FPI address both of the Ahmadiyya groups.

Muslich Zainal Asikin, in *Tempo* Magazine (Wijaya 2013) states that "we at the GAI have never been attacked. Those who are attacked are the JAI". However, the word 'Ahmadiyya' in its name has brought a negative consequence to GAI followers. People who do not have sufficient information about Ahmadiyya will think that there is only one group of Ahmadiyya. Further, they may not know that the Ahmadiyya groups are different. The name 'Ahmadiyya' may place the followers, who are affiliated to either the JAI or the GAI, as non-believers who have disseminated a deviant understanding and so they are accused to have defamed Islam.

In various discourse presentations that have been created by the GAI, there is a deliberate attempt to distinguish themselves from the JAI, especially in the case of prophethood. The GAI followers strictly believe that Ghulam Ahmad is only a reformer of Islam, not a prophet. They only believe that the promised Messiah and the awaited Mahdi have come through the figure of Ghulam Ahmad. This makes their belief different from the JAI's belief. Further, they believe that there is no sharp distinction between them and other Muslim mainstreamers, who believe that Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet of Islam, except for their belief about the coming of the Messiah and the Mahdi. For them, the two figures have arrived on Earth, while the Muslim mainstreamers, both in Indonesia and in the international world, believe that these two figures have not yet come.

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13 See *Klipping Perkembangan Pengehentian Pengajian Tahunan GAI di Yogyakarta* and *Hasil Investigasi Tim Kementerian Agama di Yogyakarta* (24–27 Januari 2012). The investigation result is audio-recorded by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In the result, it is emphasised that perpetrators of the action have little understanding about the joint ministerial decree and are unable to distinguish between the JAI and the GAI.

Although discrimination and physical attack against GAI Ahmadis are relatively small compared to the JAI one or other religious minorities such as Shi'ite, feeling discriminated and treated unequally are obviously identified in various texts that they have produced and disseminated that, in this article, are categorised as resistance discourse. They produced many articles and posted in their official website, speeches, books and personal opinions. The analysis and identification of these resistance discourses are presented in the following section.

Based on the analysis, it is found that the GAI have presented 4 discourse topics, (i) they try to make clear distinction between the GAI and the JAI; (ii) highlighting the discourse of religious freedom to justify their interpretation of Islam; (iii) including themselves as Muslims to counter social exclusion; and (iv) presenting themselves positively as a peaceful movement. These four discourse topics are constructed using various discourse strategies namely contrastive-argumentative, social inclusion, recontextualisation, and the strategy of positive attribution.

3.1 'We Are the GAI, Not the JAI'

One of the concerns of the GAI followers is their attempt to tell the public that they are different from the JAI, although both of them use the name 'Ahmadiyya'. GAI Ahmadis try to clear up the public misunderstanding about the use of the 'Ahmadiyya' name by explaining that the GAI is also Ahmadiyya, but it is different from the JAI. They have different principle understanding of Islam from the JAI that the GAI does not acknowledge the Ahmadiyya founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, as a new prophet of Islam after Muhammad but he was only a reformer that was given a task to renew Islamic interpretation.

In order to explain this difference, most discourses are presented using the contrastive-argumentative strategy. This strategy is used to contrast and oppose two different arguments to show differences between two entities being opposed (Gialdino 2010). This strategy is mainly employed to legitimize social category that THEM are different from US and that US category is presented positively while THEM category is portrayed in negative way. This is expected to make a clear distinction that GAI is different from JAI in which the former has never been a problem and never made any disagreements with Muslim mainstreamers while the problem of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia is associated with the latter. This contrastive argumentative strategy can be identified in Mulyono's (2013) argument as follows:

> *Kesalahpahaman terhadap GAI yang masih terdapat pada sebagian kecil orang, pada umumnya bukan disebabkan karena paham keagamaan yang dianut dan disebarluaskan oleh GAI, melainkan karena label Ahmadiyya yang melekat pada organisasi ini.*

> (Misunderstanding about the GAI, which still exists in the minds of a few people, is not actually generated by any religious understanding adopted and disseminated by the GAI. However, it is caused by the label of Ahmadiyya, which is used by this organisation).

In the discourse presentation above, Mulyono contrasts the GAI and the JAI in the case of religious interpretation of Islam. He argues that the GAI's Islamic understanding has never been contradicted and it is generally acceptable to the mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. What the mainstream thinks to be a deviation is the understanding of Islam disseminated by the JAI. There is no problem with the Islamic interpretation disseminated by the GAI.

In order to highlight the contrast, the issue of social conflict regarding Ahmadiyya is only related to the JAI, not the GAI. The JAI Ahmadis have been the target of violent acts, while GAI followers can live peacefully with other Muslims. This contrast is also found in Mulyono's speech (2013).[4] *Berbagai peristiwa konflik yang menyangkut Ahmadiyah dimanapun di Indonesia tidak ada sangkut pautnya dengan gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia* (Some conflicts related to the Ahmadiyya issue elsewhere in Indonesia do not have any relation to the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement [the GAI]).

The contrast is also to be reinforced by stating that these two Ahmadiyya groups do not have any close relationship at all, either in terms of organisation or ideology. This is identified in the following statement (Mulyono 2013):

> *Yang perlu diketahui juga bahwa keduanya tidak ada hubungan organisatoris maupun ideologis – yang tersebut terakhir ini terutama dalam sejumlah paham maupun praktek keagamaan.*

> (It needs to be known here that neither the JAI nor the GAI have organisational and ideological relationships – especially the latter in some understandings and religious practices).

Another similar statement is also found in Mulyono's article *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia [GAI] dan Permasalahan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Mulyono 2011). The statement below strongly highlights the point that the GAI strictly rejects the prophethood claim of Ghulam Ahmad and, therefore, it disagrees with the JAI.

> *Dengan berpedoman pada Q.S. 33:40 dan sejumlah hadits Nabi saw, yang menyatakan bahwa sesudah beliau saw, tidak ada Nabi lagi, maka GAI menolak tegas terhadap klaim kenabian sesudah Nabi Muhammad.*

(By referring to the holy Qur'an [33:40] and some of Prophet Muhammad's *Hadiths*, which state that there is no longer a prophet after him, the GAI strongly rejects all claims of the prophethood after Prophet Muhammad).

In other presentations, the GAI also reinforces the contrast by refuting the acknowledgement of Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. The GAI followers do not adhere to Ahmadiyya's belief that acknowledges Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. They just acknowledge Ghulam Ahmad as reformer of Islam, the *Messiah* and the *Mahdi*. The contrastive presentation is created by delegitimising the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad as follows (Mulyono 2011):

> *Jika Ahmadiyah diidentikkan dengan pengakuan Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad sebagai nabi dan sekaligus penerima wahyu kenabian, maka secara faktual GAI berada di luar itu.*

> (If Ahmadiyya is identified with the acknowledgement of Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet as well as a recipient of prophetic revelation, factually the GAI is outside of this understanding).

Further, in reinforcing this contrast while strengthening positive self-presentation, Mulyono (2013) depicts the GAI positively as the Indonesian Government's partner in seeking a solution to the Ahmadiyya issue in Indonesia. This implicitly delivers a message that the GAI has a good relationship with the government. The Ahmadiyya group is part of the solution, while the other Ahmadiyya group (i.e. the JAI) is part of the problem. The JAI has been considered to be a deviant sect and is the target of the joint ministerial decree.

> *Dalam hal ini, GAI telah berulang kali ikut dilibatkan oleh pihak pemerintah dalam upaya mencari penyelesaian terbaik, berkenaan dengan kasus Ahmadiyya.*

> (In the issue, the GAI has been involved frequently by the Indonesian government in seeking the best solution pertaining to the Ahmadiyya issue).

The attempts of GAI followers to distinguish themselves from the JAI are deliberate. The problem of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, which has actually been a result of the JAI's understanding of Islam, more or less, has had a negative impact on the GAI. The GAI is different from the JAI, and the name 'Ahmadiyya' they use does not mean that they are same with the JAI.

3.2 Discourse of Religious Freedom

Some other texts created by GAI followers have concentrated on disseminating the idea of freedom of religion. The religious freedom have been long established in

Indonesia and this has been perpetuated in Indonesian laws and constitution such as those found in the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution, articles 28E, 28I, and 28J, Law Number 12/2005 of the ratification of ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), especially article 18 and Law Number 39 concerning human rights as stipulated in article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the law.

Nanang R. I. Iskandar, one of the leading figures of the GAI, has explored this idea in his article entitled *Kebebasan beragama dalam Konteks Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (The Freedom of Religion in the Context of Unity in Diversity.)[14] Basyarat Asgor Ali, one of the GAI's leading youth, also highlights this idea in his article entitled *Ahmadiyah di Mata Pancasila* (Ahmadiyya in the Eyes of *Pancasila*) by promoting pluralism and cultural differences (Ali 2012).

The discourse presentation is created using the linguistic strategy of re-contextualisation. According to Fairclough (2003), "re-contextualisation is a transformation of one text/discourse into another text/discourse". This strategy is hybridity in nature by mixing different discourses into one text (Fairclough 2001). Recontextualisation transforms a discourse/meaning from its original context to another context and this transformation will create a new different meaning from its original as it is mixed with another. In some statements below, the discourse of freedom of religion is transformed into the discourse of *Pancasila*, of Indonesian laws and of the constitution, and of human rights to create a meaning that religious freedom cannot be separated from Pancasila and other laws. Therefore, government and the people of Indonesia should establish this and respect different religious interpretation.

Ali argues that violent acts against Ahmadiyya have violated the freedom of religion and, hence, these negative actions are contradictory to the *Pancasila* and also to the Indonesian laws and the Constitution (Ali 2012). He argues: *terkait dengan kasus kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah, tentu saja hal ini bertentangan dengan Pancasila dan Undang-Undang dasar 1945* (In relation to the violent acts against Ahmadiyya, these, of course, are contradictory to *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution). Ali believes that violent acts, which are mainly based on religion, are not in accordance with Indonesian culture. Indonesia recognises all forms of diversity as well as freedom of religion, and they are protected in *Pancasila* (especially the first principle).

Another re-contextualisation of freedom of religion is also identified in the discourse created by Iskandar (2014). In his article, *Kebebasan beragama dalam Konteks Bhineka Tunggal Ika*, freedom of religion is re-contextualised within the discourse of human rights. In this strategy, religious freedom is considered to be a

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14 This article was delivered in a national gathering initiated by the national Commission of Human Rights. This gathering was held in Bali on 18–20 September 2013.

pivotal aspect in the implementation of human rights. Violent acts against certain groups that are based on religion are contrary to the establishment of human rights in Indonesia. Such a re-contextualisation is to be found in his following statement: *Kebebasan beragama adalah kebebasan hak azasi manusia yang sangat penting untuk diimplementasikan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari* (The freedom of religion is a human rights freedom that it is very important to be implemented in daily life).

The phrase *kehidupan sehari-hari* (daily life) implies urgency and it delivers the sense or meaning that freedom of religion is an integral part of human daily life. It is similar to other urgent daily activities such as eating, praying, and studying, and so freedom of religion is also an urgent thing to be implemented daily in order to establish a peaceful religious life. The absence of this freedom has a negative impact on Indonesian society.

These discourse presentations are created to argue against all negative presentations that try to discredit the establishment of the freedom of religion. Although Ahmadiyya has a different interpretation on Islam, other parties should appreciate it. Freedom of religion should be viewed as an irreducible part of Indonesian culture and of its daily life. Implementing this freedom of religion is seen as an effort to establish human rights, and one that has been so far very strongly encouraged by the Indonesian Government through *Pancasila*.

3.3 'We Are Muslims'

It cannot be denied that some negative presentations have tried to exclude Ahmadiyya from Muslim community. Ahmadiyya has been considered to be a sect outside Islam. This exclusion had been created in Pakistan, where this sect was excluded from the Muslim community in 1974 (Jamil 2002; Saeed 2007, 2010). In Indonesia, some parties have also urged Ahmadiyya followers not to continue using Islam as their label and religion. The Ahmadiyya followers are urged to establish a new religion called the 'Ahmadiyya' religion and to not name themselves as Muslims.

In order to argue against this exclusion from Muslim community, Mulyono in his article *Siapakah yang disebut Muslim* (Mulyono 2011) discursively explain his religious views to maintain GAI's belief that they are Muslims. By employing the discourse strategy of social inclusion, he argues that religious practices carried out by GAI Ahmadis are similar to those that Muslim majorities conduct such as praying, fasting, and doing hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) thus GAI and its teaching is an inclusive part of Islam: *Baik secara aqidah maupun syari'ah, Gerakan Ahmadiyya (Ahmadiyah Lahore) tidak ada perbedaan sedikitpun dengan kaum Muslimin pada umumnya* (Both seen from *aqidah* [the belief] and *sharia* [Islamic laws], GAI

followers are not different from the majority of Muslims) (Mulyono 2011). This argument is used to emphasise that there are no fundamental differences between the GAI's interpretation of Islam and that which the majorities have. GAI followers also believe in the five pillars of Islam (*Rukun Islam*) and in the six pillars of faith (*Rukun Iman*) that most Muslim majorities believe.

The discourse strategy of social inclusion is also found in a statement delivered by Muslich Zainal Asikin, the Deputy Chairman of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Movement. He argues that "We (the GAI) are not so different from other Muslims". Muslim mainstreamers believe that Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet, as the GAI followers do (Wijaya 2013). The statement underlies the point that the GAI belongs to Islam and they are different from the JAI, who believe Ghulam Ahmad to be the last prophet. Azikin's statements are:

> Islam, through the holy Qur'an, clearly and definitely states that Muhammad is the last prophet… The teachings of Ahmadiyya (the GAI) do not differ or are not contradictory to the teachings of other Muslims.

The inclusion of the GAI as a part of Islam is also created by presenting the positive contributions of this Ahmadiyya group, especially in the case of Islamic thought, the Indonesian Islamic movement and modern Indonesian history. The GAI is presented as an organisation in which its Islamic thoughts have fostered the spirit of Indonesian Independence against colonialism. In Indonesian history, the independence of Indonesia could not be separated from the global role of Muslims and Islamic movements. Islam has been a source of the spirit to gain independence and the GAI has played a significant role in it. The discourse presentation can be identified in the article written by Nanang R. I. Iskandar (2009) entitled *Ahmadiyah dan Perkembangan Gerakan Keislaman di Indonesia* [Ahmadiyya and the Development of the Islamic Movement in Indonesia] as follows:

> *Memang benar bahwa intelektual Islam yang memahami Ahmadiyah, telah mendapatkan spirit Islam atau daya juang dalam amar ma'ruf nahi munkar yang sangat gigih dalam perjuangan untuk melawan imperialisme Belanda, baik melalui politik, maupun melalui perjuangan lain pada periode sebelum kemerdekaan Indonesia.*

> (It is true that Muslim intellectuals, who understand Ahmadiyya [i.e. the GAI], have obtained the spirit of Islam to establish 'commanding good deeds and forbidding evils' as their effort to fight against Dutch imperialism, either through politics or other forms of struggle prior to the independence period of Indonesia).

In this case, the discourse presentation has tried to connect narrative between the GAI, Islam, and nationalism. It delivers the meaning that the Ahmadiyya group belongs to Islam and it also contributes significantly to cultivating the spirit of

nationalism in Indonesia through its Islamic teachings. Therefore, such a presentation includes the GAI as a sect in Islam and it reveals that the GAI is an inclusive part of Indonesia and its history as well. Because they belong to Islam, GAI followers have attempted to implement the meaning of Islam itself, one which derives from the word *salam* (peace).

3.4 Peaceful Movement

As *self- and other-presentation* approach suggests, in some discourse presentations, GAI Ahmadis create a positive image for themselves. They create a discourse of peace by underlying their role as the creators of a peaceful life using the discourse strategy of positive attribution. Positive attribution is a discourse strategy that deliberately assigns to individuals or social groups certain positive characteristics (Flowerdew 2002; Khosravinik 2010). This strategy is in line with positive self-presentation that is created by text producers to present self-positive images (Van Dijk 2006). Mulyono employs this discourse strategy in his article entitled *Gerakan Ahmadiyah dan tantangannya* in order to present GAI followers as individuals who always attempt to establish a peaceful life (Mulyono 2013):

> *Seluruh warga GAI selalu mengulang salah satu janji kepada dirinya sendiri bahwa ia tidak akan menyakiti sesama manusia, baik dengan tangan, ucapan, maupun dengan cara-cara lain.*

> (All GAI followers always keep one of their promises that they will never hurt their fellow human beings, either by using hands, uttering statements, or by any other ways).

The positive image of peacemakers is not only depicted as the promise of GAI followers as individuals, but it has been institutionalised as the main goal of the organisation as well. Still in the same article, Mulyono argues that peace is the main goal of the GAI, which is translated from the meaning of Islam and its related Arabic words such as *salama* (Mulyono 2013):

> *Tujuan utama GAI adalah tegaknya kedaulatan Allah, agar umat Indonesia mencapai keadaan jiwa (state of mind) atau kehidupan batin (inner life) yang disebut salam (damai).*

> (The main goal of the GAI is to establish the sovereignty of *Allah* (God), so that Indonesian people can reach a state of mind and of inner life that is called *salam* (peace).

Discourse of peace can also be identified in an article entitled *Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia dan Permasalahan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia* (Mulyono 2011). If, in the two discourse presentations above, GAI followers focus on their relation to other human beings [they will never hurt their fellow human beings] and to God (*Allah*) [the

main goal of the GAI is to establish the sovereignty of *Allah*], the following discourse presentation of peace is connected to the concept of nationality. The presentation can be seen in the following statement (Mulyono 2011):

> *Sebagaimana terlihat dalam tujuan GAI yang telah disebutkan di atas, maka segala usaha yang dilakukan adalah berorientasi kepada ke-Indonesia-an, yakni untuk menciptakan kondisi Indonesia yang damai.*

> (As can be identified in the goal of the GAI stated above, then, all attempts are oriented to the Indonesian state; that is to create a peaceful life in Indonesia).

The GAI is depicted as an Ahmadiyya group that is concerned with establishing a peaceful life in Indonesia. This positive self-presentation is employed to construct a positive image of this group being oriented to creating a positive image for Indonesian development and, therefore, they will never create problems such as social conflict or destroying the faith of Islam. Further, the GAI is an Indonesian Islamic organisation that has made a positive contribution to the Indonesian state.

4 Conclusion

This paper has revealed some important findings either in religious study of minorities and discourse analysis. It implicitly reveals that unequal treatments especially in religious matters are still happening in Indonesia in forms of physical attacks, official policies and verbal discrimination. This may be influenced by social pressure from Islamic majorities that consider religious interpretation of minorities have been deviating from the true Islamic faith. In discourse study perspective, this paper sheds a new light in the study of resistance discourse by highlighting the case of religious minority discrimination and how this discursive discrimination is argued against by minorities. As mentioned before, compared to discriminatory discourse, study concerning resistance discourse is rarely developed and under-researched in CDA.

Based on the analysis presented above, it can be concluded that religious minority (the GAI and its followers) has tried to defend its belief although they have been the target of discrimination. This can be seen in various texts they have produced and disseminated in various genres. While discursively defending its Islamic thoughts, the GAI Ahmadis have presented a number of discourse topics that mainly present themselves positively to argue against any negative presentations addressed to them. Seen from discourse study point of view, this paper has proven that not only the majorities or the holders of power that are able to create positive portrayals but also the minorities can perform the same to maintain

their ideology and religious belief. This provides us an explanation that although minorities have been placed in vulnerable situations, their rights are denied and not given equal treatment as given to majorities, they keep trying to explain to the public about their religious understanding while expecting that the majorities and people in general can understand it and accept this as something natural and acceptable.

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